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ACCOUNTING CHOICES AND REPORTED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE :
THE UK GAS INDUSTRY 1970-1980
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the accounting choices made for the UK gas 
industry during the eleven years from 1 April 1969 to 31 March 1980. 
The general research question on which the study focuses is : Vhat was 
the effect of these accounting choices on the gas industry's reported 
financial performance and what factors explain these choices and the gas 
industry's lobbying behaviour on proposed accounting standards.
The theoretical foundation for the study is the US literature on 
accounting and the political process. However, as the institutional and 
political environment of the UK gas industry was different from that of 
any firm in the United States it has been necessary to adapt the
investigation to take these differences into consideration.
Each year of the study consists of evidence which is relevant to 
the research question; calculations of the effects of the accounting 
choices on reported financial performance; explanations for the 
accounting choices and where relevant, discussion of the gas industry's 
lobbying behaviour.
The main findings of this study are :
1. When there was a perceived need to either justify or reduce
criticism of a price rise accounting choices were made which
reduced reported profit.
2. When there was a perceived need to avoid political costs accounting
choices were made which reduced reported profit.
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3. The Impact of these income decreasing accounting choices on the
gas industry's reported profits was significant.
4. The accounting choices made during the quinquennium ended 31 March
1974 appeared to undermine the intended usefulness of the
comparison between the financial target for that period with the 
reported outcomes as a control mechanism.
5. The gas industry's lobbying behaviour on proposed accounting
standards appeared to be aimed at decreasing future reported
profits which was consistent with the approach adopted for the
accounting choices made for the industry.
This study has contributed to the fund of knowledge on the impact 
of the political process on accounting choices and has thereby 
contributed to the development of a positive theory of accounting
choices.
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CHAP.TER 1 INTRODUCTION
LSI_INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces and focuses the study of accounting choices 
in the UK gas industry. The development in the United States of a
positive theory of accounting choices is briefly outlined in section 1.1. 
The impact of the political process on accounting choices in the UK gas 
industry is briefly discussed in section 1.2. The objectives of the study 
are described in section 1.3. An outline of the research methodology is 
provided in section 1.4. The limitations and key assumptions of the
study are described in section 1.5. The expected contributions to
knowledge are identified in section 1.6. An overview of the entire study 
is provided in section 1.7,
LL .DEVELOPMENT OF A POSITIVE THEORY OF ACCOUNTING CHOICES
In recent years accounting researchers in the United States have
been developing a positive theory of accounting choices. According to
Kelly (1981, p 3) a :
positive theory attempts to explain observed phenomena by searching 
for reasons why'" events occur. While founded upon observations, 
positive research goes beyond mere description to systematically 
explain the current environment. Accounting is studied in its 
social context, with concern for the interactions of the parties 
affected by accounting alternatives.
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981, p 130) consider that a positive theory of
accounting that explains why managers choose and lobby for particular
accounting alternatives would be very useful because such :
a theory could identify the economic motives that influence managers 
to make certain choices and thus indicate how these incentives could 
be altered.
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Zmijewski and Hagerman see such a positive theory as also being useful to 
accounting policy makers in enabling them to predict how managers will 
react to proposed changes in accounting practice.
Recent empirical research on accounting choices has tested simple 
hypotheses that are derived from the literature on accounting and the 
contracting process and from the literature on accounting and the 
political process.
From the literature on accounting and the contracting process two 
hypotheses have been generated and tested: the bonus plan hypothesis and
the debt/equity hypothesis. The bonus plan hypothesis predicts that if a 
firm operates a management compensation plan its managers will make 
income increasing accounting choices in order to increase the bonus 
payments made to them. The debt/equity hypothesis predicts that the 
higher the proportion of a firm's debt to equity the more likely its 
managers will make Income increasing accounting choices in order to 
reduce the probability of violating the restrictive debt covenants in the 
debt contracts.
From the literature on accounting and the political process another 
two hypotheses have been generated and tested: the regulation hypothesis
and the political costs hypothesis. The regulation hypothesis predicts 
that if a firm is subject to rate of return regulation of its prices its 
managers will make accounting choices which are aimed at reducing the 
reported rate of return in order to provide a more convincing case for an 
increase in prices and hence cash flows. The political costs hypothesis 
predicts that if a firm is in danger of suffering political costs it will 
make income decreasing accounting choices in order to avoid these costs 
and the consequent cash flow decreases.
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A number of proxies for the likelihood of suffering political costs 
have been used in the empirical studies: size, market share, capital
intensity and profit variability. These proxies are based on the 
arguments that a firm is more likely to suffer political costs if it is 
large, has a large market share, is capital intensive and has highly 
variable profits.
The empirical studies that test these hypotheses use data on 
companies in the USA. Most of these studies (see chapter 4) test 
hypotheses derived from both the contracting and political processes 
literature. Consequently interpretation of the results of this research 
requires ex post rationalisation of the trade-offs the managers faced 
between the conflicting pressures from the contracting and political 
processes when making the accounting choices. This study aims to 
overcome the problems associated with the conflicting pressures on 
accounting choices from the contracting and political processes by 
focusing on a situation where there appeared to be only one set of 
pressures - those from the political process.
1.2 THE POLITICAL PROCESS ASD.IHE UK GAS INDUSIRl
A situation where there appeared to be the hypothesised pressures 
from the political process but not the hypothesised pressures from the 
contracting process existed for the UK gas industry during the eleven 
years from 1970 to 1980. The choice of time period is explained in 
section 5.4.
During that period the UK gas industry was a nationalised industry 
(see section 2.1 for a definition of a nationalised industry). Like most
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nationalised industries the gas industry received most of its external 
finance from the government in the form of fixed-interest loans and did 
not have any equity capital (section 2.2.3). Thus there was no need for 
restrictive covenants in debt contracts. Also like most nationalised 
industries the gas industry did not operate management compensation 
plans CLikierman, 1983(a), p 33]. Therefore during the period of the 
study it does not seem possible that the accounting choices made for the 
UK gas industry were influenced by the pressures from the contracting 
process hypothesised in the US literature.
On the other hand, during that period the UK gas industry had many
of the characteristics that have been hypothesised to make a firm's 
accounting choices subject to the pressures from the political process. 
It was subject to various forms of regulation of its prices (see section
2.3 for a description of how these forms of regulation changed over 
time). It also had all the characteristics which have been argued to 
lead to an increased likelihood that a firm would be subject to political
costs. During that period the gas industry was large (section 2.2.4), was
a monopoly supplier of gas in the UK (section 2.2.5), was capital 
intensive (section 2.2.6) and had highly variable profits (section 2.2.7). 
In addition it received most of its external finance from the government 
(section 2.2.3) which seems likely to have contributed to its political 
sensitivity.
4 -
1.3 OBJECT 1Y££ QF...THE STUDY
The general research question to be investigated is : Vhat is the 
effect of accounting choices on reported financial performance «nd what 
factors explain such choices, and lobbying behaviour on proposed 
accounting standards, in the UK gas industry. The theoretical foundations 
for the study will be the US literature on accounting and the political 
process. However as the institutional and political environment of the 
UK gas industry is different from any firm in the United States it will 
be necessary to adapt the investigation to take these differences into 
consideration. The research approach adopted, including the hypotheses 
to be investigated, is described in section 5.2.
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study will cover the eleven years from 1 April 1969 to 31 March 
1980. Each year of the study will consist of evidence which is relevant 
to the hypotheses, the effect of the accounting choices on reported 
performance, explanations for the accounting choices and where relevant, 
discussion of the gas industry's lobbying behaviour during the year. The 
research methodology adopted is discussed in detail in chapter 5.
1.5 LIMITATIONS AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS
The limitations and key assumptions of this study will be as 
follows :
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1. This study will not deal with normative accounting issues nor will
it attempt to develop prescriptions for the improvement of the
external reporting practices of the gas industry.
2. This study will focus on the accounting choices made in the
published accounts of the gas industry. Accounting choices made for 
the gas industry for any other purpose will not be included in the 
study.
3. It is assumed that the accounting choices made for the gas industry 
are to some extent systematic and are therefore capable of being
explained.
4. External validity will be weak as the case study approach will make
it difficult to generallae the findings from one case study on the 
gas industry to the nationalised sector as a whole.
5. The ex post facto case study approach makes it difficult to draw
causal inferences with any certainty, as it is not possible to
manipulate an independent variable.
1.6 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE
Expected contributions to knowledge stemming from this research are
as follows :
1. As already noted this study aims to contribute to the fund of
knowledge on the impact of the political process on accounting 
choices and thereby contribute to the development of a positive 
theory of accounting choices.
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2. Since accounting choice studies until now have been conducted on US
data, this research will contribute to the fund of knowledge by
extending accounting choice studies to UK data.
3. This is the first accounting choice study on the UK nationalised
sector and is thus the first contribution to the development of a 
positive theory of accounting choices in the UK nationalised sector.
4. This is the first accounting choice study to adopt an in-depth
longitudinal case study approach.
5. This is the first study to investigate if there is a consistency
between a firm's accounting choices in its published accounts and 
its submissions to an accounting policy making body on proposed 
accounting practices.
1.7 AN OVERVIEW
Earlier sections of this chapter have briefly described the 
development of a positive theory of accounting choices and how a study of 
the impact of the political process on the accounting choices made for 
the UK gas industry can contribute to that development. The objectives 
of the study, research methodology, limitations, key assumptions and the 
expected contributions to knowledge have been briefly described. This 
section provides an overview of the remainder of the study.
Chapter 2 will set the scene for the study by describing the 
accountability and control of the UK nationalised industries, relevant 
characteristics of the UK gas industry and the role of accounting 
measures in its regulation. The theoretical foundations of the study will 
be established in chapter 3 which will explore the literature on
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accounting and the political process. The prior research on accounting 
choices will be reviewed in chapter 4.
The research methodology will be described in chapter 5. The 
investigation of the accounting choices made for the UK gas industry and 
details of the industry's submissions to the Accounting Standards 
Committee will be described in chapters 6 and 7.
A summary of the empirical study will be provided in chapter 8 
together with a discussion of the implications of the findings. Chapter 
9 will assess the contributions to knowledge which the study has 
achieved and will point to related areas for future research.
First the scene for the study will be set in chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 2 ■IHE..ÜK..GAS INDUSTRY AID THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING
ZJÏ INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the study. The 
accountability and control of UK nationalised industries is briefly 
reviewed in section 2.1. Those characteristics of the UK gas industry 
which appear to be relevant to the present study are reviewed in section 
2.2. The role of accounting measures in the regulation of the gas
industry is reviewed in section 2.3. A summary of the chapter is 
provided in section 2.4.
2.1 ACCOUNTABILITY AID CONTROL OF UK NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES
The Gas Act 1948 provided the legislation for the nationalisation of
the gas industry. Since then the gas industry has been treated as a
nationalised industry in government publications such as the annual
Public Expenditure White Paper and the annual Financial Statement and
Budget Report. Nationalised industries are defined by the National
Economic Development Office (1976, Appendix Volume, pp 2-3) as public
corporations which have certain characterisitics. Public corporations are
defined by the Central Statistical Office (1968, p 273) for National
Income and Expenditure purposes as :
public trading bodies which have a substantial degree of financial 
Independence of the public authority - generally the central
fovernment - which created them. A public corporation is thus istinguished from other types of trading body by two main 
characteristics. Firstly, it is publicly controlled to the extent 
that the Sovereign, Parliament or a Minister appoints, directly or 
indirectly, the \^ole or the majority of the board of management. 
Secondly, it is a corporate body free to manage its affairs without 
detailed control by Parliament or other elected body; in particular, 
its financial independence includes the power to borrow, within 
limits laid down by Parliament, and to maintain its own reserves.
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The National Economic Development Office (1976, Appendix Volume, pp 2-3) 
uses the above definition of public corporations to define nationalised 
industries as public corporations :
a) whose assets are in public ownership and vested in a 
corporation;
b) whose boards are appointed by a Secretary of State;
c) whose board members and employees are not civil servants;
d) which are primarily engaged in industrial or other trading 
activities;
e) which are differentiated from other public corporations by the 
degree to which they are engaged in sale of goods and services 
and the extent to which revenue is derived directly from their 
customers.
The Nationalisation Acts set out the duties of the boards of 
nationalised industries and also the power and duties of Ministers. In 
principle each board is responsible to a Minister. In practice each 
industry deals with the government department headed by the Minister to 
whom the industry is responsible. That government department is known 
as an industry's 'sponsoring' department as part of its responsibilities 
include looking after that industry's interests in discussions with the 
Treasury and other government departments. The Minister in charge of the 
'sponsoring' department has formal responsibility in the House of Commons 
for answering questions which relate to each industry responsible to him 
as well as being responsible for government policy in relation to that 
Industry.
The statutes specify that the boards should present annual reports 
and accounts to Ministers who should in turn place them before 
Parliament. The industries' annual reports and accounts can be the 
subject of both parliamentary questions and parliamentary debates. In 
addition, from 1952 to 1980 the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries (SCNI) had the right to question the industries on their
- 10
annual report and accounts. In addition to politicians, there are other 
groups such as the press and the Nationalised Industries' Consumers 
Councils who scrutinise the industries' published accounts on behalf of 
the general public.
The economic, political and social pressures on a nationalised
industry are different from those on a private sector corporation. There 
is no danger of bankruptcy or takeover for any of the industries, and 
some of them operate as monopolies or near-monopolies. The degree of 
autonomy granted to the managers of nationalised industries is limited. 
The framework for decision making and control is specified by the
government through the publication of White Papers, of which there have 
so far been three : (HM Treasury, 1961), (HM Treasury, 1967) and (HM
Treasury, 1978). These will be discussed in detail and in chronological 
order in section 2.3.
2,1,1 Involvement of cizll servajats in making accountiag choices
There is some doubt as to whether the managers of nationalised
industries make their accounting choices independently. When discussing 
the adjustments for inflation by the nationalised industries during 1976 
to 1981 Likierman (1983a, p 30) points out that it is not clear who was 
responsible for these accounting choices. He explains the situation as 
follows :
The role of three key parts of the government administrative
machinery is also unknown because of the normal provisions of
secrecy surrounding their activities. Each of the three has a 
different set of Interests, the Treasury having to be consulted on 
accounting activities, the government accounting service dealing 
with accounting policy and a group of sponsoring government 
departments looking after general policy in respect of the
industries. It can be surmised, although it cannot be proved, that 
the different interests resulted in different viewpoints on this
issue.
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The suspicion that civil servants have some involvement in making
accounting choices for the nationalised industries is increased by the
tone of the submissions to the Transport Committee’s (1982) review of the
form of the nationalised industries' reports and accounts. For instance
the Chief Secretary of the British Railways Board made the following two
comments in his submission (p 23) :
At the end of the day, it is the sponsoring Minister who is 
responsible for determining the basic content and presentation of an 
Industry's Report and Accounts.
and
The Committee may be interested to know that a Joint Vorking Party 
has been set up, comprising the Department of Transport, the Board 
and our auditors, to review issues of accounting policy.
The involvement of civil servants in making accounting choices is
also mentioned in the Price Commission Report on the South of Scotland
Electricity Board (Price Commission, 1978a). In response to criticism of
their policy of charging interest during an asset's construction period
against revenue rather than capitalising it, the Board explained that
(para 4.15) ;
they are not permitted to change the policy  without the consent
of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the approval of the 
Treasury.
The Chairman of the Accounting Standards Committee, Ian Hay
Davison, expressed his views on this topic (Accountancy Age, 30 September
1982, p 11) when discussing the published accounts of the nationalised
industries, as follows :
The relevant secretary of state can, and usually does, dictate the 
form of accounts, and I suspect it would not be unfair to say that 
private sector accounting standards are tolerated as long as the 
Treasury, and the sponsoring departments, do not find them 
inconvenient.
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Although the above evidence is not conclusive it does suggest that 
civil servants have some involvement in making accounting choices for the 
nationalised industries.
2.2 GAS INDUSTRY
This section describes those characteristics of the UK gas industry 
which are relevant to the present study. Organisational structure and 
changes in gas supplies are described in section 2.2.1, consumer 
representation in section 2.2.2, sources of finance in section 2.2.3, size 
in section 2.2.4, competition in section 2.2.5, capital intensity in
section 2.2.6 and variability of reported profits in section 2.2.7.
2a2jJL Organlsatlonal structure-and changes in gas supplies
The Gas Act 1948 provided the legislation for the nationalisation of
the gas industry. Under that Act twelve relatively autonomous Area
Boards were set up. The Act also established a Gas Council whose duties
were to advise the Minister on matters relating to the gas industry and
to promote and co-ordinate the activities of the Area Boards (section
22). According to Williams (1981, p 103) :
Nationalisation was the greatest single event in the history of the
gas industry in the first century and a half of its existence. It
gave it for the first time a structure based on units, each large 
enough to develop technologically and commercially, and an overall 
organisation that put it on a footing comparable with that of its 
major rivals, coal and electricity.
When the gas industry was nationalised almost all the gas used in 
the UK was manufactured using coal-based methods. However, it was clear 
at that time that there were a number of disadvantages in having an
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almost exclusively coal-based industry. The disadvantages identified by 
Williams <1981, p 121) were as follows ;
1) the direct carbonisation process required high quality coking coal
which was becoming scarce and expensive;
2) a large labour force was required and wage rates were rising;
3) the revenue from coke which was a major by-product of the process
was uncertain;
4) the process produced noxious waste which was difficult to dispose 
of;
5) a grid distribution system was not feasible so a large number of 
relatively small manufacturing units had to be maintained;
6) the working conditions in these gasworks were unattractive relative 
to working conditions in other industries at that time.
These disadvantages of the coal-based manufacture of gas provided 
the incentives for the gas industry's research and development effort to 
focus on 1) the complete gasification of low-grade coal and on 2) the use 
of oil as a feedstock instead of coal. A third alternative considered
was the importation of liquified natural gas.
Although the gas industry did introduce the complete gasification
process in two plants the process was later abandoned when less
expensive alternatives became available. One of these cheaper 
alternatives was the manufacture of gas from oil. In the early 1960's
oil-based manufacturing plants were introduced which could not only 
produce the gas more cheaply but could also transmit it more easily.
Around the same time liquified natural gas from the Sahara Desert was
being imported to Canvey Island and in 1963-64 a pipeline was
constructed which transmitted natural gas to other parts of the country.
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As it happened the importation of natural gas gave gas industry 
engineers’ experience in handling high pressure natural gas which was to 
be very useful in the years to come.
Before the changeover from coal-based to oil-based plants was 
complete it became apparent that there were considerable supplies of gas 
under the North Sea and the Government decided to exploit this resource
through a policy of rapid absorption (Ministry of Power, 1967). As the
gas industry was a monopoly supplier of gas in the UK and as it had by 
then a nationwide distribution system the Gas Council was in a very 
strong position when negotiating the purchase of natural gas from the oil 
companies. As a result the gas industry was able to negotiate purchases 
at very favourable rates. Thus in the late 1960's the gas industry
started another period of major transition this time from a mixture of 
coal-based and oil-based manufacture of gas to the distribution of 
natural gas. This transition has two important consequences which are 
relevant to the present study. The first is that the coal-based and oil- 
based manufacturing plants became obsolete and were gradually taken out 
of use. The second is that customers' appliances had to be converted to 
cope with natural gas. The accounting choices made in relation to the 
obsolete plant and the conversion costs are described in chapters 6 
and 7.
The transition from coal-based and oil-based gas to natural gas
during the ten years from 1963-64 to 1972-73 is demonstrated in Table
2.1 which is reproduced from the BGC's Annual Report and Accounts for 
1972-73 <p 15).
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Tabla. 2.1
Yearly percentages of gas available
100%
Coal-based gas
50%
Oil-based gas
Natural gas 0%
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
During the same 10-year period the number of gas works in operation 
was reduced from 272 to 81 (BGC Annual Report and Accounts 1972-73, pp 
60-61). By 1977 the transition to natural gas was virtually complete 
(BGC Annual Report and Accounts 1976/77, p 22) and the number of gas 
works in operation had fallen to 35 (p 63).
The transition from manufactured gas to natural gas led to the Gas 
Act 1972 which abolished the Area Boards and the Gas Council and 
established the British Gas Corporation as the monopoly supplier of gas 
in the United Kingdom. During the era of manufactured gas one of the 
prime responsibilities of the Area Boards had been to ensure that, in 
spite of the vagaries of the British weather, there was sufficient gas to 
meet demand. With the advent of natural gas and a national transmission
- 16 -
system that responsibility ceased for the Area Boards. Thus the 1972 Gas 
Act's change of organisational structure for the gas industry was aimed 
at transferring power to the centre which seemed to be more appropriate 
for an industry moving towards a position where its prime responsibility 
would be the distribution of natural gas through a national transmission 
system.
2JL2— Consumer representation
The Gas Act 1948 required each Area Board to have a Gas
Consultative Council. Each Council was to have not less than 20 and not
more than 30 members, all of whom, including the Chairman, were to be
appointed by the Minister [section 9(2)3. The Chairman was to be a
member of the local Area Board which was also given responsibility for
providing premises and 'permanent staff [section 9(9) and (10)3. This
arrangement was criticised by Williams (1981, p 276) as follows :
A priori this appears altogether too cosy an arrangement for 
effectiveness, with the Councils too much under the shadow of the 
Boards. The latter provided the accommodation - often within the 
Board's own premises - and the office staff and paid the general 
running costs; the Chairman was a member of the Board and thus had 
a loyalty to them which might be prejudicial to his freedom to 
criticise. A consumer with a genuine grievance might well feel that 
the odds were loaded against him from the outset.
The 1948 arrangement could also be criticised on the basis that there
was no central body through which the Gas Consultative Councils for each
Area could co-operate. This could be interpreted as a policy of divide
and rule (Williams, 1981, p 276). However Williams (p 278) saw the main
weakness of the Councils as follows :
Even if there was a strong case to be argued, they did not have 
resources, comparable with those of the industry, to establish the 
facts, marshall the evidence, present a convincing report, and argue 
it forcefully.
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Like most nationalised industries the gas industry did not have any 
equity capital. Until it became self-financing in the late 1970s most of 
its finance was obtained in the form of fixed-interest loans from the 
National Loans Fund which is administered by the Treasury. Since 1955 
nationalised industries have not been allowed to raise finance on the UK 
capital market which explains why there were no further issues of British 
Gas stock during the 11 years of the study. However, the gas industry 
was given permission to raise finance abroad, with Treasury guarantees as 
to payment of both capital and interest, which it did during the period 
of the study.
2u2A Size
This section aims to give an indication of the size of the gas 
industry during the period of the study by comparing its capital 
employed .turnover and net profit before interest and tax with these 
criteria for both other nationalised industries and for UK industrial 
companies.
A useful ranking of UK firms by the size of their turnover is 
provided by The Times 1000 annual publication. The size of each firm's 
capital employed and net profit before interest and tax is also provided. 
Included in this annual publication is a ranking of the UK nationalised 
industries. Three years of The Times 1000 <1970-71, 1974-75 and 1979- 
80) were inspected to give an indication of the relative size of the gas 
industry during the period of the study. Unfortunately The Times 1000 
for 1969-70 which covered the first year of the study was not available 
to the author.
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The major change in the arrangements for consumer representation 
introduced by the Gas Act 1972 was the establishment of the National Gas 
Consumers Council. Twelve Regional Gas Consumers' Councils were also 
established along the same lines as the Consultative Councils which they 
replaced. The establishment of a National Council reflected the transfer 
of power to the centre within the gas industry as described in section 
2.2.1. The National Council also provided a body through which the 
Regional Councils could discuss and co-operate on matters which did not 
appertain to only a single region. The Chairman of the National Council 
was to be appointed by the Secretary of State and the other members were 
to be Chairmen of the Regional Gas Consumer Councils together with other 
persons appointed by the Secretary of State [section 9(2)]. The funds 
for the operation of the Consumer Councils were to be provided by the 
BGC [Schedule 3(3)3.
2l.2j2 Sources of finance
According to the gas industry's published report and accounts at 31 
March 1970, 31 March 1975 and 31 March 1980 its outstanding borrowings
and self-financing ratios at these dates were as shown in Table
Table 2,2
Outstanding borroMings
19Z0. 1975. 198.0
£m £m £m
British Gas stoc3c 465.2 214.0 214.0
Government loans 1127.3 1651.4 -
Foreign loans 32.1 223.7 304.9
Ban3t overdrafts and other 23.1 39.7 91.1
2 1 2 ^ aiOiO
Self-financing ra.tlo 100%
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There were 16 nationalised industries in 1970-71, 17 in 1974-75 and 
20 in 1979-80. On size of capital employed the gas industry was third 
in 1970-71, third in 1974-75 and fourth in 1979-80. On size of turnover 
the gas industry was fifth in 1974-75 and sixth in 1979-80. The Times 
1000 list of nationalised industries did not provide information on 
turnover for 1970-71. On size of net profit before interest and tax the 
gas industry was third in 1970-71, second in 1974-75 and third in 1979- 
80.
The gas industry was also compared to the 1000 largest UK 
industrial companies. The number of companies with larger capital 
employed was three in 1970-71, three in 1974-75 and four in 1979-80. 
The number of companies with larger turnover was 14 in 1974-75 and 
seven in 1979-80. The number of companies with a larger net profit 
before interest and tax was four in 1970-71, four in 1974-75 and two in 
1979-80.
These comparisons indicate that throughout the period of the study 
the gas industry was a relatively large organisation in the UK context.
2.2.5 CqapetltlQH
During the period of the study the 12 Area Gas Boards (up to 31 
December 1972) and the BGC (from 1 January 1973) were monopoly suppliers 
of gas in the UK. However, in the energy market the gas industry was in 
competition with other sources of energy. The gas industry's changing 
share of the energy market is demonstrated in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.8
Final comsumption of energy in the UK analysed by fuel
1970 1975 1980
% % %
Coal and other solid fuels 31 18 13
Oil 47 46 44
Electricity 11 13 13
Gas 11 23 30
Ï M I M Ï M
As can be seen from Table 2.3 the gas Industry increased its share 
of the energy market during the period of the study by 19% largely at the 
expense of the coal industry.
One aspect of this expansion of the gas industry's activities which 
is relevant to the current study is the increase in the average number of
customers (voters) from 13,306 in 1969-70 to 13,620 in 1974-75, to 15,074
in 1979-80.
2^2afi Capital Intensity
This section aims to give an indication of the capital intensity of 
the gas industry during the period of the study by comparing its capital 
intensity ratio with both the average for the nationalised industries and 
the average for the 20 largest UK industrial companies.
As when giving an indication of the relative size of the gas 
industry (section 2.2.4) the information in The Times 1000 annual
publications was used. The capital intensity ratio was calculated as the 
ratio of capital employed to turnover expressed as a percentage. The 
capital intensity ratio for the gas industry is compared with the average 
capital intensity ratios for the nationalised sector and for the 20
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1970-71 1974-75 1979-80
% % %
258 226 73
I/A 189 122
53 59 52
largest Industrial companies for 1970-71, 1974-75 and 1979-80 in Table 
2.4. It should be noted that it was not possible to calculate an average 
capital intensity for the nationalised industries for 1970-71 because The 
Times 1000 list of nationalised industries for that year did not provide 
information on turnover.
Table 2,4
Comparison of capital intensity ratios
Gas industry
Average for nationalised industries 
Average for 20 largest industrial companies
The fall in the capital intensity ratio for the gas industry for 
1979-80 is due to the rapid increase in turnover from £897,500,000 in 
1974-75 to £2,971,800,000 in 1979-80 while capital employed only 
increased from £2,027,800,000 to £2,180,800,000 over the same period. 
This increase in turnover is a reflection of the increase of 7% in market 
share achieved by the gas industry during this period shown in Table 2.3. 
As noted in section 2.2.1 the transition from town gas to natural gas was 
completed in 1977 which accounts for the relatively low increase in 
capital employed during this period.
The comparison of the capital intensity ratio for the gas industry 
with the average for the nationalised sector is inconclusive as shown on 
Table 2.4. There are other highly capital intensive nationalised 
industries such as electricity, rail and telecommunications. In 1974-75
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the gas industry had the seventh highest ratio out of 17 while in 1979-
80 it had the twelfth highest ratio out of 20.
The comparison with the average for the 20 largest industrial 
companies in the UK indicates that during the period of the study the gas 
industry was considerably more capital intensive than those industrial 
companies of similar size (see section 2.2.4).
2.2.Z Variability of reported profits
The variability of the reported profits of the gas industry during 
the period of the study is illustrated in Table 2.5. As can be seen from
the Table the changes from one year to the next have sometimes been
dramatic.
Tabla 2Æ 
Variability of reported profits 
Year ended Reported profit 
or (loss)___
Percentage increase 
or (decrease)
1969 17,471,000
1970 13,749,000 (21%)
1971 1,990,000 (86%)
1972 15,119,000 660%
1973 5,600,000 (63%)
1974 (41,500,000) (841%)
1975 (42,300,000) (2%)
1976 25,100,000 159%
1977 31,500,000 25%
1978 180,300,000 472%
1979 360,700,000 100%
1980 425,900,000 18%
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2ul THE ROLE OF ACCQUITIIG MEASURES II THE REGULATION OF THE GAS
IIDHSTRY
The section traces chronologically the role of accounting measures 
in the regulation of the gas industry. This chronological approach 
starts with the Gas Act 1948 in section 2.3.1 and then continues with the
1961 White Paper in section 2.3.2, the 1965 Fuel Policy White Paper in
section 2.3.3, the 1967 White Paper in section 2.3.4, the Counter-Inflation 
Act 1973 in section 2.3.5, the Price Commission Act 1977 in section 2.3.6 
and the 1978 White Paper in section 2.3.7. Concluding comments are 
provided in section 2.3.8.
2i3A Gaa Act 1948
Section 41 of the Act required each Area Board :
to secure that the revenues of the board are not less than
sufficient to meet their outgoings properly chargeable to revenue 
account, taking one year with another.
Although there was a general direction that prices should be kept as low
as possible the Area Boards were permitted to fix their own prices
[section 1(8)].
2j3u2__1961 White PapfiC
The 1961 White Paper <HM Treasury, 1961) was the first departure 
from the requirements of the various Nationalisation Acts. It pointed out 
(para 16) that :
the nationalised industries generally have had to rely more heavily 
upon the Exchequer than is healthy, either for themselves or for the 
economy as a whole.
It was then argued (para 22) that :
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there are powerful grounds in the national interest for requiring 
these undertakings to make a contribution towards the cost of their 
capital development out of their own earnings, and so reduce their 
claims upon the nation's savings and the burden on the Exchequer : 
this is particularly so for those undertakings which are expanding 
fast and which have relatively large capital needs.
From the above it would appear that one of the aims of the 1961 White
Paper was to reduce the extent of nationalised industries borrowing from
the Government. This was to be achieved by setting each nationalised
industry a financial target which would presumably in most cases, result
in consumers being charged increased prices as the industries were now
to be required to achieve more than a break-even position as required by
the Nationalisation Acts. In addition to breaking even over a five-year
period the Industries were to provide from revenue for the excess of
replacement cost depreciation over historic cost depreciation and were to
make adequate allocations to reserves as safeguards against premature
obsolescence and similar contingencies (para 19). In practice the
financial targets were generally set in accounting rate of return terms
(HM Treasury 1967, Table 1).
The 1961 White Paper made little comment on the pricing and
investment policies the Industries were expected to pursue. It thus
allowed them to continue to price on the "average cost-plus" basis
(Lapsley, 1981, p 2). As Heald (1980, p 252) points out :
The 1961 White Paper was essentially about financial targets. They 
were designed to prevent too much of the nation's capital resources 
being diverted to the nationalised industries and earning a return
lower than that of the displaced private investment.
2.3.3 1965 Fuel Policy White Paper
The 1965 Fuel Policy White Paper (Cmnd 2798) (Ministry of Power, 
1965) recommended the same pricing policies for the nationalised fuel
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industries as the 1961 White Paper had recommended for the nationalised 
sector as a whole. Para 94 of the 1965 Fuel Policy White Paper stated 
that :
in general, the industries' tariffs should provide revenue sufficient 
to cover the full accounting costs of the industry, including 
overheads and the surplus needed to achieve the agreed financial 
objectives.
Zj2A 1967 White Paper
There was a change of emphasis in the 1967 White Paper (Cmnd 3437)
(HM Treasury, 1967). Instead of focusing on financial control as the
1961 White Paper and 1965 Fuel Policy White Paper had done the focus was
placed on the requirements of allocative efficiency. Cmnd 3437
recommended that investments should be assessed on a DCF basis, using a
test rate of discount that reflected the social opportunity cost of
capital (paras 6-16) and that prices should be related to long run
marginal costs (paras 17-26). To allocate resources on an efficient
basis only pricing and investment criteria are required I Heald (1980),
Lapsley (1981) and Davies and Mclnnes (1982)3 but Cmnd 3437 also
recommended the setting of financial targets (paras 33-36).
The 1967 White Paper's approach to pricing is of relevance to the
present study. Para 17 stated that the Government's policy on pricing i
starts from the principle that nationalised industries' revenues 
should normally cover their accounting costs in full - Including the
service of capital and appropriate provision for its replacement.
Although the above statement is consistent with the recommendations in
the 1961 White Paper and in the 1965 Fuel Policy White Paper the change
in emphasis became apparent in the paragraphs which followed. For
instance para 21 stated that :
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In addition to recovering accounting costs, prices need to be 
reasonably related to costs at the margin and to be designed to
promote the efficient use of resources  In the long run the main
consideration is the cost of supplying on a continuing basis ....
The relevance of the 1967 White Paper to the gas industry was
assessed by the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (1968). The
SCNI summarised the pricing policies advocated in both the 1967 White
Paper (Cmnd 3437) and in the 1965 Fuel Policy White Paper (Cmnd 2798)
and noted that there appeared to be a change in priorities between the
two.
Cmnd 3437 appears, at any rate in places, to give priority to 
devising pricing policies with reference to costs of supply, while 
covering accounting costs wherever possible; Cmnd 2798 appears to 
give priority to covering accounting costs while accepting that it 
is desirable that tariffs should be related to consumer costs (para 
III.6).
The SCNI accepted that :
the inconsistency may very well be confined only to policy, for the 
outcome of a policy of long run marginal cost pricing will normally 
produce a surplus large enough to cover the whole of an industry's 
accounting costs (para III.7).
However the SCNI also pointed out that :
even in the long run, it is possible in principle for marginal costs 
to be less than unit costs, which would mean that a policy of long- 
run marginal cost pricing could involve the industry in an 
accounting deficit (para III.7).
The SCNI saw the practical question of whether the gas industry should
set their prices at the level required to meet their accounting costs or
whether they should relate their prices to long-run marginal costs as
being of considerable importance and pointed out that the question arose
on the charges for the obsolete gas-making plant (section III.8).
In April 1969 the Minister of Power published his observations
(Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, 1969) on the above report
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by the SCNI. The Minister's response to the apparent change in pricing
policy priorities between Cmnd 3437 and Cmnd 2798 was as follows :
In the Minister's view the apparent inconsistency arises from the 
varying interpretations that can be placed on the phrase 'related to 
long-run marginal costs'. Neither of the White Papers intended it 
to mean 'equal to long-run marginal costs' even for an industry in 
equilibrium. As a statement of the Government's policy, Cmnd 3437 
must be read as a whole, from which it will be clear that the policy 
starts from the principle that nationalised industries' revenue 
should normally cover their accounting costs in full (para 9).
The Minister's conclusions on pricing are of interest to the present
study as they give an indication of the direction of influence, if any,
which the sponsor department may have given to the gas industry :
The Minister concludes that there are good grounds for charging 
prices close to long-run marginal costs to those consumer classes 
that tend to be relatively sensitive to price, while settling other 
parts of the industry's tariffs above marginal costs in order to 
make a contribution to the industry's overheads. This is broadly 
the pricing policy that the gas industry intends to pursue, as 
explained to the Committee by Sir Henry Jones (Q 136) (para 14). 
(Sir Henry Jones was at that time Chairman of the Gas Council).
Finally, the Minister outlined his Intention regarding the setting of
a future financial objective for the gas industry.
The intention therefore is to set a financial objective for the next 
five years that will be consistent both with the earning of 
appropriate returns over the whole life of new assets and with the 
pursuit by the industry of pricing policies on the lines indicated 
in the preceding paragraphs and with the present and prospective 
situation facing the gas industry, including market conditions and 
the need for a rapid build-up in the use of North Sea gas.
It seems reasonable to conclude from this that the Ministry of Power
intended to set objectives for the gas industry for the next five years 
which took into account the fact that prices would be set at a level 
which would enable the industry to recover its full accounting costs 
including the amortisation of both obsolete gas-making plant and the 
costs of conversion to natural gas at the amortisation rates then
prevailing.
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A report on gas prices by the National Board for Prices and Incomes 
(NBPI) (1969) was published in February 1969. The NBPI discuss the 
extent to which the gas industry should follow the 1967 White Paper's (HK 
Treasury, 1967) recommendation that prices should be related to marginal 
costs. They argue (para 55) that the purpose of that recommendation :
is to enable consumers to take decisions now in the light of likely
future developments.
They argue, however, that the marginal costs of natural gas are likely to 
show a changing pattern over time (paras 56 and 57). As long as the 
consumption of natural gas was below the capacity of the national 
transmission system the costs to the Gas Council of supplying extra gas 
to the Area Boards would consist of little more than the cost of buying 
gas at the beach-head and pumping it to the Area Boards' off-take points. 
However, if the demand for gas increased as expected beyond the initial 
capacity of the national transmission system the structure of costs would 
change to include a capital element to reflect the costs of additional 
compressors and additional storage capacity. Thus if the prices charged 
to gas consumers were closely related to marginal costs they would be 
low at first but would jump in probably two or three years time. The 
NBPI argued that this pattern of prices would not be in the best 
interests of consumers who might be induced by the low initial costs to 
buy expensive gas appliances only to find gas prices rising sharply 
later.
For the above reasons the NBPI recommended that the Gas Council 
charge the Area Boards a price for gas related to the longer-term 
estimate of costs. On retail prices the NBPI recommended that the Area 
Boards set these at levels which (para 65) :
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at least cover marginal costs (and which in addition meet the
revenue requirements resulting from the financial obligations).
Thus the NBPI was recommending that the gas industry be given freedom to 
charge customers more than marginal costs in order to meet its financial 
targets.
As part of the National Economic Development Office (1976) study of 
the UK nationalised industries Coopers and Lybrand (1976) were 
commissioned to review the pricing policies, investment criteria and 
financial objectives of four nationalised industries. One of the 
industries investigated was the gas industry. Coopers and Lybrand found 
that each of the four nationalised industries sought to set their prices 
at the level required to enable them to recover their accounting costs (p 
98) and none of the four based their pricing policies on marginal costs 
(p 100). The investigation of the gas industry's pricing policies 
ascertained that the financial objective was used to ascertain the total 
additional revenue requirements (p 106). Then an assessment was made of 
the additional revenues to be expected from contract sales to industrial 
and commercial customers where the prices were market related (p 101 and 
p 106). The 'residual' revenue requirement was then to be achieved by 
increases in the charges to domestic customers (p 106).
From their evidence to the SCNI in 1968 (Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries, 1968) and from the Minister of Power's
observations on that SCNI report in - 1969 (Select Committee on
Nationalised Industries, 1969) it seems clear that the Ministry of Power
and the Gas Council did hot intend to set gas prices equal to long-run
marginal costs as recommended in the 1967 White Paper (HM Treasury 
1967). Instead they intended to set gas prices at the level required to
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cover accounting costs In full. This pricing strategy appeared to have 
the backing of the NBPI (National Board for Prices and Incomes 1969). 
The evidence from the Coopers and Lybrand (1976) investigation confirms 
that domestic gas prices were not based on long-run marginal costs but 
were instead based on the additional revenues required to meet the 
financial objective.
The pricing strategy adopted is of considerable importance for the 
present study which asssumes that accounting coats were a factor in the 
determination of gas prices.
2.3i5 Cknmter-Inflation Act 1973
From 2 April 1973 as a result of the Counter Inflation Act 1973 
increases in gas prices had to be approved by the Price Commission. 
Although the Commission's powers were derived from the Act, the detailed 
provisions relating to the Commission’s functions appeared in Statutory 
Orders. The detailed provisions of these Statutory Orders changed over 
time and are described in chapters 6 and 7. In general terms the Price 
Commission's decisions relating to the granting of price rises were to be 
based on accounting information supplied by the firm which had to be 
reconcilable with the firm's audited accounts. Thus accounting 
information continued to have a role in the determination of gas prices.
2.3^ 6 Price (Commission Act 19.77.
The Price Commission Act gave the Commission the power from 1 
August 1978 to conduct a more detailed and flexible investigation of any 
proposed price rise than had previously been possible under the Counter- 
Inflation Act 1973's Statutory Orders. The Commission did carry out such
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an investigation of a proposed rise in gas prices in the spring of 1979. 
As the Price Commission's (1979) report demonstrates accounting 
information from the gas industry's published accounts was part of the 
information set used in the investigation. Thus even under the more
flexible investigations authorised by the Price Commission Act 1977 
accounting information had a role to play in the determination of gas 
prices.
2.3.7. 1978 Khitfl Paper
The investigation by the National Economic Development Office in
1976 highlighted the practical problems of implementing the theoretically
perfect pricing and investment guidelines in the 1967 White Paper. As a
result a third White Paper was published in 1978 (HM Treasury, 1978).
This attempted to overcome the practical difficulties of the 1967 White
Paper and in addition extended the framework of control.
The 1978 White Paper modified the marginal cost pricing rule to one
of average incremental cost which involved ;
taking the investment programme, relating it to the output
associated with that investment and estimating the price at which 
this output would have to sell in order to cover all the costs,
including capital costs, involved in producing it (Appendix 1, para 
5).
However, the White Paper also stated that :
the Government sees its main role as determining the overall 
financial target, and hence the general level of prices (para 67).
and
it is primarily for each nationalised industry to work out the 
details of its prices with regard to its markets and its overall 
objectives, including its financial target (para 68).
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These statements in the 1978 White Paper are somewhat ambiguous and 
have been interpreted as an abandonment of marginal cost pricing and a 
return to prices determined on the basis of accounting costs (Heald, 
1980).
2L3j,8 Concluding
During the eleven years of the study from 1970 to 1980 accounting 
measures appear to have had a role to play in the setting of gas prices. 
Although the 1967 White Paper recommended that nationalised industries' 
prices be set on the basis of long-run marginal costs all the evidence 
described in section 2.3.4 indicates that gas prices were set on the 
basis of accoaunting costs. From 2 April 1973 to 31 July 1978 the Price 
Commission was given the authority to use the accounting-based rules 
specified in Statutory Orders as the basis for acceptance or rejection of 
proposed rises in gas prices. From 1 August 1978 the Price Commission 
had the authority to move away from these detailed accounting-based rules 
to adopt a more flexible and detailed approach to the investigation of 
proposed price rises. However, the Price Commission's investigation of 
the proposed gas price rise in the spring of 1979 still used accounting 
information from the gas industry's audited accounts in the conduct of 
the investigation, The iw78 White Paper's pricing guidelines, although 
ambiguous, still allowed nationalised industries prices and therefore gas 
prices to be set on the basis of accounting costs. Thus throughout the 
eleven years of the present study accounting costs appear to have had a 
role to play in the setting of gas prices.
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2.4 ...-SnXXASY
This chapter has set the scene for the study. Throughout the period 
of the study the gas industry was a nationalised industry which meant 
that civil servants may have been involved in making accounting choices 
for the industry.
The gas industry's main characteristics during the period of the 
study were that it was large, capital intensive, was a monopoly supplier 
of gas in the UK, had highly variable reported profits, received a 
significant proportion of its external finance from the government and 
its prices were subject to various forms of regulation in each of which 
accounting costs appear to have had a role to play.
It has been argued in section 1.2 that the above characteristics of 
the UK gas industry suggest that it may have been subject to pressures 
from the political process. It was further argued in section 1.3 that 
these pressures may have influenced the accounting choices made for the 
UK gas industry. The next chapter reviews the literature on accounting 
and the political process.
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CHARTER 3 ..ACCOUNTING AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
3.0..INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the theoretical foundations of the study by 
reviewing the mainly US literature on accounting and the political 
process. The nature of the political process is described in section 3.1, 
the participants in the political process in section 3.2 and the impact 
of the political process on accounting choices in section 3.3. Concluding 
comments are provided in section 3.4.
3.1 ...THE.-.NATURE QF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The traditional economic theory of the political process assumes
that government intervention in the market is aimed at achieving "public
interest" objectives (Posner, 1974 and McCraw, 1975). This "public
interest" theory assumes that government regulations and other
interventions are aimed at remedying perceived market failures. However,
the inconsistencies between the "public interest" hypothesis and the
evidence has led to the hypothesis being reformed. The reformed
hypothesis is based on the assumption that the participants in the
political process act in their own self interest.
This alternative view of the political process leads Schumpeter
(1949) to define democracy as :
an institutional arrangement in which individuals acquire the power 
to make political decisions by means of a competitive struggle for 
people's votes.
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This view la extended by Downs (1957 and 1957a) and by Buchanan and 
Tulloch (1962). Interconnected work by Olsen (1971), Stigler (1971), 
Posner (1974) and Peltzman (1976) on the theory of economic regulation is 
based on the assumption that participants in the political process take 
actions which are aimed at maximising their utility. As Posner (1974, p 
356) points out :
the general assumption of economics that human behaviour can best 
be understood as the response of rational self -interested beings to 
their environment must have extensive application to the political 
process.
The maximisation of the utility of the participants in the political 
process involves these participants in a competition for wealth transfers 
and as a result they incur information, lobbying and coalition costs 
(Vatts and Zimmerman, 1986, p 222). Nonzero information, lobbying and 
coalition costs are critical for accounting choices to have economic
consequences. If these costs were not nonzero users could costlessly 
unravel accounting choices, coalesce and lobby to prevent the accounting 
choices having the economic consequences desired by the firm's managers 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, p 83). According to Vatts and Zimmerman 
(1986, p 223) ;
the magnitude of these costs and their distribution across groups 
determine the outcome of the political process.
Information costs include the costs of gathering and if necessary
adjusting and interpreting the information appertaining to a particular
issue. Lobbying costs are the costs of taking some action which may 
change the probable outcome of the political process. Coalition costs are 
the costs of forming coalitions that are expected to be capable of 
achieving greater success in the political process than individuals.
Coalitions should be able to achieve cost reductions in both information
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and lobbying costs relative to the costs that would be incurred on an 
individual basis.
It could be argued that the costs of adjusting and interpreting
information by participants in the political process is higher than these
costs are for capital market participants who are likely to have a
comparative advantage at such activities (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p
117, fn 21). Also as Stigler (1971, p 11) points out :
the costs of comprehensive information are higher in the political 
area because information must be sought on many issues of little or 
no direct concern to the individual,...
If these costs are higher in the political process than in the market
process there will be more opportunistic behaviour in the political
process than in the market process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p 242).
The expected benefit from incurring information, lobbying and
coalition costs is the probability that a proposed political decision will
be affected by the lobbying behaviour times the present value of the
proposed political decision on an individual or group's wealth.
The participants in the political process decide whether or not to
express their preferences by either individual or group representation on
the basis of an assessment of the costs and benefits of doing so. An
individual or group will only participate in the political process if the
expected marginal benefits exceed the expected marginal costs.
3.2 PARTICIPANTS IS THE POLITICAL PRQ.C£S£
This section explores the motivation of various groups to 
participate in the political process. The motivation of voters is 
discussed in section 3.2.1, the motivation of the media in section 3.2.2, 
the motivation of politicians in section 3.2,3 and the motivation of 
bureaucrats in section 3.2.4.
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2j2J. Yotera
The number of political issues which arise and are discussed during 
the course of a year is very large. The costs to the individual voter of 
keeping track of his representative's vote on each issue and of working 
out the effect of each issue on his own utility are likely to be very 
high. Furthermore, the likelihood that one individual's vote is going to 
affect the result of an election is trivial (Downs 1957 and 1957a). Thus 
the voter has little incentive to gather information relative to his vote 
as it is likely that the marginal costs of doing so will exceed the 
marginal benefits. It therefore seems likely as Watts (1977 p 65)
suggests that voters will vote on the basis of information gathered as a 
by-product of some other activity such as reading newspapers or watching 
television for entertainment.
3,22 The Kedla
If the voter does not demand information for voting decisions from 
the press but instead demands to be entertained the behaviour of the 
press will be affected (Watts, 1977, p 65). Watts' arguments relating to 
the behaviour of the press are derived from Jensen's (1976) attempt to 
construct a theory of the press in which he argues that the press is 
more motivated to entertain than to inform (p 271). Jensen (p 282)
describes the incentives of the press to entertain and how they do so as 
follows ;
People seem to love crises, apparently because of their 
entertainment value. If this hypothesis is true and if it 
increases.... newspaper readership, these media cannot be expected to 
remain passive bystanders.... But the incentives are for far more
than sensational reporting. The media have strong Incentives to
help manufacture such crises.
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Thus in order to increase newspaper sales reporters have incentives to 
report or create impressions of impending disasters.
32L3 PQlltlciaas
On the basis of Schumpeter's (1949) work, Downs (1957) regards the 
politician as an entrepreneur who trades in votes. As Zimmerman (1977, p 
118) points out the maximisation of a politician's utility is likely to 
partly depend upon the likelihood of being re-elected. The likelihood of 
being re-elected can be enhanced according to Jensen and Heckling (1976), 
Vatts (1977) and Zimmerman (1977) by the politician creating crises and 
then benefiting voters by "solving" them. It is argued that such 
activity enhances the politician's likelihood of being re-elected through 
the increased exposure he receives through the media who have incentives 
to highlight such crises in order to sell more newspapers as readers 
(voters) find such crises entertaining.
32,4 Bureaucrats
While the media and politicians have incentives to create crises, 
bureaucrats have incentives to avoid them. As Vatts (1977, p 67) points 
out :
bureaucrats' careers and hence their expected utilities are affected
by the likelihood of being blamed for future "crises".
Therefore a bureaucrat has incentives to try to ensure that he is not 
blamed for any crisis suffered by his political masters. In order to 
avoid blame for such a crisis he needs to have a keen understanding of 
the policies adopted by his political masters particularly insofar as 
these policies impact upon his particular responsibilities.
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3.3.. EZF2CT QF THE POLITICAL PROCESS ON ACCOUNTING CHOICES
This section explores the possible effect of the political process 
on accounting. In particular it will discuss the possible effect of the 
political process on the accounting choices made by regulated firms 
(section 3.3.1) and by firms subject to political costs (section 3.3.2).
3.3.1— Firms sulaject to regulation
In the United States the activities of firms in certain industries 
such as utilities, banking and insurance are restricted by regulations 
which are based explicitly on accounting reports. Most utilities are
subject to rate of return regulation which means that if a utility wants 
to increase its prices in order to increase its cash flows it has to 
satisfy its regulatory commission either that its costs have increased or 
alternatively that its capital employed (its rate base) has increased.
Regulation of an industry using accounting numbers will be 
ineffective unless the regulatory body gives some guidelines on 
accounting choices. Generally the regulatory bodies recommend that the 
regulated firms adopt those accounting practices recommended by 
accounting policy making bodies such as the FASB and the SEC. However, 
the recommendations of the accounting policy making bodies still leave 
managers with some discretion when making accounting choices.
In order to increase the regulated firm's cash flows its managers 
have incentives to argue with its regulatory body that prices must be 
increased. As already noted that argument needs to be supported by 
evidence that either the regulated firm's costs have increased or that its 
Investment base has increased. Thus the managers of regulated firms have
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incentives to make accounting choices which either increase the firm's 
reported costs or increase its investment base.
For the same reasons managers of regulated firms have incentives to 
lobby on proposed accounting standards. If an accounting policy making 
body proposes an accounting standard which recommends an accounting 
practice which has the effect of increasing a regulated firm's reported 
costs or Investment base the managers of that firm have incentives to 
support that proposed accounting standard. Alternatively if the proposed 
accounting standard recommends practices that decrease the regulated 
firm's costs or investment base it has incentives to oppose that proposed 
accounting standard.
The regulatory commission decision on whether or not to grant a 
price rise to a regulated firm will partly depend on whether consumers 
coalesce and lobby against the price rise. Consumers' decisions on 
whether to incur coalition and lobbying costs as well as the costs of 
gathering information relative to the proposed price rise will depend on 
the expected benefits. Vatts and Zimmerman (1978, p 117) point out that 
for small price increases the per capita costs each consumer (or group of
consumers) bears are likely to be much greater than the per capita.
benefits they will receive in the form of lower prices.
The regulators will adjust for the accounting choices made by a 
regulated firm up to the point where the marginal costs of so doing equal 
the marginal benefits. If the regulators are under political pressure 
from consumers to oppose a regulated firm's proposed price rise they are 
more likely to make adjustments for the firm's accounting choices as the 
marginal benefits from so doing are increased. Alternatively if the 
regulators are not under pressure from consumers they may decide that
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the marginal costs of adjusting for the accounting choices are greater
than the marginal benefits. As a result they may grant the proposed 
price rise. The accounting choices then help not only the regulated firm 
but also the regulatory commission justify the price rise to consumers. 
As Prakash and Rappaport (1977, p 36) point out it* is likely that the 
managers of regulated firms will take into account the past use that has 
been made of their published accounting information.
The causal link between rate regulations and accounting choices has 
been discussed by Vatts and Zimmerman (1978, pp 115-117), Vatts and
Zimmerman (1979, p 281), Kelly (1981, p 24), Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981, p 131), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, pp 85-86) and Vatts and 
Zimmerman (1986, pp 231-232). However, so far this causal link has only 
been investigated in one study (Jarrell, 1979) which is reviewed in 
section 4.4.
3.32 Fima sulaject-tQ-poIltlcal co&ta
The political process can be used to transfer wealth between groups. 
As already noted in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 both the media and
politicians have incentives to create crises. It has been hypothesised by 
for example Vatts and Zimmerman (1978, p 115), Kelly (1981, p 24),
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981, p 131), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, pp 
87-88) and Vatts and Zimmerman (1986, pp 230-231) that large reported 
profits are used to create crises, such as the accusation that a firm is 
making monopoly profits at the expense of consumers. The proposed 
"solution" to such a crisis might be to transfer wealth from the "greedy" 
monopolist firm to some other "deserving" group such as consumers 
through lower prices or taxpayers through lower taxes.
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In order to reduce the likelihood of being subjected to these 
negative wealth transfers it has been argued by the above authors that 
the managers of politically sensitive firms have incentives to (a) adopt 
accounting choices that have the effect of decreasing reported profits 
and to (b) lobby for proposed accounting standards that have that effect. 
Such action assumes that there is a low probability that those
participants in the political process who might propose such negative 
wealth transfers will adjust for the accounting choices. They will not 
adjust unless the marginal benefits of so doing exceed the marginal costs 
as discussed in section 3.1.
The variables that make a firm politically sensitive are not clear. 
The empirical studies described in section 4.3 have tested size,
concentration ratio as a surrogate for the opportunity to earn monopoly 
rents, capital intensity and risk. Of these, size has been tested the
most often. The size hypothesis is that managers of large firms are more
likely to choose income decreasing accounting choices than managers of 
small firms.
The assumption that large firms are more subject to political costs 
than small firms is tested by Zimmerman (1983). He argues that taxation 
makes up one component of political costs and that if large firms are 
subject to higher political costs they are likely to be subject to higher 
effective tax rates. On the basis of this argument he investigates the 
relationship between firm size and effective tax rates. As Ball and 
Foster (1982, pp 182-183) argue that size may be a surrogate for 
something else such as industry membership Zimmerman also investigates 
the effect of taxation on different industries.
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For the purposes of his study Zimmerman defines an "effective tax 
rate" as the ratio of taxes paid to operating cash flows. He uses data 
from the Compustat industrial files to get 43,515 usable observations 
covering the years 1947-1981.
Zimmerman divides the firms in each industry classification in his 
sample into a "large" group which consisted of the largest 50 firms in 
that industry classification and an "other" group which contains all the 
other firms in that industry. He finds that the effective tax rates for 
the 50 "largest" firms are higher than those for the "other" firms. When 
the data is broken down by industry classification Zimmerman finds that 
the association between firm size and high effective tax rates is 
strongest in the oil industry, is somewhat weaker in manufacturing 
industry and is nonexistent in the trade industry. Zimmerman explains 
this strong association between size and effective tax rates for the oil 
industry in the 1970s on the basis that in 1969 and 1971 the oil 
depletion allowance was reduced. As the large companies in that industry 
classification were oil companies the effective tax rates of the large 
firms in that classification were thereby increased relative to the 
others. This last finding suggests that the oil industry incurred the 
largest political costs.
However, as Zimmerman <p 146) points out it must be remembered that 
the results of this study provide only limited evidence that political 
costs vary with firm size as all other potential political costs 
(regulation or other negative wealth transfers) are ignored.
- 44 -
3.4 CQgCLUDIHG CQIŒEHTS
This chapter has described the theoretical foundations of the 
present study of the accounting choices in the UK gas industry by 
reviewing the mainly US literature on accounting and the political 
process.
The next chapter reviews the prior research on accounting choices.
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CHAPTER 4 ACCQUHTIHG CHOICES
4,0. IHTRQDUCTIQg
The author is not aware of any other study that has attempted to 
contribute to the development of a positive theory of accounting 
choices in the published accounts of a UK nationalised industry. 
Consequently the prior research reviewed in this chapter is only 
indirectly relevant to the present study.
As already noted in section 1.1 academic researchers in the United 
States have, over the last twenty years, attempted to develop a positive 
theory of accounting choices (although accounting procedures is the term 
generally used in the United States). It is this positive research which 
makes up most of the prior research reviewed in this chapter.
Section 4.1 briefly summarises the first attempts to develop such a 
positive theory (which were based on the proposition that managers' 
accounting choices were aimed at smoothing income) and then discusses 
the theoretical flaws in that research which have subsequently become 
apparent. The possible impact of the contracting process on accounting 
is discussed in section 4.2 and the empirical research which tests the 
impact of the contracting process and the political process (described in 
chapter 3) on both accounting choices and on lobbying behaviour on 
proposed accounting standards is described in section 4.3. The only test 
of the regulation hypothesis is described in section 4.4. The studies 
described in sections 4,3 and 4,4 are all based on accounting choices or 
lobbying behaviour relating to firms in the USA. Studies which describe 
the accounting choices made by the UK nationalised industries are
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summarised in section 4.5. Other studies which are relevant to the 
present investigation are reviewed in section 4.6. A summary and 
concluding comments on the prior research is provided in section 4.7.
4.1_I£SIg..DE THE IHCQMB SMQQTHIIG HYPOTHESIS
The first attempts to develop a positive theory of accounting 
focused on the hypothesis that managers' accounting choices were aimed at 
smoothing income. The notion was first suggested by Hepworth in 1953, 
but it was Gordon's paper in 1964 which appeared to stimulate a number 
of empirical studies aimed at testing the income smoothing hypothesis. 
Gordon assumed that managers' accounting choices were aimed at 
maximising their utility functions, which were likely to be increased by 
factors which increased their job security, the level and growth of their 
income and the level and growth of company size. He assumed that those 
factors were partly dependent on shareholder satisfaction which he 
further assumed would be increased by high and stable rates of growth in 
the income reported. On the basis of Gordon's propositions it follows 
that managers will be motivated to make accounting choices which smooth 
reported income and which smooth the rate of growth in income.
Following Gordon's (1964) paper there was a substantial number of 
empirical tests of the income smoothing hypothesis; for example, Gordon, 
Horwits and Meyers (1966); Dopuch and Drake (1966); Archibald (1967); 
Copeland and Licastro (I960); Copeland (1968); Cushing (1969); Dascher 
and Malcolm (1970); White (1970); Barefield and Comisky (1972); Beidleman 
(1973); Barnea, Ronen and Sadan (1976). Most of this empirical research 
concentrated on testing ex post whether managers had in fact smoothed
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income without attempting to test Gordon's explanation of why they had 
done so.
The income smoothing research has subsequently been criticised 
because it is based on the assumption that managers believe that 
investors cannot, or will not, fully adjust for the managers' accounting 
choices. Subsequent empirical work by for example Archibald (1972), Ball 
(1972), Kaplan and Roll (1972), Beaver and Dukes (1973), Foster (1975), 
Sunder (1975), Gassidy (1976), Dukes (1976), Foster (1977) and Hong, 
Kaplan and Mandelker (1978) indicates that accounting choices with no 
known cash flow consequences do not affect security prices. This 
evidence indicates that investors do adlust for accounting choices and 
therefore seriously undermines a major assumption on which the income 
smoothing hypothesis is based.
The above investigations into the relationship between accounting 
choices and movements in stock prices identified apparently systematic 
accounting choices that could not be explained. Recent empirical research 
has attempted to explain such accounting choices. This research assumes 
that contracting and information costs in both the contracting and 
political processes are nonzero and then tests simple hypotheses that are 
based on the further assumption that accounting choices have the 
potential to affect either the firm's or the managers' future cash flows. 
The arguments from which these simple hypotheses have been derived are 
described in chapter 3 (accounting and the political process) and in the 
next section which describes the arguments relating to accounting and the 
contracting process.
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42 ACCQÏÏITIIG AMD THE CQgTRACTIIG PROCESS
It is not argued that the contracting process has affected 
accounting choices in the UK gas industry. However, in order to review 
the empirical studies which investigate the accounting choices made by 
firms in the USA, it is necessary to briefly describe the contracting 
process and its possible Impact on accounting choices. This description 
is necessary because the hypotheses tested in these studies are derived 
from arguments relating to the impact of both the contracting process 
and the political process on accounting choices. These empirical studies 
recognise that the accounting choices made are likely to reflect trade­
offs between the sometimes conflicting pressures from the contracting and 
political processes. Consequently it is not possible to meaningfully 
describe the prior research on the impact of the political process on 
accounting choices without first providing a description of the possible 
impact of the contracting process on accounting choices.
The demand for contracts is discussed in section 4.2.1, the effect of 
management compensation plans on accounting choices is discussed in 
section 4.2.2 and the effect of debt contracts on accounting choices is 
discussed in section 4.2.3.
42.1 IhA demand fnr contracts
According to Jensen and Meckllng (1970) the demand for contracts is
the result of agency relationships between utility maxiAising individuals
and groups. They (1976, p 308) define an agency relationship as ;
a contract under which one or more persons [ principal(s)] engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent.
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Jensen and Meckling's arguments are developed in the context of a company 
in the private sector where they argue that shareholders and bondholders 
act as principals and management acts as their agent. In this context 
they see two potential conflicts of interest : the shareholder/management
conflict which gives rise to the agency costs of equity and the 
bondholder/shareholder-manager conflict which gives rise to the agency 
costs of debt.
Jensen and Xeckling argue that agency costs consist of three 
components: monitoring costs, bonding costs and the residual loss.
Monitoring costs are expenditures incurred by the principal to try to 
ensure that the agent is acting in the principal's best interest. Bonding 
costs are expenditures incurred by the agent to provide the principal 
with some assurance that he (the agent) will not take actions which will 
harm the principal's interest or that, if he does, compensation will be 
provided. The residual loss is the reduction in the amount the principal 
is willing to pay for bonds and shares because he knows that in spite of 
monitoring and bonding expenditures the agent will still have some 
opportunity to take actions which are not in the principal's best interest 
(shirking, consumption of perquisites, etc). Management bears this 
residual loss in the form of a higher cost of capital.
In their analysis Jensen and Meckling consider the situation where 
management, who own 100% of a firm, decide to sell a proportion of the 
equity. They argue that in order to reduce the residual loss on the sale 
of the equity management will voluntarily enter into contracts which will 
limit their activities. Jensen and Meckling argue that management will 
voluntarily enter into contracts which limit their activities as long as 
the marginal benefits of these contracts (in terms of the reduction in
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the residual loss) are greater than the marginal costs (in terms of the 
costs of negotiating the contracts and the utility of the perquisites etc 
forgone). An example of a bonding contract which aims at reducing the 
divergence between the interests of management and shareholders is a 
management compensation plan which provides that a portion of 
management's rewards be tied in some way to increases in shareholder 
wealth. Very often such a management compensation plan will include the 
payment of bonuses calculated as a percentage of reported net income.
Jensen and Meckling also argue that management has incentives to 
enter into contracts to reduce the agency cost of debt. In a capital 
market characterised by rational expectations potential debtholders know 
that once management has issued debt it may take financing and 
investment decisions that may not be in the best interests of the
debtholders. For a detailed description of such financing and investment 
decisions see Vatts and Zimmerman (1986, pp 186-191). In order to 
reduce the residual loss on the sale of the debt management has
incentives to enter into contracts which limit the financing and
investment decisions they can take. Such contracts, for instance, often 
place restrictions on the payment of dividends, the issuance of new debt, 
etc.
Thus in order to reduce the agency costs of both equity and debt, 
management has incentives to enter into contracts which limit their
activities such as management compensation plans and debt contracts. 
However, these contracts will not reduce agency costs unless there is 
some means of determining whether or not their covenants have been 
breached. Jensen and Meckling suggest that accounting has been used in 
setting the terms of these contracts and in monitoring the outcomes. The
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next two sections discuss how accounting information may be used in 
setting the terms of management compensation plans and debt contracts 
and how the monitoring of the outcomes against the terms of these 
contracts may affect management's choices among generally accepted 
accounting practices.
4 2 2 — Effect of aanagfigent coapepfiatlon on accouatlng choices
Although management compensation plans may impose some 
restrictions on management's accounting choices it is unlikely that these 
plans will remove all of management's discretion in this area as 
management needs to be able to make accounting choices for other 
purposes eg the avoidance of political costs.
If management compensation plans ' leave managers with some 
discretion on accounting choices and if monitoring is costly so that not 
all manipulation will be eliminated there would appear to be an incentive 
for managers to make income increasing accounting choices in order to 
increase the bonus payments to which they are entitled under the terms of 
their management compensation plans. This reasoning has led to the 
testing in a number of the empirical studies described in section 4.3 of 
what has become known (Vatts and Zimmerman, 1986, p 208) as the bonus 
plan hypothesis. This simple hypothesis is that the managers of firms 
with management compensation plans are more likely to make income 
increasing accounting choices than the managers of firms without 
management compensation plans.
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422— Effect of. debt coatracts on accounting cholcge
Debt contracts include covenants that use accounting numbers from 
audited financial statements to restrict management's actions. According 
to Leftwich (1980) and Smith and Varner (1979) typical covenants found 
in lending agreements contain restrictions relating to payment of
dividends, repurchase of shares, maintenance of working capital, merger
activity, investment in other firms, disposition of assets, additional 
debt. Most of these covenants are aimed at restricting managers' actions 
so as not to increase the risk of the debtholders. For instance, the 
restriction on the payment of dividends is intended to stop managers 
paying liquidating dividends thereby leaving the debtholders with the 
shell of the company. The restriction on the payment of dividends 
normally defines an inventory of funds payable for dividends over the 
life of the debt and dividends can only be paid out of that inventory.
Like management compensation plans debt covenants are likely to 
impose some restrictions on managers' accounting choices but these 
restrictions are unlikely to completely eliminate managers' discretion. 
As violation of a debt covenant can lead to either seizure of collateral 
or costly renegotiation of the debt contract managers are motivated to 
use their discretion in making accounting choices to try to ease the
pressure on debt covenants. They are likely to do this by making income 
increasing accounting choices. This reasoning has led to the testing of 
a simple hypothesis called the debt/equity hypothesis in a number of the 
empirical studies reviewed in the next section. That hypothesis is that 
the higher a firm's debt/equity ratio the more likely that firm is to
make Income increasing accounting choices.
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4.3 TESTS .QE...HYPOTHESES THAT PROXY FOR POLITICAL SENSITIVITY
This section reviews those studies of accounting choices and 
lobbying behaviour on proposed accounting standaurds that have tested 
hypotheses that proxy for political sensitivity. As already discussed 
these studies recognise that managers' accounting choices probably 
reflect trade-offs between conflicting pressures from the contracting and 
political processes. Consequently most of these studies do not only test
the hypothesis that in order to avoid political costs the managers of
large firms are more likely to choose income decreasing accounting 
choices than managers of small firms (the size hypothesis described in 
section 3.3.2). They test other hypotheses as well and many of the 
tests utilise multivariate statistical techniques. Consequently to make 
the review of the test of the size hypothesis meaningful it is necessary 
to also review the tests of the other hypotheses tested in these studies.
The studies are reviewed in approximately chronological order except 
that studies of the same accounting choice are reviewed together. The 
chronological approach allows the development of knowledge on the factors 
driving the accounting choices to become apparent while the grouping of 
studies of the same accounting choices allows the description of the 
alternatives available in that particular area of accounting to 
immediately precede the description of the tests.
4.3.1 General price level.adlustaenta
Vatts and Zimmerman (1978) focus on the corporate submissions to
the FASB on the FASB's 1974 Discussion Memorandum titled "Reporting the
Effects of General Price Level Changes in Financial Statements". The
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General Price Level Adjusted (GPLA) statements were to be supplementary 
to the historical cost based statements. The major effects on reported 
earnings were to be an increased depreciation charge and a gain or loss 
on net monetary assets.
Only the size hypothesis is satisfactorily investigated by Vatts and 
Zimmerman. The debt/equity hypothesis, although discussed in Vatts 
(1977), is not discussed at all by Vatts and Zimmerman perhaps because 
debt covenants would not have been affected by GPLA statements which 
were only being proposed as supplementary information. Although the 
bonus plan hypothesis is tested by Vatts and Zimmerman the test is weak 
as it seems unlikely that management compensation plans would be 
affected by supplementary GPLA information.
Vatts and Zimmerman assume that large firms are more vulnerable to 
political costs (increased taxes, government regulation and other negative 
wealth transfers) than small firms. On the basis of this assumption, 
Vatts and Zimmerman predict that :
1. Large firms whose earnings are increased by GPLA will lobby against 
the proposed standard;
2. Large firms whose earnings are decreased by GPLA will lobby for the 
proposed standard;
3. All other firms will oppose the proposed standard because they will 
incur the extra costs of preparing the GPLA statements without 
receiving any benefits.
It is assumed that managers will only lobby on a proposed 
accounting standard if the costs of doing so are exceeded by the expected 
benefits. The lobbying costs are the time and expense involved in 
preparing the submission to the FASB. The benefits are considered to be
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the probability that the FASB’s decision on a proposed standard will be 
affected by the submission times the present value of the standard on the 
firm or managers’ wealth.
There were 53 corporate submissions on GPLA, 18 are classified as 
supporting, 34 are classified as opposing and the position of one firm 
cannot be determined. The effect of GPLA on the reported earnings for 
1973 of these firms is ascertained from previous studies by Davidson and 
Veil (1975, 1975a) and by Davidson, Stickney and Veil (1976) or by using 
the techniques that are employed in these studies. The firms are ranked 
by size using each firm's Fortune 500 rank on assets. The existence or 
otherwise of an earnings based management compensation plan is 
ascertained from the responses to questionnaires sent to each firm's 
chief financial officer or from the firm's proxy statements or annual 
report.
As Vatts and Zimmerman were not sure how regulatory commissions 
would treat gains and losses on net monetary assets the 18 regulated 
firms who made submissions are excluded from consideration. That left 
34 unregulated firms, eight of which would have their earnings increased 
by GPLA and 26 of which would have their earnings decreased. GPLA was 
opposed by seven out of the eight firms whose earnings would have been 
increased and was favoured by eight out of the 26 firms whose earnings 
would have been decreased. The eight supporting submissions were all
made by the larger firms. Using the Mann-Vhitney U test, Vatts and
Zimmerman are able to reject the null hypothesis at the .001 level that 
the eight firms that supported GPLA were drawn from the same population 
as the 18 firms that opposed GPLA. Vatts and Zimmerman claim that these
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results for the 34 unregulated firms are consistent with the size 
hypothesis.
Vatts and Zimmerman assume that their evidence indicates that the 
size factor had dominated the management compensation factor. There were 
31 unregulated firms with management compensation plans. Seven of the 
23 with income decreases supported GPLA while only one of the eight with 
income increases supported GPLA. If management compensation had been an 
explanatory factor firms with income increases would have been more 
likely to support GPLA than those with income decreases. However, as 
already noted, it is not surprising that the evidence is not consistent 
with the bonus plan hypothesis given that GPLA was only proposed as 
supplementary information.
The Vatts and Zimmerman study can be criticised on the following 
bases :
1) Their choice of the GPLA proposed accounting standard means that 
only the size hypothesis can be satisfactorily investigated. As the 
proposed GPLA statements were to be supplementary the test of the 
bonus plan hypothesis is not satisfactory and the debt/equity 
hypothesis cannot be tested.
2) There are limitations associated with the investigation of the 
lobbying behaviour on only one proposed accounting standard. A 
large firm whose earnings were decreased by GPLA and which 
supported GPLA may have lobbied for some other proposed accounting 
standard which increased its earnings. A better way to investigate 
whether large firms consistently lobby for income decreasing 
accounting standards would be to investigate their lobbying 
behaviour over a whole range of proposed standards.
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3) Size can proxy for many variables other than political costs (Ball
and Foster, 1982 pp 190-191). For instance, size can be a surrogate
for industry membership and as Ball and Foster (1982, p 183) point 
out the majority of large firms in the Vatts and Zimmerman sample 
were members of the oil industry. Vatts and Zimmerman (p 121) do, 
in fact, acknowledge that oil industry firms were particularly 
politically sensitive around 1973.
422 Dépréciation^  inventory, Investaent tax credit and pensioa cnmtm
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) build on the work of Vatts and 
Zimmerman (1978) although instead of trying to explain corporate 
lobbying positions they try to explain accounting choices made by firms
in their published accounts. A priori they identify the following five
factors which they consider may affect a firm's accounting choices :
1) Size: Based on the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Vatts
and Zimmerman (1978) which have already been described in this 
chapter, Hagerman and Zmijewski argue that the larger the firm the 
greater the likelihood that it will be subject to political costs and 
the greater the motivation to make income decreasing accounting 
choices.
2) Risk: Hagerman and Zmijewski argue that high-risk firms may be 
subject to political costs because their high variance of earnings 
means there is a greater likelihood that they will report "large 
profits". Participants in the political process (see chapter 3) may 
not adjust for the firm's risk when considering these "large 
profits" because of information costs (see chapter 3). Thus high-
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risk firms will have a greater motivation to make income decreasing 
accounting choices than low-risk firms.
3) Capital intensity : Hagerman and Zmijewski argue that as it is not 
normal accounting practice to deduct the opportunity cost of capital 
when calculating a firm's reported earnings there is, ceterius 
paribus a greater likelihood of a capital intensive firm reporting 
"large profits" than a labour intensive firm. Participants in the 
political process may not adjust for the opportunity cost of capital 
when considering a capital intensive firm's "large profit" because of 
information costs. Thus capital intensive firms may be more likely 
to suffer political costs than labour intensive firms and will 
therefore be more motivated to make income decreasing accounting 
choices.
4) Competition: Managers of firms earning monopoly rents will, 
according to Hagerman and Zmijewski, be motivated to make income 
decreasing accounting choices in order to reduce both the likelihood 
of antitrust action and the likelihood of other firms entering the 
industry.
5) Incentive plans: Hagerman and Zmijewski argue, as already discussed 
in section 4.2, that the existence of a management compensation plan 
may lead to a firm's managers making income increasing accounting 
choices.
Hagerman and Zmijewski investigate firm's accounting choices 
relating to inventory, depreciation, the investment tax credit and the 
amortisation of post service pension costs. The use of LIFO, accelerated 
depreciation, the deferral method for the investment tax credit and the 
amortisation of post service pension costs over a period of less than or
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equal to 30 years are assumed to be income decreasing. The use of FIFO, 
straight-line depreciation, the flow-through method for the investment 
tax credit and the amortisation of post service pension costs over 
periods in excess of 30 years are assumed to be income increasing.
The sample is 300 randomly chosen non-regulated firms that 
disclosed their accounting choices. The size of firms is measured by 
both assets and sales. The measure of risk chosen is the beta 
coefficient from the market model. Capital intensity is measured by the 
ratio of gross fixed assets to sales. Competition is measured using a 
concentration ratio which is defined (p 144) as the percentage of total 
industry sales made by some specified number of the largest firms in an 
industry. The existence or otherwise of a management compensation plan 
is ascertained from the notes to the financial statements or from the 10- 
K reports. The hypotheses are tested using probit analysis [Tobin 
(1958)]. The results of that analysis are summarised in Table 4.0.
lable-l.Q.
Independent
.variables
AccQuntiag choices
Investment Pension 
Depreciation Inventory tax credit cos.ts
Size .05 HS .10 SS
Risk .05 SSt SS SS
Capital intensity .10 .10 SS SS
Concentration ratio SS .10 .10 SS
Incentive plan .10 SS* SS .10
Sates
1. The decimals reflect the levels of significance.
2. NS signifies not significant, but sign in predicted direction.
3. NS* signifies not significant and sign not in predicted direction.
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As can be seen from Table 4.0 the expiant or y variables tend to be 
different for each accounting choice tested. This suggests that managers 
have been influenced by different variables when making each accounting 
choice (which seems unlikely) or that the accounting choices are not made 
independently.
Hagerman and Zmijewski (p 156) also test the overall significance of 
their models. Using Chi-square statistics the overall findings for each 
accounting choice are as follows: depreciation significant at .01 level;
inventory significant at .05 level; investment tax credit significant at 
.10 level and past service amortisation methods significant at .10 level, 
thus the overall results are broadly consistent with the hypotheses.
4.3.3 Income strategy based on depreciation. Inv^tory. Investment tax 
pgasion Ætsts
The major flaw in Hagerman and Zmijewski's research is that they
assume that each accounting choice is made independently. This flaw is
rectified in Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) who treat a firm's set of 
accounting choices as a single comprehensive decision which they term the 
firm's income strategy. They argue that a firm's income strategy need not 
be extreme (either all income increasing or all income decreasing) 
because of the trade-offs the managers face between various factors. The
factors which Zmijewski and Hagerman use in their study are the five
independent variables used by Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) plus the 
total debt to total assets ratio which is in essence a restatement of the 
debt/equity hypothesis.
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Zmljewskl and Hagerman are not able to ascertain the monetary 
effects of the accounting choices. Instead they make three different 
assumptions about their relative monetary effects.
1. All the accounting choices have an equal effect on income. This
assumption yields five different strategies each with a different 
impact on income.
2. The investment tax credit and pension cost choices have exactly
one-half of the effect of the depreciation and inventory choices. 
This assumption gives seven different strategies.
3. The investment tax credit and pension cost choices have an effect
which is less than one-half of the effect of the depreciation and 
inventory choices, which gives nine different strategies.
The data is the random sample of 300 unregulated firms used by 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) and the 34 unregulated firms who lobbied 
the FASB on GPLA used by Vatts and Zimmerman (1978).
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) provide new insights into the Vatts 
and Zimmerman (1978) empirical study. They compare the percentage of 
firms in the two samples that adopt extreme income strategies (ie either 
all increasing or all decreasing). The percentage adopting extreme 
strategies was 12.33% in the Hagerman and Zmijewski's sample against 
35.30% in Vatts and Zimmerman. Zmijewski and Hagerman establish that 
this percentage difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. 
Their suggested explanation for this difference is that managers of firms 
with extreme strategies have less scope for making accounting choices 
which will counteract the effect of a mandated accounting change and will 
therefore be more willing to incur the costs of lobbying.
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Zmijewski and Hagerman also establish that the mean size of firms
in the Vatts and Zimmerman sample is more than twice the size of firms
in the random Hagerman and Zmijewski sample. Zmijewski and Hagerman
suggest that the reason Vatts and Zimmerman are unable to find evidence
consistent with the bonus plan hypothesis may have been because the 
unregulated firms that lobbied on GPLA were so large that the political 
costs factor dominated the management compensation factor.
In their own study Zmijewski and Hagerman use 5-Probit analysis to 
estimate the effects of the independent variables on the portfolio of 
accounting choices. The statistical significance of the independent
variables are summarised in Table 4.1.
Table A A
Independent Classification of Strategies__
Variables_________________EiYfi______ Seyea------- &iaa_
Size .01 .01 .01
Risk HS HS NS
Capital intensity HS ÎTS NS
Concentration ratio .05 .05 .05
Incentive plan .05 .05 .05
Total debt/total assets .10 .05 .05
Bjates
1. The decimals reflect the levels of significance.
2. NS signifies not significant but sign in predicted direction.
The results in Table 4.1 indicate that four of the factors - size, 
concentration ratio, management compensation plans and the total debt to 
total assets ratio have a significant association with the portfolio of
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accounting choices that make up a firm's income strategy. The evidence 
suggests that firms choose an overall income strategy. This evidence is 
much stronger than that of Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) when trying to 
explain individual accounting choices.
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) investigate the size and 
concentration effect further and their analysis shows that it is the 
large firms and those in concentrated industries that are making the 
Income decreasing accounting choices. There is no evidence that small 
firms or those in less concentrated industries make income decreasing 
accounting choices.
The Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) study is probably the most 
comprehensive study of accounting choices to date. Nevertheless it still 
fails to take into account the monetary effects of the accounting choices 
on net income and fails to take into account all the accounting choices 
made by the firms in the sample.
4,3^ 4 Oil and gas accouatiiig
Until 1977 oil and gas companies had a choice between two methods 
of accounting for dry wells - the full cost method and the successful 
efforts method. The full cost method capitalised the cost of both dry 
wells and wet wells and wrote off the cost over the expected life of the 
wet wells. The successful efforts method only capitalised the cost of 
the wet wells which were written off over their expected life. The dry 
wells were written off against revenue as soon as the well was abandoned.
Sunder (1976) and Myers (1974) establish that oil and gas companies 
with expanding exploration activities which use the full cost method will 
report larger and less volatile earnings, higher net assets and a higher
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shareholders' equity than companies which use the successful efforts 
method.
In December 1977 the FASB issued FAS 19 which required the use of 
the successful efforts method. There was considerable opposition to FAS 
19 from full cost firms. These firms appealed to the SEC who in August 
1978 reversed FAS 19 and in ASK 253 and ASK 258 allowed particular 
versions of successful efforts and full cost. Three studies (Deakin, 
1979), Dhaliwal (1980) and Lilien and Pastena (1982) investigate whether 
there are significant differences between those companies which chose the 
full cost method and those which chose the successful efforts method. 
However, as Dhaliwal (1980) does not test any hypothesis derived from the 
literature on accounting and the political process, it is not included in 
this research review.
Deakin (1979) uses the arguments by the full cost firms in their 
appeals to the SEC against the imposition of successful efforts to 
establish variables which might distinguish between full cost firms and 
successful efforts firms. The full cost firms argued that they were more 
aggressive in exploration, newer, smaller and more in need of external 
finance than successful efforts firms and that dual accounting methods 
were therefore appropriate. Deakin chooses seven variables to represent 
these four factors. The significance of these seven variables is tested 
using multiple discriminant analysis and a dichotomous classification 
test on a sample of oil and gas companies. That sample excluded the 
major integrated companies as it is considered that the impact of FAS 19 
would not be significant to th;em. Of the remaining 53 companies, 25 
used the full cost method and 28 used the successful efforts method.
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The results of Deakin's tests establish that the debt/revenue ratio 
classifies firms best ie the higher the debt/revenue ratio the more likely 
the firm is to use the full cost method. This is consistent with the 
debt/equity hypothesis. Deakin's tests do not establish a significant 
relationship between size and the choice between successful efforts and 
full cost methods. However, as already noted, Deakin excluded the major 
oil and gas companies from his sample. Most of these companies chose 
the income decreasing successful efforts method and if these companies 
are included in the sample the size factor becomes significant as Deakin 
(p 727, fn 4) acknowledges. The bonus plan hypothesis is not tested.
Lilien and Pastena (1982) investigate not just the intermethod 
choice between full cost and successful efforts but also the intramethod 
choice which is the choice of procedures used in applying the full cost 
or successful efforts methods. Prior to 1978 when the SEC issued ASP 
253 and ASP 258 oil and gas companies had various procedural choices 
available to them when applying either the full cost or successful 
efforts methods. In complying with the new rules in ASP 253 and ASP 258 
oil and gas companies were required to adjust the retained earnings at 
the beginning of the year to reflect what the retaining earnings would 
have been if the new procedures had been in effect all along. This 
adjustment provides Lilien and Pastena with evidence of the monetary 
effect on income of the procedures previously adopted (the intramethod 
choice) by the oil and gas companies when using the full cost and 
successful efforts methods.
Lilien and Pastena test the size hypothesis, the debt/equity 
hypothesis, the exploratory risk hypothesis, the age hypothesis but not 
the management compensation hypothesis. Exploratory risk is deiined as
66 -
the proportion of dry wells to total wells. It Is argued the firms with 
high exploratory risk will make accounting choices which increase income 
and which reduce income volatility so that restrictive covenants in debt 
contracts are not violated. The age hypothesis is that there will be a 
correlation between the age of the firm and the use of the successful 
efforts method. Lilien and Pastena argue that as the successful efforts 
method was the only choice available until the late 1950s and given the 
costs of switching to the full cost method, older firms would be more 
likely to use the successful efforts method.
The above hypotheses are tested on a sample of 102 oil and gas 
companies. The three statistical techniques used - probit analysis, 
regression analysis and discriminant analysis provide consistent results. 
Size (at the 0.6 level) and age are positively correlated with income 
decreasing choices and exploratory risk and leverage are positively 
correlated with income increasing choices. The strength of the 
correlation increases when the intermethod and intramethod choices are 
tested together when all the explanatory variables were significant at 
the .002 level or better. Thus this study in addition to providing 
evidence which Is consistent with the individual hypotheses also provides 
further evidence which is consistent with Zmijewski and Hagerman's income 
strategy notion.
4.3.5 Interest costs
Until 1974 non-regulated firms in the USA could choose whether or 
not to capitalise interest on capital projects. Although the majority of 
firms treated such interest as an expense an increasing number had begun 
to capitalise and in 1974 the SEC imposed a moratorium on further
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adoption of capitalisation by non-regulated firms. Bowen, Horeen and 
Lacey (1981) investigate the economic factors which may have influenced 
firms' decisions on whether to expense or capitalise such interest prior 
to 1974.
Six hypotheses are tested: the bonus plan hypothesis; three
hypotheses based on covenant restrictions in debt contracts and two 
versions of the size hypothesis. The bonus plan hypothesis is that 
managers of firms with bonus plans will capitalise interest in order to 
increase a firm's reported earnings which will in turn increase their 
bonuses. The three hypotheses based on debt contracts are that firms
will capitalise interest in order to avoid violations of covenant 
restrictions relating to: (1) payment of dividends (2) interest cover (3)
leverage. The two versions of the size hypothesis tested are (1) that 
the larger firms in the oil industry will be less likely to capitalise
interest than other firms in the oil industry and (2) that the larger
firms in all industries will be less likely to capitalise interest than 
other firms.
The sample consists of 91 matched pairs of interest-capitalising 
firms and non-interest capitalising firms all of which had the 
opportunity to capitalise interest. The firms are matched by industry. 
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey establish that there was a strong correlation 
between industry membership and interest capitalisation. In order to 
control for this industry effect the matched pair design is adopted. 
Both univariate and multivariate tests are used. The multivariate tests 
confirm the results of the univariate tests.
The tests of the bonus plan hypothesis find no association between 
the presence of a bonus plan and the method chosen for interest.
However, as Vatts and Zimmerman (1986 p 279) point out the test was weak 
because many bonus plans add back interest to arrive at the earnings 
figure on which the bonus is based.
The results of the tests of the three hypotheses relating to debt 
covenants are all significant. The evidence indicates that a firm is 
more likely to capitalise interest the lower the inventory of funds 
payable as dividends (significant at the .02 level); the smaller the 
interest cover ratio (significant at the .06 level); the lower the net 
tangible assets to long-term debt ratio (significant at the .001 level).
The test of the size hypothesis on firms in the oil industry is 
significant at the .01 level. However, the test of the size hypothesis 
for firms from all industries is not as predicted as large firms from 
outside the oil industry were more likely to capitalise interest.
Dhaliwal (1982) focuses on the corporate submissions to the FASB on 
the FASB discussion memorandum on accounting for interest cost. Dhaliwal 
tests the debt/equity hypothesis, the size hypothesis and the bonus plan 
hypothesis. He excludes from his tests submissions by regulated firms, 
banks and financial service industries which leaves him with 44 
submissions of which 30 opposed capitalisation of interest costs and 14 
opposed expensing of Interest costs. Each of the hypotheses is tested 
using both univariate and multivariate techniques. The multivariate tests 
are fairly consistent with the univariate tests.
The strongest result is obtained on the tests of the debt/equity 
hypothesis where the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis at the
0.00005 level of significance. The evidence is also consistent with the 
size hypothesis although only at the 0.14 significance level. The 
evidence is not consistent with the bonus plan hypothesis.
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4,3.6— Depreciation
Dhaliwal, Sa lam on and Smith (1982) investigate if a firm's choice of 
depreciation method is affected by whether it is management controlled or 
owner controlled. Based on the work of managerial economists such as 
Villiamson (1964, 1967) and Monsen and Downs (1965) Dhaliwal, Salamon 
and Smith expect management controlled firms to make income increasing 
accounting choices (such as preferring straight-line depreciation to 
accelerated depreciation) in order to reduce the probability of a takeover 
and in order to maximise their earnings through management compensation 
plans which, according to the authors, are likely to be more prevalent in 
management controlled firms.
The empirical study examines the choice of depreciation method made 
in 1962 by 42 management controlled firms and 41 owner-controlled firms 
all of which used accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. A probit 
analysis is carried out using the debt/equity ratio, size and whether the 
firm was management controlled or owner controlled as independent 
variables. The coefficient of the debt/equity variable is significant at 
the .01 level, the coefficient of the size variable at the .15 level and 
the coefficient of the control variable at .03 level. Thus the evidence 
in this study is consistent with the debt/equity hypothesis, the size 
hypothesis and the bonus plan hypothesis if it can be assumed that 
management controlled firms are more likely to operate a bonus plan.
4.3.7 and development expenditure
Prior to 1974 when the FASB issued SFAS 2, firms could choose 
whether to capitalise or expense all or part of their research and
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development expenditure. Expensing research and development expenditure 
has the effect of decreasing reported income while capitalisation has the 
opposite effect. Using firms' 1972 accounting choices on research and 
development expenditure Daley and Vigeland (1983) test the size 
hypothesis and the following four hypotheses based on debt contracts. 
They hypothesise that firms will be motivated to capitalise interest in 
order to increase reported earnings (1) the higher the debt/equity ratio, 
(2) the lower the interest cover, (3) the higher the ratio of dividends to 
inventory of funds payable (4) the higher the proportion of public to
private debt in the firms' capital structure (because public debt is more
costly to renegotiate than private debt).
Daley and Vigeland's sample consists of 178 expensing firms and 135 
capitalising firms. They analyse their data using a multivariate 
statistical technique called the jackknife procedure. The results of the 
statistical tests are that size is significant at the 0.02 level, the 
debt/equity ratio and the dividend payability ratio at the 0.05 level and 
the ratio of public to private debt at the 0.10 level. The
interest cover ratio was not significant although the sign of the
coefficient was in the predicted direction.
To test whether the size hypothesis applies only to large firms as 
in Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) Daley and Vigeland split their sample 
of 313 firms into large firms (156) and small firms (157). They find 
that the size effect is only significant for small firms which is not 
consistent with the findings of Zmijewski and Hagerman (1961).
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Uua Summary
4.3.
The results of the tests of the size hypothesis are shown in Table
Table 4.3
Accounting choice Study,.
Level of 
Significance
General price level 
adjustments
Depreciation
Inventory
Investment tax credit
Pension costs
Income strategy based 
on depreciation,inven­
tory, investment tax 
credit à pension costs
Oil and gas accounting
Gil and gas accounting
Interest costs
Interest costs
Depreciation
Research and develop­
ment expenditure
Vatts and Zimmerman (1978)
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) 
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981)
Deakin (1979)
Lilien and Pastena (1982) 
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey (1981) 
Dhalival (1982)
Dhalival,Salamon & Smith (1982) 
Daley and Vigeland (1983)
.001
.05
.14
.10
.17
.01
Consistent
.06
Not consistent 
.14 
.15 
.02
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lotes-tQ Table 4.3
1. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) only reported significance levels of 
10% or better. The significance levels for inventory and pension 
costs were obtained from Vatts and Zimmerman (1986, p 270).
2. As already noted Deakin excluded the large integrated oil and gas 
firms from his tests but if these were included the size factor 
becomes significant (Deakin, 1979, p 727, fn 4).
3. Although the results of Bowen et al's test of the size hypothesis on 
firms from all industries is not as predicted the results of their 
test of the size hypothesis for the oil industry is significant at 
the .01 level.
As can be seen from Table 4.3 the tests provide general support for 
the size hypothesis. The only study which investigates the portfolio of 
accounting choices made by firms (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981) and 
which as a result provides the most powerful tests finds the size 
hypothesis significant at the .01 level. Of the eleven single procedure 
choice tests, six are significant at the .10 level or better, four are 
significant at the 0.14 level to 0.17 levels and only one test provides 
inconsistent results.
However, the influence of the oil and gas companies on the results 
of the above tests of the size hypothesis are not entirely clear. The 
studies by Deakin (1979) and Lilien and Pastena (1982) are confined to 
the oil and gaa industry while a number of the large firms in the 
samples of Vatts and Zimmerman (1978), Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) 
and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) are from the oil and gas industry. 
The only study (Bowen, Noreen and Lacey, 1981) that does not provide
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support for the size hypothesis when testing across industries does 
provide support at the .01 level when testing the association between 
size and accounting choices in the oil and gas industry. Thus it is 
possible that the political sensitivity of large firms in the oil and gas 
industry is affecting the results of the tests of the size hypothesis.
The other proxies for political costs tested in these studies are 
concentration ratios, capital intensity and risk. These proxies were 
tested in Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) and in Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981) but not in any of the other studies.
Both studies suggest an association between concentration ratios and 
accounting choices. Zmijewski and Hagerman’s portfolio tests are 
significant at the .05 level while the single choice tests of Hagerman 
and Zmijewski are significant at the .10 level for two of the choices and 
the coefficients have the predicted signs for the other two choices.
There is less support for capital intensity. The results of 
portfolio tests are not significant although the signs of the coefficients 
are in the predicted direction. The single choice tests provide support 
at the .10 level for two of the choices and the coefficients have the 
predicted sign for the other two choices.
There is almost no support for risk as a proxy for political costs. 
The portfolio tests are not significant although the signs of the 
coefficients are in the predicted direction. The single choice tests 
provide support at the 0.5 level on one choice and the signs of the 
coefficients are in the predicted direction on two other choices. 
However, on the fourth accounting choice the signs of the coefficient are 
in the opposite direction to that predicted.
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4.4 ...A.TEST OF THE REGULATION tfYPQTHRST<^
Jarrell (1979) extends the work of Jarrell (1978). The latter study 
found that, In general, the establishment of State commission regulation 
of the electric utility industry redistributed wealth from consumers to 
producers. Jarrell (1978) compares the prices and profits of the 
electric utilities in 25 states that established State commissions 
between 1912 and 1917 with utilities in other States that had not 
introduced State commission regulation. He finds that on average the 
former had prices and profits which were 25% and 35% higher 
respectively. This dramatic increase in price and profit levels 
accompanying the establishment of State commission regulation led Jarrell 
to question how this could happen given that the State commissions used 
rate-of-return regulation to attempt to eliminate the electric utilities' 
monopoly profits.
According to Vatts and Zimmerman (1986, p 231) most public utility 
commissions use the following rate setting formula :
Revenues=Operating expenses + depreciation + taxes + r^  x asset base 
where r^  is the allowed rate of return on capital. As Jarrell (1979, p 96) 
points out this :
role of accounting as an instrument of regulatory control 
represented quite a promotion from its ordinary book-keeping 
functions.
There is clearly scope for manipulation of operating expenses and 
depreciation but Jarrell (1979) chooses to only investigate if there has 
been manipulation of the asset base. He hypothesises that rate-of-return 
regulation provides an incentive for public utilities to revise upwards 
the valuation of their asset base so as to appear to be earning the
required accounting rate of return when In fact they are earning a supra- 
competitive return.
According to public utility laws and court interpretations the "fair 
value" of the rate base was generally to be based on "past cost" 
measures. The particular assets which Jarrell suspects might have had 
their balance sheet values increased by utilities subject to State 
commission regulation are the municipal franchises which gave electric 
utilities the authority to use public streets for distribution purposes. 
The value of these franchises had almost certainly been increased by 
State regulation which had increased electricity prices and monopoly 
rights. It may have been difficult for utilities to increase the balance 
sheet value of franchises without some transaction. However, as the 
State regulators were encouraging utilities to merge in order to eliminate 
wasteful competition there was ample opportunity to change ownership, 
whereby the seller could realise the increased value of the franchise and 
the purchaser could record that increased value in his balance sheet. 
That increased value would then be included in the asset base for rate- 
of-return regulation. Jarrell suggests that this benefit from a change of 
ownership may have led to some such changes being rigged between 
affiliated companies so that the increased values of franchises could be 
recorded in the asset base.
Jarrell uses regression analysis to test if the establishment of 
State commissions had an effect on the value of assets in regulated 
States compared with the value of assets in other States in 1917 and 
1922. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that State 
regulation did provide incentives for electric utilities to increase the 
value of their reported assets. Unfortunately, the data source did not
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provide the information necessary for Jarrell to be able to test if the 
increases in total assets were due to increases in the value of 
franchises.
Jarrell's (1979) study provides the only test of the regulation 
hypothesis known to the author. Most of the studies reviewed in section 
4.3 explicitly excluded regulated firms from their tests because the 
researchers were not sure of the impact of regulation on the accounting 
choice(s).
4.5 STUDIES OF ACCOUNTING CHOICES IN THE UK NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES
This section reviews studies of the accounting choices made in the 
UK nationised industries. Unlike the studies from the USA reviewed in 
sections 4.3 and 4.4, the British studies do not test explanatory 
hypotheses although Likierman (1983a) is an exception. Generally the 
British studies only provide a description of the accounting choices made 
by a selection of nationalised industries.
The first study was by Dean (1978). In a wide-ranging and partly 
normative discussion he provides examples of the inconsistencies between 
the accounting practices adopted by various nationalised industries.
Wright (1979) describes in detail the attempts by nine major 
nationalised industries, including the gas industry, to make adjustments 
to reflect the effects of inflation on their reported performances up to 
1978. He notes that there is a lack of consensus between the industries 
on how to make these adjustments and he concludes that this is probably 
a reflection of a similar lack of consensus on the part of accounting 
policy makers. He provides no evidence other than that disclosed in the
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Industries' annual report and accounts to explain why different industries 
made different adjustments or why some industries changed their inflation 
accounting adjustments over time. Thus there is no meaningful attempt to 
explain each industry's inflation accounting adjustments in terms of the 
changes in that industry's economic and political environment.
Gibbs and Tailor (1979) examine the 1978/79 published accounts of 
eight major nationalised industries, including the BGC. They express 
concern about the difficulties of comparing performance both between 
industries and over time for the same industry. They point out that 
comparison between industries is not meaningful not only because of the 
inherent differences between different industries' operating environments 
but also because of differences between different industries' accounting 
choices. They also point out that there are difficulties in asssessing a 
particular industry's performance over a number of years because of 
frequent changes in accounting practice. They describe the accounting 
changes made by a number of industries including the BGC and conclude (p 
23) that :
Accounting policies have been changed too frequently and, when 
considering whether to adopt new accounting principles, individual 
industries appear to have been too influenced by the effect that the 
changes would have on their published profits.
Likierman (1981) compares the 1980 and 1981 published accounts of 
18 nationalised industries in order to assess the extent of their 
compliance with Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No 16 (1980) 
on current cost accounting and with the recommendations on this topic 
from the National Industries' Chairmen's Group (1981). He finds that 
overall there had been a major movement towards current cost accounting 
but the extent of that movement varied considerably between individual
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industries. Like Vright (1979) he makes no attempt to explain the 
different accounting treatments by individual industries in terms of the 
differences in their economic and political environment.
Likierman (1983a) examines and attempts to explain the adjustments 
for inflation made by 17 nationalised industries, including the BGC, 
during the six years from 1976 to 1981. Some of the industries had been 
publicly accused of using adjustments for inflation to manipulate their 
profits and Likierman's paper attempts to ascertain the vailidity of 
these accusations.
He tests two hypotheses :
1) Industries which were not in direct competition with the private
sector and which were embarrassed by high historic cost profit 
would choose adjustments for inflation which decreased reported 
profits.
2) Industries which would not have been profitable after making
adjustments for inflation would either not make any adjustments for 
inflation or alternatively would make adjustments which increased 
reported profits.
Overall Likierman's evidence is inconclusive although a finding
which is of particular Interest to the present study is that the inflation 
accounting adjustments made by the BGC were consistent with Hypothesis 
1.
Likierman did not develop his hypotheses from the US positive 
theory of accounting choice literature. If he had done so his hypotheses 
would have been different. The testing of a size hypothesis based on 
either sales or net assets rather than on reported profits might have 
provided a better proxy for political costs. These industries not subject
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to competition are instead subject to price regulation and it would have 
been interesting to test the hypothesis that those industries had made 
inflation accounting adjustments which decreased reported profits in 
order to provide a more convincing argument for a price rise.
4,6 OTHER RELEVANT STUDIES
Heal y (1985) provides the most powerful test so far of the bonus 
plan hypothesis by investigating the association between bonus plan 
details and accounting choices. The results of his tests are not relevant 
to the present study. However, Healy's study is the first to include 
accruals as well as accounting procedures in some of the tests and to 
that extent his study is of relevance.
In these tests Healy uses total accruals as a proxy for 
discretionary accruals. He defines total accruals as the difference 
between reported accounting earnings and cash flows from operations. He 
calculates total accruals as depreciation plus changes in the non-cash 
working capital items. Thus in Healy's study total accruals includes 
accounting procedures. For instance, to the extent that depreciation per 
se is an accrual and the accelerated and straight-line methods are 
procedures then accounting procedures can be regarded as a subset of 
total accruals.
Kaplan (1985) criticises Healy's study for not including a model 
that predicts what the accruals would be in the absence of manipulation. 
Kaplan argues that Healy's definition of total accruals which he uses as 
a proxy for discretionary accruals is flawed for a number of reasons. 
For instance, the total depreciation charge for most firms arises largely
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from assets acquired in the previous year and to that extent it is not an 
accrual which is at management's discretion in the current year. Also 
working capital items fluctuate from year to year for reasons relating to 
the economic circumstances of the firm and to that extent are not
changes which reflect management manipulation.
In spite of these criticisms of Healy's treatment and definition of 
accruals the idea of including accruals as well as accounting procedures 
in accounting choice studies would appear to be worthwhile. As accruals 
present managers with another area for possible manipulation, tests which 
include both accruals and accounting procedures will be more powerful.
4.2 3UM ASY AND CONCLUSION
The prior studies which test hypotheses that proxy for political
costs provide evidence consistent with size (ten studies), concentration 
ratio (two studies) and capital intensity (two studies). The only study 
of the regulation hypothesis provides consistent evidence.
So far the preponderance of studies focus on only one accounting
choice. As most firms probably face conflicting pressure from the 
contracting and political processes they probably do not opt for extreme 
income increasing or income decreasing accounting choices. Thus a single 
accounting choice may not be representive of a firm's other accounting 
choices. For this reason the single accounting choice studies lack power.
Studies which focus on a portfolio of choices C Zmijewski and
Hagerman (1981) and to a limited extent Lilien and Pastena (1932)1 or 
include accruals (Healy, 1985) are more powerful than the single choice 
studies. So far no study has looked at both accounting choices and
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lobbying behaviour. The Ideal would be a study that investigated all
accounting choices (accruals and procedures) and lobbying behaviour for a 
firm over a number of years. Such an investigation would provide a
powerful test.
The studies have other weaknesses. Most of the studies fail to take 
into consideration the monetary effect of the accounting choices. A 
further weakness of all of the studies is that the increase-decrease
dichotomisation only refers to the impact of the accounting choices on 
the current year's income. Most accounting choices only create timing 
differences which reverse in some future year. The timing difference 
aspect of accounting choices is ignored in every study.
There have so far been no tests of hypotheses derived from the 
political process using accounting choices made by UK nationalised 
industries although there have been a number of studies that have
described these accounting choices.
An attempt is made to overcome some of these weaknesses in prior 
studies of accounting choices in the research methodology adopted for the 
present study, which is described in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.0 ■■ 13iIR.Q£>UCTIQR
This chapter describes the research methodology adopted in the 
empirical study. Section 5.1 distinguishes between the scientific and 
naturalistic approaches to research. Section 5.2 describes the research 
approach adopted In the present study. Section 5.3 describes the 
strengths of the case study approach adopted and section 5.4 describes 
the advantages of the longitudinal research design adopted. The 
investigation of the effect of the accounting choices is described in 
section 5.5 and the investigation of the explanations for these accounting 
choices is described in section 5.6. The investigation of the gas 
industry's lobbying behaviour is described in section 5.7. Concluding 
comments are provided in section 5.8.
5.1 SCIENTIFIC V NATURALISTIC APPROACHES TQ RESEARCH
Several recent contributions to the accounting literature [eg Abdel- 
Khalik and Ajinka (1979), Colville (1981) and Tomkins and Groves (1981)] 
have distinguished between the 'scientific' and 'naturalistic' approaches 
to research and have discussed the relative merits of each approach. 
Each of these contributions to the accounting literature has drawn on the 
debate between alternative research approaches in the sociology literature 
[eg Glaser and Strauss (1967), Blumer (1969) and Denzin (1978)].
The 'scientific' approach has been adopted in most of the existing 
rigorous accounting research (Tomkins and Groves, 1981, p 31) and in
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most sociological and psychological research (Blumer, 1969, p 29). This 
approach :
represents an attempt to translate the principles and methodology of 
the natural and physical sciences into the realm of the social 
sciences (Colville, 1981, p 121).
This approach is described by Blumer (1969, p 29) as follows :
One starts with the construction of a scheme, theory or model of the 
empirical world or area under study. The scheme, theory or model 
represents the way in which one believes the empirical world to be 
BtruC'tured and to operate. One then deduces from this scheme an 
assertion as to what one would expect to happen under such and such 
a set of empirical circumstances. This assertion is the hypothesis. 
One then arranges a study of a given empirical area that represents 
these circumstances. If the findings from such a study verify the 
hypothesis one assumes that the scheme, model or theory from which 
the hypothesis has been drawn is empirically valid. Logically, this 
view rests on an "as if" nation; that is, one approaches the
empirical world as. if it had such and such a make up, deduces 
narrow specific consequences as to what one would find if the 
empirical world had the make up attributed to it, and then sees if 
in fact such consequences are to be found in the empirical world.
Mills (1959) criticises the use of the ’scientific' approach for
inhibiting the kind of problems which can be researched in the social
sciences. He claims that the methodology was determining the problems in
that only those problems which could be accommodated by the methodology
were deemed suitable for scientific inquiry. Glaser and Strauss (1967)
criticise the scientific method for presupposing the categories of
relevance which exist in the data as a result ignoring those aspects of
the data which do not fit the conceptual category of the deductive
theory. Blumer (1969) criticises the approach as
it forces .... data into an artificial framework that 
seriously limits and impairs general empirical analysis.
Blumer also argues that the use of this methodology allows the researcher
to use the research model as a substitute for intimate knowledge of the
sphere of life being studied.
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As explained in the next section the research approach adopted in 
the present study is a compromise between the 'scientific' and
'naturalistic' approaches.
5.2 RESEARCH APPROACH ADOPTED
t'rom the description in chapter 2 of the UK gas industry and the 
role of accounting measures in its regulation, from the review in chapter 
3 of the US literature on accounting and the political process and from 
the review in chapter 4 of the prior research on accounting choices, two 
hypotheses relating to the accounting choices made for the UK gas
Industry during the period of the study have been generated :
Hypothesis 1 : When there is a perceived need to either Justify a price
rise or reduce criticism of a price rise accounting choices will be made
which reduce reported profit.
Hypothesis 2 : When there is a perceived need to avoid political costs 
accounting choices will be made which reduce reported profit.
This study will test these hypotheses. In addition this study will 
investigate the gas industry’s submissions to the Accounting Standards 
Committee on proposed Statements of Standard Accounting Practice. If 
these submissions are motivated by the same factors as hypothesised 
above for the industry's accounting choices then the submissions will 
support proposed accounting practices that would decrease the industry's 
future reported profits and will oppose proposed accounting practices 
that would increase the industry's future reported profits.
The hypotheses above were largely derived from US literature. In 
order to cope with the differences between the institutional, political
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and regulatory environment of the UK gas industry (chapter 2) and that 
relating to regulated firms and politically sensitive firms in the United 
States (section 3.3) the research approach adopted will be a compromise 
between the 'scientific' and 'naturalistic' approaches described in the 
previous section. Although the two hypotheses above will be used to 
focus the search for explanations for the accounting choices made for the 
gas industry it is recognised that in a UK setting there may be other 
explanations for the accounting choices. Therefore the study will not 
restrict the explanations to those covered by the two hypotheses above if 
other explanations become apparent during the empirical research.
Although the evidence in section 2.1.1 is not conclusive the study 
will assume that the accounting choices made for the gas industry were 
not made independently by gas industry management and that civil 
servants were also involved in making these choices.
5.3 THE GAS INDUSTRY - A CASE STUDY
The decision to investigate accounting choices in only the gas 
industry turned the current study into what is known in the research 
literature as a "case study". Hagg and Hedland (1979, p 1j5) have 
commented that:
accounting researchers have not seriously considered the potential 
that case approaches can offer.
According to Goode and Hatt (1952, p 331) a case study is :
a way of organising social data so as to preserve the unitary 
character of the social object being studied.
Katz (1953, p 75) argued that the great strength of the case study is:
its inductive procedure, its potentiality for discovering significant 
variables and basic relations that would never be found if we were 
confined to research dictated by a hypothetical-deductive model.
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Xatz (p 75) saw the case study and the survey as being :
the great protection in social science against the sterility and 
triviality of premature model building.
However, he felt that a case study provided both a more detailed and a
more natural picture of the interrelations than a survey (p 58).
5.A ...WJLGITUDIML RESEARCH DESIGN
The author decided to adopt a longitudinal research design. This is 
consistent with the recommendations of social anthropologists such as 
Smith (1962) for the study of social processes - the behaviour of men 
over time. Smith (1962, p 81) recommended that the appropriate field of 
anthropological study should be a "unit over time, not merely a unit at a 
particular point in time". In this way, structural regularities may be 
abstracted from the succession of relatively unique events "to reveal the 
outlines of an order within processes of simultaneous continuity and 
change" (p 84).
For his study on the politics of organisational decision making 
Pettigrew (1973, p xv) justified the use of a longitudinal research design 
as follows ;
an organisation or any other social system may profitably be 
explored as an ongoing system with a past, a present and a future. 
The generalised implication is that man's behaviour at time ™2iy 
be explained with reference to his past actions at time t| and his 
future designs at time t^  as well as to the particular set of forces 
impinging on him at time . Sound theory must therefore take into 
account the history and the future of a system and relate uhem to 
the present.
Such an argument can be applied to the choices of accounting bases in the 
published accounts of the gas industry. The choices at time t_g may oe 
influenced (a) by the choices made in prior years because of the
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consistency concept in accounting, (b) by the expected impact of the 
choices made in t^ on the expected income outcomes at time , t^ etc and 
the expected economic consequences on publication of these outcomes and 
(c) by the expected impact on income at time t^ and the expected 
economic consequences on publication at t^ . As Boring (1963, p 5) 
pointed out:
The best fact is one that is set in a context, that is, known in 
relation to other facts, that is perceived in part in the context of 
its past, that comes into understanding as an event which acquires 
significance because it belongs to a continuous dynamic sequence ...
This longitudinal case study investigates the accounting choices
made in the gas industry during the eleven-year period from 1 April 1969
to 31 March 1980. The opening date of the case study was chosen because
the government set the gas industry a financial target from that date
to 31 March 1974. 'A priori' it seemed possible that the accounting
choices might have been influenced by the financial target. The original
intention was that the longitudinal case study should cover a fourteen-
year period from 1 April 1969 to 31 March 1983 which was the end of the
financial year immediately preceding the period during which the
empirical investigation was conducted. However, the investigation of the
accounting choices made during the three years ended 31 March 1983 did
not reveal any new types of accounting choices nor any new explanations
for the accounting choices made. Therefore, the decision was made to
drop these three years so that the longitudinal case study now ends at
31 March 1980.
The eleven year period is divided into two sub-periods. Chapter 6 
focuses on the quinquennium from 1 April 1969 to 31 March 1974 for which 
the government set the gas industry a financial taiget. chapter >
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focuses on the years from 1 April 1974 to 31 March 1980 for which
financial targets were not set (apart from the year ended 31 March 1980).
Twelve separate files were prepared for each financial year from 1 
April 1968 to 31 March 1980. Although the study only identifies and
attempts to explain the accounting choices made during the eleven years 
to 31 March 1980, a file was prepared for the year ended 31 March 1969. 
This was done for two reasons :
(1) so that the published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1969
could be used as a benchmark for the investigation of the accounting
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970; and
(2) given the significance of the decision to exploit natural gas to the 
present study the author decided to start the review of relevant 
events with the report from the Select Committee on Nationalised
Industries published in July 1968 titled the Exploitation of North
Sea Gas (Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, 1968).
In addition to the published accounts for that financial year each 
file contained details of events during that year which the author judged
to be relevant to an explanation of the accounting choices made by the
gas industry during the period of the study.
The research approach recommended above by Smith (1962), Boring
(1963) and Pettigrew (1973) has been adopted in the present study ie the 
accounting choices are explained in the context of past events, present 
pressures and future expectations. Each year of the study has been 
written up in at least three sections which describe :
(1) the relevant events up to the end of that financial year;
(2 the effect of the accounting choices made during that year on the
reported outcomes for that year;
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(3) the explanations for the accounting choices made during that year. 
For most years the explanations of the accounting choices included in the 
third section above are derived from events up to the end of the 
financial year in question but on occasion the explanations are derived 
from events which took place after the end of the financial year eg SCNI 
investigations.
For those years during which the gas industry lobbied the 
Accounting Standards Committee on a proposed accounting standard the 
author has Included a fourth section which describes both the position 
adopted by the gas industry and the justification given for adopting that 
position. The author has attempted to estimate the impact of that
proposed accounting standard on the gas industry's future reported 
performance and has then attempted to explain the position adopted within 
the context of the gas industry's self-interest.
5.5 INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECT QF THE ■ACCOUNTING CHQIGES.
This section describes the investigation of the effect of the 
accounting choices made during the eleven years of the study. Section
5.5.1 describes the published accounts examined. Section 5.5.2 describes 
the types of accounting choices identified. Section 5.5.3 describes how 
the effects of these accounting choices were ascertained. Section 5.5.4 
explains why the accounting choices made during the three years ended 31 
March 1972 have been split into two categories. Section 5.5.5 discusses 
how the present study improves upon previous investigations of accounting 
choices.
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5.5. 1 Published accounts
The accounting choices were identified by examining the published 
accounts (in particular the notes to the accounts) of the gas industry 
for each of the eleven years of the study. On 1 January 1973 the BGC 
was formed. Prior to that date the gas industry was made up of the Gas 
Council and twelve relatively autonomous Area Boards. Thus for the first 
three years of the study it was necessary to examine the consolidated 
accounts of the Gas Council and the Area Boards as well as the published 
accounts of the Gas Council and those of the twelve Area Boards. For the 
remaining years of the study it was only necessary to examine the 
published accounts of the BGC.
5.5.2 Types of accounting choice identified
Vatts and Zimmerman (1979, p 275) define accounting procedures, 
techniques and practices as "any computational algorithm used or 
suggested in the preparation of financial accounting statements" (footnote 
8). The present study adopts the Vatts and Zimmerman definition above 
but uses the term "accounting choices". Thus for the purposes of this 
study accounting choices are defined as any accounting procedure, 
technique or practice used in the preparation of financial accounting 
statements. Thus both accounting procedures and accruals are included in
the present study.
The accounting choices in the present study which might be 
described as accruals are all increases or decreases in provisions. 
Examples of individual provisions which were changed during the period 
covered by the study were a provision against accrued income from gaa
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sales, a provision against contingencies, a provision against stock 
obsolescence and deterioration, a pension scheme provision, a provision 
for deferred repairs and a provision for field abandonment costs. Each 
change in these provisions has been treated as an accounting choice.
Examples of accounting choices in the present study which might be 
described as choices of accounting procedures are the accelerated write­
off of exploration expenditure, the non-capitalisation of interest, 
salaries and overheads on capital projects, the accelerated amortisation 
of displaced plant and deferred charges, the accelerated amortisation of 
loan expenses, changes in various depreciation rates, the charging of the 
cost of replacing certain categories of fixed assets to revenue and the 
charging of supplementary depreciation.
The last two examples in the preceding paragraph, the charging of 
the cost of replacing certain categories of fixed assets and the charging 
of supplementary depreciation, were treated differently from the other 
choices of accounting procedures. For the other accounting choices the 
consistency convention in accounting ensured that their effect on 
subsequent years was automatically determined eg the acceleration of the 
rate of write-off of an asset. For this reason the effects of these 
accounting choices on subsequent years were not treated as the result of 
new accounting choices made in the later years. However, the annual 
charges against revenue for the replacement cost of certain categories of 
fixed assets and for supplementary depreciation were treated as new 
accounting choices each year. For each of these accounting choices a 
subjective judgement had to be made each year on the size of the charge 
so it seemed logical to treat each year's charge against revenue as a new 
accounting choice.
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It was appreciated that all the accounting choices identified in 
chapters 6 and 7 could be explained on the basis that they were chosen 
to reflect "economic reality". However, if the effect of these accounting 
choices on the gas industry's reported outcomes was in the same direction 
each year (eg income decreasing) then the "economic reality" explanation 
becomes less convincing.
5.5.3 Effect of the accounting choices
The two hypotheses formulated in section 5.2 focused on the effect 
of the accounting choices on the reported profit. Therefore the 
investigation of the effect of the accounting choices made during the 
eleven years of the present study ascertained the effect of each 
accounting choice on the reported profit or loss for the year in which 
that accounting choice was made.
However, further investigations were made of the effects of the 
accounting choices made during the first five years of the study, For 
these five years, the quinquennium ended 31 March 1974, the gas industry 
was set a financial target of achieving a net return of 7% on average 
capital employed. It seemed worthwhile to investigate whether the effect 
of the accounting choices made during the five years ended 31 March 1974 
had undermined the usefulness of the financial target.
Therefore for each of the five years ended 31 March 1974 calculation 
was made of the effect of the accounting choices made each year on the 
net return on average capital employed for that year. In order to do 
this the effect of the accounting choices on the capital employed at the 
end of each year was ascertained as well as the effect on the net profit
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or loss for each year. These calculations are shown in sections. 6.1.2,
6.1.4, 6.2.3, 6.3.2, 6.3.4, 6.4.2, and 6.5,2.
The effect of accounting choices is not restricted to the year
during which the accounting choice is made. As Holthausen and Leftwich
(1983, p 104) pointed out :
most accounting technique choices are timing choices because they 
shift revenue or expenses among periods, without altering total 
revenue and expenses over these periods. Thus, the increase- 
decrease dichotomisation does not fully reflect the decision being 
made.
Over the life of an accounting entity these timing differences make no 
difference to the total income reported. However, over a relatively short 
period of time, such as a quinquennium, this may not be the case. 
Consequently, it was decided to investigate the effect of the accounting 
choices made during the quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 on all the 
outcomes for the quinquennium. The effect of each year's accounting 
choices was investigated separately and is described separately in 
sections 6.6.1, 6.6.2, 6.6.3, 6.6.4 and 6.6.5.
Finally the cumulative effect of the accounting choices made during 
the quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 on the net return on average 
capital employed was calculated and is shown in section 6.7.
5.5.4 Accounting choices made during the three Years ended 31 March 1922
Prior to investigating the accounting choices made for the gas 
industry for the three years ended 31 March 1972, it was known that uhe 
twelve Area Boards were relatively autonomous. However, there was no way 
of knowing whether that autonomy extended to their accounting choices. 
The Gas Council might have influenced all the accounting choices made for
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the Area Boards in order to achieve desired results in the consolidated 
accounts.
The Investigation of the accounting choices made for the twelve Area 
Boards identified acknowledgement in their published accounts that 
certain accounting choices had been made at the request of the Gas 
Council. During the year ended 31 March 1970 the Gas Council had 
requested all Area Boards who had not already done so to transfer all 
reserves to reserve fund and during the year ended 31 March 1972 the Gas 
Council had requested all Area Boards to accelerate the amortisation of 
displaced plant. For the remaining accounting choices made during the 
three years ended 31 March 1972 there was no acknowledgement that they 
had been made at the request of the Gas Council.
In chapter 6 the accounting choices made during the three years 
ended 31 March 1972 have been split into two categories. The first 
category is those accounting choices made for the Gas Council or made for 
the Area Boards at the request of the Gas Council. The second category 
is the remaining accounting choices made for the Area Boards. This split 
was considered necessary because if the accounting choices in the second 
category had been made independently by the Area Boards they would not 
have been subject to the same pressures as those in the first category. 
As this study attempts to explain the accounting choices made for the 
gas industry as a whole that evidence could not be used to explain the 
accounting choices in the second category if they were chosen 
independently by the Area Boards.
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5Æ.5— laoroveaents on prior studies
Cl) Holthausen and Leftwich (p 104) also pointed out that many of the 
previous studies only investigated the effect of one particular 
accounting choice. The weakness of such a research approach is that 
if a firm wanted to manipulate its income it would be likely to use 
more than one accounting choice to do so. Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981) substantially improved on these single accounting choice 
tests by investigating whether firms had used a portfolio of 
accounting choices to achieve an overall income strategy. However 
Zmijewski and Hagerman restricted their investigation to only four 
accounting choices. The case study approach adopted in the present 
study enabled the author to investigate all the accounting choices 
made by the gas industry during the eleven years from 1 April 1969 
to 31 March 1980.
(2) Finally, Holthausen and Leftwich (p 104) pointed out that most of 
the previous studies weight each accounting choice equally. The 
present study overcomes this weakness by calculating the monetary 
effect of the accounting choices on the reported outcomes.
5.6 INVESTIGATION QF THE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE ACCQUNTIHG CHQJG££
This section describes the investigation of the explanations for the 
accounting choices made during the eleven years of the study. The 
explanatory hypotheses formulated in section 5.2 were used to focus the 
search for evidence which would explain the accounting choices. That 
evidence was identified from inspection of the gas indutstry report and
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accounts (as described in section 5.5.1) and from the use of the 
following four indexes described in later sub-sections :
1. General Index of Parliamentary Debates (section 5.6.1);
2. Government Publications Catalogue (section 5.6.2);
3. Research Index (section 5.6.3);
4. British Humanities Index (section 5.6.4).
5ÆJL— General Index to the ParlianAntary Debates
The author inspected the General Index to the Parliamentary Debates 
for each Parliamentary Session for 1967/68 to 1980/81. Details of the 
Parliamentary Debates are included in numbered volumes of Hansard for 
each Parliamentary Session. Each volume of Hansard is divided into two 
sections - Oral Answers which includes debates and Written Answers.
All the entries under the subject heading "Gas" or under related 
headings such as "Gas Boards", "Gas Industry", "Gas and Electricity", "Gas 
and Electricity Industries", "Gas Corporation", "Gas Tariffs", etc in the 
General Index for each Session from 1967/68 to 1980/81 were reviewed and 
if the description of the item indicated that it might be relevant to the 
present study it was inspected in the appropriate volume of Hansard.
The General Index was also used to search for evidence of 
government policy on the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). 
Government policy on the PSBR was considered relevant to the present 
study when the gas industry was unable to finance all its capital 
expenditure from existing resources. The two main sources of additional, 
finance were :
(1) an increase in gas prices; or (2.) additional borrowing from the 
government which would have the effect of increasing the PSBR. If the
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government's policy was to reduce the level of government borrowing, 
government politicians and civil servants would have a preference for the 
additional resources being raised by an increase in gas prices, provided 
that such an increase did not conflict with any other macro-economic 
policy. The General Index was used to identify government policy on the 
PSBR as described in each year's Budget Statement which was then 
inserted in the author's file for the relevant year.
The items from Hansard which have been included in Chapters 8 and 9
(a considerably smaller number than the number originally included in the 
file for each year) have been referenced as suggested by Pemberton (1971, 
p 101) except that each reference ends with either the words "Oral 
Answers" or "Written Answers" to identify which section of a volume is 
being cited. This seemed to the author to be an improvement on 
Pemberton's recommendation that the column numbers for the Written 
Answers section be typed in italics.
5.6.2 Catalogue of Governaent Publications
The annual Catalogue of Government Publications contains ail the 
items published by HMSO during the year except Statutory Instruments. 
Section I contains Parliamentary Papers such as House of Lords Papers 
and Bills, House of Lords Parliamentary Deoates, House of Commons Papers, 
House of Commons Parliamentary Debates (Hansard and standing Committee 
Debates), House of Commons Bill, Command Papers and Public General Acts.
Section II contains both Parliamentary and Non-Parliamentary
Publications, listed under the government departments and other bodies 
responsible for their preparation.
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All the entries under the subject heading "Gas" in the index for 
each year from 1968 to 1981 were reviewed and if the description of the
item indicated that it might be relevant to the present study it was
inspected.
The annual Catalogue of Government Publications was also used to 
identify the Public Expenditure White Papers and the Financial Statement 
and Budget Reports published during the period of the study. These were 
inspected to Identify government policy on nationalised industries' 
borrowing for the reasons described in section 5.6.1.
5Æ3 Research Index
The Research Index is a fortnightly index of articles and news 
items, mainly of financial interest which have appeared in about 150 
newspapers, business, economic and trade periodicals during the previous 
two weeks. The Index is arranged in two sections covering (1) 
industrial, financial and commercial news arranged under broad subject 
headings and (2) company news arranged alphabetically by company name. 
From 1973 each section has been cumulated every six months into what is
titled the "Research Index Amalgamation". According to Vernon (1984, p
40) the Research Index "is the best available means of tracing very 
recent business information in newpapers ".
The author's experience confirmed Vernon's view. However, the search 
process was somewhat tedious. The Andersonian Library at the University 
of Strathclyde only had the "Research Index Amalgamation" from 1975. 
Thus the fortnightly index had to be used for the years from 1968 to 
1972. All the entries under the subject heading "Gas" in the first 
section of the index for each year from 1968 to 1981 were reviewed and
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if the title of the item indicated that it might be relevant to the 
present study it was inspected. This inspection was largely carried out 
in the Mitchell Library, Glasgow. Any item which was not available in 
the Mitchell Library for any reason was inspected in the Colindale 
Newspaper Library, London, on one of the author's trips to London.
 British Tndftl
The British Humanities Index covers articles from nearly 400 British 
Journals and newspapers in all areas of the humanities including 
management and business. All the entries under the subject heading "Gas 
Industry : Great Britain" and related headings were reviewed for each 
year from 1968 to 1981 and if the title of the article indicated that it
might be relevant to the present study it was inspected either in the
Mitchell Library, Glasgow or in the Colindale Newspaper Library, London.
The author did not find the British Humanities Index as useful to 
the present study as the Research Index. This was a result of the 
British Humanities Index's focus on articles which were by their nature 
usually discussive. The author was mainly interested in identifying the 
unfolding of events in each year which he considered relevant to the
study. These events were included in the newspapers reports covered by 
the Research Index to a greated extent than they were included in the
articles covered by the British Humanities Index.
5.6.5 CnTit.ATit. Analysis
As the longitudinal case study developed it occurred to the author 
that the national daily newspaper reports on the gas industry's published 
accounts tended to focus rather more on expected or proposed increases in
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gas prices than on the contents of the published accounts, If this 
reaction by the press was predictable by the managers of the gas
industry and by civil servants in the gas industry's sponsor department 
it might have influenced the accounting choices made for the gas
industry. For Instance, these managers and civil servants would not want 
the press to argue that a price rise was unreasonable because the gas 
industry was making large profits. Such arguments could be picked up by 
non-government politicians. Thus the press could create crises on the
question of the level of gas prices which the managers of the gas
industry, the civil servants in the gas industry's sponsor department and 
the government would rather avoid. One way of avoiding such crises
would be to make accounting choices which reduced the gas industry's 
reported profit.
In order to establish in a systematic and objective fashion whether
the press did, in fact, focus on gas prices in their reports on the gas
industry's published report and accounts the author decided to content
analyse for each year of the case study the reports in the national daily
newspapers on the gas industry's published report and accounts.
Content analysis has been defined as follows:
Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication (Berelson, 1952, p 18)
Content analysis refers to any procedure for assessing the relative 
extent to which specified references, attitudes or themes permeate a 
given message or document (Stone, 1964).
According to Cartwright (1953, p 435) the objective of content analysis
is to treat "raw" data in a scientific manner so that a body of knowledge
can be built up.
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The literature on content analysis (see for example Berelson, 1952; 
Berelson, 1954; Cartwright, 1953; Holsti, 1969) distinguishes between 
recording units, context units and units of enumeration. A recording unit 
is the specific segment of the content that is characterised by placing 
it in a given category. It may not be possible to classify a recording 
unit without some further reference to the context in which it appears. 
A context unit is "the largest body of content that may be examined in 
characterising a recording unit" (Berelson, 1952). The unit of 
enumeration is the unit in terms of which quantification is performed. 
In the case of communications research the unit of enumeration that seems 
to have been the most popular is that of physical length (Cartwright, 
1953, p 459).
The author decided that the context units should be the reports in 
the national daily newspapers on the day after the gas industry's report 
and accounts were published. The reports in national daily newspapers 
were chosen on the basis that, generally speaking, national daily 
newspapers have larger circulations than provincial newspapers and may 
therefore be in a position to influence a larger number of people. The 
recording unit chosen was that part of these newspaper reports which had 
gas prices as a theme. The unit of enumeration adopted was column 
centimetres. The percentage of each of these newspaper reports In which 
gas prices were adopted as a theme was then calculated. These percentages 
are included in chapters 8 and 9 in the description of the relevant 
events up to the end of each financial year.
The theme of gas prices was adopted as the recording unit because 
of the theoretical reasons described in the first paragraph of this 
section. Before carrying out the content analysis the author was aware
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of the difficulties involved in adopting a thematic approach. Berelson 
(1952, p 139) pointed out that the theme is the most difficult from the 
standpoint of reliability :
Communication on almost every topic is extremely varied, and the 
decision as to when a particular wording should be coded as an 
occurrence of a general theme is not easy to make.
The author did indeed find difficulty in making judgements in
certain cases as to whether or not a particular sentence or paragraph
should be treated as adopting the theme of gas prices. Nevertheless,
Judgements were made and hopefully the results of the content analysis
give, at least, a broad indication of the approach adopted by national
daily newspapers to the publication of the report and accounts of the gas
Industry.
5 Æ  INVESTIGATION QF LOBBYING BEHAVIQUE
The gas industry's lobbying behaviour was investigated by examining 
each of its submissions to the Accounting Standards Committee on 
accounting practices proposed in Exposure Drafts. These submissions were 
examined in the library of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Vales.
Relevant details of each submission are incorporated in the case 
study. This approach overcomes the weakness of previous studies on 
lobbying behaviour which simply coded each submission as oeing either 
for or against the proposed accounting practice. Such a dichotomous 
classification loses much of the richness of the submission eg uhe 
intensity of a respondent's position or the agreement with certain parts 
of an exposure draft and disagreement with others.
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By including lobbying behaviour in the study the author hoped to
improve on previous studies, none of which had investigated accounting 
choices and lobbying behaviour for the same firm. If the factor(s)
driving accounting choices and lobbying behaviour is(are) the same, as
one would expect when studying one particular firm, there should be 
consistency between the accounting choices made and the lobbying
positions adopted.
5.8 CONCLUDING CQKMENTS
This chapter has described in detail the research methodology 
adopted for the investigation of the accounting choices made for the UK 
gas industry during the eleven years from 1 April 1969 to 31 March 1980. 
That investigation is described in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 6 ACCOUNTING CHOICES 1 9 7 0 - 1 0 7 4 
 Introduction
This chapter describes the investigation of the accounting choices
made during the quinquennium ended 31 March 1974. Each year's
accounting choices were investigated separately and these investigations 
are described separately in sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. The 
investigation of the effect of each year's accounting choices on the 
reported outcomes for later years of the quinquennium is shown in section 
6.6. The cumulative effect of the accounting choices made during the 
quinquennium on the reported net returns on average capital employed 
during this period is described and discussed in section 6.7. Brief 
concluding comments are provided in section 6.8.
It should be noted that during the period under review civil service 
reorganisations meant that the gas industry's sponsor department changed 
several times. Up to October 1969 it was the Ministry of Power, from 
October 1969 to October 1970 it was the Ministry of Technology, from 
October 1970 to March 1974 it was the Department of Trade and Industry 
and from March 1974 it was the Department of Energy.
ACCOUNTING CHOICES MADE DURING YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH ,19711
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices
made during the year ended 31 March 1970. The evidence collected up oO 
31 March 1970 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses formulated 
in sections 5.2 is described in section 6.1.1. The effect of the
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accounting choices made for or at the request of the Gas Council is shown 
in section 6.1.2 and the explanations for these accounting choices are 
given in section 6.1.3. The effect of the other accounting choices made 
for the Area Boards is shown in section 6.1.4 and the explanations for 
these accounting choices are given in section 6.1.5
ôxLul Evidence ta 31 March 1970
During the quinquennium ended on 31 March 1974 the gas industry 
went through a period of significant change due to the changeover from 
town to natural gas. Although it began before the quinquennium 
commenced, most of this change took place during the quinquennium. 
During the year immediately preceding the quinquennium (the year ended 31 
March 1969) 22% of the total gas available was natural gas. During the 
last year of the quinquennium (the year ended 31 March 1974) 93.5% of the 
total gas available was natural gas (BGC, Annual Report and Accounts 
1973-74, p 15).
Given the significance of the decision to exploit natural gas to the 
quinquennium under study the researcher decided to start the 
chronological review of explanatory evidence with the report from the 
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (SCNI) published in July 1963 
titled the Exploitation of North Sea Gas (Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries, 1968). The pricing principles discussed in this 
report have already been reviewed in Chapter 2. In addition this report 
included three other matters which are relevant to this study.
(1) The first of these is the description by both the Gas Council and 
the Ministry of Power of the accounting treatment adopted for ubsolete 
plant and the expected impact of that treatment on gas price=>. The
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accounting charges arising from the premature obsolescence of gas-making
plant were estimated to be around MOO million and when asked (Q.79) how
this would be treated in the accounts, Mr. Crofton of the Ministry of
Power replied that :
Out of that MOO million, it is expected that possibly flOO million 
will be accounted for by way of depreciation, so that the eventual 
charges to obsolescence are likely to be around 2300 million. 
According to the standard rules adopted by the gas industry, plant 
would be written off to obsolescence reserves, if there are any, and 
when they have been exhausted they would be written off to revenue 
over the next 15 years or the remaining life of the asset, whichever 
is less.
In reply to a later question (Q.81) Mr. Crofton confirmed that:
Tariffs will have to carry this obsolescence charge if the reserves 
are not available and they will not, I suspect, be available for a 
sum of this size.
Mr. Crofton *3 comments are of interest not only for their manifest
content but also for the indication which they give of the detailed 
awareness of the Ministry of Power of accounting matters relating to the 
gas industry.
The Gas Council confirmed that the unamortised balances on plant
made obsolete by the advent of natural gas were likely to amount to f300
million approximately (Evidence, page 28, para 50) and confirmed (Q.118)
the accounting treatment described above. The Chairman of the Gas
Council explained their pricing policy as:
to have very close regard to marginal costs in certain parts of our 
tariffs for industrial and domestic customers and at the same time 
to have a sufficiently flexible approach to be able to recover 
enough money not to run into deficiency. (Q.136)
As regards the calculation of long-run marginal costs the Chairman
confirmed that obsolescence charges would not be taken into account at 
all but that they would be provided for out of their general revenues
(Q.774).
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The SCNI foresaw that it was likely that the Gas Council would be
"required to adapt their pricing policy specifically to meet the charges
for prematurely obsolete gas plant" (para III 18). They expressed their
concern as follows;
Your Committee do not wish to suggest that Cmnd 3437 promised that 
cost-based pricing policies would be the unalterable rule in all 
circumstances for the future, for it certainly did not; but they wish 
to draw attention to the fact that, in the first case which they
have studied since the Paper was presented to Parliament, they find 
that it is far from certain that the new principles foreshadowed in
the White Paper will be applied (para III 22).
(2) The second matter in the SCNI report which is relevant to the 
present study is the criticism of the Government and the Ministry of 
Power by the Chairman of the National Coal Board (NCB) regarding 
obsolete plant. When interviewed on 15 May 1968 by the SCNI the
Chairman of the NCB criticised the Government for not having a
nationalised fuel policy and claimed that as a result "hundreds of
millions of pounds of state capital have been invested abortively" (Q 
451). In answer to a later question (Q 532) he criticised the
effectiveness of the Ministry of Power regarding the investment
programme of the energy industries. He pointed out that, on average, 
senior civil servants are moved every 22 months and as a result they 
tend not to "look ahead at what is the impact of the act of ■ one industry 
upon the other and the consequent abortive capital at present being 
invested".
The SCNI did not accept the criticism of the Ministry of Power by 
the Chairman of the NCB. They stated (para 1 36) that the .
concept of cost-savings by means of replacement is clear enough 
when looked at within a single enterprise, and it is equally valid 
for the whole of the energy market.
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The SCNI concluded (para 1 37) that :
If the Ministry of Power are satisfied that from an economic point 
of view the replacement of one source of energy by another produces 
a margin of saving which represents an acceptable net return on 
investment, they cannot be criticised on general economic grounds 
for approving that replacement.
(3) The third matter in the SCNI report which is relevant to the present
study is the criticism of the Ministry of Power by the SCNI regarding
obsolete plant. On 26 June 1968 Mr. Mikardo of the SCNI criticised the
Ministry of Power for overinvesting in gas manufacturing plant which
turned out to be uneconomic. His questions demonstrated his concern that
the consumer was as a result going to have to pay a price which exceeded
long-run marginal cost as recommended in Cmnd 3437 (Treasury, 1967).
His questions were as follows :
Q843 Suppose the Gas Council had not had a monopoly. Other people could 
have bought North Sea gas and distributed it; they could have 
started new companies for the purpose. They would not have been 
saddled with the cost of obsolete gas equipment. They would have 
been able to sell it at a price which took no account of writing off 
the cost of obsolete gas equipment. They could have put the Gas 
Council out of existence, could they not?
QÔ44 Why should the monopoly position of the Gas Council and the fact 
that they apparently did not do sufficient to anticipate the 
technical revolution put the gas consumer on a worse footing in 
respect of the prices he has to pay for North Sea gas than would be 
the case in a competitive situation?
Q845 ...if we may go back ...to Cmnd 3437, what it specifies is long-run 
marginal costs and including as an element in the costs an element 
to cover historic accounting costs but not the write off of 
obsolescent plant. On that basis, to the extent that the Gas 
Council is going to load its price with an element to enable it vO 
write off the cost of obsolescent plant, is that not a direct 
departure from Cmnd 3437?
The Ministry of Power replied "Yes" to Q843 but gave evasive 
answers to Q844 and to Q845.
The SCNI concluded (para I 37) that :
Any error in investment lies not in investing in the new process 
which show an economic return, but in having in the past over 
invested in processes which now prove uneconomic.
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This would seem to suggest that the SCNI suspected that the Ministry of 
Power had allowed the Gas Council to over-invest in gas manufacturing 
plant which had or was going to become uneconomic due to the 
introduction of natural gas.
The Times Business News commented on the report as follows :
The most important point the Committee examined is probably the 
effect on the gas industry's pricing policy of adopting different 
financial assumptions ... if - which seems more likely - it is 
insisted that the fSOOm of prematurely-retired gas plant are to be 
depreciated against the greatly increased margins on the sale of 
natural gas, it is unlikely that prices will be reduced much, if at 
all, for some years. (Gas World 5 October 1968, p 305.)
When commenting on the SCNI report to the press the Gas Council
chairman Sir Henry Jones committed himself to lower prices :
Ve do expect lower prices after conversion to natural gas and very 
specially so for large consumers, he said. (Gas World, 5 October 
1968, p 305).
On November 25, 1968, the Financial Times published an article (p 
12) by Professor Maurice Peston which contributed to the debate as to 
whether the accounting charges for obsolete plant should be reflected in 
gas prices:
My view is that it is allocative efficiency that matters, and that 
it is absurd to burden the users of the new product with costs
unconnected with its supply, but which could be charged to them 
because of the special position of the gas industry as a single or 
monopoly supplier. Essentially what we have here is the development 
of a new industry based on natural gas which is replacing an old 
industry based on conventional gas production. Vhy should the 
customers of the new industry subsidise the old one? It is
difficult to see why they should be selected for this tax on income 
distribution grounds, and there are no other grounds which are 
obviously relevant.
The linkage between the level of prices on the one hand and the 
relationship between the financial target and the reported surplus on the 
other was reflected in the comments on future gas prices by the Chairman
of the Gas Council, Sir Henry Jones, in late February 1969. He stated that
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in the 1970s when the gas industry should t^art having surpluses of 
substantial proportions it should be possible to start thinking of what 
further reductions could be made in the price of gas. "Ve shall see as 
we go along , he said. Ve don't know yet what our financial objectives 
will be ~ and that is a further reason for being cautious" (extracted
from Gas Varld, 1 March 1969, p 231).
Vhen arguing for the retention of a vigorous coal industry Lord
Robens in March 1969 criticised the exploitation of North Sea gas as 
follows :
What bothers me so profoundly is that the nation is allocating
cfibOO million in the next five years on the conversion and re­
equipment of appliances and distribution networks and other works 
which will only be required for 20 or 25 years. Existing gas 
making equipment worth £300 million will have to be written off. 
(Gas World. 22 March 1969, p 317.)
There was plenty of sympathy for Lord Robens' views among speakers
in a Commons debate on fuel policy a few days later. Further attacks
were made on the gas industry. For instance, Mr. Fred Evans stated that:
Meeting these costs is bound to be reflected in the charges paid for 
gas. The gas authority, therefore, aim to treble their sales by 
1975, but 1968, the yardstick on which the trebling was based, was 
already a record year for sales by the Gas Council and I beg leave 
to doubt whether a 300 per cent increase is within the Council's 
capacity (Gas Vorld. 22 March 1969, p 317).
And from Mr Alex Eadie came this comment :
All the evidence seems to indicate that in spite of the tremendous 
capital investment by the Government, and all the modern 
innovations, there will not be any cheap North Sea gas for the 
consumers (Gas Vorld. 22 March 1969, p 317).
In April 1969 the Minister of Power published his observations 
(Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, 1969) on the becond Report 
from the SCNI - Session 1967-68 (Select Committee on Nationalised
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Industries. 1968), Accounting costs which were likely to lead to total
accounting costs exceeding long-run marginal costs were discussed ;
The most significant of these to which we can point at present is 
the once and for all expenditure on conversion. Such expenditure is 
not part of long-run marginal costs and this therefore is a major 
reason for expecting that long-run marginal costs will prove to be 
below future average costs. If so, expenditure such as that on 
conversion can earn a proper return only if some or all consumers 
are charged prices above long-run marginal costs in order to meet 
full accounting costs (para 10).
The other accounting cost discussed in this context was the amortisation 
of obsolete plant :
If the costs of obsolete plant did not fall on the gas consumer, 
they would have to fall on the taxpayer through deficits or a
capital reconstruction. There seems no justification for such a 
transfer unless it can be shown that the recovery of these charges 
would distort the pattern of gas sales and frustrate the rapid 
absorption of natural gas to the overall disadvantage of the general 
(tax paying) community. But the additional departure from marginal 
cost pricing necessary to recover these costs will be relatively 
small and will not, in the Minister's view lead to any significant 
distorting of resource allocation (para 13).
The Minister's conclusions on pricing are of interest to the present
study as they give an indication of the direction of influence, if any,
which the sponsor department may have given to the gas Industry ;
The Minister concludes that there are good grounds for charging 
prices close to long-run marginal costs to those consumer classes 
that tend to be relatively sensitive to price, while setting other 
parts of the industry's tariffs above marginal costs in order to 
make a contribution to the industry's overheads. This is broadly 
the pricing policy that the gas industry intends to pursue, as
explained to the Committee by Sir Henry Jones (Q 136),( para 14).
Finally, the Minister outlined his intention regarding the setting of
a future financial objective for the gas industry :
The intention therefore is to set a financial objective for the next 
five years that will be consistent both with the earning of 
appropriate returns over the whole life of new assets and with the 
pursuit by the industry of pricing policies on the lines indicated 
in the preceding paragraphs and with the present and prospective 
situation facing the gas industry, including market conditions and 
the need for a rapid build-up in the use of Borth Sea gas (para 15).
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It seems reasonable to conclude from this that the Ministry of Power 
intended to set objectives for the gas industry for the next five years 
which took into account the fact that prices would be set at a level 
which would enable the industry to recover its full accounting costs 
including the amortisation of obsolete plant at the amortisation rates 
then prevailing.
On 6 October 1969 the Ministry of Power announced new financial 
objectives for the gas industry (The Times, 7 October 1969, p 22. These 
new financial objectives were to earn a net return (surplus and interest 
but excluding depreciation) of 7% on average net assets employed (The Gas 
Council, Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 1970, p 
21). In setting these financial objectives the Ministry claimed to have 
taken into account the pricing and investment criteria set out in the 
1967 White Paper (HM Treasury, 1967) and the transformation in the 
circumstances of the gas industry due to the introduction of natural gas 
(Gas World, 11 October 1969, p 317).
The publication on 14 October 1969 of the gas industry's annual 
reports and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1969 was used oy oir 
Henry Jones, Chairman of the Gas Council, as an opportunity to get the 
message over to the public that gas prices were likely to be lower in «^ue 
future.
The following day the headlines in the national newspapers were as 
follows:
The Timpg (p 22) : Gas Council recovers to £17.5m
profit peak
The Guardian (p 13) : More cuts planned by Gas Council
The Daily Telegraph (p 28) : Gas industry turns loss into fj.7^ m
profit
Flnanei.,1 TItbps <p 12) : Record £17.5in surplus by gas Industry
Financial Time* (p 34) : Lower gas prices promised following
£90m 'profit"
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Dally Mirror (p 21) : Going down ... the price of natural
gas
Daily Express (p 12) : Gas bills cut : C0U5CIL REPORT
RECORD £17m PROFIT
Daily Mail (p 9) : Cheaper gas pledged as sales soar
Ths. .Sun (p 7) ; Gas chief makes pledge on price cuts
As can be seen each of the national newspapers, with the exception of Iha
limes, and The Daily....Telegraph, had a headline which focused on the
proposed reduction in gas prices. The percentage of total space in these
reports in which prices were adopted as a theme was as follows : The
Ilmea, 0%; The Guardian. 59%; The Daily .Telegraph, 0%; Financial Times,
30%; Daily Mirror, 89%; Daily Express, 40%; Daily Mail. 45% and The Sun,
73%. Bone of the press reports made any reference to the accounting
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1969.
The Financial Times report(p 34) included the following:
A continuous process of price reductions for gas was promised by 
Sir Henry Jones, chairman of the Gas Council, yesterday when he 
revealed that the gas industry made a £90.4m 'profit' in private 
enterprise terms last year and achieved a record net surplus of
£17.5m after meeting interest charges.
Sir Henry pointed out that the industry was relying on lower prices 
to bring about the very rapid growth planned in the use of gas in 
industry and that domestic consumers would benefit as their 
appliances were converted to natural gas.
The Government has already said that the price of gas is likely to 
fall in real terms over the next five years, but Sir Henry went
further. The industry's own five-year programmes of development 
provides for reducing average prices of gas over the period, he
explained.
The Financial Times Survey on The GaS Industry published on 24 
Bovember 1969 was also used by Sir Henry Jones to gain publicity for the 
industry's pricing plans. He stated (p ID that "our plans provide for 
reducing average prices of gas in real terms over the next five years
covered by our new financial target".
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— Effect—flf thp, Accounting choirAo for or at thA T»<viiip«f. pf the
Gas Council
All the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1970 for the Gas Council or for the Area Boards at the request of the Gas 
Council are described in Appendix A. The effects of these accounting 
choices on the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 are shown on 
Table 6.1 and the effects on the capital employed at 31 March 1970 are 
shown on Table 6.2. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are derived from Tables All and 
A12 in Appendix A.
The reported outcomes for the year ended 31 March 1970 have been 
restated to what they would have been if these accounting choices during 
the year had not been made. The restatement of the net surplus is shown 
on Table 6.3, the restatement of the capital employed is shown on Table 
6.4 and the restatement of the net return on average capital employed is 
shown on Table 6.5.
These accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 
had the effect of :
(1 ) increasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 by 
approximately £358,000 (Table 6.1) from £13,391,000 to £13,749,000 
(Table 6.3) which is an increase of 2.67%;
(2) decreasing the capital employed at 31 March 1970 by approximately
£7,601,000 (Table 6.2) from £1,665,555,000 to £1,657,954,000 (Table 
6.4) which is a decrease of 0.46%, and
(3) increasing the net return on average capital employed for the year
ended 31 March 1970 by 0.038% from 6.438% to 6.476% (Table 6.5).
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Table 6,1
Effect OIL, the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 of those 
accountiag choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 which were 
either made for, the. Gas Council or were made for the Area Boards at the 
request of the Gas Council
 Incr_______ Deer.
£ £
Gas Council - none
All Area Boards - transfer of all reserves
to reserve fund as at 
1 April 1969 (Table A9) 358,142
Bet increasing effect on reported net surplus 358,142
Table 6.2
Effect on the capital employed at 21 March— 19.ZG— of— these— accounting
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 which were either made 
for the Gas Council or were made for the Area Boards ..at the request of 
the Gas Council
Incr_________Deer
£ £
Gas Council - none
All Area Boards - transfer of all reserves
to reserve fund as at
1 April 1969 (Table AlO) 7,600,987
Bet decreasing effect on reported capital 
employed
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Table 6.1
Restatement of the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 for the 
effect of-those accQunting choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1920— which were, either made for the Gas Council or were made for the 
Area Boards at the request of the Gas Council
£
Reported net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 13,749,000
Less: Bet increasing effect on the reported net surplus 
of those accounting choices made for the Area 
Boards at the request of the Gas Council
(Table 6.1) 358,000
Restated net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 13,391.000
Table 6.4
Restatement of the capital employed at . 31 March 1970 for the._.eifect o£ 
those accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 which 
were either made for the Gas Council or were made for the Area Boards at 
the request of the Gas Council
£
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1970 1,657,954,000
Add: Bet decreasing effect on the reported capital
employed of those accounting choices made for 
the Area Boards at the request of the Gas Council 
(Table 6.2) 7,601,000
Restated capital employed at 31 March 1970 1,665>555,000
- 117-
Table 6.5
the year ended 31 March 1970 which were either made for the Gas Counni i 
or were, .made for, the Area. Boards at the request of the Gas Cnunrii
Adjusted for the 
As reported restated net surplus
in published (Table 6.3) and for
accounts the restated capital
I
.amploved (Table 6.4) 
t
Interest 87,958,000 87,958,000
Bet surplus for year (Table 6.3) 13,749,000 13,391,000
Bet return for financial target 
purposes 101.707.000 101.349.000
Capital employed at 1 April 1969 1,482,832,000 1,482,832,000
Capital employed at 31 March 1970 
(Table 6.4) 1,657,954,000 1,665,555,000
Average capital employed during 
year 1,570,393,000 1,574,193,500
Return on average capital 
employed 6.476% 6.438%
 Explanations for the accounting choices made for or at the.jequest
Ol-the Gas Council
As can be seen fron section 6.1.1, during the two years up to 31 
March 1970 concern was expressed in the House of Commons by non­
government politicians, at meetings of the SCBI by non-government 
politicians, in the press by Professor Maurice Feston and by the press 
itself that the gas consumer was not going to benefit from the 
exploitation of natural gas. It was argued that the prices charged to 
the gas consumer were not going to fall, in spite of the low cost of
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natural gas to the gas industry, because the industry was going to pass 
on to the uonaumer the high costs of the obsolete gas manufacturing 
plant. In addition the non-government politicians on the SCSI had 
criticised the officials from the Ministry of Power for having over­
invested in gas making plant which turned out to be uneconomic. Finally, 
the Government had been criticised by the Chairman of the NCB for not 
having a nationalised fuel policy the lack of which had led to civil 
servants authorising investments in the nationalised fuel industries 
which had turned out to be abortive.
The unamortised cost of the gas manufacturing made obsolete during 
the year ended 31 March 1970 amounted to £36,220,000. It would seem 
likely that based on the past behaviour of the press and non-government 
politicians summarised in the previous paragraph that gas industry 
management and civil servants would expect that disclosure of such a 
large amount of displaced plant for the year ended 31 March 1970 would 
lead to further criticism of the decision to exploit natural gas. In 
these circumstances gas industry management and civil servants would be 
motivated to make accounting choices that reduced as far as possible the 
amount of displaced plant shown on the gas industry's balance sheet at 31 
March 1970.
The accounting treatment of the obsolete plant displaced during the 
year ended 31 March 1970 showed two changes from the previous year 
which are described in detail in Appendix A.
The first of these changes was the recommendation by the Gas 
Council that all the Area Boards' reserves should be transferred to the 
reserve fund. This recommendation effectively removed the restriction 
accepted by nine of the Area Boards that the only reserve which could be
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used for writing off obsolete plant was the obsolescence and development 
reserve. The removal of this restriction enabled those Area Boards to 
increase the amount of displaced plant written off against reserves by
£7,959,000 (see Table A3), thereby reducing the amount transferred to 
displaced plant in the consolidated balance sheet by that amount.
The second change, which was presumably recommended by the Gas 
Council as it was accepted by both relevant Area Boards, was to transfer
obsolete oil-based gas making plant displaced during the year to deferred
charges account instead of to displaced plant account. This accounting 
choice had the effect of reducing the amount transferred to displaced 
plant account by a further £1,936,000,
Thus these accounting choices relating to obsolete plant displaced 
during the year ended 31 March 1970 had the effect of reducing the 
amount transferred to displaced plant account at 31 March 1970 by
£9,695,000 (£7,959,000+£l,936,000) which represented 27.3% of the total
obsolete plant displaced during that year which was £36,220,000 (see 
Table A2).
These accounting choices were consistent with the explanation that 
they had been chosen in order to reduce the apparent impact on future gas 
prices of the amount to be written off displaced plant. By making these 
accounting choices gas industry management and civil servants may have 
hoped to reduce the likelihood of future criticism of the decision to
exploit natural gas.
In section 6.1.1 the effect of the transfer of all reserves to 
reserve fund on the reported outcomes for the year ended 31 March 1970 
was described. If this transfer had not been requested by the Gas
Council, Area Boards would have transferred a further £/ ,959,000
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approximately to displaced plant account and as a result the total amount 
written off displaced plant during the year ended 31 March 1970 would 
have increased by approximately £358,000 (l/15th of £7,959,000). Thus 
this accounting choice had the effect of increasing the reported net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 by £358,000 and decreasing the 
capital employed at 31 March 1970 by £7,601,000 (£7,959,000-£358,000) as 
shown in section 6.1.1. The transfer of obsolete oil-based gas making 
plant to deferred charges account instead of to displaced plant account 
affected neither the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 nor the 
capital employed at 31 March 1970 as the basis of calculating the
amounts written off these two accounts was the same (l/15th of the
unamortised cost). It is argued that gas industry management and civil 
servants would have seen these effects as being of secondary importance 
to their perceived need to reduce the unamortised cost of the displaced 
plant shown in the consolidated balance sheet.
During the year ended 31 March 1970 the Chairman of the gas 
industry had attempted to increase the consumption of gas by forecasting
that the gas industry would be able to reduce gas prices as a result of
the exploitation of natural gas. In these circumstances there was clearly 
no motivation to make accounting choices which decreased the reported 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 in order to provide a 
Justification for a price rise. The gas industry was not in danger of 
suffering any political costs during the year ended 31 March 1970. 
Therefore there was no motivation to make accounting choices which 
decreased the reported surplus in order to avoid political costs. Thus 
the evidence for the year ended 31 March 1970 does not contradict the 
hypotheses derived from the US literature as the motivation to make
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Income decreasing accounting choices assumed in these hypotheses did not 
exist for the gas industry for the year ended 31 March 1970.
— Effect QÎ the other accounting cholcee made for the Ar^a Rnarrig
All the accounting choices made for the Area Boards during the year 
ended 31 March 1970 are described in Appendix A. The only accounting
choice made during the year ended 31 March 1970 for which there was 
evidence of Gas Council involvement was the Council's instruction to all 
those Area Boards who had not already done so to transfer all their 
reserves to reserve fund. The effects of all the other accounting choices 
made for the Area Boards during the year ended 31 March 1970 on the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 are shown on Table 6.6 and the 
effects on the capital employed at 31 March 1970 are shown on Table 6.7. 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 are derived from Tables All and A12 in Appendix A.
The reported outcomes for the year ended 31 March 1970 have been 
restated to what they would have been if these accounting choices during 
the year had not been made. The restatement of the net surplus is shown 
on Table 6.8, the restatement of the capital employed is shown on Table
6.9 and the restatement of the net return on average capital employed is 
shown on Table 6.10.
These accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970
had the effect of :
(1) increasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 by 
approximately £1,077,000 (Table 6.6) from £12,672,000 to £13,749,000 
(Table 6.8) which ic an increase of 8.50%;
- 122 -
(2.) dé'_-rtiâalng- the capital employed at 31 March 1970 by approximately
£3,392,000 (Table 6.7) from £1,661,346,000 to £1,657,954,000 (Table
6.9) which is a decrease of 0.20%, and
(3) increasing the net return on average capital employed for the year
ended 31 March 1970 by 0.075% from 6.401% to 6.476% (Table 6.10).
Table 6.6
Effect-...on the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 of those 
acCQUhting choices made for the Area Boards during the year ended 31 
March. 197.0. for which there was no evidence of Gas Council involvement
Jjicr_____ Deer
East Midlands - prov re gas sales 270,000
- spec amort chge re an ind conv 155,000
- incr in prov re contingencies 76,000
- prov re painting of gas holder 60,000
- inc in prov re stock obsol etc 61,000
- under use of pension prov 32,407
Eastern - dec in prov for deferred repairs 39,000
- inc in mise provs 14,000
Borth Eastern - dec in pension scheme prov 9,000
- rel of retort reset prov 60,000
- dec in other provs 51,000
Borth Thames - inc in amount w/o assets of
former undertakings 46,759
- rel of prov for repairs 46,000
- dec in prov for leasehold dilap 55,000
Borth Western - inc in prov re employers' liab
ins fuBd (\000
Borthern - change in deprec of short-lived
assets 43,400
Scottish - dec in prov for deferred repairs 5,000
South Eastern - change re calc of unread gas 357,720
- change in deprec of new and
renewed services o4d,upp
South Western - none
Southern - inc in mise provs 10,000
Wales - none
West Midlands - rel of prov re gas sales i 808^1^----731066
’731.166
Bet increasing effect on reported net surplus 1 >Q7? >0-19.
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Table 6.7
Effect on the capital eaploved at 31 «arch 1970 at those accounting choices 
aade for the Area Boards during the year ended 31 March 1970 for wMrh 
there was no eYideace .of Gas Council involvement
East Midlands - prov re gas sales
- spec amort chge re an ind conv
- inc in prov re contingencies
- prov re painting of gas holder
- inc in prov re stock obsol etc
- under use of pension prov
Eastern - inc in investment res
- dec in prov for deferred repairs
- inc in mise provs
Borth Eastern - dec in pension scheme prov
- rel of retort reset prov
- dec in other provisions
- prov for obsol
Borth Thames - bal of compensation w/o against 
res fund
- transf from res fund to intang
assets of former undertakings
- inc in amount w/o assets of
former undertakings
- rel of prov for repairs
- dec in prov for leasehole dilap
Borth Western - inc in prov re employers' liab 
ins fund
Borthern - change in deprec of short-lived
assets
Scottish - dec in prov for deferred repairs
South Eastern - change re calc of unread gas
- change in deprec of new and
renewed services
South Western - none
Southern - inc in mise provs
Wales - none
West Midlands - rel of prov re gas sales
Bet decreasing effect on reported capital employed
Incr_______ Dficn
270,000
155,000
76,000
60,000
61,000
32,407
25,000
39,000
14,000
9,000
60,000
51,000
2,826,000
1,000,000
783,000
46,759
46,000
220,000
(%000
43,400
5,000
357,720
642,056
10,000
500.000
1,973,176 5,355,106
1.973.17^
3.39D99&
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Table 6.8 
Involvement
Reported net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970
Less: Bet increasing effect on the reported net surplus
of those accounting choices made for the Area 
Boards for which there was no evidence of Gas 
Council involvement (Table 6.6)
t
13,749,000
1,077,000
Restated net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 
Tab.le...6u&
12>672.QQQ
Restatement of the, capital, employed at 31 March 1970 for the effect of those 
accounting choices made for the Area Boards during the year ended 31 March 
197.0 for which there was no evidence of Gas Council involvement
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1970
Add: Bet decreasing effect on the reported capital
employed of those accounting choices made for 
the Area Boards for which there was no evidence 
of Gas Council involvement (Table 6.7)
Restated capital employed at 31 March 1970
I
1,657,954,000
3^^2^00
Calculation of the effect on the net...return. on average capital employed for. 
the year ended 31 March 1970 of those accounting choices made for the Area 
Boards during the year ended 31 March 197.0 for which there was no evidence 
(Douncll involvementof_Gas_
Interest
Bet surplus for year (Table 6.8)
Bet return for financial 
target purposes
Capital employed at 1 April 1969 
Capital employed at 31 March 1970
(Table 6
Average capital employed 
during year
Return^on average capital 
employed
Adjusted for the restated 
As reported net surplus (Table 6.8)
accounts
t
87.958.000
13.749.000
1 01 .707.000
empioved uâDie
87.953.000
12.672.000
100.630.00.Q_
1,482,832,000 1,482,832,000
1,657,954,000 1.661.346,000
1,570,393,000 1,572,089,000
6.476% 6.401%
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fluids—ffYPlaaatrlQiifi for the other ch n i/^
As can be seen from Tables 6.6 and 6.7 different accounting choices 
were made for different Area Boards. This is consistent with these 
accounting choices having been made independently by the individual Area 
Boards.
As can been seen from Table 6.10 the effect of these accounting 
choices on the reported return on average capital employed for the gas 
industry as a whole was insignificant. This is also consistent with 
these accounting choices having been made independently by the individual 
Area Boards.
If these accounting choices were made independently by the
individual Area Boards then these accounting choices cannot be explained 
by the evidence collected for this study as that evidence only purports 
to describe the pressures on the gas industry as a whole. The pressures 
on the individual Area Boards may have been different.
6.2 ACCOUNTING CHOICES MADE BUR IMG YEAR.MDED 31 MARCH 1971
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1971. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1971 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is 
described in section 6.2.1. The explanations for the lack of accounting 
choices made for or at the request of the Gas Council are given in 6.2.2. 
The effect of the accounting choices made for the Area Boards is shown
in section 6.2.3 and the explanations for these accounting choices are
given in section 6.2.4.
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Çb2A Evidence to 31 March IQfl
The first indication that the gas industry wanted to increase prices
came in August 1970. During that month the National Board for Prices
and Incomes (NBPI) published a report titled Costs and Efficiency in the
Uââ— Industry, (National Board for Prices and Incomes, 1970). In that
report the NBPI estimated that the gas industry could save up to £100
million over the next five years by increasing efficiency. In their
reaction to the NBPI report the Gas Council hinted that they might be
seeking a rise in gas prices in the near future:
Ve consider that, in examining any proposals for price increases 
which the industry may put forward, the Government would be justified in 
expecting the industry to commit itself to achieving increased savings of 
the order recommended in this report and to develop action programmes to 
that end (Gas World. 22 August 1970, p 149).
More details relating to what Sir Henry Jones called "a modest increase"
in the price of gas became available to Gas World in the following week.
The magazine stated (p 168) that;
Higher prices, to bring in about £25m a year are likely to be 
requested in the near future. No application has yet been lodged
  but the industry is understood to feel that increases are
necessary to counter the rise in costs and wages.
At the press conference on 13 October 1970 to present the Council’s
annual report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1970 Sir Henry
Jones explained that increases in gas prices were necessary to enable the
gas industry to meet its financial targets. His comments were as
follows:
We, in common with the other publicly-owned industries, have to meet 
financial targets which are set by government. We do not regard an 
increase in costs as justifying automatic increases in prices. We 
have already achieved substantial savings In costs. But we have 
been unable to offset all the additional costs burden that we 
confront together with many other industries today. Our present 
situation is such that we must either increase some prices or fai± 
to meet our financial targets; and this would result in increased
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borrowing from the government. In these circumstances the gas 
industry is discussing with the government increases in gas prices 
(Gas. World, 17 October 1970, p 293).
The press reports on the day after the annual report and accounts 
for the year ended 31 March 1970 were published (14 October 1970) 
concentrated more on the possible future price rise than on the contents 
of the financial statements. Headlines in national newspapers were as 
follows:
: Gas charges may go up in January
Gas prices will rise by 8pc in winter
The Times (pi) 
The Guardian (pi) 
The. D.aily-Telesraph (plO)
ElaanciaL.Tlffles (pll) 
Financial Times (p34) 
Daily Mirror (p4) 
Daily Express (pi) 
Daily Mail (pll) 
The gun (p4)
GAS BOARDS PLAN 6-lOpc PRICE RISES 
NEXT YEAR
Gas Council Annual Report: Natural gas 
now accounts for over half the supply
Domestic consumer to bear brunt of gas 
price rise
Big rises in gas bills this winter 
DEARER GAS
High speed gas slows down: But prices 
speed UP
NOV GAS BILLS GO UP IN NEW POWER SHOCK
As can be seen each of the national newspapers had a headline which 
focused on the proposed rise in gas prices. The percentage of tocaj, 
space in these reports in which prices were adopted as a vheme was a= 
follows: The Times. 65%; The Guardian, 70%; InS— Dally— lgi.£grapn. 90/^;
Financial Times. 38%; (although in the report on page 34 of the Financial 
Times prices were adopted as a theme throughout) ; Daily— Mirror, iOO/«, 
Daily Express. 100%; Daily Mail. 100% and Iha_Sun, 84%. In addition the 
Financial Times had an editorial that day which had the headline A nign^
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pries, for .gas, in which 65% of the content had prices as a theme. None 
of the press reports made any reference to the accounting choices made 
during the year ended 31 March 1970.
The pressure on the government from non-government politicians
regarding gas prices is illustrated by the following exchange in the
House of Commons on 9 November 1970 on gas and electricity prices:
Mr Judd asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on how 
many occasions since 24 July he had intervened to prevent proposed price 
increases by the gas and electricity supply industries.
Mr John Davies: I have once invited a board to defer a proposal.
Mr Judd: Why is it that the right hon Gentleman has not vetoed price
increases in this sphere? Does he recall the specific pledges made by 
his right hon Friends on this issue of price increases in the public
sector? Is he aware that many of the least affluent members of our
community feel betrayed by this Government and, together with many 
others, regard the so-called pledges in the recent election as nothing 
more than cynical and despicable opportunism?
Mr Davies: I recognise the wide spread concern that there is over the
various increases in prices. I also realise the degree to which this is 
due to the pace of inflation at the moment. I would stress that I have 
no formal powers to prevent price increases,
As regards the undertakings given by this Government, it will be 
recalled that Mr Macleod said in this House that we would scrutinise very 
closely all proposed increases in the public sector and that these 
increases would be allowed only when there was a proven case for them.
(806 HC Deb 1970/71 col 24 Oral answers).
The financial pressure on the gas industry in late 1970 was summarised
in the Financial Times on 23 November 1970, p 15 as follows:
In the past year the industry has also encountered some serious 
financial problems. Like other industries, it has been affected very 
badly by the very rapid rates of inflation in wages, materials and 
general costs. The expense of the conversion programme, for 
instance, originally estimated at £400m in total, has now been 
revised upwards to £530m largely because of inflation. Earlier this 
year the industry also agreed significant wages rises for almost all 
its employees, adding a further £84m to its cosvs over the period 
1969-74.
Signs of strain on the industry's cash flow were already evident in 
last year's financial results and the Gas Council and the Boards are
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now seeking price rises to recover costs. They are thought to be 
seeking a total £30in extra revenue a year with the increases being 
imposed selectively. Boards' running losses at the moment and 
domestic consumers of town gas will probably bear the brunt. 
Announcement of the changes is expected early next year. Although 
the rise is disappointing in terms of the industry's expectations 
about continuing price reductions with the entry of natural gas, the 
long-term trend on prices remains one of relative stability compared 
to general industrial inflation..
In December 1970 the government agreed to price rises for the gas
industry which varied from Area Board to Area Board and also varied
between different types of consumers but which averaged just over six per
cent. (Gas World. 19/26 December 1970, p 503).
The granting of this increase led to the following exchange in the
House of Commons on 18 January 1971:
Mr Judd asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what 
studies he has made of the inflationary significance of proposed gas 
price increases and of their social significance particularly for the 
elderly and those on low income; what action he has taken to 
prevent these increases; and whether he will make a statement.
Mr Ridley: These increases average 6.37. and for domestic consumers
alone 8.27. against an increase of 15.4% in the index of retail 
prices since the last gas price increases in April 1968. Since then 
many consumers have had price reductions on conversion to natural 
gas. Increases in fuel costs are reflected in the retail prices 
index and are therefore taken into account along with other factors 
when new rates of social security benefits are fixed.
(809 HC Deb 1970/71 col 182 Written Answers).
A further question was raised on 8 March 1971:
Mr David Stoddart asked the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry what proportion of recent increases in gas tariffs is due
to wage and salary awards in those industries during 1970.
Mr Ridley: The estimated cost to the gas industry in a full year of
wage and salary awards granted during 1970 is £23 million, the 
estimated additional revenue from the recent tariff increases is £37 
million.
(813 HC Deb 1970/71 col 10 Written Answers)
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âj2b2— Bgplai^tlflaa for the lack of accounting choirp» ««H# fnr nr at the 
request of the Gas Council
As noted in section 6.1.1 the Ministry of Power set the gas industry 
a financial target of achieving a 7% net return on average capital 
employed for the quinquennium ended on 31 March 1974. This represented 
an increase on the previous financial target of over 1%% (Gas World 11 
October 1969, p 317). According to the Financial Times (22 November
1971, p 18) that increase was partly aimed at ensuring that the gas
consumer contributed a larger proportion of the gas industry's financial 
requirements than had been the case in previous years. The Financial
Times claimed that the industry's financial target was aimed at achieving 
a self-financing ratio of 42% over the quinquennium. As the self-
financing ratio for the two years ended 31 March 1971 averaged only 29% 
(Gas Council, Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March
1970, p 25; 1971, p 23) it seems likely that civil servants would have
wanted to see gas prices rise in the future provided such a rise did not
conflict with any of the Government's macro-economic policies.
The evidence in section 6.2 indicated that;
1) gas industry management saw the need to meet the industry s
financial target as a suitable basis on which to justify a price 
rise;
2) the press thought their readers were interested in gas prices
changes;
3) non-government politicians saw increases in gas prices a
possible source of embarrassment to the Government.
The evidence in section 6.3.1 indicates that by May 1971 the gas 
industry had applied for a price rise.
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Ah Can be seen from Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B no accounting 
choices were made for the Gas Council for the year ended 31 March 1971 
nor was there any evidence that any of the accounting choices made by 
the Area Boards for the year ended 31 March 1971 had been made at the 
request of the Gas Council. The reported return on average capital 
employed for the year ended 31 March 1971 was 6.2% against the financial 
target of 7% (Gas Council, Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 
31 March 1971, p 21).
As the reported outcome was well below the financial target, gas 
Industry management and civil servants had no need to make Income- 
decreasing accounting choices in order to provide justification for a 
future price rise or to reduce criticism of such a price rise from the 
press and/or non-government politicians.
There was no evidence that the gas industry was in any danger of
suffering any political costs during the year ended 31 March 1971.
Therefore there was no motivation to make income-decreasing accounting 
choices during the year ended 31 March 1971 in order to avoid political 
costs.
Thus the evidence for the year ended 31 March 1971 does not
contradict the hypotheses derived from the US literature as the 
motivation to make income-decreasing accounting choices assumed in these 
hypotheses did not exist for the gas industry for the year ended 31
March 1971.
6^ .3 Effect of the accQunting cholces flade for the Area Boards
All the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1971 
are described in Appendix B. All these accounting choices were made for
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the Area Boards. There was no evidence of Gas Council involvement in any 
of these accounting choices. The effects of these accounting choices on 
the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971 are shown on Table
Ô.11. The effe*_t on the capital employed at 31 March 1971 are shown on 
Table 6.12. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 are derived from Tables B1 and B2 in 
Appendix B.
The reported outcomes for the year ended 31 March 1971 have been 
restated to what they would have been if the accounting choices during 
the year had not been made. The restatement of the net surplus is shown
on Table 6.13, the restatement of the capital employed is shown on Table
6.14 and the restatement of the net return on average capital employed is 
shown on Table 6.15.
The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1971 had 
the effect of:
(1) decreasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971 by
approximately £904,000 (Table 6.11) from £2,894,000 to £1,990,000
(Table 6.13) which is a decrease of 31.24%, and
(2) decreasing the capital employed at 31 March 1971 by approximately 
£887,000 (Table 6.12) from £1,869,125,000 to £1,868,238,000 (Table
6.14) which is a decrease of 0.05%.
The above decrease in the net surplus for the year ended 31 March
1971 and the above decrease in the capital employed at 31 March 1971 did
not affect the reported net return on average capital employed for the 
year ended 31 March 1971 which remained at 6.2% (Table 6.15).
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Table 6,11
Etrect on the net aurplua for the year ended 31 March 1971 of those 
accounting— choices— made for the Area Boards during the year ended 31 
March 1971 for which there was no evidence of Gas Council involvement
East Midlands
Eastern
Borth Eastern 
Borth Thames - none 
Borth Western
- rel of prov re gas sales
- deer in prov re painting 
of gas holder
- incr in prov re stock 
obsol etc
- under use of pension prov
- accel deprec on distrib 
system
- incr in prov for deferred 
repairs
- deer in mise provisions
- deer in pension scheme prov
Borthern
Scottish
South Eastern 
South Western 
Southern 
Wales
West Midlands
- incr in prov re employers' 
liab ins fund
- capitalisation of certain 
salaries and related costs
- deprec of the salaries and 
related costs capitalised
- incr in prov for deferred 
repairs
- none
- none
- incr in provisions
- none
- change in calc of deprec
Bet decreasing effect on reported net surplus
Incr
270,000
45,000
71.000
10.000
199,000
Deer
121,538
26,007
605,860
58,000
4,000
6,567
249,000
22,000
407.000
595,000 1,499,972
595 .ODD.
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Table 6.12
encla y ^  at 31— aarch 1971— of those accounting
East Midlands
Eastern
Borth Eastern 
Borth Thames
Borth Western 
Borthern
Scottish
South Eastern 
South Western 
Southern
Wales
West Midlands
- rel of prov re gas sales
- deer in prov re painting 
of gas holder
- incr in prov re stock 
obsol etc
- under use of pension prov
- accel deprec on distrib 
system
- incr in investment res
- incr in prov for deferred 
repairs
- deer in mise provisions
- deer in pension scheme prov
- transf from res fund to 
intang assets of former 
undertakings
- prov for leasehold dilapid 
w/o against res fund
- incr in prov re employers' 
liab ins"fund
- capitalisation of certain 
salaries and related costs
- deprec of the salaries and 
related costs capitalised
- incr in prov for deferred 
repairs
- none
- none
- incr in provisions
- transf from investment res to 
res fund
- none
- change in calc of deprec
-IhCIL
270,000
45,000
86,000
10,000
40,000
199,000
6,000
656,000
Deer
121,538
26,007
605,860
3,000
58,000
40.000 
4,000
6,567
249.000
22.000
407.000
Bet decreasing effect on reported capital employed
1,542,972
656.000
886.972
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table 6JU1
I
Reported-net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971
Add: Net decreasing effect on the reported net surplus
of those accounting choices made for the Area 
Boards for which there was no evidence of Gas 
Council involvement (Table 6.11)
Restated net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971
1,990,000
904,000
2.394,000
Table _bil4,
Restâteiaeiit-.of the ..capital employed at 31 March 1971 for the effect of 
these aceouatiag choices made for the Area Boards during the year ended 
31 March 1971
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1971
£
1,368,238,000
Add: Net decreasing effect on the reported capital 
employed of those accounting choices made for 
the Area Boards for which there was no 
evidence of Gas Council involvement (Table 6.12) 887,000
Restated capital employed at 31 March 1971 1.869.125.000
Table 6,15
Calculation of the effect on the net return on average caoitai emDloYsd
for the vear ended 31 March 1971 of those accQuntiniI choices made for
the Area Boards during the vear ended 31 March 1971 for which there was
ilq evidence of Gas Council involvemeat
Adjusted for the restated 
As reported net surplus (Table 6.13) 
in published and for the restated capi 
mrcnunts tal emoloved (Table 6.14)
I £
Interest 106,680,000 106,680,000
Net surplus for year (Table 6.13) 1,990,000 . 2,894,000
Net return for financial target 
purposes
Capital employed at 1 April 1970
108.670.000 109.574.000
1,657.954,000 1,657,954,000
Canital employed at 31 March 
1971 (Table 6.14) 1,868,238,000 1,869,125,000
Average capital employed 
during year 1,763,096,000 1,763,538,000
Return on average capital 
employed 6.164% 6.213%
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— Rxplapatloas for the accounting choicer made for the Area Bnarrtg
As can be seen from Tables 6.11 and 6.12 different accounting choices 
were made for different Area Boards. This is consistent with those 
accounting choices having been made independently by the individual Area 
Boards.
As can be seen from Table 6.15, the effect of these accounting 
choices on the reported return on average capital employed for the gas 
industry as a whole was insignificant. This is also consistent with 
these accounting choices having been made independently by the individual 
Area Boards.
If these accounting choices were made independently by the 
individual Area Boards then these accounting choices cannot be explained 
by the evidence collected for this study as that evidence only purports 
to describe the pressures on the gas industry as a whole. The pressures 
on the individual Area Boards may have been different.
ACCOUNTING CHOICES MADE DURIFG YEAB ENDED 31 MAECH lâZ2.
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1972. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1972 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is 
described in section 6.3.1. The effect of the accounting choices made for 
or at the request of the Gas Council is shown in section 6.^ .2 and the 
explanations for these accounting choices are given in section 6.3.3. ihe 
effect of the other accounting choices made for the Area Boards is shown 
In section 6.3.4, and the explanations for these accounting cholct;ss - 
given in section 6.3.5.
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GuU Evidence to 31 Marrh 197%
On 5 May 1971 the Elnanclal Times, (p 1) reported that the gas 
Industry had asked the Government for permission to raise prices by an 
average of between 6 and 7 per cent from mid-summer. According to the 
Financial Times report these increases were needed to meet the Increased 
costs of raw material and labour and to enable the industry to meet its 
financial target.
On 14 June 1971 The— Times (p 17) reported that because the 
Government had delayed consideration of the gas industry's application 
for price rises the Gas Gouncil had abandoned plans to introduce higher 
tariffs on 1 July. The report pointed out that as it was unlikely that 
any increases which the Government might approve could be implemented 
before September or October the gas industry was now going to lose three 
month's increased revenue which would jeopardise the industry's chances 
of meeting- its financial target.
As a result of the CBI initiative in July 1971 to counter inflation 
there was a further threat to the gas industry’s hopes of a price rise. 
In his 'mini-budget' statement on 19 July 1971 (821 HC Deb 1970/71 cois 
1037-8 Oral Answers) the Chancellor of the Exchequer ‘.Mr Anthony Barber) 
informed the House of Commons that he and fellow Ministers had discussed 
the CBI proposals with the chairman of the major nationalised industries. 
He continued as follows :
The Government expressed the view that the nationalised inu.u:=tr.i.e!= 
should be prepared to match the performance of the private sector 
members of the CBI by accepting the same restraint on prices on the 
same conditions. I am pleased to be able to tell the House than the 
chairmen of all the major nationalised industries have said that 
they intend to co-operate in this way.
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The gas industry was thus pledged to hold down prices to 5% in the 
twelve months to July 1972.
At the press conference on 12 October 1971 to present the annual
report and accounts of the gas industry for the year ended 31 March
1971, Sir Henry Jones made it clear that he did not think the CBI
initiative was in the best interests of the industry. He pointed out that
the industry had been continually hampered recently in its efforts to
meet its financial target by delay in approving price increases :
A 7.5% increase that the industry had wanted to introduce in July 
1970 had been held up until January of this year. A further 7 per 
cent increase the board had hoped to introduce this July had been 
delayed and would now be introduced as a 5 per cent rise in January 
(The Times. 13 October 1971, p 19).
The press reports the day after the annual report and accounts for 
the year ended 31 March 1971 were published (13 October 1971) 
concentrated more on the expected price rise of 5% in January 1972 than 
on the contents of the financial statements. Headlines in the national 
newspapers were as follows ;
: Gas price to rise by 5 pcThe Times (p 1)
Ihe Times (p 19)
Ihe Guardian (p l)
Ihe Daily Telegraph (p 9)
Ilaancial Times <p 1) 
Haily Mirror (p 32)
Daily Express (p 6) 
DaiiyJttall (p 10)
The Sun (P 5)
Gas price increase follows dearer 
electricity : rise in coal cost seems 
inevitable
State help for gas urged
PRICES UP 5 pc AS GAS CHIEF ATTACKS 
GOVERNMENT
5% rise in gas prices coming 
GAS PRICES GO UP IN NEV YEAR 
GAS BILL UP 5 pc shock for New Year 
High speed rises for gas prices 
Now gas goes up 5p in the £
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As can be seen each of the national newspapers apart from The 
Guardian had a headline which focused on the proposed rise in gas prices. 
The percentage of total space in these reports in which prices were
adopted as a theme was as follows ; The Timeg, 84%; The Guardian 89%;
Xhâ— Dally— Tslegraph, 90%; Financial Times, 74%; Daily Mirror, 90%; Daily
Express, 74%; Daily Mail, 100% and The Sun, 94%. None of the press
reports made any reference to the accounting choices made during the year 
ended 31 March 1971.
The Financial.Times Survey of the Gas Industry on 22 November 1971 
(p 18) estimated that as a result of the decision to exploit North Sea 
gas the capital requirements of the industry had increased from an 
average of £60m a year in the fifteen years up to 1965 to over £300m in
1971. The Survey pointed out that this level of capital expenditure was 
expected to continue until the mid-1970s at least. The Financial Times 
pointed out that the large increases in capital expenditure had led to 
large increases in borrowing which were up from a pre 1965 average level
of £15m a year to over £200m a year in 1971. The self-financing ratio
had fallen from the 41 per cent average of the 1949-65 era to an average 
of around 25 per cent since 1965. The Survey argued that part of the 
reason for increasing the financial target for the quinquennium ended on 
31 March 1974 was so that gas consumers, through higher prices, would 
finance more of the industry's capital requirements and that borrowing 
would be proportionately lower. The Survey explained that the industry 
was having difficulty achieving its financial target because price rises 
were delayed or restrained. The £30m a year which the proposed January 
1972 rise of 5% was expected to bring in was not considered sufficient 
to put the industry back on to its target.
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The 5 per cent rise in gas prices was granted from January 1972 
(Annual report and accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended 31 
March 1972, Financial Survey, p 18).
During January 1972 the Gas Bill C HC Bill 1971/72 (62)] to
establish the BGC received its First and Second Reading in the House of
Commons (829 HC Deb 1971/72 cols 223-224 Oral Answers and cols 1635- 
1708 Oral Answers).
Clause 16 of that Bill is of interest to the present study. Clause 
16 stated that :
If in any financial year of the Corporation there is an excess of 
the revenue of the Corporation over the total sums properly
chargeable by them to revenue account, the Secretary of State may
with the approval of the Treasury direct the Corporation to pay over
to him so much of that excess as appears to him after consultation 
with the Corporation, to be surplus to their requirements; and it
shall be the duty of the Corporation to comply with any such 
direction.
The Minister for Industry, Sir John Eden, when introducing the Bill
at the Second Reading Justified Clause 16 as follows :
Ve cannot tell how successful the corporation will be in future in 
the finding of natural gas and perhaps oil, but in this kind of 
activity there is the possibility that really large finds might give 
the industry exceptionally high profits. In such circumstances it 
would not necessarily be right for these profits to accrue wholly to
the industry (829 HC Deb 1971/72 col 1645 Oral Answers).
He then attempted to provide reassurance to those concerned about the
government having such powers by stating that :
I would emphasise as strongly as I can that it (Clause 16) will not
be used to require the corporation to pay over any and every
surplus. The industry has heavy financial burdens in the shape of 
obsolete plant and conversion expenditure, and it has reserves which 
are tiny in relation to its assets. The Government fully recognise
the need to discharge these financial burdens and to build up proper
reserves, and the new powers will certainly not be used to prevent 
this being done (829 HC Deb 1971/72 col 1645 Oral Answers).
Nevertheless, Clause 16 caused considerable controversy during the Second
Reading (see 829 HC Deb 1971/72 cols 1669-1701 Oral Answers).
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Gas Council
All the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1972 
for the Gas Council or for the Area Boards at the request of the Gas 
Council are described in Appendix C. The effects of these accounting 
choices on the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 are shown on 
Table 8.16 and the effects on the capital employed at 31 March 1972 are 
shown on Table 6.17. Tables 6.16 and 6.17 are derived from Tables C4 and 
C5 in Appendix C.
The restatement of the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 
is shown on table 6.18, the restatement of the interest charge for the 
year ended 31 March 1972 is shown on Table 6.19, the restatement of the 
capital employed at 31 March 1972 is shown on Table 6.20 and the 
restatement of the net return on average capital employed is shown on 
Table 6.21.
The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1972 had 
the effect of :
(1) decreasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 by 
approximately £9,751,000 (Table 6.16) from £24,870,000 to £15,119,000 
(Table 6.18) which is a decrease of 39.21%;
(2) increasing the interest charge for the year ended 31 March 1972 by
approximately £1,237,000 from £123,545,000 to £124,782,000 (Table
6.19) which is an increase of 1.00%
(3) decreasing the capital employed at 31 March 1972 by approximately
£9,751,000 (Table 6.17) from £2,021,906,000 to £2,012,155,000 (Table
6.20) which is a decrease of 0.48%, and
(4) decreasing the return on average capital employed for the year ended
31 March 1972 by 0.419% from 7.630% to 7.211% (Table 6.21)
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Table 6.16 
Effect on the net surplus for tho ..year ended 31 March 1972 of those
'i! s ! !
incr. Deer
Gas Council
All Area Boards -
accelerated write-off of 
exploration expenditure 
non-capitalisation of interest 
depreciation saved on 
non-capitalisation of interest 
non-capitalisation of salaries 
and related expenses 
depreciation saved on 
non-capitalisation of salaries 
and related expenses
accelerated amortisation of 
displaced plant
55,683
44,663
100,346
4,612,500
1,237,391
992,517
3,009,062
Net decreasing effect on reported net surplus
9,851,470
100.346
9.751.124
Table 6.1.7
Effect on the capital employed at 31 March J.972_ of those accQuating 
choices made during the year ended 31 March 19.72 which were either made 
for the Gas Councfl or were made for the Area..Boards at the request of 
the Gas Council
Gas Council
All Area Boards -
accelerated write-off of 
exploration expenditure 
non-capitalisation of interest 
depreciation saved on non­
capitalisation of interest 
non-capitalisation of salaries 
and related expenses 
depreciation saved on non­
capitalisation of salaries 
and related expenses
accelerated amortisation of 
displaced plant
Net decreasing effect on reported capital employed
I £
4,612,500
1,237,391
55,683
992,517
44,663
3,009,062
100,346 9,851,470
9,751 . m
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Table 6.1&
pftfltatement of the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 for the 
pffect of those accountine choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1072 which were either made for the Gas Council or were made for the 
Area Boards at the request of the Gas Council
Reported net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 15,119,000
Add: Net decreasing effect on the reported net surplus
of those accounting choices which were either made
for the Gas Council or were made for the Area Boards
at the request of the Gas Council (Table 6.16) 9,751,000
Restated net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 24,@70»0.00.
Table 6A9.
Restatement of the interest charge for the year ended 31 March 1972 .fou 
the effect of the Gas CounclHs accQuatlQg cholce_ to cease capitalialng. 
interest on construction work commenced after 31 March 19.Z1
I
Reported interest charge for the year ended 31 March 1972 124,782,000
Less: Increasing effect on the reported interest charge
of the Gas Council's choice of ceasing to capitalise
interest on construction work commenced after 31 March
1971 (Appendix C) 1,237,000
Restated interest charge for the year ended 31 March 123.54.5.OOP
Table 6.20
the request of the Gas CouhCil
t
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1972 2,012,155,
Council (Table 6.17) _________ _
Restated capital employed at 31 March 1972 2,o^l,906.000
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Table 6.21
CâlCUlatlOfl Qf the sffect on the net return on average capital employed far the 
year ended. 31— March 1972 of those accouatlng choices made during the year 
ended 31—March—1.972—which were either made far the Gas Council or were made 
for tha..Area..,.Beards.at the request of the Gas Council
As reported 
in published 
accounts
Adjusted for the restated 
net surplus (Table 6.18) 
and for the restated capi­
tal employed (Table 6.20)
£ £
Interest (Table 6.19) 124,782,000 123,545,000
Net surplus for year (Table 6.18) 15,119,000 24,870,000
Net return for financial target 
purposes
Capital employed at 1 April 1971
139.901.000 148,415.000
1,868,258,000 1,868,258,000
Capital employed at 31 March 
1972 (Table 6.20) 2,012,155,000 2,021,906,000
Average capital employed during 
year 1,940,206,000 1,945,082,000
Return on average capital 
employed during year 7.211% 7.630%
6.3.3 Rxpianations for the accounting choices made fOT QT at the request...ffif 
the Gas Council
Civil servants' underlying motivation for setting the financial 
target for the quinquennium ended 31 Meurch 1974 was discussed in section 
6.2.2. They were apparently aiming at the gas industry achieving an 
average self-financing ratio of 42% over the quinquennium. As the self 
financing ratio for the three years ended 31 March 1972 averaged only 
35% (Gas Council, Annual Report and Accounts 1970, p 25; 1971, p 23 and 
1972, p 22) it seems likely that civil servants would have wanted to see
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gas prices rise in the future provided such a rise did not conflict with 
any of the Government's macro-economic policies.
The evidence is section 6.3 indicated that:
1)
2)
gas industry management saw the need to meet the industry's 
financial target as a suitable basis on which to Justify a price 
rise;
the press thought their readers were interested in gas price 
changes.
The evidence in section 6.4.1 indicates that by September 1972 the 
gas industry had applied for a price rise.
The effect of the accounting choices which were either made for the 
Gas Council or were made for the Area Boards at the request of the Gas 
Council during the year ended 31 March 1972 is shown in section 6.3.2. 
These accounting choices had the effect of reducing the reported surplus 
for the year by approximately £9,751,000 (Table 6.16) and the net return 
on average capital employed for the year by 0.419% from 7.630% to 7.211% 
(Table 6.21).
In October 1970 and October 1971 gas industry management had 
justified price rises on the basis that they were needed to meet the 
financial target of achieving a 7 per cent return on average capital 
employed. However, before these accounting choices, the return on average 
capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1972 would have been 7.6% 
against the financial target of 7%. It may be that if the gas industry 
had reported a 7.6% return on average capital employed for the year ended 
31 March 1972 against the financial target of 7% and at the same time 
announced an increase in gas prices then this would have given the press 
and/or non-government politicians the opportunity to create a crisis for 
the gas industry and the Government. Gas industry management and civil
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servants alght have expected the press and/or non-government 
politicians to argue that as the financial target had been exceeded by a 
significant margin the price rise was unnecessary and was unfair on the 
gas consumer.
In order to reduce the likelihood of the press and/or non-government 
politicians behaving in this way it could be argued that it was in the 
interests of both gas industry management and civil servants to make 
income decreasing accounting choices which also had the effect of 
reducing the extent to which the return on average capital employed 
exceeded the financial target.
In any event, income decreasing accounting choices made during the
year ended 31 March 1972 which reduced the reported return on average
capital employed from 7.6% to 7.2% (Table 6.21) are consistent with the 
explanation that they were chosen by the Gas Council and by civil 
servants in order to help justify, or at least not make more difficult, 
the arguments for a future increase in gas prices.
Clause 16 of the Gas Bill 1972 provided a further possible 
motivation for the income decreasing accounting choices as that Clause 
gave the government the right to transfer to the Treasury any profits
made by the gas industry. The Minister for Industry had tried to provide
reassurance that this Clause would only be used if the industry earned 
"exceptionally high profits" (829 HC Deb 1971/72 col 1645 Oral Answers). 
In spite of this reassurance a non-government politician Mr Alex Eadie 
claimed that :
It is no secret that the whole gas industry is appalled by the Bill 
and that the officials in charge of the industry are appalled by 
this Clause (HC Standing Committee B 1971/72 Vol II col 840).
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Kr Eadie's comment seems to indicate that the civil servants in the
sponsor department were on the side of the gas industry and against the 
government and probably the Treasury on this matter.
Thus the income decreasing accounting choices made during the year 
ended 31 March 1972 are consistent with the explanation that they were 
chosen by the Gas Council and by civil servants in the sponsor
department in order to avoid the political costs of a wealth transfer to 
the Treasury of a portion of the gas industry's surplus for the year 
ended 31 March 1972.
ÔJL1— Ettùüt td thfl other accounting choinpft for the Area Rnard«
All the accounting choices made for the Area Boards during the year 
ended 31 March 1972 are described in Appendix C. The only accounting 
choice made during the year ended 31 March 1972 for which there was
evidence of Gas Council involvement was the Council's instruction to all 
Area Boards to accelerate their amortisation of displaced plant. The 
effects of all the other accounting choices made for the Area Boards
during the year ended 31 March 1972 on the net surplus for the year 
ended 31 March 1972 are shown on Table 6.22 and the effects on the 
capital employed at 31 March 1972 are shown on Table 6.23. Tables 6.22 
and 6.23 are derived from Tables C4 and C5 in Appendix C.
The reported outcomes for the year ended 31 March 1972 have been 
restated to what they would have been if these accounting choices during 
the year had not been made. The restatement of the net surplus is shown
on Table 6.24, the restatement of the capital employed is shown on Table
6.25 and the restatement of the net return on average capital employed is
shown on Table 6.26.
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These accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1972
had the effect of :
(1) increasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 by 
approximately £2,006,000 (Table 6.22) from £13,033,000 to £15,119,000 
(Table 6.24) which is an increase of 16.00%;
(2) increasing the capital employed at 31 March 1972 by approximately 
£1,577,000 (Table 6.23) from £2,010,578,000 to £2,012,155,000 (Table 
6.25) which is an increase of 0.78%, and
(3) increasing the net return on average capital employed for the year 
ended 31 March 1972 by 0.105% from 7.106% to 7.211% (Table 6.26).
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Table 6.22
Effect on the net, surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 of those 
accounting choices made for the Area Boards during the year ended 31 
March 1972 for which there was no evidence of Gas Council Involvement
_IûûT Desr.
East Midlands - rel of prov re painting of
gas holder 15,000
- deer in prov re stock obsol etc 333,436
- deer of pension scheme prov 104,548
- rel of spec prov for doubtful
debts 250,000
- rel of prov for repairs 240,000
- rel of prov for hardship 10,000
Eastern - incr in mise provisions 149,000
North Eastern - deer of pension scheme prov 10,000
North Thames - none
North Western - none
Northern - none
250,000
36,563
Scottish - deer in prov for deferred
repairs
- rel of pension scheme prov 120,000
- surplus on sale of an investment 
in an assoc company used to 
accel the amort of displaced 
plant
South Eastern - capitalisation of certain labour
costs '
- deprec on cost of labour 
capitalised
South Western - none
Southern - inc in mise provisions
Vales - rel of pension scheme prov 131,585
2,086.494
28,638
11,000
West Midlands - none 2,275,132 188,638
' 188,6m
Net increasing effect on reported net surplus
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Table 6.23.
Effect on the capital employed at 31 March 1972 of those accounting choices 
made for the Area Boards during the year ended 31 March 1972 for which 
there was no evidence of Gas Council involvement
East Midlands -
Eastern
North Eastern 
North Thames
North Western
Northern
Scottish
rel of prov re painting of
§as holder ecr in prov re stock obsol etc
- deer of pension scheme prov
- rel of spec prov for doubtful 
debts
- rel of prov for repairs
- rel of prov for hardship
- deer in investment res
- rel of prov for deferred repairs
- incr in mise prov
- deer of pension scheme prov
- transf from res fund to 
intangible assets of former 
undertakings
- none
- none
- deer in prov for deferred 
repairs
- rel of pension scheme prov
- surplus on sale of an investment
in an assoc company used to 
accel the amort of displaced
- surplus on sale of an investment
in an assoc compainr used to 
fully amort the balance of 
compensation
JjOCIL ..Pfigr.
South Eastern -
South Western -
Southern
Vales
West Midlands -
capitalisation of certain labour
costs  ^ , -u
deprec on cost of labour 
capitalised
none
incr in mise provisions 
rel of pension scheme prov 
rel of pension scheme prov
Net increasing effect on reported capital 
employed
15.000 
333,436 
104,548
250.000
240.000
10.000
117.000
265.000
10,000
250.000
120.000
36,563
774,000
131,585
331.000
2,988,132
UlLgl^
1,576.814
149,000
804,000
365,633
53,047
28,638
11,000
1,411,318
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Table 6.2.4
Restatement q£. tbe-aet surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 for the 
effect QÎ those accQuntliig choices made for the Area Boards during the 
year ended 31^ .March 1972 for which there was no evidence of Gas Council 
involvement
Reported net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 15,119,000
Less: Net increasing effect on the reported net surplus
of those accounting choices made for the Area 
Boards for which there was no evidence of Gas 
Council involvement (Table 6.22) 2,086,000
Restated net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 13&033*00.0
Table 6,25
Restatement of the capital employed at 31 March 1972. for the ..effect..of 
those accounting choices made for the Area Boards—during, the year, ended 
31 March 1972 for which there was no evidence of Gas Council Involvement
£
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1972 2,012,155,000
Less: Net increasing effect on the reported capital
employed of those accounting choices made for 
the Area Boards for which there was no 
evidence of Gas Council involvement
(Table 6.23) 1,577,000
Restated capital employed at 31 March 1972 2,010.578.000
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Tabl@_626
Calculation of the effect, on the net return on average capital employed for the 
year ended 31 March 1972 of those accounting choices made for the Area Boards
Council involvement
As reported 
in published 
accounts
Adjusted for the restated 
net surplus (Table 6.24) 
and for the restated cap­
ital employed (Table 6.26)
I t
Interest 124,782,000 124,782,000
Net surplus for year (Table 6.24) 15,119,000 13,033,000
Net return for financial target 
purposes
Capital employed at 1 April 
1971
139.901,000 137.815.000
1,868,258,000 1,868,258,000
Capital employed at 31 March 
1972 (Table 6.25) 2,012,155,000 2,010,578,000
Average capital employed 
during year 1,940,206,000 1,939,418,000
Return on average capital 
employed 7.211% 7.106%
6.3.5 BxplapAtlnng for the rrthfir a<
Area Boards
As can be seen from Tables 6.22 and 6.23 different accounting 
choices were made for different Area Boards. This is consistent with 
these accounting choices having been made independently by their
individual Area Boards.
As can be seen from Table 6.26 these accounting choices Increaael
the net return on average capital employed by 0.105%. As can be seen
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from Table 6.21 the accounting choices made for the Gas Council or for 
the Area Boards at the request of the Gas Council the net
return on average capital employed by 0.419%. This is also consistent 
with these accounting choices having been made independently by the 
individual Area Boards.
If these accounting choices were made Independently by the 
individual Area Boards then these accounting choices cannot be explained 
by the evidence collected for this study as that evidence only purports 
to describe the pressures on the gas industry as a whole. The pressures 
on the individual Area Boards may have been different.
6A. ACGQUNTISG..XHQICES MADE DUEJIG YEAS ENDED 31 MARGE 1973
This section described the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1973. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1973 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is 
described in section 6.4.1. The effect of the accounting choices is shown 
in section 6.4.2 and the explanations for these accounting choices are 
given in section 6.4.3.
6AJL Evidence to 31 March 1973
As a result of the controversy relating to Clause 16 of the Gas Bill 
1972 (described above) both the government and the opposition proposed 
amendments to that Clause at the Standing Committee stage (HC Standing 
Committee B 1971/72 Vol II cols 829-862). Although the opposition 
objected in principle to the Clause (cols 830-832) their two amendments 
(col 829) were aimed at ensuring that any such transfer was discussed in
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Parliament. Both opposition amendments were defeated (cols (861-862). 
The government's amendment (cols 829-830) which was accepted (cols 861- 
864) changed Clause 16 to read as follows :
If in any financial year of the Corporation there is an excess of
the revenue of the Corporation over the total sums properly 
chargeable by them to revenue account, the Secretary of State may 
with the approval of the Treasury direct the Corporation to pay over 
to him so much of that excess as appears to him, after consultation 
with the Corporation, to be -
(a) attributable to the carrying on, whether by the Corporation or 
by any subsidiary of theirs, of activities falling within 
paragraph (a) or (b) of section 2(2) of this Act, and
(b) surplus to the Corporation's requirements;
and it shall be the duty of the Corporation to comply with any such
direction :
Provided that no such direction shall be given as respects any
financial year unless the total of the sums standing to the credit
of the Corporation's reserves at the beginning of that year exceeds
10 per cent of the value at the beginning of that year of their net
assets as for the time being defined for the purposes of this
section by the Secretary of State. C HC Bill 1971/72 (148)]
The activities referred to in (a) above are the Corporation's oil and
gas activities.
The Minister for Industry, Mr Emery, attempted to establish the 
reasonableness of the new Clause 16 by pointing out that at 31 March
1971 the industry's net assets stood at over £1,800m which meant that 
reserves would have to grow to £180m before the Government's powers
under Clause 16 came into effect (col 853). According to Mr Emery (col
857) the gas industry's reserves were only £6.6m in 1971.
The opposition pointed out that they thought the management of the
gas industry would be unhappy with Clause 16 both in its original form 
(col 840) and in its amended form (col 860). Mr Emery replied (col 860)
that there had been consultation with the industry and others on the
Government's Amendment and "that the Amendment goes a long way, if not
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entirely, to meet objections" (col 860). Mr Varley was not impressed with 
Mr Emery saying that the gas industry was better pleased with this 
Amendment than the Clause as it stood. He expressed his feelings as 
follows :
It is like the man who was being hanged and found out at last that
he was only to be tortured and he was grateful for that. I am sure
that they still object to this as violently as they did before (col 
861).
There were no further changes to Clause 16 and it became Section 16 
of the Gas Act 1972 which received Royal Assent on 9 August 1972.
In early September 1972 the national press publicised rumours that 
the gas industry had government approval for an overall increase in the 
price of gas of 5% or more (Gas World. 16 September 1972, p 205).
When presenting the annual report and accounts for both the year 
ended 31 March 1970 and the year ended 31 March 1971 the Chairman of 
the Gas Council had argued that a price rise was required because the
industry had failed to meet its financial target in these years. As
already noted the reported returns were 6.5% for the year ended 31 March 
1970 and 6.2% for the year ended 31 March 1971 against the target of 7% 
over the quinquennium. During the year ended 31 March 1972 the industry 
reported a return on average capital employed of 7.2% which exceeded the 
target by 0.2%. This meant that the Chairman, Mr Arthur Hetherington had
to change his argument for a price rise. At the press conference on 10
October 1972 to present the annual report and accounts for the year ended 
31 March 1972 he pointed out that the industry was still about £20m
short of the overall surplus necessary to achieve an annual average
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return of 7% over the first three years of the quinquennium. He further
Justified the proposed price rise on the basis that there was ;
still a great need to build up reserves for the future and to
increase the proportion of new capital expenditure which is being
met from internal resources (Financial Tlapg, 11 October 1972, p 
36).
The press reports the day after the publication of the annual report
and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1972 (11 October 1972)
concentrated more on the possible future price rise than on the contents
of the financial statements. The headlines in those national newspapers,
which carried a report, suggested something amiss about the gas industry
wanting a price rise when its sales and profits were improving :
The Times (p 19) .* Gas charges may rise despite Jump in sales
The Guardian (p 15) : Gas Council profit improves but its prices
may rise
Financial Times (p 36) £15m gas surplus "not enough"
The percentage of total space in these reports in which prices were 
adopted as a theme was as follows : The Times. 42%; The Guardian, 80%; 
and the Financial Times. 66%. None of the press reports made any
reference to the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March
1972.
Unfortunately from the gas industry's point of view this proposed
price rise had to be abandoned because of the general restraint in the
autumn of 1972 caused by the Government's Counter Inflation Programme
which started on 6 November 1972.
In his Budget Statement on 6 March 1973 (852 HC Deb 1972/73 col 
235-280 Oral Answers) Mr Barber announced various measures which would 
lead to increases in the public sector borrowing requirement. He
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acknowledged that "the large borrowing requirement in 1973-74 poses a 
considerable financing task for the authorities" (col 254).
6A2— Effect, of the accounting chnicpc
All the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1973 
are described in Appendix D. The effects of these accounting choices on 
the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 are shown on Table 
6.27. The effects on the capital employed at 31 March 1973 are shown on 
Table 6.28. Tables 6.27 and 6.28 are derived from Tables D1 and D2 in 
Appendix D.
The restatement of the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 
is shown on Table 6.29, the restatement of the capital employed at 31 
March 1973 is shown on Table 6.30 and the restatement of the return on 
average capital employed is shown on Table 6.31.
The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1973 had 
the effect of ;
(1) decreasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 by 
approximately £19,746,000 (Table 6.27) from £25,346,000 to £5,600,000 
(Table 6.29) which is a decrease of 77.91%;
(2) decreasing the capital employed at 31 March 1973 by
approximately £19,746,000 (Table 6.28) from £2,071,346,000 to
£2,051,600,000 (Table 6.30) which is a decrease of 0.95%, and
(3) decreasing the return on average capital employed for the year
ended 31 March 1973 by 0.931% from 8.249% to 7.318% (Table 6.31).
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Table 6.27
Errect Qa-the._Jl&t surplus far the year ended 31 March 1973 of the 
accouatlng cholcea made during the year ended 31 March 1973
Increasing Decreasing
Balance of compensation written off as an
extraordinary item 4,686,000
Unamortised balance on pre-vesting fixed
assets written off as an extraordinary item 2,027,000
Accelerated amortisation of deferred charges:
conversion to natural gas 11,125,000
Accelerated amortisation of loan expenses 1.908.000
Decreasing effect on reported net surplus 19,746,000.
table 6.28
Effect, on the capital employed at 31 March 1973 of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1973.
Increasing Decreasing
Balance of compensation written off as an
extraordinary item 4,686,000
Unamortised balance on pre-vesting fixed
assets written off as an extraordinary item 2,027,000
Accelerated amortisation of deferred charges:
conversion to natural gas ’ ’
Accelerated amortisation of loan expenses 1,908.000
Decreasing effect on capital employed
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Table 622
Restatement of .the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 for the
effect of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March
1971
t
Reported net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 5,600,000
Add: Decreasing effect on the reported net surplus of
the accounting choices made during the year
(Table 6.27) 19,746,000
Restated net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 25,346.,Q.QD.
Table. bilQ.
Restatement of the capital employed at 31 March., .1973 for ..the effect .Qi 
the accounting choices made during the year .ended 3.1 March 1973.
I
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1973 2,051,600,000
Add: Decreasing effect on the reported capital
employed of the accounting choices made
during the year (Table 6.28) * '
Restated capital employed at 31 March 1973 2,071.346,000
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Table 6.31
Calculation of the effect ga the net return on average rap, ta 1 ewplnyad fnr tba
y@nr—ended—3T—Mflrch 1973 of the account y n» chninee
31 Marsh JL&Za
Interest
Net surplus for year (Table 6.29)
Net return for financial target 
purposes
Capital employed at 1 April 1972
Capital employed at 31 March 
1973 (Table 6.30)
Average capital employed during 
year
Return on average capital 
employed
As reported 
in published 
accounts
Adjusted for the restated 
net surplus (Table 6.29) 
and for the restated cap­
ital employed (Table 6.30)
t I
143,213,000 143,213,000
5,600,000 25,346,000
148,813,000 168.559.000
2,015,500,000 2,015,500,000
2,051,600,000 2,071,346,000
2,033,550,000 2,043,423,000
7.318% 8.249%
6At2 ExplaTtation for the accounting choices
The self-financing ratio for the four years ended 31 March 1973 
averaged 48% (Gas Council, Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 
31 March 1970, p 25; 1971, p 23; 1972, p 22 and the BGC's Anpual Report 
and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 1973, p 53). Although civil 
servants may have considered this ratio to be satisfactory, particularly 
as the self-financing ratio for the year ended 31 March 1973 had risen 
to 85%, they would probably still have preferred to see gas prices rise
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so that even more of the gas industry's future capital expenditure would 
be financed by the gas consumer rather than by borrowing from the 
Treasury. As Mr Barber acknowledged in his Budget Statement on 6 March 
1973 (section 6.4.1) the large increase in the public sector borrowing 
requirement had presented the Treasury with a "considerable financing 
task". For this reason it seems likely that civil servants would have 
wanted to see gas prices rise in the future provided that such a rise did 
not conflict with the Government's Counter Inflation Programme.
The evidence in section 6.4.1 indicated that :
1) gas industry management wanted to increase gas prices;
2) the press drew their readers' attention to the proposed rise in gas
prices but ignored the accounting choices made for the year ended 
31 March 1972 although these had a significant effect in reducing 
both the reported surplus and reported net return on average capital 
employed for the year ended 31 March 1972.
The effect of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1973 is shown in section 6.4.2. These accounting choices had the 
effect of reducing the reported surplus for the year by approximately 
«619,746,000 (Table 6.27) and the return on average capital employed for 
the year by 0.9% from 8.2% to 7.3% (Table 6.31).
From a pricing perspective these accounting choices could possibly 
be explained on the same basis as in the previous year. Gas industry 
management and civil servants might have expected that if the gas 
industry had reported a 8.2% return on average capital employed for the
year ended 31 March 1973 against the financial target of 7% and at the
same time announced an increase in gas prices then this would have given
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the press and/or non-govemaent politicians the opportunity to create a
crisis for the gas industry and the Government.
Income-decreasing accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1973 which reduced the reported return on average capital employed 
for the year from 8.2% to 7.3%, are consistent with the explanation that 
they were chosen by the Gas Council and by civil servants in order to 
help justify, or at least not make more difficult, the arguments for a 
future increase in gas prices.
The accounting choices during the year ended 31 March 1972 are 
consistent with the explanation that they had been chosen In order to 
avoid a wealth transfer to the Treasury as a result of Clause 16 of the 
Gas Bill 1972. However, the amendments to that Clause before it became 
Section 16 of the Gas Act 1972 probably removed any motivation to make 
income decreasing accounting choices for that reason during the year 
ended 31 March 1973. Section 16 of the Gas Act 1972 would only come 
into effect if the reserves of the gas industry at the beginning of the 
year exceeded 10% of its net assets at the beginning of the year. Given 
that the industry's net assets at 1 April 1972 amounted to Æ2,012,156,000 
and its reserves at that date to only £16,488,000 or 0.8% the accounting 
choices made during the year cannot be explained by the gas Industry s 
desire to avoid a wealth transfer resulting from Section 16.
The review of relevant events up to 31 March 1973 did not identify 
any other political costs which the gas industry or the Department of 
Trade and Industry might suffer as a result of the gas industry s 
published accounts for th* ywr ended 31 Xsrch 1973. Thus the accounting 
choices made during the year ended 31 Karch 1973 cannot be explained on 
the basis that they have been chosen In order to avoid political costs,
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ft.fi ACCOmTMQ CHOICES HADE DPRIIG YEAB SIDED 31 KARCH 1974
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1974. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1974 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is 
described in section 6.5.1. The effect of the accounting choices is shown 
in sections 6.5.2 and the explanations for these accounting choices are 
given in section 6.5.3. The gas industry's lobbying behaviour during the 
year is described and discussed in section 6.5.4.
6.5.1 Evldenca._tn 31 March 1974
The Counter-Inflation Act, which created the Price Commission and 
defined its powers and functions, received the Royal Assent on 22 March
1973. The Commission formally came into being on 2 April 1973 although 
the standstill on prices (Stage 1) continued until 28 April 1973 in order 
to cover the changeover to VAT. Stage 2 commenced on 29 April 1973. 
The Commission was charged by the Act with ensuring that the provisions 
of the Price and Pay Code relating to prices and charges were 
Implemented. Although the Commission's powers were derived from the Act, 
the detailed provisions relating to the Commission’s functions appeared 
in Statutory Orders. There were a number of these Orders. The principle 
ones and their relevance to the gas industry are described below :
(1) The Counter-Inflation (Price and Pay Code) Order 1973 (Ho 658) :
This was the Order which contained the Price and Pay Code in its 
final form. Para 3 described the general principles relating to
prices which included the aim of limiting :
the extent to which prices may be increased on account of 
increased costs.
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And para 16 which turned out to be crucial to the BGC stated that :
Prices which are within the control may not be increased unless 
there is an increase in total costs per unit of output. Mo increase 
may exceed the increase in total costs per unit.
(2) The Counter-Inflation (Notification of Increases in Prices and
Charges) Order 1973 do 664) ; This Order required large firms to 
notify the Price Commission in advance of proposed increases in 
prices and charges and required the Commission to approve, qualify 
or reject the proposed increases. The BGC was one of the firms 
covered by this Order.
(3) The Counter-Inflation (Prices and Charges) (Information) Order 1973
(No 778) ; This Order described the obligation on large and medium
businesses to submit periodical returns to the Price Commission. 
Para 4 of that Order specified that these returns must be
reconcilable with the annual accounts. This Order also applied to 
the BGC.
The Price Commission felt it was important that its role should be
clearly understood and in para 4.2 of its first report (Price Commission,
1973) it described that role as follows :
It is not in any sense of the term deciding whether proposed 
increases in prices are reasonable or unreasonable. It cannot reject 
an application because it thinks that in social or economic terms it 
would be wrong for the price in question to be increased : or even 
because it felt that on general grounds an increase in the price was 
unjustified. The Code is a statutory instrument and the function of 
the Commission is to administer it. The Code gives the Commission 
no general discretionary powers. It follows that if an application 
is within the terms of the Code the Commission must allow it. 
Equally if the application is not within the terms of the Code the 
Commission must reject it.
On 12 June 1973 the BGC lodged an application for a 5 per cent rise 
in gas prices from 1 September 1973 which was estimated to bring in
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£30m a year in additional revenue if accepted (Financial Times, 13 June
1973, p 1). The BGC justified the proposed price rise as follows :
Increased efficiency and major growth have kept the industry
profitable but British Gas cannot escape the effect of the very
severe inflation which has so dramatically affected the economy as 
a whole. Last year's proposals for price increases designed to the 
financial requirements of the industry were overtaken by Stage 1 of 
the counter inflation policy. An application for price increases has
now been lodged with the Price Commission. The proposals which are
designed to conform to the limitations imposed by Stage 2 of the 
Price and Pay Code are based on allowable costs and do not exceed 5 
per cent (Gas World, 16 June 1973, p 515).
This proposed price rise had been discussed with the civil servants 
from the Department of Trade and Industry prior to submission (Financial 
lijlêS., 13 June 1973, pi) which suggests that it had Ministerial approval 
(Gaa.. World, u  July 1973, p 19).
On 6 July 1973 the Price Commission announced that it had rejected 
the BGC's proposed price rise on the basis that costs per unit in the 
industry had fallen (The Guardian. 7 July 1973, p 1). According to Iha 
Guardian report the BGC "reacted furiously" and claimed that the price 
rise had been lost on a "technicality". The Corporation was reported as 
pointing out that the Price Commission had ignored the fact that income 
per unit had fallen at an even greater rate than costs per unit so that 
overall the industry was losing money. The BGC claimed that it had 
pointed out this "major defect" to the government when the code was first 
drafted and it understood that this had been recognised. The
Corporation was therefore "greatly surprised and disappointed" that its 
proposed price rise had been rejected on this basis (The Guardian, 7 July 
1973, p 1).
The annual report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1973 
were published on 4 September 1973. As already noted the reported return
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on average capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1973 was 7.3% 
against the target of 7%. This made it difficult for the BGC to argue 
that a price rise was required in order to meet the financial target. 
Instead it was argued in the following extract from the "Financial 
survey in the unaudited section of the annual report and accounts that 
the financial target had become inadequate for the industry's financial 
needs.
It must ....be emphasised that the target of 7 per cent, 
incorporating as it does the interest element, has become inadequate 
for the industry's financial needs because of the steep rise in 
interest rates since 1969. It is essential that adequate provision 
is made for the cost of replacing existing assets out of current 
revenue either by allocations from profits to reserve, which at the 
end of the year was only £25.8 million, or by a specific provision 
in the accounts. It is estimated that an appropriate amount for 
this purpose would be of the order of 2 per cent on net assets.
The author has calculated that a 2% return (after interest) on average
capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1973 (2% of £2,033.6m)
would have allowed the BGC to earn profits of £40.7m against the reported
profit for that year of only £5.7m. Such a target would have given the
BGC a plausible argument for a price rise.
At the press conference on 4 September 1973 to present the BGC's
published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1973, Mr Arthur
Hetherington, chairman of the BGC, was severely critical of the Price
Commission for rejecting their proposed price rise in July :
Ve are particularly disturbed that the application under the Price 
Code should have been rejected on what we regard as a technicality 
to which we had drawn attention when the Code was being drafted. 
It cannot make sense in my view that we should not be able to raise 
prices when we are incurring heavy increases in costs which will 
cause us to move from a small profit last year to a large loss this 
year ....It is difficult to believe that an industry should be
deliberately forced into a loss-making situation through the 
operation of the Code (Financial Times, 5 September 1973, p 44).
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In Justifying the need for a price rise the Chairman of the BGC appeared 
to play down the 7.3% reported return on average capital employed for the 
year ended 31 March 1973 which was probably an embarrassment to him 
exceeding as it did the financial target of 7%. Instead he Justified the 
price rise on the basis of the large loss expected for the year ended 31 
March 1974.
The press reports the day after the annual report and accounts were 
published (5 September 1973) concentrated on the possible future price 
rise and the BGC's expected loss during the year ended 31 March 1974. 
The headlines in the national newspapers were as follows :
The Times(p 23)
The Guardian (p 1>
The Daily Telegraph (p 7) 
Financial Times (p 44) 
Daily Mirror (p ii)
Gas industry to lodge further 
application for increase in tariffs
Gas loss may put up price
Gas Corporation likely to show loss 
of £35m
GAS CHIEF ATTACKS REFUSAL OF 5 pc 
TARIFF INCREASE
British Gas heading for loss of £35m 
to £45m this year
GAS PRICE RISE IS ON THE WAY:
Massive loss will force new call for 
increases
Daily Express (p 5) 
Daily Mail (p i l )  
The Sun, (p 2)
; Flare-up over gas prices 
: Gas boss blames prices ruling
Bid for high speed gas rise 
The percentage of total space in these reports in which prices were 
adopted as a theme was as follows : The Times. 62%; The Guardian. 66%; 
The Daily Telegraph. 79%; Financial. Times, 43%; Daily Mirror, 100%; Daily 
Express., 100%; Daily Mail. 100%; and Iha_SiUl, 100%. None of the press 
reports made any reference to the accounting choices made during the year
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ended 31 March 1973 although, as already noted, these had the effect of 
reducing the reported return on average capital employed by 0.9% from 
3.2% to 7.3%. This tends to undermine Likierman's <1983, p 145) argument 
that "it is the media which probably act as the most influential 
watchdog" regarding the published accounts of the nationalised industries.
On 1 November 1973 a new statutory instrument the Counter-Inflation 
(Price and Pay Code) (No 2) Order 1973 (No 1785) became the basis of
Stage 3 of the government's counter-inflation policy, the significance of
this statutory instrument for the BGC and its possible effect on the 
BGC's accounting choices will be discussed in section 6.5.3.
On 26 November 1973 the BGC applied to the Price Commission for an
increase in gas prices of approximately 7.5% from 1 January 1974 (Gas 
World. January 1974, p 61). On 21 December 1973 permission for that rise 
in gas prices was granted which the BGC estimated would bring in
additional revenue of about £55m in a full year (Financial Times., 22
December 1973, p 24),
The Statutory Corporations (Financial Provisions) Act 1974 was 
introduced on 8 February 1974. Section 1(1) of that Act specified that 
compensation should be paid by the appropriate Minister to those 
corporate bodies which had in any of the financial years 1971-73 
incurred deficits as a result of compliance with national policy relating 
to the limitation of prices. Schedule 1 to that Act specified that 
£33,381,000 be paid to the BGC as compensation for those losses incurred 
by the gas industry in the years ended 31 March 1971, 1972, and 1973 
which arose as a result of government restraint of prices. Section 2 
specified that compensation should be paid to those corporate bodies 
which incurred deficits for the years ended 31 March 1974 and 31 March
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1975 as a result of price restraint. The amount of compensation to be 
paid for each of these two years was to be equal to each entity's 
reported loss in each year's audited financial accounts.
As a result of the general election on 28 February 1974 Harold 
Vilson formed a minority government. In his Budget Statement on 26 
March 1974 (871 HC Deb 1974 col 294) Denis Healey, the new Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, announced a "massive reduction in the public sector's 
borrowing requirement, a reduction of about £1,500 million compared with 
1973-74". He also announced that the new government had asked the BGC 
"to refrain from putting forward any price increase" (col 301). This was 
justified on the basis that the new government wanted to ease the 
financial pressures on the domestic consumer at a time when they had 
already given permission for coal and electricity increases (cols 299- 
301).
&J5L2 Effect of the accounting choices
All the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1974 
are described in Appendix E. The effects of these accounting choices on 
the net loss for the year ended 31 March 1974 are shown on Table 6.32. 
The effects of these accounting choices on the net assets at 31 March 
1974 are shown on Table 6.33. Tables 6.32 and 6.33 are derived from
Tables El and E2 in Appendix E.
The restatement of the net loss for the year ended 31 March 1974 is 
shown on Table 6.34, the restatement of the capital employed at 31 March 
1974 is shown on Table 6.35 and the restatement of the return on average
capital employed is shown on Table 6.36.
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The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1974 had 
the effect of :
(1) increasing the net loss for the year ended 31 March 1974 by
approximately £13,621,000 (Table 6.32) from £27,879,000 to 
£41,500,000 (Table 6.34) which is an increase of 48.86%;
(2) decreasing the capital employed at 31 March 1974 by approximately
£13,621,000 (Table 6.33) from £2,120,121,000 to £2,106,500,000 (Table 
6.35) which is a decrease of 0.64%, and
(3) decreasing the return on average capital employed for the year ended
31 March 1974 by 0.635% from 6.043% to 5.408% (Table 6.36).
Table 6,32
Effect on the net loss for the year ended 31 March— 1974— of— the.
accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1974
Increasing Decreasing
Changes in various depreciation rates 9,200,000
Non-capitalisation of overheads 3,700,000
Depreciation saved on non-capitalisation
of overheads 207,200
Reduction of hire purchase interest earned i3 828 *00^-----g07 ^ 00
207.200
Net increasing effect on reported net loss 13,620,800
Table 6.33
March 1974 of the accounting choices.Effect on the capital ei^ lay^ at 31 Ma^ 
made during the year ended 31 March 19.74
Increasing Decreasing
Changes in various depreciation rates 9,200,000
Non-capitalisation of overheads 3,700,000
Depreciation saved on non-capitalisation of 
overheads
Reduction of hire purchase interest earned  200--13 Q2Q 000
' 207.200
Net^de^easing effect on reported capital '13,620.800
- 171 -
Table
Restatement of the net loss for the year ended 31 March 1974 for thA 
effect— of— the— accounting choices— made during the year ended 31 March
m i
£
Reported net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 41.500,000
Less.: Net increasing effect on the reported net loss of
the accounting choices made during the year
(Table 6.32) 13,621,000
Restated net loss for the year ended 31 March 1974 27.879.000
Table 6.35
Restatement of the capital employed at 31 March..J974 for the effect of 
the accounting choices made during the.year ended 31 March 1974
£
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1974 2,106,500,000
Add; Net decreasing effect on the reported capital 
employed of the accounting choices made
during the year (Table 6.33) 13,621,000
Restated capital employed at 31 March 1974 2,120.*121 ,QOD.
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Table 6.3.6
CalculatlQB-of the effect on the net return on average capital employed for thp 
year.en^d .^  March 1974 of the accounting choices made during the year 
31 March—1.9.7.4
Adjusted for the restated
As reported 
in published 
accounts
net
and
ital
surplus (Table 6.34) 
for the restated cap- 
employed (Table 6.35)
£ £
Interest 153,931,000 153,931,000
Met loss for year (Table 6.34) (41,500,000) (27,879,000)
Return for financial target 
purposes 112.431.000 126.052.000
Capital employed at 1 April 1973 2,051,600,000 2,051,600,000
Capital employed at 31 March 
1974 (Table 6.35) 2,106,500,000 2,120,121,000
Average capital employed during 
year 2,079,050,000 2,085,860,000
Return on average capital 
employed 5.408% 6.043%
6.5.3 Explanations for the accounting choices
As noted in section 6.5.1 Mr Healey in his Budget Statement on 26 
March 1974 announced a "massive reduction" of about £1,500 million in the 
public sector borrowing requirement for 1974/75 compared to 1973/74. In 
these circumstances it seems likely that civil servants would want to see 
gas prices rise after the end of the gas price freeze which was also 
announced in the Budget Statement. Otherwise the gas industry would have 
to finance its capital expenditure through increased borrowing from the 
Treasury which would increase the public sector borrowing requirement.
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The evidence in section 6.5.1 indicated that gas industry management 
wanted to increase gas prices. That evidence also indicated that the 
accounting choices made for the year ended 31 March 1974 were to have a 
direct impact on the industry's future cash flows. That impact was 
dependent upon the rules of the Counter-Inflation (Price and Pay Code) 
(No 2) Order 1973 (No 1785) and upon section 2 of the Statutory 
Corporations (Financial Provisions) Act 1974.
Para 84 of the Counter-Inflation (Price and Pay Code) (No 2) Order 
1973 (No 1785) applied only to the gas and electricity industries. It 
stated that :
Where since the base date the average revenue per unit has fallen 
faster than the average costs per unit, tariffs may be increased by 
the amount necessary to restore the cash margin per unit of output 
to the level which applied at the base date. Where since the base 
date the average revenue per unit has fallen but average costs per 
unit have risen, the permissible increase in tariffs may include an 
element sufficient to restore average revenue per unit to the base
date level in addition to an element calculated on the basis of
allowable cost increases.
Para 21 of the Code stated that the base date was 30 April 1973 but 
where :
The price of a particular product or of a range of related products 
has not been increased since 30 September 1972 that date may, at 
the option of the enterprise, be substituted for 30 April 1973.
As the BGC had not been able to increase its prices since 1 January
1972 it could have opted for September 1972 as its base date if it so
desired.
As the submissions to the Price Commission remain confidential the 
researcher was unable to ascertain directly the exact basis of the price 
rise proposed by the BGC in November 1973. However, it seems clear from
the Financial Surveys included in the annual report and accounts for the
years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 that whichever basis was
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opted for by the BGC one or other of the situations described in para 84 
would apply.
According to the Financial Survey of the year ended 31 Ihurch 1973 
included In the published report and accounts for that year Cp 12) there 
was during that year a reduction of 61p from 7.83p to 7.22p in the 
average revenue per therm and a reduction of .47p from 7.64p to 7.17p per
them in the overall cost of gas supplied. According to the Financial 
Survey of the year ended 31 March 1974 (p 11) there was during that year 
a reduction of .2Op from 7,22p to 7.02p in the average revenue per therm 
and an increase of .2 Ip from 7.17p to 7.38p per therm in the overall cost 
of gas supplied. Thus during these two years there appeared to be a 
continued reduction in the average revenue per therm making para 84 
relevant to the BGC regarding any submission to the Price Commission for 
a price rise.
If the BGC chose 30 September 1972 as its These date for the price 
rise proposed in ifoveaber 1973 (which seems likely on the Tbasis of the 
evidence below) it would probably have been possible for the corporation 
to have claimed that, since the base date, the average revenue per therm 
had fallen faster than the average costs per therm as shown below.
m  p^ft 1972 36 Sept 1973 Beereââè
Average revenue per them 7.52p 7-12p (0.4Op)
Average costs per therm 7.40p 7.27p <0,13p)
The author has made the above calculations based on two
assumptions:
<1> that the proposed price rise in November 1973 was based on 
accounting figures up to 30 September 1973, and
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(2) that revenues and costs changed evenly through both the year ended 
31 March 1973 and the year ended 31 March 1974.
In these circumstances para 84 stated that :
tariffs may be increased by the amount necessary to restore the
cash margin per unit of output to the level which applied at the
base date.
This would appear to have motivated the BGC to make accounting choices
during the year ended 31 March 1974 which either decreased revenue or
increased costs.
There were three accounting choices made during the year ended 31
March 1974 (see Table 6.32). The method of release of hire purchase
interest to revenue was standardised for all regions which had the effect
of decreasing revenue by £928,000. There were changes in various
depreciation rates which increased total costs by £9,200,000. The
decision to cease capitalising overheads related to fixed assets
constructed by the BGC increased total costs by a net £3,492,800, Thus
these accounting choices were consistent with the explanation that they
had been chosen in order to increase the price rise permitted under the
Price Code if 30 September 1972 was chosen as the base date.
If the BGC chose 30 April 1973 as its base date for the price rise
proposed in November 1973 it would probably have been possible for the
corporation to have claimed that, since the base date, the average revenue
per therm had fallen but average costs had risen as shown below ;
Increase
3 0 April 1973 30 Sept 19T1 (decrease)
Average revenue per therm 7.20p 7.12p (0.8p)
Average costs per therm 7.19p 7.27^  0 8p
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The author has made the above calculations based on two
assumptions:
(1) that the proposed price rise in November 1973 was based on
accounting figures to 30 September 1973 and
(2) that revenues and costs changed evenly through the year ended 31
March 1974.
In these circumstances para 84 stated that :
the permissible increase in tariffs may include an element 
sufficient to restore average revenue per unit to the base level in 
addition to an element calculated on the basis of allowable cost 
increases.
This would appear to motivate the BGC to make accounting choices during 
the year ended 31 March 1974 that either decreased revenue or increased 
allowable costs.
It is not clear from the Price Code whether the overheads which 
were previously capitalised would have been accepted as an allowable
cost. However, depreciation was specifically included in allowable costs
[ para 28 (ii) (d)]. Thus at least two out of three accounting choices made 
during the year ended 31 March 1974 were consistent with the explanation 
that they had been chosen in order to increase the price rise permitted 
under the Price Code if 30 April 1973 was chosen as the base date.
The evidence in section 6.5.1 suggests that the civil servants had 
backed the BGC's proposed price rise of 5% in June 1973. Presumably they
did so in order to reduce the pressure on the PSBR for the reasons
described in the first paragraph of this section. The rejection of that 
proposed price rise by the Price Commission in July 1973 would therefore 
have been a disappointment to the civil servants. The disappointment of 
gas industry management is clear from section 6.5.1. Thus both civil
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servants and gas Industry management had reasons for making accounting 
choices during the year ended 31 March 1974 which would increase the 
size of the price rise which would be acceptable to the Price Commission 
in November 1973. For the reasons described in the preceding paragraphs 
these accounting choices had to be income decreasing. Gas industry 
management and civil servants may also have felt that income decreasing 
accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1974 would help 
Justify future proposed price rises even if the Price Code was changed.
As already noted in section 6.5.1 section 2 of the Statutory 
Corporations (Financial Provisions) Act 1974 required the Government to 
pay compensation equal to the financial loss reported in the audited 
accounts. The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1974 increased the net loss by £13.6m from £27.9m to £41.5m which is an 
increase of 49%. Thus these accounting choices increased the 
compensation the BGC received from the Government by £13.6m or 49%. As 
explained above these accounting choices are consistent with the 
explanation that they were chosen in order to increase the size of the 
price rise allowable by the Price Commission in November 1973. However, 
the passing of the Statutory Corporations (Financial Provisions) Act 1974 
in February 1974 ensured that the BGC received a further cash flow 
benefit from these accounting choices.
As a result of the increased payment for compensation these 
accounting choices had the effect of increasing the PSBR by £13.6 million. 
However, the civil servants may not have been too concerned as there may 
have been a net benefit to the PSBR from these accounting choices. The 
effect of these accounting choices in reducing gas industry borrowing and 
therefore the PSBR as a result of the December 1973 gas price rise may
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bave been more than «3.6 million. That gas price rise was estimated to
bring in £55 million in a full year (section 6.5.1).
6 .5 .4  T .n h b y 1 n g
On 26 July 1973 Mr J H Smith, the Member for Finance for the BGC
lobbied on Exposure Draft 8 "Accounting for changes in the purchasing
power of money". That submission included the following comments :
There are two adjustments of significance in the revenue account,
and these are on depreciation and on the holding of long-term loans. 
I welcome the adjustment on depreciation as being a reasonable
approximation to replacement cost depreciation, but see no merit in 
the adjustment for holding of long-term loans which suggests a 
profitability for the industry which does not exist.
Thus the BGC supported the adjustment for depreciation which would
decrease income but opposed the adjustment for purchasing power gains on
long-term loans which would increase income. Thus this submission on
Exposure Draft 8 is consistent with BGC’s preference for accounting
choices which would decrease income.
6.6 EFFECT ON QUINQUENNIUM OUTCOMES.
As noted in section 6.1.1 the financial target set for the gas industry
for the quinquennium ended on 31 March 1974 was to earn a net return
(surplus and interest but excluding depreciation) of 7 per cent on
average capital employed during the five-year period ended on 31 March
1974. The effect of the accounting choices made each year on the
reported outcomes for that year has already been described.
However, as Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, p 104) point out ;
most accounting technique choices are timing choices because they 
shift revenues or expenses among periods, without altering to.al 
revenue and expenses over those periods. Thus, the increase
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decrease dlchotomlsatlon does not fully reflect the decision being 
made. °
Over the life of an accounting entity these timing differences will make 
no difference to the total income reported. However, over a relatively 
short period of time, such as a quinquennium, this may not be the case.
Consequently, the researcher decided to investigate the effect of the 
accounting choices made during the quinquennium on all the outcomes for 
the quinquennium. Calculations were made of not only the effect of each 
accounting choice on the net surplus or deficit for the year in which the 
accounting choice was made but also the effect on the net surplus or 
deficit for each remaining year of the quinquennium. These calculations 
are shown in Appendices A to E. Calculations were made of not only the 
effect of each accounting choice on the net assets at the end of the year 
in which the accounting choice was made but also the effect on the net 
assets at the end of each remaining year of the quinquennium. These 
calculations are also shown in Appendices A to E.
Finally, calculations were made of not only the effect of the 
accounting choices on the net return on average capital employed for the 
year in which the accounting choice was made but also the effect on the 
net return on average capital employed for each remaining year of the 
quinquennium. These calculations are shown in Appendix F.
This section provides a summary of the investigation of the effect 
of the accounting choices made during the quinquennium on all the 
outcomes for the quinquennium. The effect of each year's accounting 
choices was investigated and is described separately in sections 6.6.1,
6.6.2, 6,6.3, 6.6.4 and 6.6.5.
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It should be noted that all the accounting choices made during the 
three years ended 31 March 1972 are included in this section.
ôAâl— Effect of accounting choicee made during y^ar 31 March 1970
The effects of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1970 on the outcomes for the quinquennium are shown on Table 6.37.
Table. 6_.37— Effect of the accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March... 1970 QD the outcomes for the quinquennium
Year ended 
31 March
Effect on net 
surplus
Incr Deer
Effect on capital
employed
Incr Deer
Effect on net 
return on average 
capital employed 
Iner Deer
1970 1,435,000 10,993,000 0.1%
1971 1,335,000 620,000 0.1%
1972 1,883,000 3,414,000 0.1%
1973 4,114,000 4,664,000 0.2%
1974 2,035,000 5,343,000 No change
The effects on the net surplus for each year were obtained from
Table All and the effects on the capital employed for each year were
obtained from Table A12. The effects on the net return on average 
capital employed for the years ended 3-1 March 1970, 31 March 1971, 31 
March 1972, 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 were obtained from Tables 
F3, F6, FIO, F14 and F18 respectively.
As can be seen from Table 6.37 the accounting choices made during 
the year ended 31 March 1970 did not have a significant effect on the 
net return on average capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1970 
nor did they have a significant effect on the net return on average 
capital employed for the remaining years of the quinquennium.
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8.6.2— Effect of accounting rhnirfa »aHa Hiirlng year en/led 31 March 1971
The effects of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1971 on the reported outcomes for the quinquennium are shown on 
Table 6.38.
Table 6.38 Effect of the accounting choices made during, the year ended
31 March 1971 on the outcomes for the quinquennium.
Year ended 
31 March
Effect on net
surplus
Incr Deer
Effect on capital
employed
Incr Deer
Effect on net 
return on average 
capital employed 
Incr Deer
1971 904,000 887,000 No change
1972 760,000 1,647,000 0.1%
1973 703,000 2,350,000 No change
1974 991,000 3,341,000 No change
The effects on the net surplus for each year were obtained from
Table B1 and the effects on the capital employed for each year were 
obtained from Table B2. The effects on the net return on average capital 
employed for the years ended 31 March 1971, 31 March 1972, 31 March 1973 
and 31 March 1974 were obtained from Tables F6, FIO, F14 and F18
respectively.
As can be seen from Table 6.38 the accounting choices made during
the year ended 31 March 1971 did not affect the net return on average
capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1971 nor did they have a 
Significant effect on the net return on average capital employed for the 
remaining years of the quinquennium.
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& Æ 3 — Effect of accounting chnlr##* during ypar Atwlori 31 Marrh 1972
The effects of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1972 on the reported outcomes for the quinquennium are shown on 
Table 6.39.
Table 6.39 Effect of...the accounting choicea-jaadfi during the year ended
31 March 1972 on the outcomes for the quinquennium
Year ended 
31 March
Effect on net 
surplus
. Incr Deer
Effect on capital
employed
Incr Deer
Effect on net 
return on average 
capital employed 
Incr Deer
1972 7,665,000 8,174,000 0.3%
1973 9,597,000 17,771,000 0.4%
1974 24,219,000 41,990,000 0.9%
The effects on the net surplus for each year were obtained from 
Table C4 and the effects on the capital employed for each year were 
obtained from Table C5. The effects on the net return on average capital 
employed for the years ended 31 March 1972, 31 March 1973 and 31 March 
1974 were obtained from Tables FIO, F14 and F18 respectively.
As can be seen from Table 6.39 the accounting choices made during 
the year ended 31 March 1972 had the effect of reducing the return on 
average capital employed by 0.3% in that year, by 0.4% In the year ended 
31 March 1974 and by 0.9% in the year ended 31 March 1974. The 
accounting choices which had the largest effect in reducing the average 
capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1972 were the accelerated 
amortisation of displaced plant, the accelerated write-off of exploration 
expenditure, the non-capitalisation of Interest and the non-capitalisation 
of salaries and related expenses. As can be seen from Table C4 and C5
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these accounting choices had not begun to reverse by the end of the 
quinquennium. They had a major effect in reducing the return on average 
capital employed during the years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974.
6.6.4- Effect of acCOUatlM choicee «adm diirlng year endAH 31 1Q73
The effects of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1973 on the reported outcomes for the quinquennium are shown on 
Table 6.40.
Table. 6.40— Effect of_the accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1973. on the outcomes for the quinquennium
Effect on net
Year ended Effect on net Effect on capital return on average
31 March surplus employed capital employed
Incr Deer Incr Deer Incr Deer
1973 19,746,000 19,746,000 0.9%
1974 18,545,000 38,291,000 0.8%
The effects on the net surplus for each year were obtained from
Table D1 and the effects on the capital employed for each year were 
obtained from Table D2. The effects on the net return on average capital 
employed for the years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 were
obtained from Tables F14 and F1Ô respectively.
As can be seen from Table 6.40 the accounting choices made during 
the year ended 31 March 1973 had the effect of reducing the return on 
average capital employed by 0.9% in that year and by 0.8% in the year 
ended 31 March 1974. As can be seen from Table D1 the accounting
choices during the year ended 31 March 1973 to write off the balance of 
compensation and the unamortised balances on pre vesting fixed assets as
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extraordinary items began to reverse during the year ended 31 March
1974. This had the effect of increasing income for the year ended 31
March 1974 by £1,581,914. However, the accounting choices during the
year ended 31 March 1973 to accelerate the amortisation of deferred
charges and to accelerate the amortisation of loan expenses did not begin
to reverse during the year ended 31 March 1974. This had the effect of 
decreasing income for the year ended 31 March 1974 by £20,126,886. Thus 
the overall effect of the accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1973 on the income for the year ended 31 March 1974 was to 
decrease it by £18,544,972.
6.6.5 Effect of accounting choices made during year ended 31 Marck-1974
The effects of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1974 on the outcomes for the year ended 31 March 1974 are 
described in section 6.5.2. As this was the last year of the quinquennium 
these accounting choices obviously did not have any other effects on the 
quinquennium. These effects are reproduced in summarised form in Table 
6.41.
Table 6.41
Effect on net
Year ended Effect on net Effect on capital return on average
31 March loss employed capital employed
Deer Incr Decu Incr Deer------
1974
Aiiwl.- -- --— ---------
13,621,000 13,621,000 0.6%
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tJ.— CUM ULATIVE EFFECT_QN RETURN ON CAPITAL RMPrnvpp
Table 6.42 overleaf, which is based on Tables 6.37, 6.38, 6.39, 6.40 
and 6.41, shows the cumulative effect of the accounting choices made 
during the quinquennium on the reported net returns on average capital 
employed during the quinquennium.
Table. 6,42---Cumulative effect on accounting choices _made durinv the
quinquennium on the --reported net returns on average canital emnlnv^ aH
during the quinquennium
Accounting choices 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
1970 - Table 6.37 +0.1% +0.1% +0.1% + 0.2% No change
1971 - Table 6.38 No change -0.1% No change No change
1972 - Table 6.39 -0.3% -0.4% -0.9%
1973 - Table 6.40 -0.9% -0.8%
1974 - Table 6.41 -0.6%
+0.1% +0.1% -0.3% -1.1% -2.3%
Outcome before 
accounting choices 
made in the 
quinquennium 6.4% 6.1% 7.5% 8.4% 7.7%
Reported outcome 6.5% 6.2% 7.2% 7.3% 5.4%
Financial target 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0%
Presumably it was assumed in October 1969 when the financial target 
was set that the outcomes for each year of the quinquennium would be 
measured on the basis of the accounting choices used in the annual report 
and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1969 which were published in 
October 1969. If these accounting choices had been used throughout the 
quinquennium the outcomes for each year would have been different as 
shown in Table 6.42. For the last three years of the quinquennium these 
differences became significant. For the year ended 31 March 1972 the 
return on average capital employed was reduced by 0.3% from 7.5% to 7.2%.
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For the year ended 31 March 1973 the return on average capital employed 
was reduced by 1.14 from 8.4% to 7.3%. For the year ended 31 March 1974 
the return on average capital employed was reduced by 2.3% from 7.7% to 
5.4% (a reduction of one third).
6.8- . SUMMARY
This chapter has described the investigation of the accounting 
choices made during the quinquennium ended 31 March 1974. As noted in 
section 5.2 this study has assumed that civil servants had some 
involvement in making accounting choices for the gas industry. Limited 
evidence consistent with that assumption has been identified and is 
described in this chapter.
The evidence relating to the accounting choices made either for the 
Gas Council or for the individual Area Boards at the request of the Gas 
Council during the years ended 31 March 1970, 31 March 1971 and 31 March 
1972 and the evidence relating to the accounting choices made for the BGC 
during the years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 was not 
inconsistent with the two explanatory hypotheses, identified in section
5.2, which were used to focus the empirical study. During the years 
ended 31 March 1970 and 31 March 1971 when there was no need to Justify 
or reduce criticism of a price rise nor a need to avoid political costs 
income decreasing accounting choices were not made. However, during the 
years ended 31 March 1972, 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 when such 
needs did exist income decreasing accounting choices were made. The 
effect of these income decreasing accounting choices was not 
insignificant reducing the gas industry's reported net income by 39.2%
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for the year ended 31 March 1972, by 77.9% for the year ended 31 March
1973 and by 48.9% for the year ended 31 March 1974.
The investigation of the accounting choices made during the 
quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 identified two explanations for the 
accounting choices not covered by the two explanatory hypotheses derived 
from the US literature. The accounting choices made during the year 
ended 31 March 1970, which reduced the amount of displaced plant shown 
on the consolidated balance sheet, were consistent with the explanation 
that they had been made in order to reduce the likelihood of future 
criticism of government politicians, civil servants and gas industry 
management that the decision to exploit natural gas was not going to lead 
to lower gas prices as the gas consumer was going to have to bear the 
costs of obsolete gas manufacturing plant. The accounting choices made 
during the year ended 31 March 1974 were consistent with the explanation 
that they were made in order to increase the amount of compensation for 
price restraint payable under section 2 of the Statutory Corporations 
(Financial Provisions) Act 1974.
The hypothesised explanations for the accounting choices would only 
hold provided gas industry management and those civil servants involved 
in making the accounting choices believed that the other groups 
participating in the political process relating to the gas industry would 
not adjust for the accounting choices. The investigation described in 
this chapter provided no evidence that any of these groups had, in fact, 
made adjustments for the accounting choices, presumably because they 
thought that the marginal costs of adjusting exceeded the marginal 
benefits. Thus the investigation of the behaviour of the other groups 
participating in the political process relating to the gas industry did
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not provide evidence which was inconsistent with the hypothesised
explanations for the accounting choices.
During the quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 the gas industry only 
lobbied on one proposed accounting standard, ED8 in July 1973. The 
positions adopted in that submission were consistent with gas industry 
management's apparent preferences for accounting choices which would
decrease the industry's reported profits.
The investigation of the accounting choices for the quinquennium 
ended 31 March 1974 investigated the effect of the accounting choice on 
all the outcomes for the quinquennium. The accounting choices made 
during the years ended 31 March 1972 and 31 March 1973 were found to 
have a significant effect on the reported outcomes for the remaining 
years of the quinquennium.
Finally, the cumulative effect of the accounting choices made during 
the quinquennium on the reported net returns on average capital for each 
year of the quinquennium were calculated. For the last three years of 
the quinquennium these reported net returns were significantly reduced : 
for the year ended 31 March 1972 by 0.3% from 7.5% to 7.2%; for the year 
ended 31 March 1973 by 1.1% from 8.4% to 7.3%; for the year ended 31 
March 1974 by 2.3% from 7.7% to 5.4%. Thus the cumulative effect of the 
accounting choices made during the quinquennium would appear to have had
an impact on the usefulness of the comparison of the reported net return
on average capital employed with the financial target.
The next chapter describes the investigation of the accounting 
choices and the submissions on proposed accounting standards made during 
the six years ended 31 March 1980.
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CHAPTER 7 ACCQUHTIBG CHOICKR 1Q7S-lQ«n
•LQ IBTRQDOCTIQH
This chapter describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the six years ended 31 March 1980. Each year's accounting 
choices were examined separately and these investigations are described 
separately in sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6. Brief concluding 
comments are provided in section 7.7.
The financial framework for the six years ended 31 March 1980 
described in this chapter was different from that for the five years 
ended 31 March 1974 described in the previous chapter. A financial 
target was set for the quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 which was 
consistent with the recommendations of the 1967 White Paper (Cmnd 3437). 
For the six years ended 31 March 1980 described in this chapter a 
financial target was only set for one year - the year ended 31 March 
1980.
7,1 ACCQUMTIMG CHOICES MADE DUEIMG YEAR EBBED 31 MARCH 1975.
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1975. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1975 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses formulated 
in section 5.2 is described in section 7.1.1. The effect of the 
accounting choices is shown in section 7.1.2 and the explanations for 
these accounting choices are given in section 7.1.3.
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ZJJL— Evidence to 31 Xamh 197^
As noted in section 6.5.1 Denis Healey announced in his Budget
Statement on 26 March 1974 that he had asked the BGC "to refrain from
putting forward any price increase". However, by June 1974 the BGC was
lobbying for a price rise. On 26 June 1974 the Financial Times (p 44)
carried a report titled "Gas chief calls for price rise". That report
included the following ;
Confirming that the corporation expected to show a loss of about 
Æ40m in the last financial year, Sir Arthur said that prices would 
have to rise by around 10% if an even greater loss was not to be 
made this year ... The corporation was already in negotiations for 
an increase earlier in the year when the change of government led 
to a halt in the discussions. Although no further negotiations have 
since taken place the Department of Energy at least is known to
favour granting the rise this year.
The unaudited sections of the BGC's annual report and accounts for
the year ended 31 March 1974 published on 3 September 1974 were used by
the BGC to lobby for a price rise. In the Foreword (p 7) Sir Arthur
Hetherington stated :
As a direct result of price restraint during a period of high 
inflation, we are announcing a very substantial loss in the year
ended 31 March 1974 and warning of the danger of losses in 
subsequent years unless some modest price increases are permitted.
The Review of the Year (p 8) included the following :
Soon after the end of the year HM Government asked the Corporation 
to refrain, for the time being, from increasing the price charged to 
domestic customers. Unless this policy is altered and the 
Corporation is allowed to increase prices to meet increases in 
costs, the financial position of the Corporation will deteriorate and 
it is likely that an increased loss will be incurred during the year 
ending 31 March 1975. The Corporation has made and will continue 
to make strong representations to the Secretary of State for a 
change in this policy so that the gas industry can recover a sound 
financial position and avoid accumulating losses. This can be done 
with the aid of a modest increase in charges.
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The Financial Survey (p 11) summarised the history of governments' 
restraint of gas prices since 1967 and quantified the cumulative effect 
up to 31 March 1974 as follows ;
The cumulative effect of these restraints up to March 1974 has been 
to deny the Corporation income totalling some 2110 million. Even 
after allowing for compensation from the Government of 274.9 million 
for the four years to 31 March 1974 this still leaves a (balance of 
some 235 million lost to the industry when it was badly needed to 
strengthen its very low level of financial reserves at a time of 
continuing expansion, increasing demands for gas and high interest 
rates.
At the press conference on 4 September 1974 to present the BGC's
annual report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1974 Sir Arthur
Hetherington attributed much of the blame for the loss of 241.5m to the
price restraint policies of successive governments. He went on to say :
Ve do not know whether we shall be able to get an increase. Ve 
have no arrangement with the Government. I can only say that, 
under the allowable costs formula of the prices code, if we were to 
go for an increase now it would be in the region of 10 per cent. I 
have to say that it is inevitable that the longer we have to wait 
for an increase the larger it will have to be (Ihfi— Times, 4 
September 1974, p 17).
The press reports the day after the annual report and accounts for 
the year ended 31 March 1974 were published (4 September 1974) 
concentrated more on the possibility of future price rises than on the 
contents of the financial statements. The headlines in the national 
newspapers were as follows :
The Times <p 1) = price warning
Times (P 17) ' by lorVratlorT'""
<P 19) :
The Guardian <p 1)
The Daily Telegraph (p 2)
Warning of 10 pc rise in gas prices 
10 pc RISE FOR DOMESTIC GAS URGED
(p 28) :
Dally Mirror (p 22) ^
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The percentage of total space in these reports in which prices were 
adopted as a theme was as follows : Ih£._Jiaea 65%; The Guardian 87%;
The Daily ■■Telegraph 88%; Financial TItbps 70% and The Daily Mlrrnr 56%. 
Fone of the press reports made any reference to the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1974 although these had the effect 
of reducing the reported return on average capital employed from 6% to 
5.4%.
In an editorial on the same day titled "The policies of the gas
price" (p 1) the Financial Times commented that "the political advantage
of keeping gas cheap is easy to understand". The Daily Telegraph in its
report above (4 September 1974) suggested that "Mr Varley, Energy
Secretary, is determined to block the corporation's request until after a
General Election".
The General Election on 10 October 1974 was won by the Labour
Party. In his Budget Statement on 12 November 1974 the Chancellor of
the Exchequer (Mr Healey) announced that he intended to let nationalised
industries' prices rise, subject to the jurisdiction of the Price
Commission, in order to phase out completely as quickly as possible the
government's payments to the industries of compensation for price
restraint (881 EC Deb 1974/75 col 268 Oral Answers).
Apparently as a result of Mr Healey's Budget Statement the following
questions on future gas price increases were asked in the House of
Commons on 18 November 1974 and 25 November 1974 respectively .
Mr Rost asked the Secretary of State for Industry what is the 
estimated increase in domestic and industrial gas prices next year 
that will result from the Budget proposals.
Mr Eadie : Any application for further price increases in the light
of the Budget statement have yet to be formulated by the industries 
and considered by the Government and the Price Commission. It is
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therefore impossible to give an estimate (881 HC Deb 1974/75 col 
296 Written Answers).
Mr Skeet asked the Secretary of State for Energy when he proposes
to increase gas prices.
Mr John Smith : As my right hon Friend the Chancellor of the
Exchequer has already indicated, domestic gas prices are likely to 
rise in the new year (882 HC Deb 1974/75 col 5 Written Answers).
In its report for the period from 1 September 1974 to 30 November
1974 the Price Commission made the following comments on the
reconciliation of the periodic returns submitted to it with the published
annual accounts ;
Article 5(1) of the Information Order requires that periodic returns 
of net profit margins, which are normally based on information in 
management accounts, should be reconcilable with the firm's annual 
accounts. The checking of these reconciliations has become an
increasing part of the Commission's work. By this means the
Commission are able to verify that an enterprise is accounting for
all of its activities which are subject to control and can ensure 
that the figures reported in the periodic returns are on the same 
basis as that used in the annual accounts (which in turn should
also have been used in arriving at the reference level figure).
So far it would appear that in most cases periodic returns, when 
taken together, form a reasonably accurate representation of the
results appearing in the audited accounts of enterprises (Price 
Commission, Report for period 1 September 1974 to 30 November 1974, 
HC 125, 1974/75, para 3.14).
The above comments by the Price Commission are important to the 
present study as it is argued elsewhere (sections 6.5.3, 7.1.3, 7.2.3 and 
7.3.3) that a factor which may have influenced the BGC's accounting
choices was the desire to influence Price Commission decisions on whether 
or not to accept the BGC's proposals for price rises. This explanation 
for the BGC's accounting choices would only hold if the Price 
Commission's decisions were based on figures prepared on the same basis 
as those in the published accounts.
- 194 -
On 13 December 1974 the national press carried reports that the 
Price Commission had not intervened on the application by the BGC to 
Increase gas prices by 12% from the first meter reading after 1 January
(The Times, p 1; The Guardian, p 24; The Daily Telegraph, p l; and
the Financial Times, p 36).
On 20 December 1974 the Counter-Inflation (Price Code) Order 1974 
(SI 2113) became the basis for Stage 4 of the government's counter­
inflation policy. The significance of this statutory instrument for the 
BGC and its possible effect on the BGC's accounting choices will be 
discussed in section 7.1.3.
In his Budget Statement on 15 April 1975 Mr Healey acknowledged 
that the PSBR had increased significantly during the year ended 31 March 
1975 (890 HC Deb 1974/75 cols 278-279). He claimed that the increases 
were largely due to the effects of inflation (col 279).
ZJL2 Effect of the accountlag choice
All the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1975 
are described in Appendix G. The effects of these accounting choices on 
the net loss for the year ended 31 March 1975 are shown on Table 7.1 
which is derived from Table G1 in Appendix G. The restatement of the net 
loss for the year ended 31 March 1975 is shown on Table 7.2. The
accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1975 had the
effect of increasing the net loss for the year ended 31 March 1975 by 
approximately 220,380,000 (Table 7.1) from 221,920,000 to 242,300,000 
(Table 7.2) which is an increase of 93%.
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Table .lA.
ElTect— QiL-JÜis— nsi— lass, for ihe year ended 3i March 1975 nf thP 
accounting chQiaes jaade during the year ended 31 March 1975
Increasing Decreasing
t I
Accelerated amortisation of deferred charges;
conversion to natural gas 16,600,000
Accelerated amortisation of displaced plant 3,780,000
Increasing effect on reported net loss 20.380,000___________
TabIS-.Z.t2.
Restatement of the net loss for the year ended 31 March 1975 for the 
effect of ths ._accaunting_ choices made during the year ended 31 March 
19Z5.
2
Reported net loss for the year ended 31 March 1975 42,300,000
Less: Increasing effect on reported net loss of the
accounting choices made during the year (Table 7.1) 20,380,000
Restated net loss for the year ended 31 March 1975 2.1,920k000.
7-,1.3 Explanations for the accounting choices
As already noted in section 7.1,1 the Counter-Inflation (Price Code) 
Order 1974 (SI 2113) came into effect on 20 December 1974. Para 98,2(c) 
of that Price Code stated that a nationalised industry could increase
prices by the amount necessary :
to provide sufficient revenue in the accounting year in question to 
ensure a surplus in that year of 2 per cent calculated on turnover 
on controlled activities in that year; or at the option of the 
industry, a return of 10 per cent on net assets.
According to para 98,4 (a) (ii) that surplus was to be after a deduction
for depreciation and acconUng to pani 984(a)Uli) t Mt depreciation was
to include any amounts written off displaced plant and deferred charges
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which should "be calculated in accordance with accounting principles 
consistently applied by the industry concerned".
As noted in section 7.1.2 two accounting choices were made during 
the year ended 31 March 1975 which were (1) to accelerate the 
amortisation of displaced plant and (2) to accelerate the amortisation of 
deferred charges. These accounting choices had the effect of increasing 
the net loss for the year ended 31 March 1975 by 220,380,000 from
221,920,000 to 242,300,000, an increase of 93% (section 7.1.2).
The evidence to 31 March 1975 provides ample indication of the 
BGC's perceived need for a price rise. The accounting choices made 
during the year ended 31 March 1975 are consistent with the explanation 
that they were chosen in order to increase the size of the price rises 
the BGC could apply for under Stage 4. As an application under Stage 4 
would likely be made during the year ended 31 March 1976 the BGC would 
be able to argue, if they so desired, that the accounting choices for 
displaced plant and deferred charges were consistent with those used in 
the previous year’s published accounts (the year ended 31 March 1975).
Given that the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr Healey) had made it 
clear in his Budget Statement on 12 November 1974 that the Government 
intended to let nationalised Industries’ prices rise in order to phase out 
compensation for price restraint, and presumably also to ease the 
pressure on the PSBR, civil servants would tend not to be motivated to 
oppose accounting choices by the BGC which would enable the corporation 
to justify a larger price rise than it could otherwise have done.
As already noted in the review of relevant events to 31 March 1974, 
section 2 of the Statutory Corporations (Financial Provisions) Act 1974 
required the Government to pay compensation equal to the financial loss
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reported in the audited accounts, The accounting choices made during the 
year ended 31 March 1975 increased the net loss by 220,380,000 from
221,920,000 to 242,300,000 which is an increase of 93%. Thus these 
accounting choices increased the compensation the BGC received from the 
Government by 220,380,000 or 93%, As explained above these accounting 
choices are consistent with the explanation that they were chosen in 
order to increase the size of the price rise which would be allowable by 
the Price Commission under Stage 4. However, section 2 of the Statutory 
Corporations (Financial Provisions) Act 1974 ensured that the BGC 
received a further cash flow benefit from these accounting choices.
As a result of the increased payment for compensation these 
accounting choices had the effect of Increasing the PSBR by 220,380,000. 
However, the civil servants may not have been too concerned as there may 
have been a net benefit to the Treasury from these accounting choices. 
The effect of these accounting choices in reducing gas industry borrowing 
and therefore the PSBR as a result of the July 1975 gas price rise may 
have been more than 220,380,000. As noted in section 7.2 the rise in the 
price of gas was estimated to bring in 2250 million in a full year.
7.2 ACCOUNTING CHOICES MADE DURING YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH.i.âZS.
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1976. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1976 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is 
described in section 7.2.1. The effect of the accounting choices is shown 
in section 7.2.2 and the explanations for these accounting choices are 
given in section 7.2.3. The gas industry's lobbying behaviour during the 
year is described and discussed in section 7.2.4.
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L2J Evidence to 31 March lQ7fi
On 24 June 1975 the national press carried reports that the BGC had
notified the Price Commission of proposed increases of around 20% (The
Dally Telegraph, p l; Daily Mail, p 9).
At the press conference on 30 July 1975 to present the BGC's annual
report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1975 Sir Arthur
Hetherington announced Price Commission approval for a 20 per cent rise
in gas prices from the first meter reading after 1 October 1975.
According to the Financial Times (31 July 1975, p 28) the :
industry's latest price increase, which follows a £42.3m loss 
recorded by the corporation in the financial year 1974-75 is 
expected to bring in an additional £120m of revenue to the industry 
this year and some £250m in a full year.
The press reports the day after the annual report and accounts for
the year ended 31 March 1975 were published (31 July 1975) concentrated
more on the future price rise than on the contents of the financial 
statements. The headlines in the national newspapers were as follows :
The Times (p 17)
The Guardian (p 1)
The Daily Telegraph (p D  
Financial Times (p 8)
Financial Times (p 28) 
Daily Mirror (p 2)
Daily Mail (p 9)
The Sun (p 2)
Go-ahead in October for 2Op increase 
in gas prices
Gas prices to rise as contract row 
flares
GAS UP 28 pc AFTER LOSS OF £44m
Deficit of £44m on higher sales last 
year
Go-ahead for 20% gas price increases 
High-rise gas on way 
State firms £660m in debt-and you pay 
Gas prices will rocket by 20 pc
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The percentage of total space in these reports in which prices were 
adopted as a theme was as follows : The Times 100%; The Guardian 96%; 
The Daily Telegraph 100%; Financial Times 55%; Dally Mirror ioo%; Daily 
X&il 1004 and Ihg—Sun. 864. The approach adopted by the press would seem 
to indicate their belief that their readers were more interested in future 
gas prices than in the contents of the financial statements for the year
ended 31 March 1975. None of the press reports made any reference to
the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1975.
In April 1975, Sub-Committee B of the SON I decided that its first 
inquiry should be into the tariff structures and pricing policies of 
electricity and gas. The greater part of the oral evidence was taken by 
the Sub-Committee between June and early August 1975 and the remainder 
in November. Most of the written evidence was received over the same 
period. The SCNI's report together with the Minutes of Proceedings of 
the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices was published in April 
1976 (SCNI, 1976).
When questioned on 2 July 1975 as to whether gas prices should be 
set in line with long-run marginal costs in the natural gas system (Q 
263) Mr J H Smith, the BGC's Member for Finance replied by describing
long-run marginal costs as "one of those concepts that no one seems to
be able to define. There are many definitions". He then informed the 
Sub-Committee that the BGC's pricing policy was to try to avoid any 
sharp increases in gas prices by writing off the £1,000 million of 
displaced plant and deferred charges while there were still supplies of 
low-cost gas from the Southern Basis of the North Sea.
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In reply to a question on tariffs and long-run marginal costs (Q 
531) on 5 November 1975 Mr Buckley of the BGC replied ;
we do not anticipate that the higher prices being paid for new 
purchases of gas will lead to a steep increase in gas tariffs 
because of the way we have managed the finances of the industry 
over the past few years. What we have done is to change our 
depreciation policy gradually over the last three or four years.... 
Vhat we have done is to decide to write off the whole of our 
conversion expenditure....approaching £1,000 million altogether. Ve 
are writing that off over five years. This write off will just about 
coincide with the full impact of Frigg gas coming in ...
In answer to a later question (Q 536) on 5 November 1975 Mr Smith 
informed the Sub-Committee that he did not consider the BGC's reserves of 
£60 million to be satisfactory for a firm as large as the BGC. He 
claimed that industries of a similar size had reserves of £700-£800 
million. He also argued that the BGC should finance more of its capital 
expenditure and that in order to achieve this the BGC would have to make 
bigger profits. He thought a profit of 4 per cent on turnover was what
the BGC should aim at but recognised that Stage 4 of the Price Code only
allowed 2 per cent on turnover.
In the House of Commons on 25 November 1975 the following exchange 
took place :
Mr Lawrence asked the Secretary of State for Energy whether the 
recent increase in gas prices conforms with the Government s 
counter-inflation policy.
Mr John Smith : Yes. This increase was in accordance with
provisions of the Price Code, as well as reflecting the need,
recognised in the Government's White Paper on "The Attack on 
Inflation", to increase nationalised industry prices this year in 
order to eliminate deficits (901 HC Deb 1975/76 col 35 Written
Answers).
On 11 February 1976 Sub-Committee B of the SCNI took evidence from 
BGC top management on the BGC's published accounts for the year ended 31 
March 1975 (SCNI, 1976a). The desire to increase cash flows was clear
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from the following response by Mr J H Smith, the BGC's Member for
Finance, to a question (Q 3) on the desirable level of reserves :
The position on reserves .... is that because of our not being able 
to achieve the right sort of profit levels, mainly because of price 
restraint, we have not been able to carry out obligations of putting 
money into reserves. Our view is that we should be able to build up 
sufficient reserves, very much in line with a major private 
enterprise concern, the aim being, of course, to be able to meet from 
internal reserves a much greater proportion of our future capital 
expenditure.
Mr Smith quantified the level of reserves he thought the BGC should
be aiming at by the early 1980's as being five hundred million pounds
(answers to Q3 and Q6).
The Government's policy on the financing of the nationalised
industries' capital expenditure was stated in the Public Expenditure White
Paper published in February 1976 (Treasury 1976) as follows ;
In future, the general aim will be for the nationalised industries to 
finance more of their capital expenditure from earnings, and to 
reduce their demands for borrowing and for grants ...
On 20 February 1976 at an energy conference organised by the
Department of Energy the coal and electricity industries lobbied for a
tax on gas (Department of Energy, 1976). For instance, Mr Arthur
Hawkins, the Chairman of the Central Electricity Generating Board argued
as follows :
North sea gas .... has seriously eroded electricity's competitive
position in the heating and cooking market. The under-pricing of 
gas is encouraging the rapid exhaustion of an irreplaceable premium 
fuel and chemical feedstock. In the meantime the country's coal
stocks are piling up. And as we all know, it costs nothing to turn 
down the gas taps in the North Sea. Electricity believes that there 
is a case for revenue earning tax on all natural gas supplies landed 
in this country .... The Government I am sure could use the tax which 
could amount to several hundreds of millions of pounds a year, to 
create job opportunities, or to help poor people to pay their fuel
bills (p 4).
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In his Budget Statement on 6 April 1976 (909 HC Deb 1975/76 cols 
232-283 Oral Answers) Denis Healey explained that the PSBR for the year 
ended 31 March 1976 was higher than expected mainly as a result of the 
under estimating of the effect of inflation on public expenditure (col 
236). He announced that improved methods of monitoring public 
expenditure were being developed including extensive use of cash limits 
(col 269).
Z.2L2 Effect of the accounting choices
Only one accounting choice was made during the year ended 31 March 
1976 and it is described in Appendix H. The effect of that accounting 
choice on the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1976 is shown on 
Table 7,3 which is derived from Table HI in Appendix H. The restatement 
of the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1976 is shown on Table 7.4. 
The accounting choice made during the year ended 31 March 1976 had the 
effect of decreasing the reported net profit for the year ended 31 March 
1976 by £48,100,000 from £73,200,000 to £25,100,000 (Table 7.4) which is 
a reduction of 65.7%.
I&bie 7.3 
Effect on the reported net profit for the year endfid 31 March 1976 of the 
accounting choice made during the year ended 31 March 19.76 
Increasing Decreasia&
£
Charging the cost of replacing certain categories 
of existing fixed assets to revenue 48,100,0.011
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Table ZA
Restatement of the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1976 for the 
effect of the accounting choice made during the year ended 31 March 1976
I
Reported net profit for the year ended 31 March 1976 25,100,000
Add: Decreasing effect on reported net profit of the
accounting choices made during the year (Table 7.3) 48,100,000
Restated net profit for the year ended 31 March 1976 73.200.000
7.2.3 Explanations for the accounting choices
The evidence in section 7.2.1 indicated that the Government wanted 
nationalised industries to reduce their demands for borrowing and grants, 
presumably to reduce the pressure on an increasing PSBR. In these 
circumstances it seems likely that civil servants would encourage the BGC 
to finance its capital expenditure from increased gas prices rather than
from increased borrowing from the Treasury.
The evidence in section 7.2.1 indicated that BGC management wanted
to raise gas prices for the same reason.
As noted in section 7.1.3 para 98, 2(c) of the Counter-Inflat ion 
(Price Code) Order 1974 (SI 2113) stated that a nationalised industry 
could increase prices by the amount necessary
industry, a return of 10 per cent on net assets..
According to para98, 4(a)(ii) that surplus should be after a deduction for
depreciation.
In his evidence to the SCNI (SCNI. 1976) on 5 November 1975 Mr 
Smith of the BGC stated (Q 538) •
- 204 -
Ve cannot get the full 2 per cent on turnover at the moment because 
part of our replacement cost depreciation charge that I mentioned is 
not allowable by the Price Commission. Ve are only getting 1 per 
cent at the moment. Ve need another 3 per cent".
Mr Smith s evidence indicated that the BGC had used the replacement cost 
depreciation to try to increase the size of the price rise allowable under 
the rules of the Price Commission.
For the year ended 31 March 1976 the BGC made a surplus of 1.6 per 
cent calculated on turnover and a return on average net assets before 
interest of 8.6 per cent (BGC annual report and accounts, p 12). If 
replacement cost depreciation had not been charged during that year the 
reported surplus would have been £73,200,000 instead of £25,100,000 and 
the surplus as a percentage of turnover would have been 4.7 per cent and 
the return on average net assets before interest would have been 11 per 
cent. Presumably such high returns for the year ended 31 March 1976 
would have made it impossible for the BGC to successfully apply to the 
Price Commission for a price rise under Stage 4.
Thus the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1976 are consistent with the explanations that they were chosen by BGC 
management and by civil servants in order to influence the outcome of 
applications to the Price Commission for price increases under otage 4,
The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1976 
cannot be explained on the basis that they were chosen in order to reduce 
or avoid political costs. Although the idea of a tax on gas was 
suggested in February 1976 this was after the BGC had made the decision 
to charge the cost of replacing certain categories of fixed assets to 
revenue. This accounting choice which was effective from 1 April 1975 
was certainly made before 5 November 1975 when written evidence on the 
matter was provided to the SCNI (SCNI, 1976).
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1.2A Lobbying betavifuir
In his evidence to the SCNI (SCNI, 1976) Mr Smith of the BGC
informed the SCNI that evidence had been given on behalf of the
Corporation to the Sand Hands Committee. In September 1975 the
Sandllands Committee published its report (Sandilands Committee, 1975).
The Preface by the Chairman included the following statement (p xv)
Ve decided not to publish either written evidence or the records of 
discussions since we felt our task would be facilitated if the 
issues were considered in an informal atmosphere. In addition, in 
view of the undertaking of confidentiality which we gave to those 
who submitted evidence to us, we have not published a list of their 
names.
Thus it was not possible for the author to inspect the submission by the
BGC to the Sandilands Committee.
However, the main thrusts of that submission are reasonably clear
from an inspection of Mr Smith's evidence to the SCNI (SCNI, 1976). On 5
November 1975 in response to Q 533 on how the BGC should account for
inflation Mr Smith replied as follows :
Ve gave evidence as a Corporation to the Sandilands Committee and 
the final recommendations of Sandilands are very close to the sort 
of evidence that we gave. There are points of difference. Ve
certainly did not go along with the chartered accountants' CPP
method and we believe that Sandilands has a great deal to commend 
it as far as our own industry is concerned.
The above comments by Mr Smith are consistent with his submissions 
in July 1973 on Exposure Draft 8 "Accounting for changes in the 
purchasing power of money". In that submission Mr Smith supported the 
adjustment for depreciation which would decrease income but opposed the 
adjustment for purchasing power gains on long-term loans which would 
increase income. As the effects on income of the Sandilands 
recommendations would all have been income decreasing the BGC submission
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would also appear to be consistent with the BGC's preference for 
accounting choices which would decrease income.
ZL2— ACCOUNTING. CHOICES MADE DURING YEAR BNDED 31 MARCH 1Q77
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1977. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1977 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is 
described in section 7.3.1. The effect of the accounting choices is shown 
in section 7.3.2 and the explanations for these accounting choices are 
given in section 7.3.3. The gas industry's lobbying behaviour during the 
year is described and discussed in section 7.3.4.
ZiSLl fiYidence to 31 larch 19Z7
In June 1976 the Consultative Document on the Modifications to the 
Price Code (Department for Prices and Consumer Protection, 1976) 
recognised the argument of the Sandilands Committee that accounts drawn 
up on a historic cost basis "may conceal the fact that the firm Is not 
making sufficient money even to replace the assets it has consumed" (para 
5). The Consultative Document proposed that, while an accounting 
standard based on the Sandilands Committee's recommendations was being 
prepared, there should be a general marking-up of historic cost based 
depreciation charges. The proposed adjustment factor was 1.3 (para 8).
On 22 June 1976 the Department of Energy held a "National Energy 
Conference" (Department of Energy. 1976a). At the Invitation of the 
Secretary of State for Energy a paper entitled "The case for a planned 
energy policy" was prepared by Francis Morrell and Francis Crlpps
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(Department of Energy, 1976a) and made available for discussion at the 
conference.
In that paper the authors stated that :
If energy policy continues on traditional lines, cheap gas will 
expand its domestic and industrial market at the expense of 
electricity, jeopardising the coal industry whose main outlet is now 
in fuel for power stations. Thus the steady build-up of new pits, 
vital for the long term, will be held back for short-term reasons. 
Conservation and development of renewable sources will proceed 
slowly. Offshore oil and gas reserves will be depleted rapidly 
(para 3).
To overcome these problems the authors recommended parity pricing 
of electricity and gas (para 7). The Chairman of the BGC, Sir Arthur 
Hetherington responded by arguing that if the parity pricing of gas and 
electricity was adopted the cost of gas would be at least doubled to some 
14 million gas customers and give a savage increase to the cost of living 
(p 9).
On 19 July 1976 the Secretary of State for Energy (Dr J Dickson 
Mabon) was able to assure Mr Teddy Taylor that "it is not the
Government's present intention to impose a gas tax" (915 HC Deb 1975/76
col 1272 Oral Answers).
At the press conference on 27 July 1976 to present the annual
report and accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1976, Mr 
Denis Rooke stated that the BGC would be applying for as big an increase 
as possible under the new Price Code although it would abide by its
promise not to raise charges before October '-Elnahui&l— IlSlua*
1976, p 7). The press reports the day after the annual report and
accounts were published (28 July 1976) concentrated more on the expected 
price rise of 10-12 per cent than on the contents of the financial 
statements. The headlines In the national newspapers were as follows :
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The Times (p 17) British Gas aims to end its price 
freeze with 10 pc October rise
(p 1)
(p 17)
The Dally Telegraph (p 1) 
Financial Times (p 7) 
Daily Mirror (p 1)
Daily. Express (p 3)
The Sun <p 4)
Dearer gas sought
British Gas begins high-speed recovery 
Gas Price Rise of 10 pc sought 
Big price rise in autumn 
GAS PRICE RISE BLAST 
Gas prices to rise again 
10 pc GAS PRICE RISE SHOCKER
As can be seen above three out of seven national newspapers carried
all or part of their report on page 1 and every national newspaper 
carried a headline which focused on the future rise in gas prices. The 
percentage of total space in these reports in which prices were adopted 
as a theme was as follows ; The Times 54%; The Guardian 35%; The Daily 
Telegraph 70%; Financial Times. 25%; Daily .M irror 100%; Daily ...Express 79% 
and The Sun 100%. The approach adopted by the press would seem to 
indicate their belief that their readers were more interested in future 
gas prices than in the contents of the financial statements for the year 
ended 31 March 1976.
Only The Guardian pointed out that the BGC had chosen to charge the 
cost of replacing certain categories of existing fixed assets to revenue 
thereby reducing its surplus for the year ended 31 March 1976 from £73.2
million to £25.1 million. Given that this accounting change had a major
effect on the profit for the year ended 31 March 1976 and given that it 
was relatively easy to identify and to understand, the press seem to have 
failed to fulfil their role as a "watchdog" (Likierman, 1983, p 145)
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regarding the published accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 
1976.
The Dally Mirror carried a comment from TUG chairman. Mr Cyril 
Plant, which attempted to create a crisis for the BGC and the Government 
by condemning the future gas price rise in the light of the £25.1 million 
profit. Mr Plant was quoted as saying :
It is deplorable that in the same breath as they announce a £25
million profit the gas chiefs indicate a desire to increase prices.
Mr Platt could presumably have created more of a crisis if the profit
figure had been £73 million as it would have been but for the accounting
decision to charge the replacement cost of certain categories of existing 
fixed assets to revenue.
On 1 August 1976 the Counter Inflation (Price Code) Order 1976 (SI 
No 1170) came into operation. Para 41 allowed depreciation charges to be 
adjusted by a factor of 1.4 for the purposes of the Price Code.
On 10 September 1976 The Times (p 5) reported that the BGC had 
been given permission by the Price Commission to increase its charges oy 
12% from the first meter reading after 1 October 1976.
On 30 September 1976 the Price Commission published its Report for 
the period from 1 June to 31 August 1976 (Price Commission, 1976). That 
report included a section on nationalised industry prices (p 7) which 
pointed out that the provisions of the Price Code allow Ministers to 
reduce or extinguish price rises made by nationalised industries even if 
these increases were within the terms of the Price Code and had been 
approved by the Price Commission. The Price Commission felt that it was 
generally not appreciated that the power to control nationalised industry
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prices was firmly vested in the Minister responsible and not the Price 
Commission.
On 15 December 1976 Mr Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
announced various Government measures aimed at improving the nation's
economic situation. Included in the Government's measures aimed at
reducing the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (in order to satisfy the
International Monetary Fund) was an agreement with the BGC that gas
prices should be raised from April 1977 (922 HC Deb 1976/77 col 1529
Oral Answers). On 22 December 1976 Mr Denis Rooke. the Chairman of the
BGC stressed that the proposed increase - which could be up to 10% - was
most definitely not a tax on gas since the extra revenue that would be
raised as a result of the new tariff increase would be used to repay high
interest borrowing (The Times. 23 December, p 16).
The national press carried reports on 11 February 1977 that the 1
April price rises would be around 10-11% (The Guardian, p 14. The Daily
Ifilegraph, p 2 and the Financial Times, p 7). The Daily Telegraph, (p 2)
pointed out that :
under existing price code rules the corporation does not have a case 
to justify an average increase of around 10-11 pc that would be 
needed to meet the Government's objective. But ministers have 
powers to override the price code and the Price Commission to clear 
the increase.
On 11 March 1977 the Financial Times (p 1) reported that the
Energy Secretary, Mr Tony Benn, intends to sign a special consent 
order next week to push through a 10 per cent gas price increase on 
April 1 despite the Price Commission's published verdict yesterday
that it would be inadmissible under normal price controls  The
Commission said that it is the first time that the Government has 
used its special powers under Schedule 2 of the Counter Inflation 
Act to override a commission decision that a price rise is not 
justified .... The Government's decision to use the powers is likely 
to cause it considerable political difficulty. The TUC has made it 
clear that unless the Government takes a strong line on prices there 
is little chance of a third stage of pay restraint.
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wasThe Government's political difficulty over the gas price rise 
reflected in the following exchanges in the House of Commons. On 14
March 1977 Mr Mewbert asked the Secretary of State for Energy how many 
representations he had had on the impending increase in gas prices. Dr 
John A Cunningham replied : "My Department has received just over 150 
up to today" (928 HC Deb 1976/77 col 29 Written Answers). On 17 March 
1977 Dr Glyn asked the Secretary of State for Energy whether he took 
into account the impact of a 10% rise in gas prices on pensioners and 
those on fixed incomes before giving an instruction to British Gas to 
increase prices. Dr J Dickson Mabon replied : "We are aware of these 
considerations, but an increase in gas prices was necessary to reduce the 
level of Government financing" (928 HC Deb 1976/77, col 251, Written
Answers).
There were a number of questions on gas prices which received oral
answers in the House of Commons on 28 March 1977. For instance, Mr
Whitehead asked the Secretary of State for Energy what representations he 
had received about his decision to authorise a 10 per cent increase in 
gas prices. Dr John A Cunningham replied : "My right hon Friend has 
received about 500 representations from consumers and their 
representatives up to 25 March" (929 HC Deb 1976/77 col 4 Oral Answers). 
In reply to a later question from Mr Whiteford which included the claim 
that the gas price rise had "caused outrage among many of our own 
working supporters" Dr Cunningham accepted that any increase in price at 
this time is bound to cause concern among people on low incomes" (929 HC 
Deb 1976/77 col 5, Oral Answers).
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ZJL2— Effect of the accounting chnir^
All the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1977 
are described in Appendix J. The effects of these accounting choices on 
the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1977 are shown on Table 7.5 
which is derived from Table J1 in Appendix J. The restatement of the net 
profit for the year ended 31 March 1977 is shown on Table 7.6. The 
accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1977 had the 
effect of decreasing the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1977 by 
approximately £242,072,000 from £273,572,000 to £31,500,000 (Table 7.6) 
which is a decrease of 88.5%.
Table 7.5
Effect on the reported net profit for the year ended 31 March 19.77 of the 
accounting choices made during the year ended .31 March 1977
Increasing Decreasing
£
Replacement expenditure charged as a trading cost 55,576,000
Supplementary depreciation charge 102,596,000
Accelerated amortisation of displaced plant 27,300,000
Accelerated amortisation of deferred charges 56,600,000
Decreasing effect on reported net profit — — ------- 242,072.000
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TabieJIJl
Restatement of the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1977 fnr thp 
effect-q£. the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1977
I
Reported net profit for the year ended 31 March 1977 31,500,000
Add: Decreasing effect on reported net profit of the
accounting choices made during the year (Table 7.5) 242,072,000
Restated net profit for the year ended 31 March 1977 273.572.000
ZJL2—Bxplanatlcma for the accounting choicee
The evidence in section 7.2.1 indicated that in early 1976 the 
Government wanted nationalised industries to reduce their demands for 
borrowing and grants, presumably to reduce the pressure on an increasing 
PSER. There was no evidence in section 7.3.1 that the Government had 
changed that policy prior to the BGC's proposal to raise gas prices from 
1 October 1976. In these circumstances it seems likely that civil 
servants would have supported that price rise proposal as the main 
alternative source of finance would have been borrowing from the 
Government. According to the evidence in section 7.4.1 (Ihs— Dâily. 
Telegraph, 28 June 1977, p 1 and the Financial Times, 29 June 1977, p 8) 
the Department of Energy supported the BGC's accounting choices.
The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1977 are 
consistent with the explanation that they were chosen by BGC management 
and by civil servants in order to influence the outcome of the 
application to the Price Commission for a rise in gas prices from October 
1976.
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As Mr Smith’s evidence on 5 November 1975 (Q 538) to the SCNI
(SCNI, 1976) indicated that part of the replacement expenditure charged 
as a trading cost was allowable by the Price Commission it seems
reasonable to assume that part of that charge for the year ended 31 
March 1977 formed part of the BGC's price claim for October 1976.
From a pricing perspective the introduction of the supplementary 
depreciation charge can be explained from events both before and after 31 
March 1977. In June 1976 the Consultative Document on the Modifications 
to the Price Code (Department for Prices and Consumer Protection, 1976) 
recognised that the historic cost accounting method made too little 
provision for depreciation. In the absence of an inflation accounting 
standard, an adjustment factor of 1.3 to historic cost depreciation was 
proposed. On 1 August 1976 the new Price Code (SI. No 1170) was 
published which increased the factor by which historic cost depreciation 
charges were to be adjusted to 1.4. The Chairman of the BGC, Mr Denis
Rooke, had already stated that the BGC would be applying for as big a
price rise as possible under the new Price Code (Financial Times., 28 July 
1976, p 7). Thus the application by the BGC for a price rise from 1 
October 1976 was partly justified by applying a factor of 1.4 to the 
BGC's historic cost depreciation. This was later (8 February 1978) 
confirmed to the SCNI (SCNI, 1978) by Sir Denis Rooke in answer to Q 85 
on supplementary depreciation. "Ve were the first nationalised industry 
... to adopt the 40 per cent part of it. Ve had to because that formed 
part of our price claim to the Price Commission in October 1976 - it was 
in the price code at the time we made that submission." Mr J Smith in 
answer to Q 83 stated that "this was certainly a factor in our decision
to move to inflation accounting".
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The accelerated write-off of displaced plant and deferred charges 
can also be explained from a pricing perspective. Both of these 
accounting changes were introduced on 1 April 1976 (see Appendix J). The
resulting Increased write-offs were probably Included In the October 1976 
price rise application, thereby increasing the size of the price rise 
applied for. Although there Is no definite evidence that these
accelerated write-offs were accepted by the Price Commission In October 
1976, Th&- Economist. (30 July 1977) reported that they were acceptable to 
the Price Commission in the published accounts for the year ended 31 
March 1977. This would suggest that these accelerated write-offs were
also acceptable to the Price Commission in October 1976.
Thus the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1977 are consistent with the explanations that they were chosen by BGC 
management and civil servants In order to Influence the outcome of
applications to the Price Commission for price Increases.
BGC management (although not civil servants) may have had
additional reasons for choosing income-decreasing accounting choices for 
the year ended 31 March 1977. These reasons may have been the avoidance 
of the imposition of political costs. The evidence suggests that the BGC 
was In danger of suffering political costs as a result of the arguments 
for a tax on gas and as a result of section 16 of the Gas Act 1972.
The arguments for a tax on gas appear to have started at the 
Tripartite Energy Consultations In February 1976, continued at the
National Energy Conference In June 1976 and then on 19 July 1976 a
question on the topic was asked In the House of Commons. Clearly BGC
management would not have wanted to provide fuel for these arguments by 
reporting profits which could have been described as excessive. Thus the
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accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1977 which 
reduced the reported profit by £242,072,000 are consistent with the 
explanation that they were chosen by BGC management in order to avoid 
political costs in the form of the proposed tax on gas.
Section 16 of the Gas Act 1972 gave the Government the power to 
transfer part of the profits of the BGC to the Treasury if the reserves 
of the BGC at the beginning of the year exceeded 10% of the corporation’s
net assets at the beginning of the year. According to the BGC's balance
sheet at 31 March 1977 the net assets at that date amounted to 
£2,318,300,000 and the accumulated reserves at that date amounted to 
£116,000,000. As Table 9.5 shows, the accounting choices during the year 
ended 31 March 1977 decreased the reported profit by £242,072,000. If 
these accounting choices had not been made the accumulated reserves at 31 
March 1977 would have been £358,072,000 which is more than 10% of the 
net assets of £2,318,800,000 at that date. Thus if the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1977 had not been made the 
Government would have had the power to transfer to the Treasury a
proportion of the BGC's profits for the year ended 31 March 1978. The
BGC would obviously have been motivated to make accounting choices which 
postponed for as long as possible the Government's powers under oectlon 
16. Thus the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1977 are consistent with the explanation that they were chosen by BGC 
management in order to avoid the political costs which would have 
resulted from the Government exercising Its right to transfer a 
proportion of the BGC's profits for the year ended 31 March 1978 to the 
Treasury under Section 16 of the Gas Act 1972.
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7.3. 4 r.nhbying
On 14 May 1976 Mr J H Smith, the BGC's Member for Finance, wrote to
the Accounting Standards Committee regarding revised Exposure Draft 17
on Accounting for research and development. He made the following point;
Paras 7-11. Whilst I would not disagree that there are 
circumstances in which it may be Justified to defer the writing off 
of expenditure on development, I feel that the option should remain 
open to write off the whole cost of research and development as it 
is incurred.
Accordingly I should prefer the wording in paragraph 11 to read: 
"....it may. be carried forward" rather than "it should be carried 
forward." Whilst this would allow the writing off of development 
expenditure to be a discretionary matter, the onus would remain on 
those who wish to defer write-off to meet the criteria for such 
deferment.
The charge for "Research testing and development" in the published 
accounts of the year ended 31 March 1976 was £16,100,000 (p 38). If the 
revised Exposure Draft became a Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 
without any change on the above matter the profit of the BGC would have 
been increased by the amount of the development expenditure incurred each 
year.
The submission by Mr J H Smith above is consistent with a desire by 
the BGC not to have its profits increased as a result of the 
recommendations of a proposed Statement of Standard Accounting Practice.
7.4 ACCOUNTING CHOTCFS MADE DURING YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 197b.
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1978. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1978 which relates to the two explantory hypotheses is 
described in section 7.4.1. The effect of the accounting choices is shown
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in section 7.4.2 and the explanations for these accounting choices are 
given in section 7.4.3.
ZAd— Evidence to 31 Marr.h iqyft
The pressure for a tax on gas continued in May 1977. On 2 May 1977
The Dally Telegraph (p 6) carried a report that a Cabinet decision would 
be needed to settle the latest row on this matter between the gas and 
coal industries. On 30 May 1977 The Dailv Telegraph (p 16) carried a 
report titled "Pressure grows for gas tax" which stated that the BGC was 
disturbed by "the increasing possibility that the Coal Board backed by 
the TUC will win the battle to have a tax imposed on its troublesome 
rival".
On 26 June 1977 The Sunday Telegraph (p 1) carried a report of a 
row between the BGC and the Price Commission titled "GAS ROV OVER EXCESS 
PROFITS". The Sunday Telegraph reported that the Price Commission was 
claiming that the BGC had made £35 to £36 million more than is allowed 
under the Price Code.
The next morning the Chairman of the BGC, Sir Denis Rooke, publicly 
denied that the corporation had made excess profits and said there would 
be no refund to consumers. "Vhat excess profits?" he asked reporters who 
questioned him. "You should not read such silly newspapers" (Fmanciai 
limes, 28 June 1977, p 34). Two hours later the Price Commission 
announced that the BGC had made excess profits of £36.6 million. In the 
evening the BGC again denied it had made excess profits and claimed that 
it had written to the Price Commission pointing out "distorting factors". 
The BGC claimed that during the year ended 31 March 1977 it had made a
profit of £30 million on a turnover of over £2 billion and that the Price
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Commission s figure of £36.6 million was "determined under Price 
Commission rules and not by normal accounting procedures" (The Guardian, 
28 June 1977. p 1). The political visibility of the BGC was reflected in 
coverage given to the row by the national press. The headlines on 28 
June 1977 were as follows :
The Tim.es (p 19) : Price Commission and British Gas clash
over "excess" profit
The Guardian (pi) : Profits of £30m start gas row
The Dally. ..Telegraph, ( p i )  ; £36 m "EXCESS PROFIT" BY STATE GAS
Row over claim by price watchdog
Fiaangial Times (p 34) : British Gas rejects profiteering charge
Daily. Mirror (p 5) : Storm over the gas profits is hotting
up
Dally Express (p 2) : Vhat a gas over profits
Daily Mail (pi) : GASMAN TOLD: PAY IT BACK: Good news
for the householder, Row over £36 
million profit
Ihe_Sim (pi) : STORM ON GAS PROFIT
The above headlines and the contents of their reports provide good 
examples of the press making the most of the "crisis" (Vatts, 1977; 
Jensen, 1976).
The Department of Energy's position in this dispute is of interest
to the current research. The Daily Telegraph (p D  report on 28 June
1977 claimed that the Energy Department had backed Sir Denis Rooke's 
claim that the BGC had not made too much profit and a further report in 
the Financial Times (p 8) on 29 June 1977 stated that the Department of 
Energy was satisfied with the corporation's accountancy procedures.
On 29 June 1977 the F^ Tiancial Times, carried an editorial (p 18) 
titled "Getting all hot about gas" which explored the dispute between the
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BGC and the Price Commission. The Financial Times questioned what the 
dispute was likely to achieve :
even if the Corporation has breached the price code, there would
seem to be little practical chance of gas prices being adjusted in
accordance with the code's provisions. Having instructed the Gas 
Corporation to raise its prices by 10 per cent from April 1, the 
Government would be most unlikely to countenance a reduction now, 
albeit one of relatively modest proportions.
On 15 July 1977 The Times (p 19) reported that the Price Commission 
had ordered a freeze on gas prices until the excess profits of £36.6m had
been used up. On 22 July 1977 the Price Commission Act received the
Royal Assent. This gave the Price Commission the power to conduct a 
detailed investigation of any proposed price rise. Profit margin control 
was to continue from 1 August 1977 to 31 July 1978 as specified in the 
Counter-Inflation (Price Code) Order 1977 (SI 1272). From 1 August 1978 
the Price Commission was to be free to adopt a more flexible approach in
its investigations.
On 26 July 1977 the BGC published its annual report and accounts 
for the year ended 31 March 1977. The press reports the following day 
had the following headlines :
The Times (p 22)
The Guardian (p 12)
The Daily Telegraph, (p 6) 
Financial Times, (p 8)
(p 42) 
Daily Mirror (p 14)
Daily Mail <p 31)
The Sun (p 11)
Gas chairman pledges price stability 
despite higher cost of supplies
£25OM gas 'profit' buried
GAS SHOWS PROFIT OF £31M
British Gas seeks greater freedom to 
make profits
Tracing the leak in Gas profits 
GAS PROFITS ARE RED HOT 
Cut gobbledegook - and our gas bills 
FREEZE ON GAS PRICE
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The percentage of total space In these press reports in which prices were
adopted as a theme was as follows : Ihfi Times, 43%; The Guardian, 12%;
The Dally Telegraph. 6%; Einaaclal Times, 28%; Daily Mirror, 15%; paiiy
Mali) 334 and The Sun 71%. These percentages are relatively low compared
to other years which was presumably because a price rise was not
imminent as Sir Denis Rooke had pledged price stability until April 1978.
The. Guardian (p 12) and the Financial Times (p 42) described the
effect of the accounting choices made by the BGC during the year ended
31 March 1977. The Guardian reported as follows :
British Gas which has been ordered to freeze its charges by the 
Price Commission is making more money than implied by the £31.5 
millions profit disclosed in yesterday's annual report,
Although the £31.5 millions is easily a record for the corporation 
it was reached only after the introduction of changed accounting 
procedures without which it could easily have been well over five 
times as high.
If the results had been drawn up on the same basis as the previous 
year the profit and loss account would have included £102.6 millions 
which has been charged this year to a specially created fixed asset 
maintenance account.
This is in accordance with prudent accounting practice being a 
movement towards current cost accounting but without it the 
declared profit would have been £134.1 millions. If the accounts 
had been done on the same basis as two years ago (when the 
corporation started making provisions for special depreciation) this 
year's pre-tax profit would have risen to £189.7 million.
In addition, for the first time, BG has decided to accelerate its 
provisions for displaced plant (the unamortised residue costs of old 
coal and oil based plant) and to bring forward the writing-off of
expenditure incurred on the conversion programme .......
In other words the accounts could easily be re-written to show a
profit of around £250 millions for 1976-77 before tax ...
On 30 July 1977 Fconomlsl (p 84) carried a report titled "It's a 
gas" which described the BGC's supplementary depreciation charge and its 
accelerated amortisation of displaced plant and deferred charges. IM
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EcflUDBlst claimed that the Price Commission had accepted the accelerated
amortisation of displaced plant and deferred charges and had accepted the
supplementary depreciation charge to the extent that It was not more than
140* of last year's level. The report claimed that the dispute between
the BGC and the Price Commission arose because :
some engineering works planned for last winter were delayed. If all 
had gone as planned an extra £36m would have appeared as 
replacement expenditure ...
On 31 July 1977 The Sunday— Times (p 61) carried a report titled 
"THE BILLION POUND EXPLOSION IN GAS". The introductory paragraph of that 
report stated ;
It is arguable whether the British Gas Corporation is more adept in 
the business of gas distribution or in the art of accounting. With 
two major changes in accounting methods in two years the 
corporation has flown in the face of the cardinal accounting 
principle - consistency and virtually adopted its own definition of 
depreciation. The effect has been to cloud the corporation's high 
and rising profits and put off the day when the Government may 
demand that some of the money is handed over.
The report went on to argue that :
British Gas has developed rare and unrealistic accounting techniques 
and seems bent on thwarting the will of Parliament as expressed in
the 1972 Gas Act  Parliament in her wisdom recognised the unique
blessing cheap natural gas conferred on the corporation and decreed 
that when that blessing became too much, it should be shared. 
Section 16 of the Gas Act gives the Secretary of State power to 
siphon off excess revenue from British Gas provided its reserves, 
shown in the balance sheet, exceed 10% of net assets. In the last 
two years changes in the corporation's accounting methods have 
distorted profit figures and effectively postponed the day when 
section 16 may be used in the way Parliament clearly envisaged.
The Ar.r.nnntants Veeklv in a report (p 3) on 5 August 1977 titled
"British Gas profits slashed by write-off changes" described the effect
of the accounting choices made by the BGC during the year ended 31 March
1977. The reported commented that by :
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has laid itself open to suspicion that it has made changes simply 
to suit the political climate of the day.
In the summer of 1977 there was thus evidence of the press taking 
an interest in the BGC's accounting choices which may have been due to 
the dispute between the BGC and the Price Commission in June 1977.
On 8 February 1978 the SCSI (SCNI, 1978) questioned the BGC on 
their report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1977. Mr Edwin 
Vainwright of the SCNI asked (Q 82) why the BGC had adopted the 
accounting practice of charging supplementary depreciation. Sir Denis 
Rooke replied that the BGC wanted to ensure that in a time of high 
inflation its depreciation charges were sufficient "to cover the cost of 
the real use and replacement of fixed assets". He argued that the BGC's 
supplementary depreciation charge not only had the support of the 
accountancy profession but also had the support of the Government "whom 
you will recall in the House on one occasion said they do believe that a 
steady move towards some sort of inflation accounting is necessary and 
proper".
Mr Vainwright responded <Q 83) by suggesting that the public would
see the supplementary depreciation charge as an attempt by the BGC to
reduce its profits. Mr Smith justified the supplementary depreciation
charge on the basis of the price code which ;
included some 18 months ago for the first time a provision for a 40 
per cent up-lift in the charge for depreciation for pricing 
purposes, and of course, this was certainly a factor in our decision 
to move to inflation accounting. Even if we had not done it, and 
you ask how it affects the pricing situation, the 40 per cent in the 
price code would have affected our pricing situation anyway.
In answer to a later question (Q 85) from Mr Thomas, Sir Denis
Rooke confirmed that the 40 per cent uplift had formed part of the BGC's
price claim to the Price Commission in October 1976.
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Mr Thomas then asked (Q 86) if the reason the BGC had increased its
depreciation charge by almost 100 per cent between 1976 and 1977 was to
reduce its profits from an embarrassingly high level to a more acceptable
level. Sir Denis Rooke did not accept this explanation arguing that :
we have, through our sponsoring department sought the means of 
going into replacement cost depreciation over many years back; to 
my knowledge 7 or 8 years back. And this moment, when they decided 
to put something in the price code was the first time we had any 
opportunity to move.
Mr Marshall asked a question <Q 94) about financial targets to
which Sir Denis Rooke replied ;
Ve certainly agree that a proper target should be set by the 
Secretary of State. Ve have always pressed for such targets. Ve
were very glad when they were set earlier, and we were very sad
when they gradually lost their meaning and fell by the wayside. Ve 
have consistently said we would like to see a target. The one we 
have gone on putting forward both internally and when I have
mentioned publicly is a target of 4 per cent return on turnover 
after charging current cost depreciation and interest.
Sir Denis's answer led to the following exchange with Mr Renton of
the SCNI (Q 98 and Q 99) :
Mr Renton : If I can just be clear in relation to your 1977
Accounts, if you had made the 4 per cent profit on turnover which 
you seek, this would have meant your making a profit of around £80 
million?
Sir Denis Rooke : £78 million is the figure.
Mr Renton : Instead of a profit of £31 million. Vhat would that
really mean in terms of increased price at the moment if you were
to be given that target ....?
Mr J Smith : A 4 per cent increase on tariff gas.
The cash flow benefits to the BGC of having a financial target are 
thus obvious.
On 11 February 1978 The Guardian (p 22) reported that the BGo and 
the Price Commission had finally settled their dispute over the claim by 
the latter that the BGC had made excess profits of £36.6 million during 
the year ended 31 March 1977. The agreement announced Jointly on 10
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February was that gas prices should remain frozen until April 1979 
provided that there is no major increase in the rate of inflation.
The first meeting of the Energy Commission was held on 28 November
1977 (Energy Commission, 1977). The main purpose of that meeting was to 
discuss a Working Document on Energy Policy which had been prepared by 
civil servants in conjunction with the industries concerned. After 
discussion and appropriate amendments the Working Document was to go 
forward to Ministers with the recommendation that it be published as a 
Green Paper. The impact of gas prices on the demand for other forms of 
energy was discussed. Mr Berridge, Chairman of the South of Scotland 
Electricity Board pointed out that gas represented a constraint on coal 
and electricity (p 12); Sir William Hawthorne, Chairman of the Advisory 
Council on Energy Conservation said that consumers only preferred gas 
because it was cheaper than oil (p 12); Mr F L Tombs, Chairman of the 
Electricity Council pointed out that as gas was undercutting electricity 
in a number of markets, the electricity industry's capacity to make a 
nuclear contribution was affected and suggested that gas prices be linked 
to future replacement costs rather than to early acquisition costs (p 13).
The Green Paper on Energy Policy was duly published on 13 February
1978 (Department of Energy, 1978). Para 8.16 recommended that gas 
prices:
need to be related to the expected cost of future supplies, rather 
than to its historic costs, and this implies prices higher than can 
be justified by the view that price increases should be limited to 
those made necessary by cost increases actually incurred.
Para 8.21 pointed out that decisions relating to the future
expansion of the gas industry would have to take into account the effect
on the long term growth of the coal, electricity and nuclear industries.
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The Energy Commission held its second meeting on 13 February 1978 
(Energy Commission, 1978). Once again the pricing of energy was 
discussed. Sir Francis Tombs pointed out that energy pricing was decided
on a short-term basis. He said that ;
all the energy industries presently price on 12 months accounts and 
the prospect of a very large profit appearing is embarrassing both 
to the industry and the Government, and one might note here that 
British Gas tried very hard indeed last year to Justify their price
situation by prudently  anticipating writing off capital costs, a
very sensible thing to do on a year's basis, though it does not 
necessarily lay the foundation for the future.
Sir Denis Rooke denied that the BGC had made its accounting choices 
for the year ended 31 March 1977 for this reason. He argued that the 
August 1976 change in the Price Code had given the BGC its first 
opportunity to move towards replacement cost depreciation. He added that 
as "officials who have been around a long time in the Department of 
Energy will know, British Gas have been asking to go on a replacement 
cost depreciation basis for many years". This comment gives further 
evidence of the involvement of civil servants from the Department of 
Energy in the BGC's accounting choices. He justified the accelerated 
write-off of displaced plant and deferred charges on the basis that the 
BGC wanted these written off before the more expensive gas from the 
northern basis of the North Sea came on stream so that consumers would
not have to suffer a sudden dramatic jump in gas prices.
Sir Derek Ezra, Chairman of the National Coal Board, expressed his 
concern that the relatively low price of gas to the domestic consumer was 
adversely affecting the other energy industries whose prices were related 
to the international price of oil. Sir Denis Rooke argued that the 
current price of gas to the domestic consumer had been greatly affected
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by the control on prices exercised by the IBP! and by the Price
Commission over many years. He argued that :
If it were thought that prices ought to have been higher one way to 
have done that would have been to set financial targets, and can I 
remind Members that my industry has been one that has been asking 
for the setting of a realistic financial target for a long time .... 
This would give you an argument when you face NBPI or Price
Commission or somebody else".
Sir Denis Rooke s comment appears to indicate that he preferred to
have a financial target because it could provide a good basis for arguing
for a price rise.
On 14 February 1978 Sir Francis Tombs launched a further attack on
the BGC’s pricing policy when speaking to the Electrical Industries' Club
in London, He described the gas industry's recent expansion as "a model
of the monopoly exploitation of a cheap and favoured fuel". He said that
the amount of gas available to British Gas will increase by 50 per cent
in the next few years.
If gas is to dominate the energy market then its competitors and 
potential substitutes - electricity and coal - will have limited 
markets and will not be able to afford the investment necessary on 
a very large timescale in order to provide the capacity to replace
the gas when reserves are depleted. (Ihs Guardian, 15 February
1978, p 14).
There was further criticism of gas prices from the electricity 
industry on 22 February 1978. On that date the SCNI questioned the top 
management of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) on various 
matters including the effect on the electricity industry of the 
competition from the BGC. Mr G England, Chairman of the CEGB, took the 
opportunity to recommend that gas prices should reflect the longer term 
costs of bringing in more expensive gas supplies from the fields in the 
northern part of the North Sea (Q 284, Q 285, Q 286 and Q 287) (SCNI, 
1978).
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1 A j2— B ffflflt o f thp accountiiyg nhnilîpe
All the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1978 
are described in the Appendix K. The effects of these accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1978 on the reported pre-tax profit 
for the year ended 31 March 1978 are shown on Table 7.7 which is derived 
from Table K1 in Appendix K. The restatement of the pre-tax profit for 
the year ended 31 March 1978 is shown on Table 7.8. The accounting 
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1978 had the effect of 
decreasing the pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 1978 by 
£240,600,000 from £420,900,000 to £180,300,000 (Table 7.8) which is a 
decrease of 57.2%.
Table 7.7
Effect on the reported pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 1978 
of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March-_I9Z8.
Increasing Decreasing
Replacement expenditure charged as a trading cost 89,000,000
Supplementary depreciation charge 145,400,000
Provision for field abandonment costs 6,200,000
Decreasing effect on reported pre-tax profit  24Q t6QQ >QQQ.
Table 7,8 
Restatement of the pre-tax profit for the year ended 3.1— March 19Z8— for the 
effect of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March .19.7.8.
£
Reported pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 1978 180,300,000
Restated pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 1978 42Q.9QQ.QM.
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It should be noted that In addition to the accounting choices listed 
•in Table 7.7 there was, for the first time, in the years covered by this 
study, a deferred tax adjustment. That adjustment is described in 
Appendix K but has not been included in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 above for the 
following reasons :
(1) The Price Commission appeared to focus on pre-tax profits. the 
Counter-Inflation (Price Code) Order 1977 (SI 1272) specified that 
the net profit used in calculating the net profit margin should be 
the pre-tax profit [para 11 (i)]. After profit margin control ended 
on 31 July 1978 the Price Commission were free to take a more 
flexible approach when they chose to investigate a proposed price 
rise. However, the Commission appears to have continued to focus on 
the pre-tax profit. The Commission's investigation into the BGC's 
proposed price rise from April 1979 (Price Commission, 1979) did 
not mention the BGC's deferred tax adjustments when discussing the 
BGC's accounting choices over the five years to 31 March 1978 
(paras 9.33 to 9.43). Also when calculating the BGC's return on 
capital employed over these years (paras 9.44 to 9.47) the
Commission used the pre-tax profit.
(2) The focus of the press was on pre-tax profits (see sections 7.51 
and 7.61). Thus the two hypotheses on which this study is largely 
based cannot provide an explanation for the deferred tax adjustment. 
The deferred tax adjustments in future years have been ignored and 
the remaining years of this sub-period focus on pre-tax pro!its.
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Z A i2.— Hyplanfltinn for thA f^hoiroo
The disputes between the BGC and the Price Commission in July 1973
and in June/July 1977 almost certainly meant that the BGC saw the Price
Commission as a threat to a gas price rise in April 1979.
The Price Commission's choices of proposed price rises to
investigate since the Price Commission Act 1977 must have increased the
BGC s suspicion that there was a danger of a Price Commission
investigation of any proposed gas price rise for April 1979. The Price
Commission (1978) later explained their choice of investigation from 1
August 1977 to 30 April 1978 as follows :
our primary concern has been sectors where competition is limited. 
Ve have wanted to show whether lack of full competition has led to 
inefficiency in the use of resources, to exploitation of market 
strength against the consumer or to an unreasonable level of 
profit....
As a result of the BGC having no competition with reference to the 
distribution of gas, and as the 10% rise in gas prices from 1 April 1977 
had led to accusations that the gas consumer was being exploited and 
also as the BGC was, in absolute terms, making large profits, gas 
industry management and civil servants must have realised that there was 
a danger of a Price Commission investigation of any price rise proposed 
for April 1979.
Gas industry management and civil servants probably felt that if 
the press and non-government politicians created a crisis over the size 
of the BGC's reported profits the likelihood of a Price Commission 
investigation would be increased. Furthermore, gas industry management 
and civil servants would have been aware that any proposal to increase 
gas prices from April 1979 would become public knowledge some time
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before that when the most recent reported profits of the BGC would have 
been those for the year ended 31 March 1978. As the profits for the 
year ended 31 March 1978 showed a dramatic Increase over those for the 
previous year there was therefore an Increased motivation for gas 
industry management and civil servants to make income decreasing 
accounting choices in order to reduce the likelihood of the press or non­
government politicians creating a crisis which would in turn increase the 
likelihood of a Price Commission investigation of any price rise proposed 
for April 1979.
Glvil servants had a further reason for encouraging the BGC to make 
accounting choices which decreased the BGC's reported profit for the year 
ended 31 March 1978. In December 1976 the Government had over-ruled the 
Price Commission in order to impose a 10% gas price rise from 1 April 
1977. This price rise was one of a number of measures aimed at reducing 
the PSBR - as requested by the IMF. However, as a result of this price 
rise the Government could have been subject to further criticism when the 
BGC's accounts were published if the reported profits for the year ended 
31 March 1978 were seen as being excessively large. The press and/or 
non-government politicians could have claimed that the April 1977 price 
rise had been unnecessary and had been unfair to the gas consumer. Civil 
servants would be aware that government politicians might blame them for 
not avoiding such criticism. Thus civil servants would be motivated to 
encourage the BGC to make income decreasing accounting choices in order 
to avoid the likelihood of such criticism of the government.
Thus the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1978 are consistent with the explanation that they were chosen by BGC 
management and civil servants in order to help justify (or at least
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reduce criticism of) both the Government's April 1977 gas price increase 
and any proposed gas price rise in April 1979.
The demands for a tax on gas continued during the year ended 31 
March 1978 as noted in section 7.4.1. Clearly BGC management would not 
have wanted to provide fuel for these arguments by reporting profits 
which could have been described as excessive. Thus the accounting 
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1978, which reduced the 
reported profit by £240,600,000 or 57.2% are consistent with the 
explanation that they were chosen by BGC management in order to avoid 
political costs in the form of the proposed tax on gas.
In section 7.3.3 it was claimed that the accounting choices for the 
year ended 31 March 1977 were consistent with the explanation that they 
had been chosen by BGC management in order to avoid the political costs 
which would have resulted from the Government exercising its right to 
transfer a proportion of the BGC's profits for the year ended 31 March 
1978 to the Treasury under section 16 of the Gas Act 1972. It is not 
possible to make a similar claim for the accounting choices made during 
the year ended 31 March 1978. According to the BGC's balance sheet at 31 
March 1978 the net assets at that date amounted to £2,102,200,000 and the 
accumulated reserves at that date amounted to £313,000,000 which is more 
than 10% of the net assets. Thus in spite of the income decreasing 
accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1978 the 
Government would have been able, if it had so desired, to transfer a 
proportion of the profits for the year ended 31 March 1979 to the 
Treasury under section 16 of the Gas Act 1972.
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Zx5— ACCOUNTING CHOICES MADE BUR TNG YEAR REDED 31 MARCH 1979
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1979. The evidence collected up to
31 March 1979 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is
described in section 7.5.1. The effect of the accounting choices is shown 
in section 7.5.2 and the explanations for these accounting choices are
given in section 7.5.3.
L5J.— Evidence to 31 March 1Q7Q
On 7 June 1978 the Financial Tlaea tp 7) reported that Mr Anthony 
Vedgewood Benn, the Energy Secretary, had rejected the idea of a special 
tax on gas to bring the price of gas more into line with other forms of 
energy.
On 11 June 1978 The Sunday Times (p 53) carried a report titled
"Heat on British Gas as profits double". The report claimed that :
Profits approaching £200m are to be declared by the British Gas
Corporation in the next few weeks. This will be   many times the
previous year's £31m. The results are likely to stoke up the still 
simmering row over whether there should be a gas tax.
At the press conference on 17 July 1978 to present the BGC's annual
report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 1978, Sir Denis Rooke
explained the increase in pre-tax profits from £31.6m in the previous
year to £180.3m in the current year on the basis that it had resulted
from the Government-imposed price increase from 1 April 1977. He argued
that despite the massive increase in profits he expected to apply for an
increase in gas prices in April 1979 (at the end of the current freeze on
gas prices) because by that time the BGC would be buying its natural gas
from the much more expensive fields in the northern North Sea.
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The headlines in the national newspapers on 18 July 1978 
follows :
were as
The Times (p 21)
(p 25)
The Guardian (p l)
(p 11)
The Daily .Telegraph (p 1)
(p 6)
British Gas boosts profits to a record 
£180m
Ignoring the Hyde guidelines
Gas prices to rise despite record 
profit
British gas for the best inflation
Freeze on gas price to end next year
STATE GAS DENIES UNDERSTATING PROFIT 
BY £145m
Financial Times (p i)
(p 38) 
Dally Mirror (p 2)
Daily Mail (p 9)
(p 19)
The Sun (p 2)
Gas profits up- but price may increase 
Cash flow bonanza for British Gas 
Gas prices row erupts 
Gas likely to go up despite big profits 
Mr Therm's profits are a gas, man 
£180m gas profit
The proportion of the press reports in which prices were adopted as 
a theme was as follows ; The Times. 5%; The Guardian, 37%; The.. Daily 
Telegraph, 60%; Financial Times. 27%; Daily Mirror, 86%; Daily Mail, 54% 
and The Sun 75%. These percentages are relatively low compared to other 
years which was presumably because a price rise was not imminent as the 
Price Commission had insisted that gas prices remain frozen until April 
1979.
All the press reports above tended to focus on the BGC s profit 
before taxation of £180.3 million rather than on the profit after taxation 
of £103.9 million. Thus the deferred tax charge of £76.4 did not 
influence the profit figure highlighted in the press reports, nor was it
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criticised in any of the national newspapers. The supplementary
depreciation charge of £145.4 million was mentioned by The
Guardian. Ilia ..Daily Telegraph, the Financial Time« and the Daiiv
Only the Daily Mail mentioned the charge to revenue of £89.0 million for
replacement expenditure and the new provision for field abandonment costs 
of £6.2 million. Both The Tiaes. and the Financial Times noted that the 
BGC had not made a gearing adjustment which would have reduced the 
supplementary depreciation charge. Both newspapers criticised the BGC 
for not making this adjustment and thereby not adhering to the Hyde 
guidelines.
The Economist (29 July 1978, pp 89-90) in an article titled "Shoot 
the nationalised auditor - no one would notice" criticised the accounting 
choices made by nationalised industries in 1978. The BGC was criticised 
for the supplementary depreciation charge, for the accelerated write-off 
of displaced plant and deferred charges and for the deferred tax charge. 
On the deferred tax charge The Economist pointed out that the BGC 
intended to spend £1.6 billion on new investment over the next five 
years, much of which would attract capital allowances. Ths— ECQPQmist 
deduced from this that the BGC must be expecting huge profits over the 
next five years otherwise the deferred tax charge would be unnecessary.
On 23 December 1978 the F.ihfahClal Times (p 1> carried a report that 
the Government had set the BGC a new financial target. According to the 
published report and accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 
1979 (p 18) the Government had set the BGC a financial target for the 
year ended 31 March 1980 of a return on turnover of 6.5 per cent after 
interest and depreciation according to the accounting conventions adopted 
in the accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1978. When
- 236 -
giving évidence te the SCÏI on 31 January 1979 (Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries, 1979) Sir Denis Hooke described the one-year 
target as "extremely unwelcome" as :
"we just do not know what to do with a one-year target. It does not 
teach you anything about running the business. Vhat we want is 
continuity .... We need a target that continues into the future so 
that we know how to steer the ship" (Q 127)
In answer to a later question (Q 143) Sir Denis became more specific 
about why the 6.5% target was unwelcome.
The moment I go for a price increase .. my customers will start
asking me : "Vhat is the justification for putting up the price of
gas?" If I say, "It is because of a target of 6.5 per cent" they 
will say : "Why should you be adopting a target of 6.5 per cent when 
you have publicly said, many times, that your commercial view was 
something around 4 per cent?" Vhat I want to be clear on is this. 
Vhat is the basis of the 6.5 per cent? Exactly what am I going to
say to my customers?  I have to deal with my customers, the Price
Commission and the Consumer Council.
This comment from Sir Denis also gives an indication that he saw an
important use of the financial target as being to justify a price rise.
On 23 February 1979 the Financial Times carried a report (p 6) that
the BGC was to notify the Price Commission that it planned to increase
its prices by between 8 per cent and 10 per cent. The BGC justified the
proposed price rise on the basis that it was required in order to meet
the financial target of 6.5 per cent on turnover imposed by the
Government. According to the corporation the Government had made it clear
that its 6.5 per cent target was designed to ensure that gas prices did
not fall in real terms during the next year. According to the Financial
Times the Government had imposed the financial target on the BGC to
ensure that gas prices did not fall too far below electricity prices in
order to safeguard the interests of the coal and electricity industries.
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On 1 March 1979 the BGC notified the Price Commission under the 
Prices and Charges (Notification of Increases) Order 1978 (SI No 1083) of 
its intention to increase its charges (Price Commission, 1979, p VI).
An example of the embarrassment that the high profits of the BGC 
brought to the Government was thf following question in the House of 
Commons on 8 March 1979. Mr Dykes asked the Secretary of State for 
Energy what action he proposes to take to delay the proposed 10% rise in 
the price of average domestic gas tariffs in view of the substantial 
surplus shown in the accounts of the BGC. Mr Benn responded : "I 
understand that the British Gas Corporation has now made application to 
increase domestic tariffs from 1 April by about 8%. Otherwise I have
nothing to add...." (963 HC Deb 1978/79 col 741 Written Answers).
On 22 March 1979 the Price Commission gave notice to the Secretary 
of State for Prices and Consumer Protection that an investigation of the 
BGC Vs proposed price increase should be undertaken under the terms of the 
Price Commission Act 1977. On the same date a copy of the Notice was 
given to the BGC (Price Commission, 1979, p VI).
On 24 March 1979 the Financial Times (p 1) reported that the Price
Commission had frozen gas prices for three months while it investigated 
the price rise application from the BGC. According to the Financial 
Times the Price Commission had hinted that it would consult the
Government if it found that the financial targets set the BGC were too
high.
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7.52 Effect of the accounting rhnl^ ffi
The effects of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1979 on the reported pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 
1979 are shown on Table 7.9. The restatement of the pre-tax profit for 
the year ended 31 March 1979 is shown on Table 7.10. The accounting 
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1979 had the effect of 
decreasing the pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 1979 by 
£298,600,000 from £659,300,000 to £360,700,000 (Table 7.10) which is a 
decrease of 45.3%.
Table 7,9
Effect on the reported pre-tax profit for the year endedJ31 March. 19Z9. 
of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 197-9.
Increasing___ Decreeing
Replacement expenditure charged as a ...
trading cost (see Appendix H) 126,400,000
Supplementary depreciation charge
(s^ Appendix J)* 165,300,000
Increase in provision for field ...
abandonment costs (see Appendix K) 6,900,
Decreasing effect on reported pre-tax   2Q8.6QQ.000
Table. 7 ,10 
31.Jtarch 1979
£
Reported pre-tax profit for the year ended 360,700,000
31 March 1979
ac®cou"“  g 298,600,000
year (Table 7.9) ________
Restated pre-tax profit for the year ended 669,300.00(1
31 March 1979
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Ïj5j3—KxDlanatlnTiR for thA
Throughout the year ended 31 March 1979 the BGC knew that if it 
applied for a gas price rise In April 1979 there was the possibility that 
It would become subject to a Price Commission Investigation of the need 
for a price rise, As the Price Commission's decision on whether or not
to investigate that price rise would have to be made prior to April 1979 
and as the accounts for the year ended 31 March 1979 would not be 
published until July 1979 gas industry management and civil servants 
would know that the reported profits (and therefore the accounting 
choices) for the year ended 31 March 1979 would not influence the Price 
Commission's decision on whether or not to conduct an investigation. 
However, in the event of the Price Commission conducting an
investigation, gas industry management and civil servants may have 
expected that the accounting choices for the year ended 31 March 1979 
would have had some influence on the outcome. The Price Commission had 
previously accepted the BGC's supplementary depreciation charge and the 
corporation's policy of charging the cost of replacing certain categories 
of fixed assets to revenue. Thus, although the Price Commission s 
investigations were to be conducted on a more flexible basis since the 
Price Commission Act 1977. gas industry management and civil servants 
might have expected that increases in these charges against profits would 
be likely to help Justify their need for a price rise to tne Price
Commission.
The Government's desire to see gas prices rise can be seen in the 
setting of a financial target of achieving a 6.5» return on turnover 
the year ended 31 March 1980 when the BGC would apparently have
preferred that target to be only 4», Thus civil servants would not be
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motivated to stop the BGC making accounting choices which decreased 
profits If by so doing a price rise from April 1979 was going to be more
easily Justified.
Thus the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 
1979 are consistent with the explanation that they were chosen by BGC 
management and civil servants in order to help Justify a price rise from 
April 1979.
Although the demands for a tax on gas were not so frequent during 
the year ended 31 March 1979 as during the previous two years the BGC 
would have been well aware that these demands could have started up 
again at any time. Clearly the BGC would not have wanted to provide fuel 
for these arguments by reporting profits which could have been described 
as excessive. Thus the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1979 which reduced the reported profit by £298,600,000 or 45.3% are 
consistent with the explanation that they were chosen by BGC management 
in order to avoid political costs in the form of a proposed tax on gas.
&G ACCOUNTING CHOICES MADE DURING YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 198.0
This section describes the investigation of the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1980. The evidence collected up to 
31 March 1980 which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is 
described in section 7.6.1. The evidence collected after 31 March 1980 
which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses is described in section 
7.6.2. The effect of the accounting choices is shown in section 7.6.3 and 
the explanations for these accounting choices are given in section 7.6.4 
The gas industry's lobbying behaviour during the y^ ar i^  dc:i=f_ribçid and 
discussed in section 7.6.5.
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7.6.1 Evidence to 31 larch 1980
The Price Commission exercised their discretion under the Price 
Commission Act 1977 and on 11 April 1979 permitted a weighted average 
increase of 11 per cent in respect of non-domestic users and on 17 May 
1979 permitted a weighted average increase of 8 per cent in respect of 
domestic users (Price Commission, 1979).
At the General Election on 3 May 1979 the Conservative Party gained 
a majority of 43 over all other parties in the new House of Commons 
(Survey of Current Affairs, Vol 9, 1979, p 115). During the debate on the 
Queen's speech on 15 May 1979 the Prime Minister announced the 
Government's decision to abolish the Price Commission as part of a new 
framework of competition policy (967 HC Deb 1979-80 Col 79 Oral 
Answers). The Price Commission was progressively run down from May 
1979 (Price Commission, 1979a, p 2) and provisions for its abolition were 
included in the Competition Act 1980 which received the Royal Assent on 
3 April 1980.
In his Budget Statement on 12 June 1979 <968 HC Deb 1979-80, cols 
235-263) Sir Geoffrey Howe announced changes in taxation and public 
expenditure aimed at reducing the PSBR (col 243).
On 16 July the Financial Times in an editorial (p 14) argued the
case for introducing a special tax on gas as soon as possible. The
Financial Times argued that the huge monopoly profits of the BGC which 
at present accrued to the corporation and its domestic customers (who
were thus shielded from world energy prices) would be better transferred
to the exchequer to reduce public sector borrowing.
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On 18 July 1979 the Price Commission published its report titled 
"British Gas Corporation - Gas Prices and Allied Charges" (Price 
Commission, 1979). The Price Commission described the BGC as being an 
efficient and well-run industry but was critical of its pricing policies. 
The Commission argued that LRMC should be one of the major factors taken 
into account when setting price levels in each market segment (para 
10.12). According to the Commission although the price of gas to non­
domestic users was slightly below LRMC the price to domestic users was 
well below LRMC (para 10.13). The Commission recognised that bringing 
domestic prices into line could not be done in a single step and 
recommended this be phased over a number of years (para 10.14). The 
Commission also recognised that such a "move towards LRMC-based pricing 
would imply an appropriately higher financial target" (para 10.16).
As regards the accounting changes made over the six years to 31 
March 1979 the Commission argued that charging the cost of replacing 
certain categories of existing fixed assets as a revenue expense did 
not :
represent generally accepted accounting practice as it results in a 
mismatching of cost and revenue .... At the present time we believe 
that the continuing use of this policy results in a mis-statement of 
the balance sheet because it lowers the amounts recorded for fixed 
assets and fixed assess maintenance (para 9.39).
The Commission accepted that providing for current cost 
depreciation was reasonable (para 9.40) and appeared to accept the 
corporation's explanation for the accelerated amortisation of displaced 
plant and deferred charges (para 9.43).
At the press conference on 23 July 1979 to present the annual 
report and accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1979 w^ir 
Denis Rooke disclosed that domestic gas prices would start rising in
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1979 as part of a three to four year programme to narrow the gap with 
non-domestic gas prices (The Daily Telegraph, 23 July 1979, pi). The 
"popular" press reports the day after the annual report and accounts were 
published (24 July 1979) concentrated more on this expected rise in gas 
prices for the domestic consumer than on the contents of the financial 
statements. The headlines in the national newspapers were as follows :
The Guardian (p l) 
The Guardian (p 17)
The Daily Telegraph (p 1)
The Daily Jlfilegraph (p 21) 
Flaancial Times (p l)
Gas set to turn away extra business
For British Gas read British Cash - in 
the Guinness Book of Records
BOOMING GAS SEEKS PRICE RISE: Profits 
double to £360 million
Now it's high speed loans
British Gas to lend Government money 
after record profit
Financial Jiaes. (p 28) 
Daily ...Mirror (p 2) 
Da ily .Mail (p 9)
The Sun (p 2)
Daily _Star. (p 6)
A cash bubble at British Gas 
Gas profits up ... now for prices!
Prices threat as gas profits soar 
GAS PROFITS HIT £1M A DAY 
GAS 'HAS TO RISE BY HALF'
All the above press reports highlighted the pre-tax profit gi 
£360.7m which was regularly described as being twice the previous year's 
level. The Guardian (p 17) and The Daily. Telegraph (p 21) pointed out 
that the pre-tax profit would have been £526m if supplementary 
depreciation had not been charged. None of the press reports mentioned 
the after-tax profit figure of £172.3m. The percentage of total space in 
these reports in which prices were adopted as a theme was as follows: 
The Guardian. 10%; The Daily Telegraph, 55%; Financial Tifflas. 10%; Daily: 
Mirror. 100%; Daily Mail. 100%; Daily Star. 100%, and The Sun 25%.
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Three national newspapers carried editorials on 25 July 1979. The 
Guardian s titled Gas in search of realism" (p 14) supported the Price 
Commission's argument for an increase in gas prices and suggested that 
the state "rake off the bulk of the extra money which higher prices 
brought in". Ihe Dally Telegraph's, editorial titled "BOOMING GAS" <p 18) 
also argued for a price rise and suggested that the resulting large 
profits be reduced by imposing "on gas a revenue duty similar to that 
imposed on petrol". The Daily Mail's editorial titled "The gas dilemma" ( 
p 6.) was less sure that a rise in gas prices was a good idea concluding 
somewhat hesitantly that "quite possibly an expanded cheap gas industry 
may be Britain's best bet". The percentage of total space in these 
editorials in which prices were adopted as a theme was 100% in each case.
On 17 December 1979 the Financial Times (p 10) carried an article 
titled "The need for a British tax on gas profits". The opening sentences 
were as follows :
How does one reconcile the British public to a substantial rise in 
gas prices when the British Gas Corporation is the most profitable 
of the nationalised industries, and may be making profits of up to 
£lbn per annum in the next few years? The short answer is by 
imposing a special tax on the corporation ...
On 16 January 1980 Mr David Howell, the Secretary of State for 
Energy made a statement to the House of Commons about financial targets 
for the gas and electricity industries (976 HC Deb 1979-80 cols 1644- 
1646 Oral Answers). Mr Howell gave five reasons why gas prices would 
have to rise (col 1645) and then announced that the Government had set 
the BGC :
a target expressed as an average annual rate of return to be 
achieved over the period April 1980 to March 1983 of 9 per cent on 
net assets valued at current cost. The target is related to current 
cost operating profit after taking account of depreciation but 
before interest and tax. It will be adjusted, if necessary, after 
introduction of the proposed new current cost accounting standard.
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The target rate of return is expressed as an average over three 
years—  Details of the tariff changes necessary to achieve the 
target are a matter for British Gas. However, in broad terms, the 
Government expect domestic gas prices to increase this year by 10 
per cent over and above the rate of inflation, followed by 
comparable real increases in the following two years..
The ensuing debate produced the following exchange (col 1651) which
illustrates the government's difficulty in Justifying a rise in gas prices
when the BGC's profits were already large :
Sir Bernard Braine; Is my right hon Friend aware that  many
people in this country are mystified? They see the gas industry 
making substantial profits. My own constituents know that it is 
difficult enough to meet electricity and gas bills now. Can my 
right hon Friend explain the justification for the size of the 
increase in gas prices? That is what people want to know.
Mr Hawaii: ww.While the BGC may have a large surplus and is
efficient, it does not mean that it is competing for customers. On 
the contrary, customers are competing for gas, as industry well 
knows. That will continue until the price rises to economic levels. 
Failure to go that way will be grossly inefficient and will lead to 
arbitrary rationing and shortages.
The possibility of introducing an additional gas tax was raised by
Mr Forman (col 1652). Mr Howell responded by describing a gas tax as an
"interesting idea" which seemed to indicate that the government planned
to give the matter serious consideration.
In response to questions from Dr Owen (col 1659) Mr Howell admitted
that the BGC had not wanted such a large price rise and that the
expected increase in the BGC's profits, as a result of the proposed price
rise was between £200 and £300 million. Mr Howell s statement on the
financial targets for the gas industry was reported in the Financial.
Times (p 1) the following day. The Financial Times, commented that :
The combination of large increasing profits and high and rapidly 
increasing prices, presents the Government and British Gas with a 
problem of presentation and Energy Department officials have been 
considering w;%^ of aqydyiag a special tax M  the corporation^ 
profits.
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On 24 January 1980 the Financial TlaeR (p 23) made an attempt to
clarify matters relating to future gas prices by means of an article
consisting of questions and answers. One of these is of particular
interest from the political cost aspect of the present study :
Would it not be better to impose an explicit tax on the Corporation 
analagous to the Petroleum Revenue Tax?
Yes, if only to stop the childish personification of the argument in 
terms of a "greedy" Government or Corporation not being content
with the present massive gas profits.
The possibility of introducing a tax on gas continued to be 
discussed both in the House of Commons and in the press in early 1980. 
The matter was raised twice by Mr Joe Ashton: first on 29 January 1980
during a debate on Gas Prices (977 HC Deb 1979-80 cols 1129-1201 Oral 
Answers) and again on 11 February in a question to Mr David Howell (978 
HC Deb 1979-80 col 1047 Oral Answers). On 3 March 1980 The Daily 
Telegraph (p 28) reported that the Government was planning to announce a 
tax on gas in the Budget. Sir Denis Rooke was reported as being opposed 
to the idea.
7.6.2 Evidence after 31 Marck
This section included those events which took place after 31 March 
1980 which help to explain the accounting choices made during the year
ended 31 March 1980.
On 8 May 1980 Mr David Howell, the Secretary of State for Energy 
announced the introduction of a levy on gas (984 HC Deb 1979/80 cols 
191-192 Oral Answers). As justification he used the following public
interest argument :
This will mean that some of the financial benefits which would 
otherwise accrue to the corporation will be permanently transferred 
to the benefit of the nation as a whole.
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British Gas said it was "very disappointed" at the decision and said 
that it had opposed the levy because it would reduce cash reserves at a 
time when a huge onshore and offshore investment programme was being 
planned (Financial Times, 9 May 1980, p 48).
On 17 July 1980 the National Gas Consumers' Council claimed that 
domestic gas prices would rise by 125 per cent in the three years to the 
end of 1982 if inflation continued at its present rate. Professor Naomi 
McIntosh, Chairman of the Council, claimed that consumers simply did not 
understand why they should pay more for natural gas than is necessary 
for the continuing- needs of the industry. The NGCC claimed that it 
received many letters from people mystified by the Government's decision 
to increase prices by more than the industry needs and called on the 
Government to explain its decision to consumers (Financial Times. 18 July 
1980, p 8).
On 22 July 1980 the BGC published its report and accounts for the 
year ended 31 March 1980. The press reports the next day had the 
following headlines :
The Times (p 1)
The Times (p 17)
The Guardian (p 1)
The Daily Telegraph, (p D  
Fioaacial Times, (p l> 
Financial Tiaea. (p 26) 
Daily. Mir non (p 2) 
Daily Express (p 2) 
Daily Mail (p 16) 
Daily Star (p 8)
Record gas profit
British Gas chief cautious against 
restructuring after announcing £425m 
profits
Hands off, says British Gas after £466m 
record profit
£425m GAS PROFIT
British Gas fights asset sale
British Gas
Hands off! Gas is booming 
Price row flares over gas profits 
Gas and rail fares set to rocket again 
A blast for Maggie on gas prices
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All the above newspapers reported that the BGC had made a record
pre-tax profit of £425.9 million, an increase of 18 per cent on the
previous year. None of the press reports mentioned the aftei— tax profit
figure of £204.6 million. Ihe T1 Jies. (p 17) noted that the reported
return on turnover was 12.1% against the financial target of 6.5% set by
the previous government. Only The Daily Telegraph (p 1) mentioned that a
supplementary depreciation charge had significantly reduced the reported
profit figure. Accounting choices were not mentioned by any of the other
national newspapers.
The percentage of total space in these press reports in which prices
were adopted as a theme was as follows: The Times. 19%; The Guardian.
10%; The . Daily Telegraph, 19%: Financial Times, 4%; Daily Mirror, 31%;
Dally E%preaa, 100%; Da lly Mall, 68%; Dally Star. 77% and The Sun. 0%.
The Daily Star- (p 8) quoted the Chairman of the National Gas Consumers'
Council, Professor Naomi McIntosh as follows :
These profits confirm our view that consumers are being taken for a 
ride by the Government. British Gas has confirmed that future price 
rises will be higher than the industry itself needs.
On 4 August 1980 Mr Hannam asked the Secrtary of State for Energy
if he will list the names of organisations which have made
representations to him regarding the government imposed increase in gas 
prices. Mr Norman Lamont provided a list of 38 organisations who had 
made representations to the Department of Energy about the increase in 
gas prices. Mr Lamont also stated that the Department had received 
representations on the same topic from 90 companies, some of whom had 
expressed fears about employment prospects (990 HC Deb 1979/80 cols 39- 
40 Written Answers).
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Z Æ 3 — Effect of the accounting choicA«
The effects of the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 
March 1980 on the reported pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 
1980 are shown on Table 7.11, The restatement of the pre-tax profit for 
the year ended 31 March 1980 is shown on Table 7.12. The accounting 
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1980 had the effect of 
decreasing the pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 1980 by 
£376,000,000 from £801,900,000 to £425,900,000 (Table 7.11) which is a 
decrease of 46.9%.
•lAbICL-Z.ll
Effect Oh the reported pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 March 1980 
q£ the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1980
lacreaaiag Decreasing
£
Replacement expenditure charged as a trading cost
(see Appendix H) 134,000,000
Supplementary depreciation charge (see Appendix J) 235,800,000
Increase in provision for field abandonment costs
(see Appendix K) 6,200,000
Decreasing effect on reported pre-tax profit 376.>.Q.Q.Q,DQQ.
Table. 7 ,12. 
Restatement of the reported pre-tax profit for the year ended. 31..March 
1980 for the effect of the accounting choices made during the. year .endea 
3.1 March. 198(1
£
Reported pre-tax profit for the year ended
31 March 1980 425,900,000
Add: Decreasing effect on reported pre-tax
profit of the accounting choices made 
during the year (Table 7.11)
Restated pre-tax profit for the year ended 
31 March 1980
376,000.000
801.900.000
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7 »6 «4— Erplflnatilmifi fnr the accounting choices
The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1980
which decreased the BGC's pre-tax profit for that year by £376,000,000 or 
4.6.9% from £801,900,000 to £425,900,000 can be explained from a pricing 
perspective. As the Government had announced in January 1980 that gas 
prices were to rise by 10% over the rate of inflation in each of the 
three years to 31 March 1983 it would not want the BGC's reported profit 
to be any higher than absolutely necessary. Non-government politicians, 
the National Gas Consumers' Council and the media could have claimed that 
the BGC was already making massive profits and that these Government
imposed price rises were unnecessary and were unfair on gas consumers. 
Given that government politicians might blame them for not avoiding such 
criticism, civil servants would be motivated to encourage the BGC to make 
accounting choices which decreased the BGC's reported profit for the year 
ended 31 March 1980.
Thus the accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March
1980 are consistent with the explanation that they were chosen by BGC 
management and civil servants to reduce criticism of the Government 
imposed price rises for the three years to 31 March 1983.
The demands for a tax on gas continued during the year ended 31 
March 1980 as noted in section 9.6. Clearly the BGC would not have 
wanted to provide fuel for these arguments by reporting profits which 
were any higher than absolutely necessary. Thus the accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1980 which reduced the pre-tax
profit for that year by £376,000,000 or 46.9% are consistent with the 
explanation that they were chosen by BGC management in order to avoid 
political costs in the form of the proposed tax on gas.
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ZjjlS Lobbying behavlmir
During the year ended 31 March 1980 the BGC lobbied the Accounting
Standards Committee regarding Exposure Draft 24 on Current Cost
Accounting. The BGC expressed concern that :
there is no indication in ED24 that current cost accounting should 
eventually be included in the main accounts, nor is there any 
guidance for businesses who already provide for current cost 
adjustments in their profit and loss account.
This comment seems to reflect the BGC's desire not to return to 
preparing their main accounts on a purely historical cost basis and only 
showing the current cost adjustments in a supplementary statement. The 
BGC probably felt that the much higher profits that they would have to 
report on a historical cost basis would make it more difficult to Justify 
proposed price rises and would make the avoidance of political costs more 
difficult.
The BGC supported the depreciation, cost of sales and monetary 
working capital adjustments but objected to the gearing adjustment as 
follows :
The gearing adjustment would again appear to be a financing rather 
than a cost adjustment, but in any case it is not considered 
appropriate for nationalised industries where the fixed debt lender 
and the main 'stockholder' are the same, namely the Government. 
Some general reference in ED24 to gearing not being applicable in 
such a set of circumstances would be helpful without specifically 
mentioning nationalised industries.
Thus the BGC supported those adjustments which would reduce its 
profits but objected to the adjustment that would increase its profits.
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This chapter has described the investigation of the accounting 
choices made during the six years ended 31 March 1980. As noted in
section 5.2 this study has assumed that civil servants had some
involvement in making accounting choices for the gas industry. Limited 
evidence consistent with that assumption has been identified and is 
described in this chapter.
The evidence is consistent with the two explanatory hypotheses 
derived from the US literature identified in section 5.2. During each of
the six years there was a need to either Justify or reduce criticism of a
price rise and during each of the six years income decreasing accounting 
choices were made for the BGC. During each of the four years ended 31 
March 1977, 31 March 1978, 31 March 1979 and 31 March 1980 there was 
also a need to avoid political costs and during each of these four years 
income decreasing accounting choices were made for the BGC.
The investigation identified one explanation which was not covered 
by the two hypotheses. The income decreasing accounting choices made 
during the year ended 31 March 1975 were consistent with the explanation 
that they were made in order to increase the amount of compensation for 
price restraint payable under section 2 of the Statutory Corporations 
(Financial Provisions) Act 1974.
The effect of these income decreasing accounting choices was not 
insignificant as they reduced the gas industry's reported profit by 93.0% 
for the year ended 31 March 1975; by 65.7% for the year ended 31 March 
1976; by 88.6% for the year ended 31 March 1977; by 57.2% for the year
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ended 31 March 1973; by 45.3% for the year ended 31 March 1979 and by 
46.9% for the year ended 31 March 1980.
The hypothesised explanations for the accounting choices would only 
hold provided gas industry management and those civil servants involved 
in making the accounting choices believed that the other groups 
participating in the political process relating to the gas industry would 
not adjust for the accounting choices. The investigation provided very 
little evidence that any of these groups had, in fact, made adjustments 
for the accounting choices, presumably because they thought that the 
marginal costs of adjusting exceeded the marginal benefits. Thus the 
investigation of the behaviour of the other groups participating in the 
political process relating to the gas industry did not provide evidence 
which was inconsistent with the hypothesised explanations for the 
accounting choices.
The positions adopted by the BGC when lobbying the Accounting 
Standards Committee on ED17 and ED24 and when lobbying the Sandilands 
Committee on inflation accounting were consistent with the corporation’s 
apparent preference for accounting choices which would decrease its 
reported profits.
The next chapter provides a summary of the entire empirical study 
and discusses the implications of the findings.
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CHAPTER a SDMASY A¥n IMPLKATTnNfl
8.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarises the empirical study described in chapters 6 
and 7 and interprets the findings in the context of the theoretical 
foundations provided in chapter 3. The chapter also discusses the 
implications of the findings.
Section 8.1 provides a summary of the results of the investigation 
of the two hypotheses. Section 8.2 shows the effects of the accounting 
choices made in each year of the study on the reported net income for the 
year in which the accounting choices were made. Section 8.3 reviews the 
evidence of the involvement of civil servants in making the accounting 
choices. The behaviour of the participants in the political process not 
involved in making accounting choices is described and discussed in 
section 8.4. The explanations for the accounting choices which relate to 
gas prices are summarised in section 8.5. The explanations for the 
accounting choices which relate to political costs are summarised in 
section 8.6. Other explanations for the accounting choices are summarised 
in sections 8.7. The expla^tions for lobbying behaviour are summarised 
in section 8.8.
The implications of the accounting choices made during the 
quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 for the usefulness of the financial 
target for that period are discussed in section 8.9. The implications 
for the future economic regulation of the nationalised sector, for 
accounting policy making and for auditing are discussed in section 8.10,
- 255 -
section 8.11 and section 8.12 respectively. Concluding comments are 
provided in section 8.13.
âol— IIYESTIGATIQg OF THE TVQ HYPOTHESES
In section 5.2 two explanatory hypotheses were generated and these 
were used to focus the empirical study. These hypotheses were as 
follows:
Hypothesis 1: When there is a perceived need to either Justify a price
rise or reduce criticism of a price rise accounting choices will be made 
which reduce reported profit.
Hypothesis 2: When there is a perceived need to avoid political costs
accounting choices will be made which reduce reported profit.
The result of the investigation of these two hypotheses is described
in chapters 6 and 7 and is summarised in Table 8.0.
Table., 8. Q.
Year
ended
Justification of 
or reduction in 
criticism of a 
price rise
Avoidance
of
political
costs
Income
decreasing
accounting
choices
1970 No No No *
1971 No No No t
1972 Yes Yes Yes t
1973 Yes No Yes
1974 Yes No Yes
1975 Yes No Yes
1976 Yes No Yes
1977 Yes Yes Yes
1978 Yes Yes Yes
1979 Yes Yes Yes
1980 Yes Yes Yes
♦ Those accounting choices for which there was no evidence of Gas 
Council involvement have been ignored for the purposes of this chapter 
(see section 5.5.4).
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a.2 EFFECT OF THE ACCOUNTING
During the three years ended 31 March 1972 the gas industry was 
made up of the Gas Council and twelve Area Boards. The accounting 
choices for these three years were divided into two categories. The 
first category was those accounting choices which were either made for 
the Gas Council or were made for the individual Area Boards at the 
request of the Gas Council. The second category was those accounting 
choices made for the Area Boards where there was no evidence that they 
had been made at the request of the Gas Council.
This study does not attempt to explain the accounting choices in the 
second category. As explained in sections 6.15, 6.24 and 6.35 different 
accounting choices were made for different Area Boards during these three
years and the effect of these accounting choices on the reported returns
on average capital employed for the gas industry as a whole were
insignificant. For the year ended 31 March 1972 the accounting choices 
in the second category increase both the net surplus and the net return
on average capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1972 while the
accounting choices in the first category had the opposite effects. These 
findings are consistent with the accounting choices in the second 
category having been made independently by the individual Area Boards. 
If these accounting choices were made independently by the individual
Area Boards then they cannot be explained by the evidence described in 
sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 as that evidence only purports to describe the 
pressures on the gas industry as a whole. The pressures on the
individual Area Boards may have been different.
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This study does attempt to explain the accounting choices in the 
first category. The effects of these accounting choices which were made 
for or at the request of the Gas Council for the three years ended 31 
March 1972 together with the effects of the accounting choices made for 
the BGC for the eight years ended 31 March 1980 are shown on Table 8.1.
Table 8,1
Effect of the accounting choices made for or at the request of the Gas
Council for the three vears ended 31 March 1972 or by the BGC for the
eight years ended 31 March 1980
Year 
ended 
31 March
Estimated net 
income prior 
to accounting 
choices made 
during year
Effect on net 
income of 
accounting choices 
made during year 
incr(deer)
Reported
net
income
Percentage 
change in 
reported 
income
£ £ £
1970 13,391,000 358,000 13,749,000 +2.7%
1971 1,990,000 - 1,990,000 -
1972 24,870,000 (9,751,000) 15,119,000 -39.2%
1973 25,346,000 (19,746,000) 5,600,000 -77.9%
1974 (27,879,000) (13,621,000) (41,500,000) -48.9%
1975 (21,920,000) (20,380,000) (42,300,000) -93.0%
1976 73,200,000 (48,100,000) 25,100,000 -65.7%
1977 273,072,000 (242,072,000) 31,500,000 -88.6%
1978 420,900,000 (240,600,000) 180,300,000 -57.2%
1979 659,300,000 (298,600,000) 360,700,000 -45.3%
1980 801,900,000 (376,000,000) 425,900,000 -46.9%
As can be seen from Table 8.1 income decreasing accounting choices 
were made for each of the nine years ended 31 March 1980. The only 
years for which income decreasing accounting choices were not made were
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the years ended 31 March 1970 and 31 March 1971. For the year ended 31 
March 1970 the accounting choices made by the Area Boards at the request 
of the Gas Council had the effect of increasing reported net income by 
2.8%. There were no accounting choices made for the Gas Council or for 
the Area Boards at the request of the Gas Council during the year ended 
31 March 1971.
— IBYOLYEMEIT OF CIVIL 8E&VAETS II MAKING ACCOUNTING CHOICES
As noted in section 2.1.1 it was not clear prior to conducting the 
empirical study whether or not civil servants had been involved in 
making accounting choices for the gas industry. The empirical study 
provided some evidence on this issue. That evidence was as follows :
1) In their evidence to the SCJI in 1968 the officials from the
Ministry of Power demonstrated a keen awareness of the standard 
accounting rules used by the gas industry for writing off obsolete 
gas making plant (section 6.1.1). Such a keen awareness is
consistent with the officials from the Ministry of Power having had 
some influence in the setting of these standard rules.
2) During the dispute in 1977 between the BGC and the Price Commission 
over the BGC's "excess profits" the Financial Times. (29 June 1977,p 
8) reported that the Department of Energy was satisfied with the 
BGC's accounting procedures (section 7.4.1).
3) In his evidence to the SCHI on 8 February 1978 Sir Denis Rooke 
defended the supplementary depreciation charge in the BGC's 
published accounts by claiming that the BGC had wanted to adopt 
replacement cost depreciation for seven or eight years but had been
- 259 -
prevented from doing so by the sponsor department. He repeated 
this claim on 13 February 1978 during discussions at the Energy 
Commission (section 7.4.1).
Although the above evidence is not conclusive it is consistent with 
civil servants having some involvement in making accounting choices for 
the gas industry. This study's explanations for these accounting choices 
has assumed that civil servants were involved in making these choices. 
Thus the above evidence is consistent with that assumption.
SlA BEHAVIOUR OF THE PARTICIPANTS II THE POLITICAL PROCESS NOT
INVOLVED II MAKING ACCOUNTING CHOICES
As noted in section 3.3.1 it is likely that the use that is made of 
published accounting information will be taken into consideration by 
those making the accounting choices. If this argument holds for the UK 
gas industry its managers and those civil servants involved in making 
accounting choices for the industry would take into account the use made 
of its published accounts by other groups participating in the political 
process relating to the industry.
Insights into the behaviour of the various groups participating in 
the political process relating to the gas industry including their use of 
the Industry's published accounts is provided in chapters 6 and 7. This 
section provides for each group not involved in making the accounting 
choices a summary of that behaviour and a hypothesised explanation 
within the context of the theoretical foundations of the study provided 
in chapter 3. Non-government politicians are dealt with in section 8.4.1, 
the press in section 8.4.2, consumers in section 8.4.3, the Price
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Commission in section 8.4.4 and competitors in section 3.4.5. Concluding 
comments on the behaviour of these groups is provided in section 8.4.6.
ÔAJ— loii-gQveniment poHticl«n«
As noted in section 3.2.3 politicians have incentives to create 
crises and then benefit voters by "solving" them. In the case of non­
government politicians the emphasis is likely to be on the former 
activity as they would generally not have the power as non-government 
politicians to "solve" crises.
The present study provides ample evidence of non-government 
politicians taking an interest in gas prices both through questions to 
government politicians in the House of Commons and when serving on the 
SCSI, through questions to both civil servants and gas industry 
management. Non-government politicians did not ask any questions in the 
House of Commons on accounting choices and only the charges to revenue 
for the replacement cost of certain categories of fixed assets and the 
supplementary depreciation charges were asked about on the SCNI.
From the non-government politician's point of view gas prices 
probably provide a better source of potential crises than accounting 
choices. Increases in gas prices have an obvious effect on the gas 
consumer/voter's utility. Accounting choices do not have an effect on the 
gas consumer/voter's utility which is easily understood by the average 
gas consumer/voter. Thus in order to maximise their own utility non­
government politicians have a motivation to create crises on issues 
relating to gas prices but little motivation to create crises on issues 
relating to accounting choices.
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A further reason for not reporting on accounting choices is the 
costs to each non-government politician of unravelling the accounting 
numbers. Few non-government politicians are likely to have either the 
time or sufficient technical knowledge of accounting to be able to 
unravel the complexity associated with accounting choices. Thus from the 
viewpoint of the non-government politician the marginal benefits of 
adjusting for the accounting choices are unlikely to exceed the marginal 
costs.
&JU2 The prftfffj
As noted in section 3.2.2 the press are more motivated to entertain 
than inform and one way they can entertain is by creating impressions of 
impending disasters. Many of the reports in the national newspapers on 
thé day following the publication of the gas industry's annual accounts 
carried a headline which sensationalised a proposed or planned rise in 
gas prices. For all gas consumers a price rise would be seen as bad 
news and for some, because of their financial circumstances, it might 
well be seen as a disaster. The headlines of all the reports in the 
national newspapers on the day following the publication of the gas 
industry's annual report during the eleven years of the current study are 
included in chapters 6 and 7. Fifty-eight out of 75 reports, or 77%, had 
a headline which referred to a gas price rise. If the years 1977 and 
1978, when a gas price rise was not imminent, are excluded from the 
analysis the percentage of reports with a headline that refers to a gas
price rise goes up to 82%.
In addition to providing entertainment newspapers have incentives to
provide information which is of interest to consumers. Readers will be
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Interested In news which enables them to maximise their utility. The 
news relating to the gas industry which is likely to be of interest to 
readers is information about future gas prices. On the basis of such 
information readers can make rational decisions regarding their future 
consumption of gas and can thereby maximise their utility. Readers are 
unlikely to be interested in information relating to the gas industry's 
accounting choices as it would probably not be obvious to them what 
effect these accounting choices had on their utility. Thus in order to 
satisfy the demand from readers, the press will be motivated to supply 
information about gas prices but will not be motivated to supply 
information about accounting choices.
A further reason for not reporting on accounting choices is the 
costs to each newspaper of unravelling the accounting numbers. For 
instance, the adjustment of the accounting choices relating to displaced 
plant in the gas industry's accounts for the year ended 31 March 1970 
was extremely time-consuming. Furthermore, many newspapers would not 
have staff who had sufficient technical knowledge of accounting to be 
able to unravel the complexity associated with such accounting choices. 
Thus from the point of view of the press, if adjusting for accounting 
choices is complex the marginal benefits of so doing are unlikely to 
exceed the marginal costs.
The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 is consistent with the above 
analysis. Over the 11 years of the study on average 66% of the national 
newspaper reports on the day after the gas industry s annual accounts 
were published focused on prices. If the newspaper reports on the 
published accounts for the years ended 31 March 1977 and 31 March 1978 
(when a gas price rise was not imminent) are dropped out of the analysis
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the average proportion of the newspaper reports which focused on gas 
prices goes up to 72%. Of the 75 national newspaper reports on the day 
after the gas industry's annual accounts were published during the 11 
years of the study only 11 or 15% made any reference to accounting 
choices. lone of these 11 newspaper reports made a complete adjustment 
for all the accounting choices made for the gas industry in that year.
The above analysis of the national newspaper reports on the day 
following the publication of the gas industry's published accounts reveals 
a certain structural regularity (section 5.4). That structural regularity 
can be summarised as follows :
1) the majority of headlines focused on gas prices;
2) a substantial proportion of the content of these reports focused on 
gas prices;
3) the majority of the reports did not identify the accounting choices 
made for the gas industry.
 Coasuaers
In principle as noted in section 3.3.1 consumers' decisions on 
whether to incur coalition and lobbying costs as well as the costs of 
gathering information relative to a proposed price rise will depend on 
the expected benefits. As noted in section 2.2.2 gas consumers' coalition 
costs were to a large extent provided by the gas industry throughout the 
period of the study. However, during the period of the study there was 
little evidence of the Councils representing gas consumers by 
participating in the political process on matters relating to either gas 
prices or political costs. There was also little evidence of any public 
reaction from the Councils to the publication of the gas industry
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published accounts. The lack of evidence of the Councils' participation 
in the political process can be interpreted as an indication that the
Councils felt that the costs of lobbying and gathering information on 
these matters were likely to be greater than the expected benefits.
However, it should be borne in mind that the present study only
investigated publicly available information at the national level. Up to 
the Gas Act 1972 there was no Rational Gas Consumers Council so it is 
perhaps unreasonable to expect any reactions from consumers to appear at 
national level. After 1972 such an expectation does not appear to be 
unreasonable but it is possible that the Rational Gas Consumers Council 
decided that it could more effectively influence the political process by 
activities about which information is not publicly available. For
instance, they may have raised issues on gas prices at their regular 
meetings with the BGC. However, on the basis of the results of the 
survey by Dean (1984) on the ability of the Rationalised Industry
Consumer Councils to monitor the performance of industries it seems 
unlikely that the Rational Gas Consumer Council would have adjusted for 
the BGC's accounting choices.
8.4^ Price Coaalsslon
As noted in section 2.3.5 the detailed provisions relating to the 
Price Commission's functions appeared in Statutory Orders. The details 
of these provisions insofar as they relate to the present study have been 
described in chapters 6 and 7. As noted in section 6.5.1 these
Statutory Orders gave the Price Commission no discretionary powers.
However, as the basis of the Price Commission's decisions is not publicly
available it is not clear what approach the Price Commission adopted
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when presented with a proposal for a price rise Justified on the basis of 
accounting information which included accounting choice(s) not excluded 
in the Statutory Orders.
On the basis of the evidence presented in chapters 6 and 7 it is 
possible to hypothesise how the Price Commission might have reacted to 
such an accounting choice by the BGC. If there was pressure from the
government, civil servants and the BGC to allow a rise in gas prices and 
if after the new accounting choices (not excluded by the Statutory 
Orders) the BGC met the Statutory requirements for a price rise it would 
probably be in the interests of the Price Commission (the equivalent of 
the regulators in section 3.3.1) to not adjust for the accounting choices. 
This is because there is no evidence that the other participants in the 
political process, non-government politicians, the press and consumers 
adjusted either. Thus from the Price Commission's point of view the 
marginal costs of adjusting for the accounting choices may have exceeded 
the marginal benefits in that government politicians, civil servants and 
the BGC would probably protest if a gas price rise was not awarded while 
non-government politicians, the press and consumers would probably not 
adjust for the accounting choices if the accounting numbers were used to 
justify the gas price rise.
&JL.5 CoapetltQca
As noted in section 2.2.5 the gas industry increased its share of 
the energy market from 11% to 30% during the period of the study. This 
was a cause of considerable concern to both the coal and electricity 
industries as the evidence in chapter 7 demonstrates. It was these 
industries which first suggested and then lobbied for some sort of extra
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tax on the BGC in the hope that as such a tax would reduce the BGC's 
profits, gas prices would have to rise which would then reduce the 
attractiveness of gas relative to coal and electricity. Thus the most 
major threat that political costs would be imposed on the gas industry 
originated from its competitors.
The comments of the electricity industry indicated that they were 
aware that the gas industry's accounting choices were aimed at dampening 
down its reported profits. However, the electricity industry did not 
attempt to create a crisis over the gas industry's accounting choices, 
perhaps because the electricity industry itself had made controversial 
accounting choices (Dean, 1978; Wright, 1979; Gibbs and Taylor, 1979; 
Likierman, 1981 and Likierman, 1983). There was no evidence that either 
the electricity industry or the coal industry had fully adjusted for the 
gas industry's accounting choices, presumably because the marginal costs 
of so doing exceeded the marginal benefits.
8 Æ 6  Concluding coaaents
The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 suggest that for most of the 
period of the study the participants in the political process relating to 
the gas industry thought that the marginal costs of adjusting for the gas 
industry's accounting choices were greater than the expected marginal 
benefits. Thus the evidence is consistent with the arguments in the US 
literature on accounting and the political process described in chapter 3.
When making the accounting choices for the gas industry, gas 
industry management and civil servants are likely to take into account 
the evidence that the other participants in the political process relating 
to the industry do not usually adjust for the accounting choices.
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â>5-. EIPLASÀTIQIS FOR THE ACCOURT IRQ CHOICES WHICH RELATE TO GAS PRir.FS
As noted in section 3.3.1 it has been argued in the US literature 
that regulated firms in the USA will favour income decreasing accounting 
choices in order to provide a more convincing argument for a price rise. 
Although the UK gas industry has many features in common with regulated 
firms in the USA the regulations in the UK are looser (section 2.3) and 
the political environment is different (section 2.1). Taking these 
differences into account Hypothesis 1 (section 5.2) predicts that income 
decreasing accounting choices were made for the gas industry when there 
was a need to justify or reduce criticism of a price rise.
As demonstrated in Table 8.0 the findings of this study provide 
evidence which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. In nine out of the 11 
years of the study there was a perceived need to justify or reduce 
criticism of increase in gas prices. During each of these years 
income decreasing accounting choices were made and as can be seen from 
Table 8.1 these accounting choices decreased reported profit to a 
significant extent each year. Income decreasing accounting choices were 
not made during the remaining two years of the study when there was no 
need to justify or reduce criticism of an increase in gas prices. Thus 
the evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 indicates that gas industry 
management wanted to increase gas prices in order to increase the 
industry's cash flows which were to be used to finance the large capital 
expenditure programme resulting from the transition from the manufacture 
of town gas to the distribution of natural gas through a national
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transmission system. Also as REDO (1976, Appendix Volume, p 105) points 
out for the BGC
the self-financing ratio (ie the proportion of investment 
expenditure to be financed from internally generated funds) has 
become, in itself, an important financial objective.
If the funds necessary to finance the capital expenditure programme
could not be generated internally they would have to be sought from
external sources. The most likely external source of finance would be
borrowing from the Rational Loans Fund administered by the Treasury
(section 2.2.3). However, the evidence in chapter 6 and 7 indicates that
during the period of the study it was government policy to try to reduce
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement which included loans to
nationalised industries. Thus civil servants, particularly those at the
Treasury, would probably have preferred the BGC to raise its financial
requirements from increases in gas prices rather than from increased
borrowing from the Rational Loans Fund. Thus to the extent that lower
reported profits for the gas industry improved the justification for a
price rise to the other participants in the political process civil
servants also had reason to favour income decreasing accounting choices.
For some of the years of the study civil servants had another
reason for favouring incomé decreasing accounting choices. In 1977 and
1980 the government intervened to impose an increase in gas prices. In
each case this led to criticism from other participants in the political
process. In these circumstances government politicians would presumably
have preferred the BGC to not report massive profits as these would have
provided further ammunition for other participants in the political
process to depict the government as being "greedy" by raising gas prices
at the expense of "poor" consumers when the BGC's profits were already
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large. Thus civil servants had incentives to favour income decreasing 
accounting choices for the gas industry in order to avoid crises for 
government politicians.
The activities of civil servants described above are based on the 
argument that they did not want to be criticised by their political 
masters for either not carrying out government policies to the best of 
their ability (eg reducing the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement) or 
for not doing their best to protect their political masters from 
criticisms from the other participants in the political process. Civil 
servants probably believed that their careers could be damaged if they 
were subject to any such criticism from government politicians.
The income decreasing accounting choices by gas industry management 
and civil servants would only achieve their desired objectives provided 
the other participants in the political process did not adjust the gas 
industry's reported profits for these accounting choices. However, the 
evidence in section 8.4 indicates that most of the time the other 
participants in the political process did not, in fact, so adjust, 
presumably because the marginal costs of so doing exceeded the marginal 
benefits.
8.6 EXPT.ARATIOHS FOR THB ACCQUITIIQ CHOICES RELAXIRQ TO POLITICAL 
COSTS
As noted in section 3.3.2 it has been argued in the US literature 
that politically sensitive firms in the USA will favour income decreasing 
accounting choices in order to avoid the imposition of political costs. 
The variables which have been used in the empirical studies described in
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chapter 4 as surrogates for political sensitivity are size, the 
opportunity to earn monopoly profits, capital intensity and variability in 
reported profits. As noted in section 2.2 the UK gas industry is large, 
is a monopoly supplier of gas in the UK, is capital intensive and had 
highly variable profits during the period of the study. In addition, like 
all nationalised industries the government was a major provider of 
finance for the UK gas industry (section 2.2.3). As the UK gas industry 
had all these characteristics it seems reasonable to assume that it is a 
politically sensitive industry. This reasoning led to the generation in 
section 5.2 of Hypothesis 2 which predicts that income decreasing 
accounting choices were made for the UK gas industry when there was a 
need to avoid political costs.
As demonstrated in Table 8.0 the findings of this study provide 
evidence which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. In five out of the 11 
years of the study there was an apparent need to avoid the imposition of 
political costs. During each of these years income decreasing accounting 
choices were made and as can be seen from Table 8.1 these accounting 
choices decreased reported profit to a significant extent each year. 
Political costs might have been imposed on the gas industry as a result 
of 1) Clause 16 of the Gas Bill 1972, 2) Section 16 of the Gas Act 1972 
and 3) the arguments for a special tax on gas.
Gas industry management would not have wanted to suffer any 
political costs which would have decreased the industry's cash flows at a 
time when funds were needed to finance a large capital expenditure 
programme. Civil servants would probably have been indifferent on this 
issue as the political costs which the gas industry might have suffered 
during the period of the study would only have transferred wealth from
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one part of the public sector to another. Thus Hypothesis 2 provides gas 
industry management, but not civil servants, with a second reason for 
favouring income decreasing accounting choices.
These income decreasing accounting choices would only achieve their 
objective provided the other participants in the political process did not 
adjust the industry's reported profits for these accounting choices. 
However, the evidence in section 8.4 indicates that most of the time the 
other participants did not so adjust, presumably because the marginal 
costs of so doing exceeded the marginal benefits.
OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR THE ACCQUITIRG CHOICES
It was noted in section 5.2 that as the institutional and political 
environment of the UK gas industry was different from that of regulated 
and politically sensitive firms in the United States the investigation 
would not be restricted to the two explanatory hypotheses derived from 
the US literature. The study identified two explanations for the 
accounting choices for the UK gas industry which were not covered by the 
two hypotheses.
The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 
were consistent with the explanation that they had been made in order to 
reduce the likelihood of future criticism of government politicians, civil 
servants and gas industry management that the decision to exploit natural 
gas was not going to lead to lower prices for the gas consumer. Such
criticism had already been made by non-government politicians and the
press on the basis that gas prices were not going to fall because the gas
consumer was going to have to bear the cost of the obsolete gas-making
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plant. The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 
for the Area Boards at the request of the Gas Council significantly 
reduced the amount of obsolete plant shown in the consolidated balance 
sheet.
The accounting choices made during each of the two years ended 31 
March 1974 and 1975 were consistent with the explanations that they 
were made to increase the amount of compensation for price restraint 
payable under section 2 of the Statutory Corporations (Financial 
Provisions) Act 1974. Section 2 of that Act specified that the amount 
of compensation paid should be equal to the reported loss in the audited 
financial statements. The accounting choices made during each of these 
years significantly increased the gas industry's reported loss.
EL& EXPLANATIONS FOR LOBBYING BEHAVIOUR
The positions adopted by the BGC when lobbying the Accounting 
Standards Committee on ED8, ED17, and ED24 and when lobbying the 
Sandilands Committee on inflation accounting were consistent with the 
corporation's apparent preference for accounting choices which would 
decrease its reported profits.
8.9 IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING— CHOICES— MATE— DURING— THE. 
QUINQUENNIUM ENDED 31 MARCH 1974 FOR THE,USEFULNESS OF THE FINANCIAL 
TARGET FOR THAT PERIOD.
The gas industry was set a financial target of achieving a 7% 
return on average capital employed for the quinquennium ended 31 March 
1974 (section 6.1.1). The effects of the accounting choices made during 
the quinquennium on the accounting rates of return reported for the
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quinquennium were calculated in order to assess the extent to which these 
accounting choices had undermined the usefulness of the comparison 
between the reported rate of return and the financial target.
As noted in section 5.5.3 most accounting choices only create timing 
differences between accounting periods. They affect not only the
reported outcomes for the year in which they were made but also the 
reported outcomes for subsequent years as well. Thus in order to assess 
the extent to which the accounting choices made during the quinquennium 
affected the usefulness of the comparison between the reported rate of 
return and the financial target it was necessary to calculate not only 
the effect of the accounting choices on the reported outcomes for the 
year in which they were made but also their effect on the reported 
outcomes for the remaining years of the quinquennium. These effects are 
described in section 6.6.
The accounting choices made during the first two years of the 
quinquennium did not have a significant effect on the reported returns on 
average capital employed for any of the years of the quinquennium 
However, the accounting choices for the year ended 31 March 1972 not 
only reduced the reported return in that year by 0.3% it also reduced the 
reported returns for the next two years by 0.4% and 0.9% respectively. 
Similarly the accounting choices for the year ended 31 March 1973 not 
only reduced the reported return for that year by 0.9% but also reduced 
the reported return for the following years by 0.8%. Thus the accounting 
choices made during the years ended 31 March 1972 and 31 March 1973 
significantly affected the accounting choices for subsequent years of the 
quinquennium.
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The cumulative effects of the accounting choices made during the 
quinquennium on the reported returns on average capital employed for each 
year of the quinquennium are described in section 6.7 and are summarised 
in Table 6.42. As can be seen from Table 6.42 the cumulative effect of 
these accounting choices significantly reduced the reported return for the 
last three years of the quinquennium; the year ended 31 March 1972 was 
reduced by 0.3% from 7.5% to 7.2%; the year ended 31 March 1973 was 
reduced by 1.1% from 8.4% to 7.3% and the year ended 31 March 1974 was 
reduced by 2.3% from 7.7% to 5.4%.
Thus it would appear that the accounting choices made during the 
last three years of the quinquennium did undermine the usefulness of the 
comparison between the reported rate of return on average capital 
employed and the financial target.
The evidence summarised above suggests that the gas industry's 
financial target was not being used as intended in the 1967 White Paper 
(HM Treasury, 1967). According to para 33 of which the financial target 
was to serve :
both as an incentive to management and as one of the standards by 
which success or failure over a period of years may be judged. The 
alternative would be an indefensible lack of control over the return 
achieved on a very substantial public investment.
If the reported outcome was compared to the financial target for the
purposes described in para 33 it seems unlikely that gas industry
management would make accounting choices which significantly reduced the
reported outcomes for the last three years of the quinquennium. What
seems more likely is Deardon's (1969, p 134) conclusion that :
return on investment does not provide any control and only obscures 
the fact that there is no real control.
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This study provides evidence of an important alternative use of the 
comparison between the reported outcome and the financial target. As 
Hopwood <1984 p 185) points out :
the consequences of accounting do not necessarily have a close and 
automatic relationship with the aims in the name of which it is 
introduced.
The evidence indicates that the comparison was used by gas industry 
management to help justify rises in gas prices. The evidence suggests 
that gas industry management saw this as being an important function of 
financial targets. In 1974 (section 6.5.1) the BGC argued that its 
financial target was not high enough and later complained about the lack 
of a target for the following five years. Such arguments are consistent 
with a financial target having a useful role in the arguments for price 
rises but are not consistent with the use of financial targets for the 
assessment of operating efficiency.
For gas industry management and civil servants the system of using 
a financial target as a objective in the price-setting process has the 
advantage of flexibility. If the financial target turns out to be too low 
to achieve the desired level of prices, as in the later years of the 
quinquennium ended 31 March 1974, income decreasing accounting choices 
can be adopted which will achieve the same purpose as raising the target.
However, from the perspective of gas consumers the system seems 
less than ideal. To the extent that the financial target provides some 
sort of signal to gas consumers regarding the future level of gas prices 
the present flexibility in accounting choices undermines its usefulness. 
This weakness in the price-setting system is exacerbated by the inability 
of the other participants in the political process to identify and adjust 
for these accounting choices.
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To the extent that the financial target provides some indication of 
the level of prices required to achieve LRMC the efficient allocation of 
resources may be affected by the accounting choices. In such a situation 
income decreasing accounting choices could lead to a hidden tax being 
imposed on gas consumers.
^ -----IMPLICATIONS— EQ£L THE FUTURE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE
NATIONALISED SECTOR
The results of this study indicate that any comparison between a 
financial target and an outcome where both are expressed in accrual 
accounting terms is always going to be suspect because of the inevitable 
discretion available to those making the accounting choices. Although 
the extent of this discretion could be reduced by specifying certain 
accounting choices in advance some of the subjectivity associated with 
accrual accounting is bound to remain and therefore some opportunities 
for manipulation must also remain.
As noted in the previous section the evidence in the study suggests 
that gas industry management regarded the financial target for the 
quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 more as part of an input into an 
argument for a price rise rather than as a benchmark for use by others 
in measuring their operating efficiency.
The evidence in the study tends to be consistent with the findings 
of NEDO <1976, Appendix Volume, p 101 and p 106) that in the absence of 
either government intervention or the rules of Price Codes) the gas 
industry's prices were set on the basis of accounting costs rather than 
on the basis of long-run marginal costs as recommended in the 1967 White
Paper.
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Evidence in the study suggests that civil servants were involved in 
making accounting choices for the gas industry. Such an involvement 
would appear to sit uneasily with their responsibility to monitor the 
performance of the gas industry.
The evidence in the study suggests that most of the time the 
participants in the political process relating to the gas industry who 
were not involved in making the accounting choices did not adjust for 
these accounting choices. In other words these groups appeared to accept 
the gas industry’s reported profits at face value. In those circumstances 
the accounting choices made for the gas industry would appear to have 
undermined the contribution of the industry’s published accounts to the 
accountability and control of the industry.
It is not possible to generalise the findings of a research study on 
one nationalised industry to the nationalised sector as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study would appear to be a useful 
input to those charged with the responsibility of designing a new system 
of accountability and control for the nationalised sector.
8.11 IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTING POLICY MAKING
The study provides evidence which suggests that income decreasing 
accounting choices were made for the UK gas industry in order to provide 
a more convincing argument for a rise in gas prices or to avoid political 
costs. The study also provides evidence that each time that gas industry 
management lobbied the Accounting Standards Committee on a proposed 
accounting standard they either argued for income decreasing accounting 
or argued against income increasing accounting choices. Thus the gas
- 278 -
industry's lobbying behaviour appeared to reflect the gas industry's 
preference for income decreasing accounting choices.
Such knowledge should be useful to the Accounting Standards 
Committee if setting accounting standards specifically for the 
nationalised sector.
&12 IMPLICATIONS FOR AUDIT TNG
Vatts and Zimmerman (1979, p 280) point out that ;
Accounting texts (and theories) which detail how managers seek to 
manipulate profits and the consequent effects of these 
manipulations.... not only improve the auditor's ability to monitor 
such behaviour, but also provide the auditor with ready-made 
arguments to use against such practices in discussions with 
management.
This study not only details the accounting choices made for the UK gas 
industry but also calculates their effect on the gas industry's reported 
outcomes and attempts to provide explanations of why they were made. 
Such knowledge should be useful to the auditors of the gas industry when 
discussing future accounting choices for the industry with gas industry 
management.
8.13 SUMMARY
This chapter has summarised the findings of the investigation of 
the accounting choices made for the gas industry during the eleven years 
up to 31 March 1980. As noted in section 5.2 the study has assumed that 
these accounting choices were not made independently by gas industry 
management and that civil servants were also involved in making these
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choices. Limited evidence consistent with that assumption has been 
identified and is summarised in this chapter.
Two hypotheses derived from the US literature were used to focus 
the empirical study. The evidence was not inconsistent with these two 
hypotheses. For nine out of the eleven years of the study there was 
evidence of a perceived need to either Justify or reduce criticism of a 
price rise and income decreasing accounting choices were made. For five 
out of the eleven years there was evidence of a perceived need to avoid 
political costs and income decreasing accounting choices were made. 
During the two years of the study when there was no evidence of a 
perceived need to justify or reduce criticism of a price rise nor evidence 
of a perceived need to avoid political costs income decreasing accounting 
choices were not made.
For each of the nine years during which income decreasing
accounting choices were made the effect of these choices on the gas 
industry's reported profits was significant. The decreases in the 
reported profits ranged from 39.2% to 93.0%.
The investigation was not restricted to the two explanatory 
hypotheses derived from the US literature. Evidence consistent with 
other explanations was identified for the accounting choices made during 
the years ended 31 March 1970, 31 March 1974 and 31 March 1975.
The hypothesised explanations for the accounting choices would only 
hold provided gas industry management and those civil servants involved 
in making the accounting choices believed that the other groups
participating in the political process relating to the gas industry would
not adjust for the accounting choices. The investigation provided very
little evidence that any of these groups had, in fact, made adjustments
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for the accounting choices, presumably because they thought that the 
marginal costs of adjusting exceeded the marginal benefits. Thus the 
investigation of the behaviour of the other groups participating in the 
political process relating to the gas industry did not provide evidence 
which was inconsistent with the hypothesised explanations for the 
accounting choices.
During the eleven years of the study the gas industry lobbied on 
four proposed accounting practices and each time the position adopted was 
consistent with the BGC's apparent preference for accounting choices 
which would decrease its reported profits.
The cumulative effects of the accounting choices made during the 
three years ended 31 March 1972, 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974
significantly reduced the reported net return on average capital employed 
for these three years. The 1967 White Paper intended the comparison of 
reported outcomes with financial targets to be useful as a control
mechanism but this purpose appeared to be undermined for the gas
industry for the three years ended 31 March 1972, 31 March 1973 and 31 
March 1974 as a result of the cumulative effect of the accounting choices 
made during these years. An alternative use of financial targets was
suggested by the study as evidence was identified which was consistent 
with gas industry management seeing the financial target for the 
quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 as having a useful role in the 
arguments for price rises.
Finally, this chapter has reviewed the Implications of the study for 
the future economic regulation of the nationalised sector, for accounting 
policy making and for auditing.
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The next and final chapter will summarise the entire study, describe 
its contributions to knowledge and its limitations, and identify areas for 
future research.
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS
9.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a review of the entire thesis. A summary of 
the thesis is provided in section 9.1, the contributions to knowledge are 
identified in section 9.2, the limitations and key assumptions are 
described in section 9.3, areas for future research are described in 
section 9.4 and concluding remarks are provided in section 9.5.
Ski-SUMMARY
In chapter 1 the development in the United States of a positive 
theory of accounting choices is briefly introduced. The contributions to 
that development which are expected from the longitudinal study of the 
impact of the political process on (1) the accounting choices made for 
the UK gas industry and on (2) the gas industry's submissions to the 
Accounting Standards Committee are briefly described. The hypotheses to 
be tested are identified and a brief review of the research methodology 
is provided. The limitations amd key assumptions of the study are 
outlined as are the expected contributions to knowledge.
Chapter 2 sets the scene for the study. The accountability and 
control of the UK nationalised industries is described including the 
lijni'ted evidence on the involvement of civil servants in making 
accounting choices for the industries. Those characteristics of the UK 
gas industry considered relevant to the present study are described and 
the role of accounting measures in the regulation of the industry is
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traced from the Gas Act 1948 to the 1978 White Paper. It is concluded 
that accounting measures had a role to play in the setting of gas prices 
during the period of the present study.
The theoretical foundations of the study are provided in chapter 3 
with a review of the mainly US literature on accounting and the political 
process. The discussion of the nature of the political process introduces 
the self -interest assumption which is a key assumption of the present 
study. Based on this assumption the incentives of various groups to
participate in the political process are discussed. Finally the impact of
the political process on the accounting choices made for both regulated 
firms and politically sensitive firms is discussed.
The prior research on accounting choices is reviewed in chapter 4.
First, income smoothing research is briefly summarised and the
theoretical flaws in that research which have subsequently become 
apparent are pointed out. As the later empirical studies of accounting 
choices test hypotheses derived from both the literature on accounting 
and the political process and from the literature on accounting and the 
contracting process the latter is briefly described before reviewing the 
empirical studies. The review starts with those studies which include 
tests of hypotheses that- proxy for political sensitivity. This is 
followed by a review of the only test of the regulation hypothesis, a 
review of those studies which have described some of the accounting 
choices made by nationalised industries, and a review of a study that 
includes accruals as well as accounting procedures in its tests.
The research methodology is described in chapter 5. The distinction 
is made between the 'scientific' and 'naturalistic' approaches to research 
before the compromise between the two adopted in the present study is
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described. That compromise involves using two explanatory hypotheses 
derived from the US literature to focus the investigation of the 
accounting choices for the UK gas industry but, because of the 
institutional, political and regulatory differences between the countries, 
being prepared to accept other explanations for the accounting choices 
that are identified by the empirical study. The benefits of adopting a 
case study approach and a longitudinal research design are outlined. 
Detailed descriptions are provided of the investigations of (1) the 
effects of the accounting choices, (2) the explanations for the accounting 
choices and (3) the submissions to the Accounting Standards Committee.
The investigation of the accounting choices made during the 
quinquennium ended 31 March 1974 for which a financial target in 
accounting rate of return terms was set, is described in chapter 6. The 
structure of the description of the investigation of each year's 
accounting choices includes the following: (1) the evidence up to the end 
of that financial year which relates to the two explanatory hypotheses 
identified in section 5.2 plus any other evidence identified during the 
course of the study which seemed to provide an alternative explanation 
for the accounting choices; (2) the effects of the accounting choices on 
the reported profit or loss, capital employed and net return on average 
capital employed for the year; (3) the explanations for the accounting 
choices which are consistent with the evidence. In addition, for the 
relevant years a description is provided of the Industry s
submissions to the Accounting Standards Committee on proposed accounting 
standards. The effect of each year's accounting choices on the reported 
outcomes for later years of the quinquennium is described. Finally the 
cumulative effect of the accounting choices made during the quinquennium
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on the reported net returns on average capital employed during the 
quinquennium is described.
The investigation of the accounting choices made during the six 
years ended 31 March 1980 is described in chapter 7. The structure of 
the chapter is the same as that for chapter 6 except that as a financial 
target was not set for this period it only includes the effect of the 
accounting choices on the reported profit or loss for the year in which 
the accounting choices were made.
The empirical study is summarised and its implications are 
discussed in chapter 8. A summary is provided of (1) the investigation 
of the two hypotheses, (2) the effect of the accounting choices on 
reported net income, (3) the evidence of the involvement of civil 
servants in making the accounting choices, (4) the behaviour of those
participants in the political process not involved in making accounting 
choices, (5) the explanations for the accounting choices relating to gas
prices, (6) the explanations for the accounting choices relating to
political costs, (7) other explanations for the accounting choices and 
finally (8) the explanations for the submissions to the Accounting
Standards Committee on proposed accounting standards. The implications 
are discussed of the accounting choices made during the quinquennium 
ended 31 March 1974 for the usefulness of the financial target for that 
period. Finally the implications of the study for the future economic 
regulation of the nationalised sector, for accounting policy making and 
for auditing are discussed.
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CQHTSIBOTIOI Tfl IfHngT.BmB
The expected contributions to knowledge from this research were
described in section 1.7, In this section the contributions to knowledge
actually achieved will be matched against these earlier expectations.
1. This study has contributed to the fund of knowledge on the impact 
of the political process on accounting choices and has thereby 
contributed to the development of a positive theory of accounting 
choices.
2. As all the studies which investigated the impact of the political 
process on accounting choices have used US data this research has 
contributed to the fund of knowledge by extending such studies to 
UK data.
3. As this is the first study to focus on the impact of the political 
process on accounting choices in the UK nationalised sector it is 
the first contribution to the development of a positive theory of 
accounting choices in the UK nationalised sector.
4. This research has provided evidence relating to the UK gas industry 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that income decreasing 
accounting choices wUl be made for a regulated firm in order to 
help justify or help reduce criticism of a price rise.
5. This research has also provided evidence relating to the UK gas 
industry which is consistent with the hypothesis that income 
decreasing accounting choices will be made for a politically 
sensitive firm in order to reduce the likelihood of the imposition 
of political costs.
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6. This study has provided evidence which is consistent with
accounting choices being made for the gas industry for the year 
ended 31 March 1970 in order to reduce the likelihood of government 
politicians, civil servants and gas industry management being 
subject to further criticism that the decision to exploit natural gas 
was not going to lead to lower prices for gas consumers as gas
prices were going to include the charges for the displaced gas 
manufacturing plant.
7. This study has provided evidence which is consistent with income 
decreasing accounting choices being made for the gas industry for 
each of the two years ended 31 March 1975 in order to increase the 
amount of compensation payable under section 2 of the Statutory 
Corporations (Financial Provisions) Act 1974.
8. This is the first study which has investigated accounting choices
and lobbying behaviour on proposed accounting standards for the
same firm. The research provides evidence which suggests that the 
gas industry's lobbying behaviour was aimed at decreasing future
reported income. Thus the research provides evidence which suggests 
that a consistent approach was adopted by the gas industry when 
making accounting choices and when lobbying the Accounting
Standards Committee.
9. The study provides limited evidence which is consistent with civil 
servants having some involvement in making accounting choices for 
the gas industry.
10. The study provides evidence that most of the time those
participants in the political process relating to the gas industry 
who were not involved in making the accounting choices for the
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industry did not appear to fully adjust for these accounting 
choices.
11. This is the first accounting choice study to depart from the 
scientific method to adopt a compromise between the naturalistic 
approach and the scientific method.
12. This is the first accounting choice study to adopt an in-depth 
longitudinal case study approach.
13. Apart from Healy (1985) this is the first accounting choice study to 
include all the accounting choices made each year. Thus, as in 
Heal y (1985) both accruals and accounting procedures are included as 
accounting choices.
14. This is one of the first studies, after Zmijewski and Hagerman
(1981) and Healy (1985) to assume that accounting choices are not 
made independently.
15. This is one of the first studies to take into account the monetary 
effect of each accounting choice. In many of the prior studies each 
accounting choice was weighted equally.
16. This is the first study to investigate the effect of accounting
choices on years subsequent to the one during which the accounting 
choice was made. ^
17. This is the first study to investigate the effect of accounting
choices on the accounting rate of return reported for a nationalised 
industry.
18. This is the first study to investigate the extent to which the
accounting choices made for a nationalised industry undermined the 
usefulness of the comparison between its financial target and its 
reported outcome over the years for which the target was set.
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^ — LIMITATIONS AID KEY ASSUXPTI0M5
1.
The limitations and key assumptions of the study are as follows ;
It is assumed that the behaviour of each participant or group of 
participants in the political process relating to the gas industry 
is aimed at maximising the utility of that individual or group.
2. Although the research approach adopted was a compromise between the
naturalistic approach and the scientific method, the two hypotheses 
used did narrow the focus of the study. There may have been other 
explanations for the accounting choices which the study failed to 
identify.
3 : One alternative explanation for the accounting choices is that they
were made to reflect economic reality. However, both the number of 
income decreasing accounting choices and the significance of their 
effect during the period of the study somewhat undermines the 
plausibility of this explanation.
4. A limitation of the case study approach is having to draw a
boundary around the subject matter to be studied. In this study the 
boundary was initially drawn around those groups who appeared, a. 
priori, to have an interest in the gas industry's published accounts 
as participants in the political process relating to the gas 
industry. This led to the choice of the four indexes described in 
section 5.6. Any participant or group of participants in the 
political process relating to the gas industry who was neither 
identified, a priori, nor was identified later through inspection of 
some item identified through one of these four indexes, was excluded
from the study.
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5. This study has only examined documents and records that were
publicly available.
fix post facto case study approach makes it difficult to draw 
causal inferences with any certainty, as it is not possible to 
manipulate an independent variable. Consequently the evidence is 
described as being only "consistent with" the hypotheses.
7. External validity is weak as the case study approach makes it 
difficult to generalise the findings to other cases ie the findings 
of the study may be unique to the gas industry.
8. This study has focused on the accounting choices made in the 
published accounts of the gas industry. Accounting choices made for 
the gas industry for any other purpose have not been included in 
the study.
9. Only those accounting choices which were disclosed in the gas 
industry's published accounts have been included in the study. 
There may have been other accounting choices made for the gas 
industry's published accounts which were not disclosed. However, 
this limitation biased the results against finding a relationship 
between the independent variables and the accounting choices as 
anyone manipulating -a firm's accounting profits would obviously 
prefer not to disclose the methods they use.
10. Most accounting choices have a multiperiod effect but it has been 
assumed that the present value of the accounting choice on the 
managers' or firm's wealth is significantly influenced by the effect 
of the accounting choice on the income of the period during which 
the accounting choice was made. Consequently the explanations
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relate only to the period during which the accounting choice was 
made.
11. To a large extent accruals were only counted as accounting choices 
during the first three years of the study. After that the BGC was 
formed and much of the detailed information on accruals, previously 
disclosed in the accounts of the Gas Council and the 12 Area Boards 
was not disclosed by the BGC.
12. The causal links in this study are not based on the terms of
explicit contracts, such as management compensation plans, lending 
agreements or an explicit formula such as the rate regulation 
formula in the USA. The causal links hypothesised in this study are 
more tentative.
13. The explanations for the accounting choices made for the gas
industry are based on the behaviour of the participants in the
political process given the accounting choices actually made. There 
is no way of knowing what the behaviour of the participants in the 
political process would have been if these accounting choices had 
not been made.
14. This study has not dealt with normative accounting issues nor has 
it attempted to develop prescriptions for the improvement of the 
external reporting practices of the gas industry.
9.4 AREAS FHP FUTURE RESEARCH
The present study contributes to the development of a positive
theory of accounting choices which could be further developed as follows:
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1. As the development of the theory is at the embryonic stage further 
testing of established hypotheses would add to the fund of 
knowledge on accounting choices.
2. In particular there is a shortage of tests of the regulation 
hypothesis. Additional tests of this hypothesis would add to the 
fund of knowledge on why regulated firms make their accounting 
choices.
3. There is a dearth of accounting choice studies in a UK context. The 
testing of hypotheses using UK data would contribute to the fund of 
knowledge by explaining why accounting choices are made in the UK.
4. The present study is the first investigation of the impact of the 
political process on the accounting choices of a nationalised 
industry. Additional studies of the accounting choices made by 
other nationalised industries are necessary to build up a fund of 
knowledge which explains why accounting choices are made in the UK 
nationalised sector.
5. As far as studies of accounting choices in the nationalised sector 
are concerned additional evidence is required of :
a) the involvement of civil servants in making accounting choices 
for the nationalisedr industries;
b) the extent to which other participants in the political process 
adjust for the accounting choices made for the industries, and
c) the extent to which accounting choices undermined the usefulness 
of comparisons between nationalised industries' financial targets 
and reported outcomes.
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9..5- .CQgCLUDIIÛ.mASKS.
This study has contributed to the fund of knowledge on the impact 
of the political process on accounting choices. The investigation 
identified the accounting choices made for the UK gas industry over an 
eleven year period, calculated their monetary effect on reported outcomes 
and explained these accounting choices mainly through two hypotheses 
generated from the literature on the impact of the political process on 
accounting.
The results of this research have implications for the future 
economic regulation of the nationalised industries, for accounting policy 
makers setting standards specifically for the nationalised sector and 
for the auditors of nationalised industries.
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APfElDIX A
ACCQglTIBG CHOICES MADE DURING THE YEAR ENDED 31st MARCH 1970 
INTRODUCTION
The accounting choices made in the published accounts of the twelve 
Area Boards during the year ended 31 March 1970 are identified below. 
The Area Boards are dealt with in alphabetical order.
An accounting choice made during the year ended 31 March 1970 could 
have affected not only the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 
(eg the increase or decrease of a provision) but also the net surplus for 
each of the remaining years of the quinquennium (eg the change of a rate 
of depreciation).
The effect on net assets of the accounting choices made during the 
year ended 31 March 1970 could be either static or dynamic depending on 
the nature of the accounting choice. Where, for example, a provision was 
increased or decreased the effect on net assets would be static in that 
it would require another accounting choice in a future year to change the 
provision and hence the net assets. But where, for example, a rate of 
depreciation was changed the effect on net assets would be dynamic in 
that the changed rate of depreciation would continue to have a changing 
effect on the net assets at the end of each subsequent year. Most of the 
accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 had a static 
effect on net assets. Thus where the effect of a particular accounting 
choice on the net assets at the end of the remaining years of the 
quinquennium is not discussed below it should be assumed that the effect
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was static ie that the effect on the remaining years of the quinquennium
was the same as the effect on the net assets at 31 March 1970.
The effect, if any, of each accounting choice made during the year 
ended 31 March 1970 on the net surplus for each year of the quinquennium 
and on the net asssets at the end of each year of the quinquennium has 
been ascertained from the relevant published accounts or, where this has 
not been possible calculated as explained below. The effects on the net 
surplus for each year of the quinquennium are shown on Table All and the 
effect on the net assets at the end of each year of the quinquennium are 
shown on Table A12.
EAST MIDLANDS GAS BOARD
Provision against .incQae from gas sales
Note 1 (1970) stated that :
Having regard to the low figure for unaccounted for gas which has 
emerged at 31 March 1970 it is deemed prudent to make a provision 
of £270,000 against income from gas sales.
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 March 
1970 by £270,000.
Special charge following a re-assessment of the amortisation of. the cost 
of an industrial, conversion.
Note 6 (1970) stated that in addition to the normal write-off of l/15th 
of expenditure under "Deferred charges - conversion to natural gas" a 
special charge of £155,000 had been made in the current year following a 
re-assessment of the amortisation of the cost of an industrial concern. 
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus
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for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 March 1970 by 
£155,000.
lacrease In provision against contingencies
Mote 14(b) (1970) stated that the existing provision had been increased 
during the year ended 31 March 1970 by £76,000 to £165,000. This 
accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus for 
the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 March 1970 by 
£76,000.
Increase in provision.to covar.outstanding coa.ta.Qn gas holder painting
Mote 14(c) (1970) explained that a provision of £60,000 had been
established during the year :
to cover outstanding costs due to the shortfall in the programme of 
gas holder painting at 31 March 1970.
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus
for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 March 1970 by
£60,000.
Increase in provision against stock obsolescence and deterioration 
Mote 15(b) (1970) explained that this provision had been increased during 
the year by £61,000. This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing 
both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets 
at 31 March 1970 by £61,000.
Under-use of pension provision account tfl eliminate— the— deficiencies
arising on pension funds and schemes
Mote 13 (1969) explained that the exact amount £98,547 necessary to
eliminate the deficiencies arising on pension funds and schemes had been 
transferred from the pension provision account. Thus the charge to
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revenue relating to these deficiencies was zero. The balance on the 
pension provision account at 31 March 1969 was ^701,000 (Schedule 15 to 
the published accounts at 31 March 1969).
The deficiencies arising on pension funds and schemes during the 
year ended 31 March 1970 amounted to f133,860 but only f101,453 was 
transferred from the pension provision account leaving a balance of 
^32,407 which was charged to revenue [Mote 14(a)]. The balance on the 
pension provision account at 31 March 1970 was ^600,000 (Schedule 15 to 
the published accounts at 31 March 1970). This accounting choice to 
under use the pension provision account to eliminate the deficiencies 
arising on pension funds and schemes during the year ended 31 March 1970 
had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus for that year and the 
net assets at 31 March 1970 by ^32,407.
EA5TERM GAS BOARD 
In.creas.s. la investment reserve
Mote 10 (1970) stated that :
The investment reserve has been Increased by £25,000 to f213,000 to 
provide for the fall In value of trade and other Investments.
Mote 16 (1970) established that the j&25,000 had been transferred from the
reserve fund. Thus this accounting choice did not affect the net surplus
for the year ended 31 March 1970 but did decrease the net assets at 31
March 1970 by £25,000 as the Investment reserve was deducted from the
balance on the investment account.
Decrease in provision for deferred repairs.
Mote 13 (1970) stated that this provision had been decreased by £39,000. 
This accounting choice had the effect of Increasing both the net surplus
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for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 March 1970 by
£39,000.
Increase in miscellaneous provisions
The Increase In miscellaneous provisions of £14,000 was ascertained from 
Schedule 15 (1970). This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing 
both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets 
at 31 March 1970 by £14,000.
IQRTH EASTERM GAS BOARD 
Decrease In pension scheme prcvlslon, release of retort resetting 
provision and decrease.. In other..prcYisions
The changes in the above provisions were ascertained from Schedule 15 
(1970). All three changes had the effect of increasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 March
1970 by £9,000, £60,000 and £51,000 respectively.
Provision for obsolescence of coal carbonisation plants
Mote 12 disclosed that £2,826,000 had been transferred from the reserve
fund to set up a provision for obsolescence of coal carbonisation plants.
This transfer had no effect on the net surplus for the year ended 31 
March 1970 but decreased the net assets at 31 March 1970 by £2,826,000. 
The effect on net assets of this accounting choice was eliminated at 31 
March 1971 when obsolete assets displaced during the year completely 
eliminated the provision.
- 8 -
IORIE.IMXSS GAS BOARD
Balance of compensation written off against reserve fund
Mote 6 (1970) explained that :
The balance of compensation representing the excess of the 
consideration given for acquisition of the undertakings which vested 
In the Board In 1949 over the nominal value of the securities of 
these undertakings has now been completely written off. The normal 
depreciation In the year amounted to £14,000 and a further write off 
of £1,000,000 has been made out of accumulated reserves.
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing net assets at 31
March 1970 by £1,000,000 but had no effect on the net surplus for the
year ended on that date as the £14,000 written off to revenue that year
was the same amount as in previous years.
However, this accounting choice did affect the net surpluses of the
Morth Thames Gas Board for the years ended 31 March 1971 and 31 March
1972 and those of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1973. The net
surpluses of the Morth Thames Gas Board for the years ended 31 March
1971 and 31 March 1972 were both Increased by £14,000 as £14,000 was no
longer being written off to revenue. The net surplus of the BGC for the
year ended 31 March 1973 was Increased by £972,000 as the total balance
of compensation written off as an extraordinary item in that year was
decreased by £972,000 [£1,000,000 - (£14,000 x 2)1 as a result of this
accounting choice by the Morth Thames Gas Board during the year ended 31
March 1970. The effect of this accounting choice on net assets was thus
eliminated at 31 March 1973.
Transfer from reserve fund to Intangible assets of former undertakings 
An amount of £783,000 was transferred from the reserve fund to increase 
the write off of the Intangible assets of former undertakings. This
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transfer had the effect of decreasing the net assets at 31 March 1970 
but had no effect on the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 as 
the balance of the intangible assets was being written off at the rate of 
£200,000 per annum which was unaffected by the transfer from the reserve 
fund. The net surpluses for the years ended 31 March 1971 and 1972 were 
similarly unaffected but the net surplus of the BGC for the year ended 31 
March 1973 was increased by £783,000 as the total balance of the assets 
of former undertakings written off as an extraordinary item in that year 
was decreased by £783,000 as a result of this accounting choice by the 
Morth Thames Gas Board during the year ended 31 March 1970. The effect 
of this accounting choice on net assets was thus eliminated at 31 March 
1973.
Increase In amount written off assets of former undertakings 
Included in the net book value of the assets of former undertakings at 31 
March 1970, 31 March 1971 and 31 March 1972 was an amount in respect of 
intangible assets. This balance was being written off to revenue account 
at the rate of £200,000 per annum (Mote 13, 1970), (Mote 12, 1971) and 
(Mote 11, 1972).
However, Mote 13 to the published accounts for the year ended 31 
March 1969 stated that the balance was :
being written off over the remaining period of 50 years from
vesting date.
This change in accounting base had the effect of decreasing both 
income and net assets for each of the years ended on 31 March 1970, 31 
March 1971 and 31 March 1972. The effect of the change in each year is 
calculated below.
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Year ended 31 March 1970
Met book value of intangible assets at 31 March
1970 (Mote 13, 1970) £4.444.000
Amount which would have been written off if the 
previous accounting base had been used
l/29th of £4,444,000 £ 153,241
Amount actually written off (Mote 13, 1970) 200,000
Additional amount written off during the year 
ended 31 March 1970 46.759
Year, ended 31 March 1971
Met book value of intangible assets at 31 March
1971 (Mote 12, 1971) £2,953,000
Additional amount written off during the year 
ended 31 March 1970 46,759
Met book value of intangible assets at 31 March __________
1971 If previous accounting base had been used £2.999.759
Amount which would have been written off If the 
previous accounting base had been used
l/28th of £2,999,759 £ 107,134
Amount actually written off (Mote 12, 1971) 200,000
Additional amount written off during the year __________
ended 31 March 1971 £ 92.866
Year...ended 31 March 1972
Met book value of Intangible assets at 31 March 
1972 (Mote 11, 1972) £ 846,000
Additional amount written off during the year 
ended 31 March 1970 46,759
Additional amount written off during the year 
ended 31 March 1971 92,866
Met book value of intangible assets at 31 March __________
1972 if previous accounting base had been used £ 985.625
Amount which would have been written off If the 
IS accounting 
of £985,625
Amount actually written off (Mote 11, 1972) 200,000
previous g base had been used
l/27th  £ 36,505
Additional amount written off during the year ----------
ended 31 March 1972___________________________________________ I__16.3JL95.
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The net surplus of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1973 was 
increased by £303,120 (£46,759 + £92,866 + £163,495) as the total balance 
of the fixed assets of former undertakings written off as an 
extraordinary Item In that year had been decreased by that amount as a 
result of this accounting choice by the Forth Thames Gas Board during 
the year ended 31 March 1970. The effect on net assets of this 
accounting choice was eliminated at 31 March 1973 by the writing off of 
the fixed assets of former undertakings as an extraordinary Item during 
that year.
Saleaae of provision for repairs, decrease In provision for leasehold 
dilapidations
The changes in the above provisions were ascertained from Schedule 15 
(1970). The release of the provision for repairs had the effect of 
increasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net 
assets at 31 March 1970 by £46,000. The decrease In the provision for 
leasehold dilapidations of £220,000 had the effect of increasing the net 
assets at 31 March 1970 by that amount but the net surplus for the year 
ended 31 March 1970 was only increased by £55,000 as £165,000 was 
transferred to the reserve fund [Mote 18(1970)1.
IQRTH VESTESM GAS BOARD
Increase In provision relating to employers liability Insurance fund 
The increase of £6,000 In the above provision was ascertained from 
Schedule 15 (1970). This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing 
both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets 
at 31 March 1970 by £6,000.
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IQRTHERH GAS BOARD
Depreciation on short-lived assets changed to commence In the year 
following the Incidence of the expenditure
Mote 5 (1970) stated that ;
Depreciation on short-lived assets has hitherto commenced In the 
year of expenditure but In this years’s accounts that basis has been 
changed and depreciation will commence In the year following the 
Incidence of the expenditure, thereby reducing the depreciation 
charge In this year's accounts by £43,400.
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing both the net surplus
for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 March 1970 by
£43,400.
SCOTTISH GAS BOARD
Decrease In provision for deferred, repairs
The change In the above provision was ascertained from Schedule 15 
(1970). This accounting change had the effect of increasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 March 
1970 by £5,000.
SOUTH EASIER: GAS BOARD 
Change la the method of calculating unread gaa
Mote 2 (1970) stated that :
On 31 March 1970 the method of calculating unread gas was modified. 
In consequence this year received additional gas revenue of £621,660 
offset by an Increase of £263,940 to the provision against "accrued 
revenue for gas and rentals", giving a net benefit to revenue 
account of £357,720.
For the remaining years of the quinquennium the net benefit to 
revenue was not disclosed so these have been calculated by the 
researcher. The researcher has asssumed that at the end of each of the
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remaining years of the quinquennium the net benefit will have changed In 
proportion to the change from the previous year In the Income from gas 
sales. The net benefit to the current year's revenue will thus be the 
difference between the net benefit at the end of the current year less 
the net benefit at the end of the previous year. The researcher has also 
assumed that the provision against accrued revenue for gas and rentals 
has changed in proportion to the change In the gas revenue due to the 
change in the method of calculating unread gas. The basis of each 
calculation can be demonstrated as follows ;
Current year's net benefit to revenue =
let benefit at Previous year
end of previous x Income from gas sales for current year - net benefit 
year Income from gas sales for previous year to revenue
Year. ended 31 March 1971
The net benefit to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1971 has
been calculated as follows :
let benefit to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1971 =
Income from gas sales for 
let benefit at year ended 31 March 1971 Met benefit at
the end of the year x Income from gas sales for the end of the year
ended 31 March 1970 year ended 31 March 1970 ended 31 March 1970
= £357,720 (note 1) x £68,938.000 (note 3) _  £357,720 (note 1)
£64,286,000 (note 2)
= £383,606 - £357,720 
= £25 >886
(1) Ascertained from Mote 2 (1970)
(2) Ascertained from the revenue account for the year ended 31 March
1970
(3) Ascertained from the revenue account for the year ended 31 March
1971
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Thus the change In the method of calculating unread gas would have had 
the effect of increasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March
1971 and the net assets at 31 March 1971 by £25,886.
Year ended 31 March 1972
The net benefit to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1972 has been 
calculated as follows :
Set benefit to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1972 =
Income from gas sales for 
Set benefit at ^  the year ended 31 March 1972 ^  Set benefit at
the end of the year Income from gas sales for the end of the year
ended 31 March 1971 the year ended 31 March 1971 ended 31 March 1971
= £383,606 (note 1) ^  £75.124.000 (note 3) —  £383,606 (note 1)
£68,938,000 (note 2)
= £418,028 - £383,606 
= £34,422
(1) Calculated above
(2) Ascertained from the revenue account for the year ended 31 March 1971
(3) Ascertained from the revenue account for the year ended 31 March 1972
Thus the change in the method of calculating unread gas would have had 
the effect of increasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March
1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by £34,422.
Year ended 31 March 1973
The net benefit to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1973 has been 
calculated as follows :
Set benefit to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1973 =
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Income from gas sales for 
Set benefit at ^  the year ended 31 March 1973 __ let benefit at
the end of the year ^  Income from gas sales for the end of the year
ended 31 March 1972 the year ended 31 March 1972 ended 31 March 1972
= £418,028 (note 1) ^  £85.500.000 (note 3) —  £418,028 (note 1)
£75,124,000 (note 2)
= £475,765 - £418,028 
= £57,737
(1) Calculated above
(2) Ascertained from the revenue account for the year ended 31 March 1972
(3) Ascertained from page 65 of the published accounts of the BGC for the 
year ended 31 March 1973
Thus the change in the method of calculating unread gas would have had 
the effect of increasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 
1973 and the net assets at 31 March 1973 by £57,737.
Year ended 3.1 March 1974
The net benefit to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1974 has been 
calculated as follows :
Set benefit to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1974 =
Income from gas sales for 
Set benefit at the year ended 31 March 1974 ^  Set benefit at
the end of the year ^  Income from gas sales for the end of the year
ended 31 March 1973 the year ended 31 March 1973 ended 31 March 1973
= £475,765 (note 1) x £92.000,000 (note 3) -  £475.765 (note 1)
£85,500,000 (note 2)
= £511,934 - £475,765 
= £36,169
(1) Calculated above
(2) Ascertained from page 65 of the published accounts of the BGC for the 
year ended 31 March 1973
(3) Ascertained from page 71 of the published accounts of the BGC for the 
year ended 31 March 1974.
- 16 -
Thus the change in the method of calculating unread gas would have had 
the effect of increasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 
1974 and the net assets at 31 March 1974 by £36,169.
Change in baa is of calculating depreciation on new and, renewed services 
Mote 8 (1970) stated that :
In the case of new and renewed services, a basis of depreciation 
other than that recommended by the Joint Committee had been adopted 
up to 31 March 1969. From 1 April 1969 the Joint Committee basis 
has been used, with a saving of depreciation In this year of 
£642,056.
For the remaining four years of the quinquennium the effect, if any, 
of this change of accounting base was not disclosed. As Mote 8 (1970) 
did not explain the nature of the change of accounting base it was not 
possible for the researcher to calculate an estimate of the effect of this 
change on the next four years. Consequently the researcher has assumed 
an identical saving in depreciation for each of these four years as in 
the year ended 31 March 1970 (a fairly heroic assumption). This 
accounting choice had the effect of increasing each year's net surplus 
and of cumulatively increasing the net assets at the end of each year. 
The calculation of the cumulative effect on net assets Is shown overleaf :
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Saving in depreciation during the year ended
31 March 1970 £ 642.056
Increase In net assets at 31 March 1970 642,056
Estimated saving In depreciation during the 
year ended 31 March 1971 642,056
Cumulative Increase In net assets at 31 March 1971 1,284,112
Estimated saving In depreciation during the 
year ended 31 March 1972 642.056
Cumulative Increase In net assets at 31 March 1972 1,926,168
Estimated saving in depreciation during the 
year ended 31 March 1973 642.056
Cumulative increase in net assets at 31 March 1973 2,568,224
Estimated saving in depreciation during the 
year ended 31 March 1974 642.056
Cumulative increase in net assets at 31 March 1974 £3.210.280
SÛU.IHERM GAS BOARD
Increase lH-mlscellaafiQus...provisions
The change in the miscellaneous provisions was ascertained from Schedule 
15 (1970). This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the 
net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the net assets at 31 
March 1970 by £10,000.
VEST MIDLANDS GAiS BOARD 
Release of provision .against.. accrued income from gas sales.
Mote 1 (1970) stated that the provision made In the previous year
amounting to £500,000 against accrued revenue for gas and rentals was no 
longer required. The release of this provision had the effect of
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Increasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 and the 
net assets at 31 March 1970 by £500,000.
ALL AREA BOARDS
Accouating treatment of obsolete plant displaced during the year
In order to put the accounting choices relating to the obsolete 
plant displaced during the year ended 31 March 1970 Into context the 
accounting choices made during the previous year relating to obsolete gas 
making plant displaced during that year were examined. During the year 
ended 31 March 1969 unamortlsed balances of displaced plant amounting to 
£22,717,000 were transferred from fixed assets (see Table Al). After 
adjustments for demolition costs and for proceeds of sale these 
unamortised balances were reduced to £21,163,000 (see Table Al).
That net unamortlsed balance of displaced plant was dealt with as 
follows ;
Written off against obsolescence and development 
reserve £ 9,914,000
Written off against other reserves 4,535,000
Transferred to displaced plant account 6.714.000
£21,163,000
Most of the Area Boards had adhered to the standard rules adopted 
by the gas Industry at that time for writing off obsolete plant. In 
April 1968 these had been described to the Select Committee on 
Rationalised Industries by Mr D H Crofton from the Ministry of Power as 
follows :
According to the standard rules adopted by the gas industry, plant 
would be written off to obsolescence reserves, if there are any, and 
when they have been exhausted they would be written off to revenue
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over the next 15 years or the remaining life of the asset, whichever
is less. (SCÏI, I960, Minutes of Evidence, p 15).
During the year ended 31 March 1969 all the Area Boards adhered to 
these standard rules except the Horthern Gas Board and the Vest Midlands 
Gas Board. Morthern wrote obsolete plant off against Its general reserve 
and Vest Midlands against Its reserve fund. Both of those Area Boards 
had combined all of their reserves, including their obsolescence and 
development reserve Into one account at 1 April 1966 according to their 
published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1967.
Vlth this matter In mind the researcher also reviewed the published 
report and accounts of all the Area Boards for the year ended 31 March 
1968 and discovered that the Scottish Gas Board had written off the 
obsolete plant displaced during that year which amounted to £550,000 
against revenue account. Thus this Area Board had not adhered to the gas 
industry's standard rule regarding the writing off of obsolete plant.
During the year ended 31 March 1970 unamortlsed balances of 
displaced plant amounting to £37,555,000 were transferred from fixed 
assets (see Table A2). After adjustments for demolition costs and for 
proceeds of sale these unamortlsed balances were reduced to £36,220,000 
(see Table A2).
That net unamortlsed balance of displaced plant was dealt with as 
follows ;
£Q0&
Vrltten off against reserve fund £25,025
Transferred to deferred charges account 1,936
Transferred to displaced plant account _9,259
^ ^ £26u22D.
The published accounts for each of the Area Boards for the year 
ended 31 March 1970 showed that as at 1 April 1969 all reserves had been
- 20 -
transferred to a reserve fund. This was described by the Eastern Gas
Board (1970, p 24) as follows :
In view of projected changes In the Industry and also to accord 
with current financial practice. It was recommended by the Gas 
Council, and accepted by Area Boards, that all reserves. Including 
the balance of revenue account, shall be transferred to the reserve 
fund, thus maintaining a single account In the future. This 
recommendation was put Into effect as at the 1st April 1969...
Almost certainly the "projected changes In the Industry" referred to by
the Eastern Gas Board related to the switch from the manufacture and
distribution of town gas to the distribution of natural gas from the
Forth Sea (SCÏI, 1968). It was recognised that one of the effects of the
switch to natural gas was to be the early obsolescence of costly coal-
based and oil-based gas manufacturing plant (SCII, 1968, para III.9). The
recommendation by the Gas Council that all reserves should be transferred
to reserve fund removed the restriction accepted by nine of the Area
Boards that the only reserve which could be used for writing off obsolete
plant was the obsolescence and development reserve.
The removal of this restriction meant that an additional £7,959,000
was written off against reserves. This amount has been calculated as
follows :
Amounts written off to reserve fund by those Area Boards
ui
£ Q , Q . Q
which had adhered to the standard r les In the year 
ended 31 March 1969 (see Table A3) £12,777
Obsolescence and development reserve at 1 April 1969 or 
the amount written off against reserve fund during the 
year ended 31 March 1970 whichever was the smaller
(see Table A3) 4,818
Additional amounts written off against reserve fund due 
to the removal of the restriction that the only reserve 
which could be used for writing off obsolete plant was
the obsolescence and development reserve (see Table A3) £ 7,959.
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Thus the total amount of £25,025,000 written off against the reserve 
fund can be analysed as follows :
£000
Amounts which would have been written off according to 
the gas industry's standard rules up to 31 March 1969 
by those Area Boards that had adhered to these rules 
(see Table A3) £ 4,818
Additional amounts written off by these Area Boards as 
a result of these standard rules being changed during 
the year ended 31 March 1970 7,959
Amounts written off during the year ended 31 March 1970 
by those Area Boards than had not adhered to the gas 
Industry's rules up to 31 March 1969 (Northern 
£1,907,(500 + Vest Itidlands £9,772,000 + Scottish
£569,000 from Table A2) 12.248
£25.025.
Of the £36,220,000 net unamortlsed balances of obsolete plant 
displaced during the year ended 31 March 1970, £25,025,000 or 69.1% was 
written off against reserve fund. If those Area Boards which had adhered 
to the gas industry's standard rules up to 31 March 1969 had continued 
to adhere to these rules during the year ended 31 March 1970 they would 
have only written off £4,818,000 or 13.3% against reserves instead of 
£12,777,000 or 35.3% which represents an increase of £7,959,000 or 22%. 
The Northern Gas Board, the Vest Midlands Gas Board and the Scottish Gas 
Board had abandoned these standard rules earlier. The £12,248,000 they 
wrote off against reserve fund represented 33.8% of the total obsolete 
plant displaced during the year.
During the year ended 31 March 1970 the decision appears to have 
been made to transfer obsolete oil-based gas making plant to deferred 
charges account. This decision was not made explicit but is implied from 
the published accounts of the relevant Area Boards, the North Thames Gas 
Board and the North Vestern Gas Board.
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In Note 11 to its published accounts for the year ended 31 March
1969 titled "Displaced Plant and Obsolescence Reserve" the North Thames
Gas Board stated that :
In view of the new sources of gas supply and technical developments, 
substantial changes are expected to arise in the future in respect 
of gas manufacturing plant which will become obsolete. The amount 
and timing of these charges cannot at present be ascertained, but 
the balance of net book amount of assets declared obsolete will be 
amortised out of revenue or met by appropriation of surplus.
In Note 14 to its published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1969
titled "Deferred Charges - Conversion to Natural Gas" the North Thames
Gas Board did not mention obsolete plant at all.
In Note 14 to its published accounts for the year ended 31 March
1970 titled "Deferred Charges - Conversion to Natural Gas" the North
Thames Gas Board disclosed that unamortlsed balances of oil-based gas
making plants amounting to £1,104,000 were Included in Deferred Charges.
That Note also stated that :
The availability of large quantities of natural gas will make it 
possible for the Board to take out of commission some of its oil- 
based gas-making plant before the end of its normal life. The 
amount and timing of the obsolescence charges which will arise in 
consequence cannot yet be ascertained, but the balance of net book 
amount of assets declared obsolete will be amortised out of revenue 
in the same way as the costs incurred on conversion to natural gas.
In Note 11 to the same published accounts titled "Displaced Plant" the
North Thames Gas Board only described the accounting treatment of coal-
based plant.
A comparison between the preceding two paragraphs would appear to 
imply that a decision had been made during the year ended 31 March 1970 
to transfer obsolete oil-based gas-making plant displaced by the North 
Thames Gas Board to deferred charges account instead of to displaced 
plant account.
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In Note 8 to its published accounts for the year ended 31 March
1969 titled "Displaced Plant" the North Vestern Gas Board did not state
whether "the production plant taken out of commission" was coal-based or 
oil-based. Note 9 to the same published accounts titled "Deferred 
Charges ; Conversion to natural gas" did not mention obsolete plant at 
all.
In Note 6 to its published accounts for the year ended 31 March
1970 titled "Displaced Plant" the North Vestern Gas Board stated that :
This item relates to unamortlsed capital expenditure on coal-based 
carbonising and associated plant taken out of commission on 
replacement by oil-based gas manufacturing plant.
Note 7 to the same published accounts titled "Deferred Charges :
Conversion to natural gas" disclosed that unamortlsed balances of oil-
based gas-making plants amounting to £478,998 were included in Deferred
Charges.
A comparison between the preceding two paragraphs would appear to 
imply that a decision had been made during the year ended 31 March 1970 
to transfer obsolete oil-based gas-making plant displaced by the North 
Vestern Gas Board to deferred charges account instead of to displaced 
plant account.
Of the £36,220,000 net unamortlsed balances of obsolete plant 
displaced during the year ended 31 March 1970, £1,936,000 or 5.3% was 
transferred to deferred charges account.
It should be noted that the accounting choice during the year ended 
31 March 1970 to transfer obsolete oil-based plant displaced during the 
year to "Deferred Charges : Conversion to natural gas" was reversed 
during the year ended 31 March 1972. Note 3 to the Consolidated 
Accounts for the year ended 31 March 1972 stated that :
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The unamortlsed balance of capital expenditure on oil-based plant 
taken out of commission as a result of the natural gas conversion 
programme, together with associated plant spares and penalities 
airlslng form the cancellation of feedstock contracts has been 
transferred to Displaced Plant. Previously such plant has been 
Included as "Other consequential costs" In "Deferred charges : 
Conversion to natural gas".
The decision to transfer obsolete oil-based plant displaced during 
the years ended 31 March 1970 and 31 March 1971 to deferred charges 
account Instead of to displaced plant account affected neither the net 
surpluses for the years ended 31 March 1970 and 31 March 1971 nor the 
net assets at 31 March 1970 and at 31 March 1971 because the same basis 
was used for each account In calculating the eimounts written off to 
revenue. Consequently the remainder of this section will only focus on 
the effects of transferring all reserves to reserve fund as at 1 April 
1969.
Year ended 31 March. 19.7 Q.
During the year ended 31 March 1970 five of the nine Area Boards 
affected wrote off against their reserve funds amounts of obsolete plant 
greater than their obsolescence and development reserves at 1 April 1969 
(see Table A3). The five Area Boards were East Midlands, Eastern, North 
Thames, North Western and South Vestern. If all the reserves of these 
five Area Boards had not been transferred to their reserve funds at 1 
April 1969 the amounts of obsolete plant written off against reserves 
during the year ended 31 March 1970 would have been restricted to the 
amount of their obsolescence and development reserves at 1 April 1969 
and the remainder would have been transferred to the displaced plant 
accounts. Table A4 shows what the effects would have been, if during the 
year ended 31 March 1970 these five Area Boards had not written off
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against their reserve funds amounts of obsolete plant greater than their 
obsolescence and development reserve at 1 April 1969. Amounts 
transferred to displaced plant accounts were during the year ended 31 
March 1970 being written off to revenue over 15 years or the remaining 
life of the asset whichever was less but this was accelerated In 1972 so 
that unamortlsed balances would all be written off by 1981 at the latest. 
In calculating the amounts of displaced plant which would have been 
written off to revenue each year the reseracher has assumed (In the 
absence of any other Information on which to base the calculation) that 
l/15th of the amounts transferred from fixed assets during the year- 
ended 31 March 1970 would have been written off to revenue for the years 
ended 31 March 1970 and 31 March 1971 and that 1/10th of the 
unamortlsed balances at 31 March 1971 would have been written off to 
revenue during the year ended 31 March 1972 and during each year 
thereafter up to 1981. The effect of these calculations on the gas 
industry's net surplus and net assets is shown in Table A9 and Table AlO 
respectively.
During the year ended 31 March 1970 the net surplus and the net 
assets of the other four Area Boards were not affected by the transfer of 
all reserves to a reserve fund. North Eastern, South Eastern and 
Southern wrote off amounts of obsolete plant which were less than their 
obsolescence and development reserve at 1 April 1969 and Vales did not 
write off any obsolete plant (see Table A3).
Year ended 31 March 1921
During the year ended 31 March 1971 East Midlands, Eastern, and 
North Thames wrote off obsolete plant against their reserve funds. As
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shown in Table A4, the obsolescence and development reserves for each of 
these three Area Boards would have been used up during the year ended 31 
March 1970 if all their reserves had not been transferred to their 
reserve funds. Thus if all the reserves of these three Area Boards had 
not been transferred to their reserve funds as at 1 April 1969 the 
amounts of obsolete plant written off against reserves during the year 
ended 31 March 1971 would have been transferred to displaced plant 
account. Table A5 shows what the effects would have been during the year 
ended 31 March 1971 If these three Area Boards had not written off their 
obsolete plant against their reserve funds but had instead transferred 
them to displaced plant accounts.
Also during the year ended 31 March 1971 the treatment of the 
obsolete plant written off by the North Eastern Gas Board was affected 
by the transfer of all its reserves to its reserve fund as at 1 April 
1969. During the year ended 31 March 1970 obsolete plant amounting to 
£133,000 was written off against the reserve fund. If the £133,000 had 
been written off against the obsolescence and development reserve at 1 
April 1969 of £1,217,000 a balance of £1,084,000 on the obsolescence and 
development reserve would have remained at 31 March 1970. During the 
year ended 31 March 1971 obsolete plant amounting to £2,885,000 was 
written off against reserve fund. If all the reserves had not been 
combined as at 1 April 1969 only £1,084,000 would have been written off 
against obsolescence and development reserve. The balance of obsolete 
plant remaining £1,801,000 (£2,885,000 - £1,084,000) would have been
transferred to displaced plant account as shown on Table A5.
Amounts transferred to displaced plant accounts were during the 
year ended 31 March 1971 being written off to revenue over 15 years or
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the remaining life of the asset whichever was less but this was 
accelerated In 1972 so that the unamortlsed balances would all be written 
off by 1981 at the latest. In calculating the amounts of displaced plant 
which would have been wrltte off to revenue each year the researcher has 
assumed (in the absence of any other information on which to base the 
calculation) that l/15th of the amounts transferred from fixed assets 
during the year ended 31 March 1971 would have been written off to 
revenue during the year ended 31 March 1971 and that 1/10th of the 
unamortlsed balances at 31 March 1971 would have been written off to 
revenue during the year ended 31 March 1972 and during each year 
thereafter up to 1981. The effect of these calculations on the gas 
industry's net surplus and net assets is shown In Table A9 and AlO 
respectively.
Also during the year ended 31 March 1971 the treatment of the 
obsolete plant written off by the South Eastern Gas Board was affected by 
the transfer of all its reserves to its reserve fund as at 1 April 1969. 
During the year ended 31 March 1970 obsolete plant amounti,ng to £786,856 
was written off against the reserve fund. If the £786,856 had been 
written off against the obsolescene and development reserve at 1 April 
1969 of £5,150,451 a balance of £4,363,595 on the obsolescence and 
development reserve would have remained at 31 March 1970. Instead the 
obsolescence and development reserve was largely used to absorb the 
accumulated deficits on revenue account which at 1 April 1969 amounted to 
£2,734,000 and to absorb the deficit for the year ended 31 March 1970 
which amounted to £346,400. During the year ended 31 March 1971 
obsolete plant amounting to £3,212,000 was transferred from fixed assets 
to displaced plant account. If all the reserves had not been combined as
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at 1 April 1969 the £3,212,000 would have been transferred to
obsolescence and development reserve. This would have had the effect of
decreasing net assets at 31 March 1971 by £3,212,000, of Increasing 
income for the year ended 31 March 1971 by £79,000 (the amount written 
off) and of Increasing income for the year ended 31 March 1972 and 
thereafter by £313,300 (1/lOth of £3,212,000 - £79,000). This is shown 
in Table A6. The effect of these calculations on the gas industry's net 
surplus and net assets is shown in Table A9 and Table AlO respectively.
The balance on the obsolescence and development reserve at 31 March 1971
would have decreased to £1,151,595 (£4,363,595 - £3,212,000).
Ifiar....finded 31 March 1972
During the year ended 31 March 1972 East Midlands, North Thames 
and South Eastern wrote off obsolete plant against their reserve funds. 
As shown in Table A4, the obsolescence and development reserves for East 
Midlands and North Thames would have been used up during the year ended 
31 March 1970 if all their reserves had not been transferred to their 
reserve funds. Thus if all the reserves of these two Area Boards had not 
been transferred to their reserve funds as at 1 April 1969 the amounts of 
obsolete plant written off against reserves during the year ended 31
March 1972 would have been transferred to displaced plant account. In 
the case of the South Eastern Gas Board obsolete plant amounting to 
£3,460,000 was written off against the reserve fund. If all the reserves 
had not been transferred to the reserve fund the balance on the
obsolescence and development reserve would have been £1,151,595 as 
calculated above. Thus the amount of obsolete plant which could have 
been written off against the obsolescence and development reserve would
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have been restricted to this amount. The balance of £2,308,405 would
have been added to displaced plant account. Table A7 shows what the
effects would have been during the year ended 31 March 1972 if the
reserves had not been combined. Amounts transferred to displaced plant 
during the year ended 31 March 1972 were being written off by 1981 at 
the latest. In calculating the amounts of displaced plant which would 
have been written off to revenue each year the researcher has assumed (In 
the absence of any other information on which to base the calculation) 
that 1/lOth of the amounts transferred from fixed assets during the year
ended 31 March 1972 would have been written off to revenue during that
year and each year thereafter up to 1981. The effect of these
calculations on the gas industry's net surplus and net assets is shown in 
Table A9 and Table AlO respectively.
Also during the year ended 31 March 1972 the treatment of the
obsolete plant written off by the Southern Gas Board and the Vales Gas 
Board was affected by the transfer of all of their reserves to their 
reserve funds. In the case of Southern, obsolete plant amounting to
£163,000 was written off against the reserve fund during the year ended 
31 March 1970. If the £163,000 had been written off against the
obsolescence and development reserve at • 1 April 1969 of £1,004,000 a
balance of £841,000 on the obsolescence and development reserve would
have remained at 31 March 1970. During the year ended 31 March 1971 no 
obsolete plant was transferred from fixed assets. During the year ended 
31 March 1972 obsolete plant amounting to £5,752,000 was transferred 
from fixed assets to displaced plant account. It was not possible to
write off any of this obsolete plant against the reserve fund as it had a
debit balance of £2,849,000 at 31 March 1971 due to making deficits in
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the years ended 31 March 1970 and 31 March 1971. If the reserves had 
not been combined as at 1 April 1969 the £841,000 balance on the 
obsolescence and development reserve at 31 March 1970 would have been 
used to reduce the £5,752,000 transferred to displaced plant account 
during the year ended 31 March 1972. This would have had the effect of 
decreasing net assets at 31 March 1972 by £841,000 and of Increasing 
Income for the year ended 31 March 1972 and thereafter by £84,100 
cl/lOth of £841,000). This Is shown In Table A8.
In the case of the Vales Gas Board there was no obsolete plant 
transferred from fixed assets during the years ended 31 March 1970 and 
31 March 1971. During the year ended 31 March 1972 obsolete plant 
amounting to £3,825,000 was transferred from fixed assets to displaced 
plant account. It was not possible to write off any of this obsolete 
plant against the reserve fund as it had a debit balance of £2,599,000 at 
31 March 1971 due to making deficits in both the years ended 31 March 
1970 and 31 March 1971. If the reserves had not been combined as at 1 
April 1969 the £990,000 balance on obsolescence and development reserve 
at that date would have been used to reduce the £3,825,000 transferred to 
displaced plant account. This would have had the effect of decreasing 
net assets at 31 March 1972 by £990,000 and of increasing income for the 
year ended 31 March 1972 and thereafter by £99,000 (1/lOth of £990,000). 
This is shown In Table A8. The effect of the calculations shown in Table 
A8 on the gas Industry's net surplus and net assets is shown in Table A9 
and Table AlO respectively.
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Table A6
Effect of transferring all reserves to reserve fund as at 
1 April 1969
Year ended 31 March 1971
South
Eastern
Amount which would have been written off against 
obsolescence and development reserve but which 
was instead transferred to displaced plant 
account £3,212,000
Amount of displaced plant written off to revenue 
during the year ended 31 March 1971 which 
would not have been written off to revenue if 
all the reserves had not been transferred to 
reserve fund at 1 April 1969 79,000
Unamortised balance on displaced plant account
at 31 March 1971 3,133,000
Amount of displaced plant written off to revenue 
during the year ended 31 March 1972 and 
thereafter which would not have been written 
off to revenue if all the reserves had not 
been transferred to reserve fund at 1 April 1969 
1/10th of unamortised balance at
31 March 1971 313,300
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APEBIDII B - CQgTEITS
ACCQÜITIIG CHOICES MADE DÜRIIG THE YEAR SIDED 31 KARCH 1971
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EAST MIDLANDS GAS BOARD 46
Release of provision against income from gas sales 
Decrease in provision relating to gas holder painting 
Increase in provision against stock obsolescence and 
deterioration
Under-use of pension provision account to eliminate the 
deficiencies arising on pension funds and schemes 
Accelerated depreciation on distribution system
EASTERN GAS BOARD 48
Increase in investment reserve 
Increase in provision for deferred repairs 
Decrease in miscellaneous provisions
NORTH EASTERN GAS BOARD 49
Decrease in pension scheme provision
■NORTH THAMES GAS BOARD 49
Transfer from reserve fund to intangible assets of former 
undertakings
Provision for leasehold dilapidations written off against 
reserve fund
NORTH WESTERN GAS BOARD 50
Increase in provision relating to employers' liability 
insurance fund
Change in the basis for calculating bad and doubtful debts
NORTHERN GAS BOARD 51
Capitalisation of certain salaries and related costs 
Depreciation on the salaries and related costs 
capitalised
SCOTTISH GAS BOARD 57
Increase in provision for deferred repairs
SOUTHERN GAS BOARD 57
Increase in provisions
Transfer from investment reserve to reserve fund
VEST MIDLANDS GAS BOARD 58
Change in the basis of calculating depreciation
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AfPEIDIX B
ACCQglXIIG-CgQICES MADE DURING THE YEAR ENDED 31 KARCH 1971 
IglEQPgCTIQH
The discretionary accounting choices made in the published accounts 
of the twelve Area Boards during the year ended 31 March 1971 are 
identified below. The Area Boards are dealt with in alphabetical order.
An accounting choice made during the year ended 31 March 1971 could 
have affected not only the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971 
(eg the increase or decrease of a provision) but also the net surplus for 
each of the remaining years of the quinquennium (eg the change of a rate 
of depreciation).
The effect on net assets of the accounting choices made during the 
year ended 31 March 1971 could be either static or dynamic depending on 
the nature of the accounting choice. Where, for example, a provision was 
increased or decreased the effect on net assets would be static in that 
it would require another accounting choice in a future year to change the 
provision and hence the net assets. But where, for example, a rate of 
depreciation was changed the effect on net assets would be dynamic in 
that the changed rate of depreciation would continue to have a changing 
effect on the net assets at the end of each subsequent year. Most of the 
accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1971 had a static 
effect on net assets. Thus where the effect of a particular accounting 
choice on the net assets at the end of the remaining years of the 
quinquennium is not discussed below it should be assumed that the effect 
was static ie that the effect on the remaining years of the quinquennium 
was the same as the effect on the net assets at 31 March 1971.
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The effect, if any, of each accounting choice made during the year 
ended 31 March 1971 on the net surplus for each year of the quinquennium 
and on the net asssets at the end of each year of the quinquennium has 
been ascertained from the relevant published accounts, or, where this has 
not been possible calculated as explained below. The effects on the net 
surplus for each year of the quinquennium are shown on Table B1 and the 
effect on the net assets at the end of each year of the quinquennium are 
shown on Table B2.
EASX  MIDLANDS GAS BOARD
Release of provision against income from gas sales
Note 1 (1971) stated that this provision was no longer required. This 
accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net surplus for the 
year ended 31 March 1971 and of increasing the net assets at 31 March 
1971 by *270,000.
Decrease. . in. proylslon. relating to gas holder painting
The decrease in this provision was ascertained from Schedule 14 (1971). 
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net surplus for 
the year ended 31 March 1971 and of increasing the net assets at 31 
March 1971 by *45,000.
Increase in provision against stock obsolescence and deterioration 
Note 14(b) (1971) stated that this provision had been increased. This
accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net surplus for the 
year ended 31 March 1971 and of decreasing the net assets at 31 March 
1971 by *121,538.
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Under use of. pension provision account to eliminate the deficiencies 
arising on pension funds and schemes
The deficiencies arising on pension funds and schemes during the year 
ended 31 March 1971 amounted to *126,007 but only *100,000 was 
transferred from pension provision account leaving a balance of *26,007 
which was charged to revenue [Note 13 (1971)]. The balance on the
pension provision account at 31 March 1971 was *500,000 (Schedule 14 to 
the published accounts at 31 March 1971) and was thus sufficiently large 
to absorb the total deficiencies arising during the year ended 31 March 
1971. This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971 and of decreasing the net 
assets at 31 March 1971 by *26,007.
Accelerated depreciation on distribution sgateUL
Note 6 (1971) and Note 6 (1972) both explained that the depreciation
figures for these years Included an amount (*605,860 for 1971 and 
*562,233 for 1972) in respect of accelerated depreciation of expenditure 
incurred in compliance with the recommendations of the Institution of Gas 
Engineers relative to testing the Board's distribution system.
For the remaining two years of the quinquennium the effect, if any, 
of this change of accounting base was not disclosed. Neither Note 6 
(1971) nor Note 6 (1972) provided sufficient information to enable the 
researcher to calculate an estimate of the effect of this change on the 
next two years. Consequently the researcher has assumed an identical 
increase in the depreciation charge for the years ended 31 March 1973 
and 31 March 1974 as in the year ended 31 March 1972. This accounting 
choice had the effect of decreasing each year's net surplus and of
- 47 -
cumulatively decreasing the net assets at the end of each year. The 
calculation of the cumulative effect on net assets is shown below :
Accelerated depreciation on distribution system 
during year ended 31 March 1971 * 605.860
Decrease in net assets at 31 March 1971 605,860
Accelerated depreciation on distribution system 
during the year ended 31 March 1972 562.233
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1972 1,168,093
Estimated accelerated depreciation on distribution 
system during year ended 31 March 1973 562,233
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1973 1,730,326
Estimated accelerated depreciation on distribution 
system during year ended 31 March 1974 562.233
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1974 2.292.559
EASTERS GAS BOARD
Increase in investment reserve
The increase in the investment reserve was ascertained from Schedule 12 
(1971). The researcher has assumed that this amount was transferred 
from the reserve fund as in the year ended 31 March 1970, although Note 
17 (1971) did not confirm this (perhaps because *3,000 was not
considered to be material). On the basis of this assumption this 
accounting choice did not affect the net surplus for the year ended 31 
March 1971 but did decrease the net assets at 31 March 1971 by *3,000 as 
the investment reserve was deducted from the balance on investment 
account.
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Increase lH-proYlalQn for deferred repaire
Note 14 <1971) stated that this provision had been increased by *58,000. 
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net surplus for 
the year ended 31 March 1971 and the net assets at 31 March 1971 by 
*58,000.
Decrease in miscellaneous provisions
The decrease of *86,000 in miscellaneous provisions was ascertained from 
Schedule 14 (1971). Note 17 (1971) established that *15,000 had been 
transferred to the reserve fund. These accounting choices had the effect 
of increasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971 by 
*71,000 and of increasing the net assets at 31 March 1971 by *86,000.
NORTH EASTERN GAS BQARH 
Decrease in pension scheme prcvlslQll
The decrease in the above provision was ascertained from Schedule 14 
(1971). This accounting choice had the effect of increasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971 and the net assets at 31 March 
1971 by *10,000.
NORTH THAMES GAS BOARD
Transfer from reserve fund to intangible assets pf former .undertakings 
An amount of *40,000 was transferred from the reserve fund to increase 
the write off of the intangible assets of former undertakings [Notes 12 
and 18 (1971)]. This transfer had the effect of decreasing the net
assets at 31 March 1971 but had no effect on the net surplus for the 
year ended 31 March 1971 as the balance of the intangible assets was
- 49 -
being written off at the rate of *200,000 per annum which was unaffected 
by the transfer from the reserve fund. The net surplus for the year 
ended 31 March 1972 was similarly unaffected but the net surplus of the
BGC for the year ended 31 March 1973 was increased by *40,000 as the
total balance of the assets of former undertakings written off as an 
extraordinary item in that year [Note 2(j) and Note 10 (1973)3 was
decreased by *40,000 as a result of this accounting choice by the North 
Thames Gas Board during the year ended 31 March 1971. The effect of 
this accounting choice on net assets was thus eliminated at 31 March 
1973.
ErflYlsion for leasehold dilapidations written off against reserve fund 
The decrease in the provision for leasehold dilapidations of £40,000 
(Schedule 14, 1971) had the effect of increasing the net assets at 31
March 1971 by that amount but the net surplus for the year ended 31
March 1971 was unaffected as the *40,000 was transferred to the reserve
fund [Note 18 (1971)3.
NORTE WESTERN. GAS. BOARD.
Increase in provision relating to employers' .llabllitY. insurance fund 
The increase of *4,000 in the above provision was ascertained from
Schedule 14 (1971). This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing 
both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971 and the net assets 
at 31 March 1971 by *4,000.
Change in the basis for calculating bad and doubtful debts 
Note 12(a) (1971) stated that :
Provisions against gas and rental debtors in respect of bad and
doubtful debts have this year been computed as a percentage of the
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total debts outstanding. This Is a departure from the former
practice of making specific provisions relating to this type of
debtor.
It has not been possible to quantify the eff€»ct of this change as the
published accounts and the supporting schedules did not provide
sufficient Information.
IQRTHERH GAS BOARD
Capitalisation of certain salaries and related costs
Note 1 (1971) described the change in accounting base as follows ;
The Board's policy hitherto has been to treat all its engineering 
department costs as revenue expenditure. It is now considered 
appropriate to treat as capital expenditure the salaries of certain 
headquarters personnel who are engaged on capital projects and to 
allocate to capital expenditure a proportion of the salary, wages
and transport costs of the local distribution offices. The effect of
this change in the basis of accounting is to charge to capital 
expenditure costs of *199,000 Incurred In the year to 31 March 1971.
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing both the net surplus
for the year ended 31 March 1971 and the net assets at 31 March 1971 by
*199,000.
The amount which was charged to capital accounts for the year ended 
31 March 1972 was not disclosed in the published accounts for that year. 
This amount has been estimated by the researcher by adjusting the 
*199,000 for the year ended 31 March 1971 by the change in the Index of 
average salaries : non-manual employees (Great Britain) included in the 
Annual Abstract of Statistics for 1973 (HMSO, 1973).
The researcher has assumed that :
(a) salaries and related expenses accrued evenly through the 
year ended on 31 March 1971 and through the year ending 
on 31 March 1972.
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(b) the index of average salaries accrued evenly between April 
1971 and April 1972.
Given the above assumptions the researcher calculated the amount 
which was charged to capital accounts for the year ended 31 March 1972 
as follows :
Salaries and related expenses Index of average salaries at October 1971 
charged to capital for the year x Index of average salaries at October 1970 
ended 31 March 1971
*199,000 (note 1) x 118.9 (note 3) = *223,429
105.9 (note 2)
(1) The amount of salaries and related expenses charged to capital 
for the year ended 31 March 1971 was obtained from Note 1 to 
the published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1971
(2) At October 1970 the index of average salaries = 105.9 (April 
1970 = 100)
(3) The October 1971 index of average salaries was assumed to be 
the mid-point between the index at April 1971 and the index 
at April 1972 and was calculated as follows :
Index at April 1971 t index at April 1972 = 112,4 f 125.4 = 118.9
2 2
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing both the net surplus
for the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by
*223,429.
The amount which was charged to capital accounts for the year ended 
31 March 1973 was not disclosed in the BGC's published accounts for that 
year. This amount has been estimated by the researcher by adjusting the 
*223,429 for the year ended 31 March 1972 by the change in the Index of 
average salaries non-manual employees (Great Britain) included in the 
Annual Abstract of Statistics for 1974 (HMSO, 1974).
The researcher has assumed that :
(a) salaries and related expenses accrued evenly through the
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year ended 31 March 1972 and through the year ended 31 
March 1973,
(b) the Index of average salaries accrued evenly between April 
1971 and April 1973.
Given the above assumptions the researcher calculated the amount 
which was charged to capital account for the year ended 31 March 1973 as 
follows :
Salaries and related expenses Index of average salaries at October 1972 
charged to capital for the x Index of average salaries at October 1971 
year ended 31 March 1972
*223,429 (note 1) x 132.0 (note 3) = *248,046
118.9 (note 2)
(1) The amount of salaries and related expenses charged to capital 
for the year ended 31 March 1972 was obtained from the calcula­
tion above.
(2) The October 1971 index of average salaries was assumed to be the 
mid-point between the index at April 1971 and the index at April
1972 and was calculated as follows :
Index at April 1971 + index at April 1972 = 112.4 t. 125.4 = 118.9
2 2
(3) The October 1972 index of average salaries was assumed to be the 
mid-point between the index at April 1972 and the index at April
1973 and was calculated as follows ;
Index at April 1972 + index at April 19Z1 = 125.4 t_ ISdtî. = 132.0
2 2
This accounting choice ceased during the year ended 31 March 1974. Note
2(b) (1973) stated that in relation to fixed assets constructed by the
BGC cost included "related works and administrative overheads". But Note
2(b) (1974) stated that in the case of fixed assets constructed by the
Corporation only direct expenditure was included in cost. Note 4 (1974)
expanded on this change by stating that :
*3.7 million of expenditure which would have formed part of the cost 
of fixed assets on the basis used in previous years has been
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charged against the trading profit of the year to 31 March 1974 
following a review of the basis of overhead capitalisation.
Thus the accounting change made in the year ended 31 March 1971 did not 
have an effect on the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 nor 
on the net assets at 31 March 1974.
Finally it should be noted that the effect on net assets of the 
accounting decision to capitalise salaries and related costs was 
cumulative over the relevant years of the quinquennium. The calculation 
of these cumulative effects is shown below :
Salaries and related costs capitalised during 
the year ended 31 March 1971 *199.000
Increase in net assets at 31 March 1971 199,000
Salaries and related costs capitalised during 
the year ended 31 March 1972 223,429
Cumulative increase in net assets at 31 March 1972 422,429
Salaries and related costs capitalised during 
the year ended 31 March 1973 248.046
Cumulative increase in net assets at 31 March 1973 *67D.^ 4Z3.
The cumulative increase in net assets at 31 March 1974 was also
*670,473 as salaries and related costs were not capitalised after 31
March 1973.
Depreciation on the salaries and related costs capitalised
The capitalisation of the salaries and related costs discussed in 
the previous section meant that Northern's depreciation charges to 
revenue were increased. Details of the rates at which these amounts were 
depreciatied was not disclosed. Consequently the researcher has assumed 
that the salaries and related costs capitalised were spread over a range 
of fixed assets and that they were depreciated at the average rate used
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to depreciate lorthern's fixed assets. The average rate for each of the 
years ended on 31 March 1970, 31 March 1971 and 31 March 1972 was 
calculated as follows :
 DepceclatlQB charge for the year ended 31 March 197Q (note \)  ^lûû.
Gross book value of post vesting fixed assets ® 31 March 1970 (note 2) 1
= J.Q56... X = 3.4%
55,357 1
 Dapraclatloii charge for the year ended 31 March 1971 (note 3) y IDU
Gross book value of post vesting fixed assets ® 31 March 1971 (note 4) 1
= 19.19 X i m  = 3.1%
61,005 1
 PgpreciatiQii.-Charge for the year ended 31 March 1972 (note 5) x
Gross book value of post vesting fixed assets ® 31 March 1972 (note 6) 1
= 2199 X 2M. = 3.4%
64,934 1
(1) Obtained from Note 5 (1970)
(2) Obtained from the Balance Sheet at 31 March 1970
(3) Obtained from Note 8 (1971)
(4) Obtained from the Balance Sheet at 31 March 1971
(5) Obtained from Note 5 (1972)
(6) Obtained from the Balance Sheet at 31 March 1972.
The researcher calculated the average for these three years as 
follows ;
3.4% f 3.1% + 3.4% = 3.3%
3
and assumed that this average rate was used to depreciate the salaries 
and wages capitalised by Northern in each of the relevant years.
The extra depreciation charged in each of the four remaining years 
of the quinquennium as as a result of the accounting choice during the 
year ended 31 March 1971 to capitalise certain salaries and related costs 
was estimated as follows :
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Salaries and related costs capitalised up to 
31 March 1971 (note 7)
Estimated depreciation charged during the year 
ended 31 March 1971 on salaries and related 
costs capitalised up to 31 March 1971 
3.3% of *199,000
Estimated salaries and related costs capitalised 
up to 31 March 1972 (note 8)
Estimated depreciation charged during the year 
ended 31 March 1972 on salaries and related 
costs capitalised up to 31 March 1972 
3,3% of *422,429
Estimated salaries and related costs capitalised 
up to 31 March 1973 (note 8)
Estimated depreciation charged during the year 
ended 31 March 1973 on salaries and related 
costs capitalised up to 31 March 1973 
3.3% of *670,475
Estimated salaries and related costs capitalised 
up to 31 March 1974 (note 8)
Estimated depreciation charged during the year 
ended 31 March 1974 on salaries and related 
costs capitalised up to 31 March 1974 
3.3% of *670,475
(7) Obtained from Note 1 (1971)
*199,000
* 6.567
*422,429
* 13.940 
*670,475
* ,22d2û 
*670,475
* 22.125
(8) As calculated in the preceding section on the capitalisation of
certain salaries and related costs.
The net surplus for each year and the net assets at the end of each
year were decreased by the depreciation charged on the salaries and
related costs capitalised up to the end of that year. The effect on net 
assets was cumulative as shown overleaf :
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Estimated depreciation on salaries and related 
costs capitalised up to 31 March 1971 t 6.567
Decrease in net assets at 31 larch 1971 £ 6,567
Estimated depreciation on salaries and related 
costs capitalised up to 31 larch 1972 13.940
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 larch 1972 Æ20,507
Estimated depreciation on salaries and related 
costs capitalised up to 31 March 1973 22426
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 larch 1973 £42,633
Estimated depreciation on salaries and related 
costs capitalised up to 31 larch 1974 22.126
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 larch 1974 £64.759
SCOTTISH GAS BOARD
Increase in provision for deferred^  repairs
The increase of £249,000 in the above provision was ascertained from 
Schedule 14 (1971). This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing 
both the net surplus for the year ended 31 larch 1971 and the net assets 
at 31 March 1971 by £249,000,
SQVTHERir GAS BOARD 
Increase in provisions
The increase in provisions of £22,000 was ascertained from Schedule 14 
(1971). This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 larch 1971 and the net assets at 31 larch 
1971 by £22,000.
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Transfer from Investment reserve to reserve fund
The transfer of £6,000 from investment reserve to reserve fund was 
ascertained from Bote 9 (1971) and from Schedule 12 (1971). This
accounting choice had no effect on the net surplus for the year ended 31 
larch 1971 but had the effect of increasing the net assets at 31 larch 
1971 by £6,000 as the investment reserve was deducted from the 
investment account.
VEST HIDLMDS GAS BOARD.
Change in the basis of calculating .depreciation 
ïote 7 (1971) stated that :
During the year certain changes in the bases of depreciation have 
resulted in the charge for the year being £407,000 more than it 
would have been on the previous bases.
For the remaining three years of the (Quinquennium the effect of these
changes in the basis of calculating depreciation were not disclosed. It
was not possible for the researcher to calculate the effect of these
changes on the remaining three years of the quinquennium as insufficient
information was provided. Consequently the researcher has assumed an
identical effect on the years ended 31 larch 1972, 31 larch 1973 and 31
larch 1974 as on the year ended 31 larch 1971. This accounting change
had the effect of decreasing each year's net surplus by £407,000 and of
cumulatively decreasing the net assets at the end of each year by
£407,000. The calculation of the cumulative effect on net asssets is
shown overleaf :
58 -
Increase in depreciation charge during year ended
31 larch 1971 £ AQ7.QQQ
Decrease in net assets at 31 larch 1971 £ 407,000
Increase in depreciation charge during year ended
31 larch 1972 407.000
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 larch 1972 814,000
Increase in depreciation charge during year ended
31 larch 1973 ___407,000
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 larch 1973 1,221,000
Increase in depreciation charge during year ended
31 larch 1974 ___407,00.0
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 larch 1974 £1,626,000
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ACCQUITIHÛ CHOICES MADE DURING THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 1072 
INTRODUCTION
The discretionary accounting choices made in the published accounts 
of the twelve Area Boards during the year ended 31 March 1972 are 
identified below. The Area Boards are dealt with in alphabetical order.
An accounting choice made during the year ended 31 March 1972 could 
have affected not only the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 
(eg the increase or decrease of a provision) but also the net surplus for 
each of the remaining years of the quinquennium (eg the accelerated 
amortisation of displaced plant).
The effect on net assets of the accounting choices made during the 
year ended 31 March 1972 could be either static or dynamic depending on 
the nature of the accounting choice. Where, for example, a provision was 
increased or decreased the effect on net assets would be static in that 
it would require another accounting choice in a future year to change the 
provision and hence the net assets. But where, for example, a rate of 
amortisation was changed the effect on net assets would be dynamic in 
that the changed rate of amortisation would continue to have a changing 
effect on the net assets at the end of each subsequent year. Most of the 
accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1972 had a static 
effect on net assets. Thus where the effect of a particular accounting 
choice on the net assets at the end of the remaining years of the 
quinquennium is not discussed below is should be assumed that the effect
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was static le that the effect on the renainlng years of the quinquennium 
was the same as the effect on the net assets at 31 March 1972,
The effect, if any, of each accounting choice made during the year 
ended 31 March 1972 on the net surplus for each year of the quinquennium 
and on the net assets at the end of each year of the quinquennium has 
been ascertained from the relevant published accounts or, where this has 
not been possible calculated as explained below. The effects on the net 
surplus for each year of the quinquennium are shown on Table C5 and the 
effects on the net assets at the end of each year of the quinquennium are 
shown on Table C6.
EAST MIDLANDS GAS BOARD
Release of provision relating to gas holder painting
The release of this provision was ascertained from Schedule 14 (1972). 
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net surplus for 
the year ended 31 March 1972 and of increasing the net assets at 31 
March 1972 by f15,000.
Reduction in provision against stock obaoleacence and deterioration 
Note 15(b) (1972) stated that this provision has been reduced. This
accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net surplus for the 
year ended 31 March 1972 and of increasing the net assets at 31 March 
1972 by f333,436.
Reduction of pension scheme provision
The deficiencies arising on pension funds and schemes during the year 
ended 31 March 1972 amounted to f195,452. The amount transferred from 
the pension scheme provision amounted to f300,000 so that f.104,548 was
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credited to revenue [Note 13 (1972)3. The balance on the pension scheme
provision account at 31 March 1972 was 1200,000 (Schedule 14 to the
published accounts at 31 March 1972). Note 13 (1972) justified this
increased transfer from the pension scheme provision account as follows :
During 1971/72 and 1972/73 the Board will bear the burden of 
increased contributions to pension schemes (to meet the cost of 
higher benefits) while manpower levels will remain high due to the 
continuation of conversion and town gas production. The Board 
therefore decided to increase the transfer from the pension 
provision account during these two years, after which costs will be 
reduced as the number of employees falls.
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net surplus for
the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by
£104,548.
Release of.special provision for doubtful debts
Note 12 (1972) explained that "largely as a result of an intensification 
of the Board's debt collection procedures" the need for the special 
provision of £250,000 made in 1968/69 was no longer required. This 
accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net surplus for the 
year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by 
£250,000.
Release of provision for repairs and maintenance.of plant 
Note 14 (1972) explained that with the continued reduction in the number 
of gas maJcing plants in operation, and in the light of experience gained 
in operating the new high pressure transmission system it was decided 
that this provision was no longer required. This accounting choice had 
the effect of increasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 
and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by £240,000.
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Release of Drovlslon for hardship
The release of this provision was ascertained from Schedule 14 <1972). 
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net surplus for 
the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by 
£10,000.
EASTERN GAS BOARD
Reduction in investment reserve
The reduction in the investment reserve was ascertained from Schedule 12
(1972). Note 16 (1972) established that the £117,000 has been
transferred to the reserve fund. Thus this accounting choice did not 
affect the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 but did increase 
the net assets at 31 March 1972 by £117,000 as the investment reserve 
was deducted from the balance on investment account.
Release of provision for .deferred repairs.
The release of this provision was ascertained from Schedule 14 (1972).
Note 16 (1972) established that the £265,000 had been transferred to
reserve fund. Thus this accounting choice did not affect the net surplus 
for the year ended 31 March 1972 but did increase the net assets at 31 
March 1972 by £265,000.
Increase in miscellaneous provisions
The increase in these provisions was ascertained from Schedule 14 (1972). 
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net surplus for 
the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by 
£149,000.
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NORTH EASTERN GAS BOARD
Reduction of pension scheme provision
The reduction in the above provision was ascertained from Schedule 14 
(1972). This accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 
1972 by £10,000.
NORTH THAMES GAS BOARD
Transfer from reserve fund to intangible assets of former undertaRlnga 
An amount of £804,000 was transferred from reserve fund to increase the 
write off of the intangible assets of former undertakings [Note 11 and 17 
(1972)]. This transfer had the effect of decreasing the net assets at 31 
March 1972 but had no effect on the net surplus for the year ended 31 
March 1972 as the balance of the intangible assets was being written off 
at the rate of £200,000 per annum which was unaffected by the transfer 
from reserve fund. However, the net surplus for the BGC for the year 
ended 31 March 1973 was increased by £804,000 as the total balance of 
the assets of former undertakings written off as an extraordinary item in 
that year [Note 2(J) and Note 10 (1973)] was decreased by £804,000 as a 
result of this accounting choice by the North Thames Gas Board during 
the year ended 31 March 1972. The effect of this accounting choice on 
the net assets was thus eliminated at 31 March 1973.
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s c o n  ISA . GAE BOARD
Reduction In provision for deferred repairs
The reduction in the above provision was ascertained from Schedule 14 
(1972). This accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 
1972 by £250,000.
Release of. pension scheme provision
The release of the above provision was ascertained from Schedule 14
(1972). This accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 
1972 by £120,000.
Surplus on sale of an investment in an associated company used.Ac 
accelerate the amortisation of displaced plant.
Note 9 (1972) explained that the surplus on the sale of an investment in 
an associated company had been partly used to accelerate by £365,633 the 
amortisation of displaced plant. This accounting choice had the effect of 
decreasing the net assets at 31 March 1972 by £365,633 as the most 
likely alternative choice was to transfer the surplus to reserve fund. As 
a result of this accounting choice the net surpluses for each of the 
years ended 31 March 1972, 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 were
increased by £36,563. This was because displaced plant was to be written 
off by 31 March 1981 (Note 6, 1972) so that 1/lOth of £365,633 or
£36,563 would have been written off to revenue over each of these years.
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Surplus on sale of an lHYestneiit in an associated company used to fully 
amortise the balance of compensation
Note 9 (1972) explained that the surplus on the sale of an investment in 
an associated company had been partly used to fully amortise the balance 
of compensation at 31 March 1972 of £53,047. This accounting choice had 
the effect of decreasing the net assets at 31 March 1972 by £53,047 as
the most likely alternative choice was to transfer the surplus to reserve
fund. The net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 was unaffected 
by this accounting choice as the amount written off to revenue during 
that year (£5,539) was the same as in previous years. However, the net 
surplus for the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1973 was increased by 
£53,047 as the total balance on the balance of compensation account 
written off as an extraordinary item in that year [Note 2(j) and Note 10
(1973)] was decreased by £53,407 as a result of this accounting choice by 
the Scottish Gas Board during the year ended 31 March 1972. The effect 
of this accounting choice on the net assets was thus eliminated at 31 
March 1973.
SOUTH EASTERN GAS BOARD
Capitalisation of certain ..labour coata 
Note 9 (1972) stated that :
An amount of £774,000 has, this year, been charged to Mains and
Services in respect of certain elements of the cost of labour not
previously taken into account for capital account purposes resulting 
in a reduction of revenue expenditure of a like amount.
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing both the net surplus
for the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by
£774,000.
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The amount which was charged to capital accounts for the year ended 
31 March 1973 was not disclosed in the BGC's published accounts for that 
year. This amount has been estimated by the researcher by adjusting the 
£774,000 for the year ended 31 March 1972 by the change in the Monthly
index of average earnings included in the Annual Abstract of Statistics
for 1974 (HMSO, 1974). The researcher has assumed that this index is 
appropriate in the absence of any further details relating to the "cost of 
labour" capitalised by the South Eastern Gas Board. The researcher has 
also assumed that the cost of labour accrued evenly through the year 
ended 31 March 1972 and through the year ended 31 March 1973.
Given the above assumptions the researcher calculated the amount 
which was charged to capital account for the year ended 31 March 1973 as 
follows :
Cost of labour charged to capital x Index of average earnings. at. Oct 1972 
for the year ended 31 March 1972 Index of average earnings at Oct 1971
£774,000 (note 1) x 140.5 (note 21 = £891,369
122.0 (note 2)
(1) Obtained from Note 9 (1972)
(2) Obtained from the Monthly Index of average earnings (HMSO, 1974).
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing both the net surplus 
for the year ended 31 March 1973 and the net assets at 31 March 1973 by 
£891,369.
The researcher has assumed that this accounting choice ceased
during the year ended 31 March 1974. Note 2(b) (1973) stated that in
relation to fixed assets constructed by the BGC cost included "related
works and administrative overheads". But Note 2(b) (1974) stated that in
the case of fixed assets constructed by the Corporation only direct
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expenditure was included in cost. The researcher has assumed that the 
"cost of labour- capitalised by the South Eastern Gas Board was 
considered to be a works overhead which on the basis of the above notes 
from the published accounts of the BGC would have been capitalised during 
the year ended 31 March 1973 but not thereafter. Thus the above 
accounting change made in the year ended 31 March 1972 did not have an 
effect on the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 nor on the 
net assets at 31 March 1974.
It should be noted that the effect on net assets of the accounting 
decision to capitalise certain elements on the cost of labour was 
cumulative. The calculation of these cumulative effects is shown below :
Cost of labour capitalised during the year 
ended 31 March 1972 t 774.000
Increase in net assets at 31 March 1972 t 774,000
Cost of labour capitalised during the year 
ended 31 March 1973  891 >.369.
Increase in net assets at 31 March 1973 £1,865,389
The cumulative increase in net assets at 31 March 1974 was also 
£1,665,369 as the cost of labour was not capitalised after 31 March 1973.
Depreciation on the cost of labour capitalised
The capitalisation of the cost of labour discussed in the previous 
section meant that South Eastern's depreciation charges to revenue were 
increased. Details of the rates at which these amounts were depreciated 
was not disclosed. Consequently the researcher has assumed that the cost 
of labour capitalised was spread over a range of fixed assets and was 
depreciated at the average rate used to depreciate South Eastern's fixed
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assets. The average rate for each of the years ended on 31 March 1970,
31 March 1971 and 31 March 1972 were calculated as follows :
 D^ preciatloil charge lor the year ended 3l March 1970 (note 1) v IÛÛ.
Gross book value of post vesting fixed assets fi 31 March'70 (note2) 1
= 6,912 X I M  = 3.5%
196,824 1
— PepreciatiQn charge for the vear ended 31 March 1971 (note 3) ^ I M
Gross book value of post vesting fixed assets © 31 March'71 (note 4) 1
7.466 X 1ÛÛ. = 3.6%
206,475 1
 Dapreciation charge for the year ended 31 March 1972 (note 5) ^ I M
Gross book value of post vesting fixed assets © 31 March'72 (note 6) 1
= ..^ Q97_ X I M  = 4.1%
197,840 1
(1) Obtained from Note 9 (1970)
(2) Obtained from the Balance Sheet at 31 March 1970
(3) Obtained from Note 7 (1971)
(4) Obtained from the Balance Sheet at 31 March 1971
(5) Obtained from Note 7 (1972)
(6) Obtained from the Balance Sheet at 31 March 1972
The researcher calculated the average for these three years as follows:
3.5% t 3.6% + 4.1%. = 3.7%
3
and assumed that this average rate was used to depreciate the cost of 
labout capitalised in each of the relevant years.
The extra depreciation charged in each of the three remaining years 
of the quinquennium as a result of the accounting choice during the year 
ended 31 March 1972 to capitalise certain elements of the cost of labour 
was estimated as follows :
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Cost of labour capitalised up to 31 March 1972 
(note 7) ^ 774,000
Estimated depreciation charged during the year 
ended 31 March 1972 on the cost of labour 
capitalised up to 31 March 1972
3.7% of £774,000 £ 28.63fl
Estimated cost of labour capitalised up to 
31 March 1973 (note 8) £1,665,369
Estimated depreciation charged during the year 
ended 31 March 1973 on the cost of labour 
capitalised up to 31 March 1973
3.7% of £1,665,369 £ 61,619
Estimated cost of labour capitalised up to 
31 March 1974 (note 8) £1,665,369
Estimated depreciation charged during the year 
ended 31 March 1974 on the cost of labour 
capitalised up to 31 March 1974
3.7% of £1,665,369 £ 61.619
(7) Obtained from Note 9(1972)
(8) As calculated in the preceding section on the capitalisation of 
certain labour costs
The net surplus for each year and the net assets at the end of each 
year were decreased by the depreciation charged on the cost of labour 
capitalised up to the end of that year. The effect on net assets was 
cumulative as shown below :
Estimated depreciation on the cost of labour 
capitalised up to 31 March 1972 £ 28,638
Decrease in net assets at 31 March 1972 28,638
Estimated depreciation on the cost of labour 
capitalised up to 31 March 1973 — 61,619
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1973 90,257
Estimated depreciation on the cost of labour 
capitalised up to 31 March 1974 — 61,619
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1974
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SOUIfflEM GAS BOARD
Increase in miscellaneous provisions
The increase in the above provisions was ascertained from Schedule 14 
(1972). This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 
1972 by £11,000.
WALES GAS BOARD
Release of pension scheme provision
Note 4(ill) (1972) stated that the provision of £131,585 made in previous 
years in respect of deficiencies relating to the pension scheme was no 
longer required and had been released. This accounting choice had the 
effect of increasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 
and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by £131,585.
WEST MIDLANDS GAS BOARD
Release of pension schema provislflli
The release of these provisions was explained in Note 20 (1972) as
follows :
The Board are liable to make good the deficiencies arising on 
pension funds and schemes. As a result of the actuarial valuation 
of the Protected Persons Superannuation Scheme made as at 31 March 
1970, the annual deficiency contributions required for the period 
from 1 April 1970 to 31 March 1975 have been reduced from £186,000 
per year to £59,000 per year. The amounts over provided at 31 
March 1971 have been credited to the reserve fund.
The amount credited to the reserve fund was £331,000 (Note 19, 1972).
This accounting choice did not affect the net surplus for the year ended
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31 March 1972 but did increase the net assets at 31 March 1972 by
£331,000.
GAS COUNCIL 
Ac£elerated..wrlte-Qff of exploration expenditure
The accelerated write-off of exploration expenditure by the Gas Council 
subsidiary, Gas Council (Exploration) Ltd was described in Note 13 to the 
published accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended 31 March 1972 
as follows :
In 1970-71 and earlier years expenditure on exploration was written 
off on a straight line basis over ten years, but the basis was 
changed for 1971-72 so that it is now written off to revenue
account as incurred. The unamortised balance of exploration
expenditure at 31 March 1971 is now being written off over two
years. The effect of this change has been to increase the 
depreciation charge against the revenue of the company for the year 
to 31 March 1972 by £4.5 million ..
For the fallowing year further information was provided by Note
23(a) to the published accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March
1973. This note described the accelerated write-off of exploration
expenditure by the BGC's principal subsidiary, Gas Council (Exploration)
Ltd, during the year ended 31 March 1973 as follows :
Exploration expenditure is written off to revenue account during the 
year in which it is incurred. In addition during the year 1972/73 a 
further sum of £2.9 million was written off in respect of the 
balance of exploration expenditure incurred prior to 31 March 1971. 
There are no further such amounts to be written off in future years.
In order to calculate the amount which would have been written off
prior to the change of accounting base it was necessary to calculate the
total exploration expenditure up to 31 March 1971 as this amount was
originally being written off over ten years on a straight line basis. It
was possible to do this using the information on the fixed assets of the
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BGC subsidiary, Gas Council (Exploration) Ltd at 31 March 1973 provided
in the notes to the published accounts of the BGC for the years ended 31
March 1973 and 31 March 1974.
In Mote 23(a) to the published accounts of the BGC for the year
ended 31 March 1973 the fixed assets of Gas Council (Exploration ) Ltd at 
31 March 1973 were shown as follows .*
Elxed assets £qqq
Company's share of expenditure incurred by consortia 
on exploration for and development of natural gas
reserves (less Investment Grants) 32,033
Less; Depreciation charged to date 14.046
17.987
In Mote 23(a) to the published accounts of the BGC for the year
ended 31 March 1974 the fixed assets of Gas Council (Exploration) Ltd at 
31 March 1973 were shown as comparative figures as follows ;
Fixed assets iMA
Company's share of expenditure incurred by consortia 
on development of natural gas reserves (less
Investment Grants) 21,490
Less : Depreciation charged to date 3>5.03.
17.987
Although the unamortised balance at 31 March 1973 is the same in 
both sets of figures both the company's share of expenditure incurred and 
the accumulated depreciation thereon are £10,543,000 less in the published 
accounts at 31 March 1974 than they were in the published accounts at 31 
March 1973. The description of these fixed assets in the published 
accounts for the year ended 31 March 1973 includes the "company s share 
of expenditure incurred by consortia on exploration". The description of 
these fixed assets in the published accounts for the year ended 31 March
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1974 does not Include any mention of exploration expenditure. It 
therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the differences between the 
two sets of figures (£10,543,000) is the exploration expenditure incurred
up to 31 March 1971 which became fully amortised at 31 March 1973.
As already noted, prior to the change of accounting base exploration 
expenditure was written off on a straight line basis over ten years (Mote 
13 to the published accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended 31 
March 1972). Therefore the amount which would have been written off 
each year on the expenditure incurred on exploration up to 31 March 1971 
would have been 10% of £10,543,000 = £1,054,300.
Year ends.d 31 March 19.72.
As already noted Mote 13 to the published accounts of the Gas
Council for the year ended 31 March 1972 stated that the :
effect of this change has been to increase the depreciation charge 
against the revenue of the company for the year to 31 March 1972 by 
£4.5 million ..
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the amount written off the 
unamortised balance of exploration expenditure at 31 March 1971 during 
the year ended 31 March 1972 was £1,054,300 + £4,500,000 = £5,554,300.
The effect of the change of accounting base for the year ended 31 
March 1972 can now be calculated as follows ;
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Amounts actually written off
Amount written off unamortised balance of 
exploration expenditure at 31 March 1971
(see previous page) £5,554,300
Exploration expenditure incurred and written 
off to revenue during year ended 31 March 1972 
(line 15, Revenue Account of the Gas Council
for the year ended 31 March 1972) 125,000
Total amount written off to revenue £5.679.300
Amounts which would have been written off prior to change of accounting 
base
10% of exploration expenditure incurred up to
31 March 1971 £1,054,300
10% of exploration expenditure incurred during
year ended 31 March 1972 ___ 12,500.
1.066.800
Increase in exploration expenditure written off
due to change of accounting base 4.612,5.00.
This increase in the exploration expenditure written off to revenue 
had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 
March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by £4,612,500.
Year ended 31 March 197.3.
The effect of the change of accounting base for the year ended 31
March 1973 has been calculated as follows :
Amounts actually written off
Unamortised balance of exploration e^enditure 
at 31 March 1971 written off CNpte 23(a) to 
the published accounts of the BGC at 31 March 
1973 and Mote 23 (a) to the published accounts 
of the BGC at 31 March 19741 £2,927,000
Exploration expenditure liicurr^  during year 
ended 31 March 1973 v
published accounts of the BGC at 31 iiarcn
19743 £4.805.006
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Amounts which would have been written off prior to change of accmmting 
base
10% of exploration expenditure incurred up to
31 March 1971 £1,054,300
10% of exploration expenditure incurred up to
31 March 1972 12,500
10% of exploration expenditure incurred up to 
31 March 1973  187,800
£1.254,600
Increase in exploration expenditure written off
due to change of accounting base £3.550,400
This increase in the exploration expenditure written off to revenue 
had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31
March 1973 and the net assets at 31 March 1973 by £3,550,400.
Year ended 31 March 19.74
The effect of the change of accounting base for the year ended 31
March 1974 has been calculated as follows :
Amounts actually written .jif
Exploration expenditure incurred during year 
ended 31 March 1974 [Note 23(a) to the 
published accounts of the BGC at 31 March
Ï974] £2,792,000.
Amounts which would have been written off prior to change of. accouPtlag 
bas6
10% of exploration expenditure incurred up to
31 March 1971 £1,054,300
10% of exploration expenditure incurred up to 
31 March 1972
10% of exploration expenditure incurred up to iavaoa
31 March 1973 187,000
10% of exploration expenditure incurred up to 
31 March"^  1974 £i
Increase in exploration expenditure written of 
due to change of accounting base '
This increase in the exploration expenditure written off to revenue 
had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31
March 1974 and the net assets at 31 March 1974 by £1,258,200.
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Tie calculation of tie cumulative effect on net assets Is siown 
below :
Increase in exploration expenditure written off
during the year ended 31 March 1972 £4.612,500
Decrease in net assets at 31 March 1972 £4,612,500
Increase in exploration expenditure written off
during the year ended 31 March 1973 3.550,400
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1973 £8,162,900
Increase in exploration expenditure written off
during the year ended 31 March 1974 1.258.200
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1974 £9.421,100
£fln7capit.allsatiQn of Interest
The change of accounting base relating to the capitalisation of
interest was first mentioned in Mote 7 to the 1970-71 published accounts
of the Gas Council as follows :
Interest incurred on borrowings required to finance the provision of 
capital assets for the purpose of the reception and transmission of 
natural gas is charged to capital account in respect of assets under 
construction up to the date when they come into normal operational 
use. The amount so charged in 1970/71 was £2,607,000. Interest 
will continue to be charged to capital on construction in progress 
at 31 March 1971 until these assets come into operational use. On 
new construction work commenced after the 31 March 1971 the 
practice of charging interest to capital account will cease.
This change was confirmed in Mote 7 to the 1971-72 published accounts of
the Gas Council as follows :
The practice of charging interest to capital on new construction 
ceased from 31 March 1971 except for projects already in progress 
at that date which continue to bear interest charges until they come 
into normal operational use.
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Year ended 31 March 1972
The effect of this change of accounting base was not disclosed in 
the published accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended 31 March 
1972. Therefore this has been estimated by the researcher on the basis 
of the following available information. Para 105 of the Gas Council 
Report for the year ended 31 March 1972 stated that :
During the year investment by the Council on the natural gas
transmission system amounted to i31.9 million (including fO.8 
million for interest charged to capital).
Para 101 of the same report stated that during the year ended 31 March
1972 the industry paid an average rate of interest of 6.51% on its debt.
In the calculations which follow the researcher has assumed that this
average rate of interest of 6.51% was the rate paid on the amounts 
borrowed for investment in the natural gas transmission system during 
the year ended 31 March 1972.
According to the Revenue Account of the Gas Council for the year
ended 31 March 1972 (line 21) the interest charged to capital account 
was f788,000 (the £0.8 million referred to in para 105 above). On the 
basis of Note 7 (1971) and Note 7 (1972) this was the interest charged 
on the construction work on the natural gas transmission system 
commenced prior to 31 March 1971. Assuming as stated above that 6.51%
was the average rate of interest paid, the cost of the construction work
commenced prior to 31 March 1971 was :
f788,000 X 1QQ_ = 212,104,454
6.51
The cost of the construction work commenced after 1 April 1971 can now 
be arrived at as follows :
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Total investment in natural gas 
transmission system during the year ended 
31 March 1972 (Gas Council Report, para 
105)
Construction work commenced prior to 
31 March 1971 (as calculated above) 212,104,454
231,900,000
Interest charged to capital on 
construction work commenced prior to 
31 March 1971 (Gas Council’s Revenue 
Account for the year ended 31 March
1972, line 21) ___ ZS^^ QQQ 12.692.454
Investment in natural gas transmission 
system during the year ended 31 March
1972 commenced after 1 April 1971 219.007.546
The effect on the year ended 31 March 1972 of the accounting 
decision not to capitalise interest on construction work on the natural 
gas transmission system commenced after 1 April 1971 can now be seen to 
be 21,237,391 (6.51% of 219,007,546). Thus this accounting choice had the 
effect of decreasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 
1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by 21,237,391.
Year ended 31 March 19Z3
The amount of the investment in the natural gas transmission system 
for the year ended 31 March 1973 was not disclosed separately in the 
BGC's 1972/73 published accounts.
In order to quantify the effect of the change of accounting base 
already described in 1971/72 an estimate of the amount of the investment 
in the natural gas transmission system had to be made. This was done as 
follows .* In 1971/72 the 231.9m invested in the transmission system 
represented 21% of the additions to fixed assets. In 1973/74 the 245.9m 
invested in the transmission system (Price Commission, 1979, Table 9.11) 
represented 33% of the additions to fixed assets. It will be assumed for
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the purposes of this calculation that the average between those 2 years 
ie 27% applies to 1972/73.
Additions to fixed assets for the year ended 
31 March 1973 (BGC Report & Accounts 1972/73,
P 36) fl25.300.QQQ
27t thereof f 33.831.000
According to Note 8 (1973) the interest charged to capital for the 
year ended 31 March 1973 was 240,000. On the basis of Note 7 (1971) and 
Note 7 (1972) this was the interest charged on the construction work on 
the natural gas transmission system commenced prior to 31 March 1971. 
The average rate of interest paid by the BGC during the year ended 31 
March 1973 was 7.23% (p 14, 1973). The researcher has assumed that this 
was the average rate of interest paid on the amounts borrowed for 
investment in the natural gas transmission system during the year ended 
31 March 1973. On the basis of this assumption the cost of the
construction work commenced prior to 31 March 1971 was :
240,000 X = 2553,250
7.23
The cost of the construction work commenced after 1 April 1971 can now 
be arrived at as follows :
Total investment in natural gas 
transmission system during the
year ended 31 March 1973 (as ooi
calculated above) 233,83l,uuu
Construction work commenced prior 
to 31 March 1971 (as calculated 
above) 2553,250
Interest charged to capital on 
construction work commenced prior 
to 31 March 1971 (BGC R^ort &I r a  i°973.^ p -AMÛ2----------5SS.2aa
Investment in natural gas transmission
"prli 1971"" «33.237..Z5&
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The effect on the year ended 31 March 1973 of the accounting 
decision not to capitalise interest on construction work on the natural 
gas transmission system commenced after 1 April 1971 can now be seen to 
be 22,403,089 (7.23% of 233,237,750). Thus this accounting choice had the 
effect of decreasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 
1973 and the net assets at 31 March 1973 by 22,403,089.
Year ended. 31 March 1974
The amount of the investment in the natural gas transmission system 
for the year ended 31 March 1974 was not disclosed separately in the 
published accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1974. However, 
that amount was identified by the Price Commission (1979, Table 9.11) as 
being 245.9m.
Note 8 to the published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1974 
made it clear that there was no interest charged to capital during that 
year. On the basis of this information the researcher has assumed that 
there was no construction work commenced prior to 31 March 1971 included 
in the 245.9m investment in the natural gas transmission system during
the year ended 31 March 1974.
The average rate of interest paid by the BGC during the year ended 
31 March 1974 was 7.64% (p 13, 1974), The researcher has assumed that 
this was the average rate of interest paid on the amounts borrowed for 
investment in the natural gas transmission system during the year ended 
31 March 1974.
The effect on the year ended 31 March 1974 of the accounting 
decision not to capitalise interest on construction work on the natural 
graa transmission system after 1 April 1971 am now be seen to be
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23,506,760 (7.64% of 245,900,000). Thus this accounting choice had the 
effect of decreasing both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 
1974 and the net assets at 31 March 1974 by 23,506,760.
The calculation of the cumulative effect on net assets is shown 
below ;
Estimated increase in interest charge to
revenue for the year ended 31 March 1972 21.237,391
Estimated decrease in net assets at 
31 March 1972 21,237,391
Estimated increase in interest charge to
revenue for the year ended 31 March 1973 2.403.089
Estimated cumulative decrease in net assets 
at 31 March 1973 23,640,480
Estimated increase in interest charge to
revenue for the year ended 31 March 1974 3,506.760
Estimated cumulative decrease in net assets 
at 31 March 1974 27.147.240
Non-capitalisation of salaries and.related .expenses
Note 7 to the Gas Council's published accounts for the year ended 31
March 1972 stated that :
From 31 March 1971 the practice of charging a proportion of 
salaries and related expenses to capital accounts was discontinued. 
The amount charged to capital account in 1970-71 was 2884,000.
The amount which would have been charged to capital accounts during the
year ended 31 March 1972 was not disclosed in the published accounts for
the year ended 31 March 1972. This amount has been estimated by the
researcher by adjusting the 2884,000 for the year ended 31 March 1971 by
the change in the Index of average salaries : non-manual employees (Great
Britain) included in the Annual Abstract of Statistics for 1973 (HMSO,
1973).
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The researcher has assumed that :
(a) salaries and related expenses accrued evenly through the year ending 
on 31 March 1971 and through the year ended on 31 March 1972; and
(b) the index of average salaries accrued evenly between April 1971 and 
April 1972.
Given the above assumptions the researcher calculated the amount 
which would have been charged to capital accounts for the year ended 31 
March 1972 as follows :
Salaries & related expenses charged to x Index of average salaries 0 Oct '71 
capital for year ended 31 March '71 Index of average salaries 0 Oct '70
2884,000 (note 1) x 118.9 (note 3) = 2992,517
105.9 (note 2)
(1) The amount of salaries and related expenses charged to capital for 
the year ended 31 March 1971 was obtained from Note 7 to the
published accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended 31 March
1971.
(2) At October 1970 the index of average salaries = 105.9 (April 1970 = 
100 ) .
(3) The October 1971 index of average salaries was assumed to be the 
mid-point between the index at April 1971 and the index at April
1972 and was calculated as follows :
Index at April 1971 + index at April 1972 = 112.4 + 125.1.4
2 2
= 118.9
The effect of the change in accounting base described above is to 
decrease both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 and the 
net assets at 31 March 1972 by 2992,517.
Ifiar ended 31 March 19.Z3.
The amount which would have been charged to capital account during
the year ended 31 March 1973 was not disclosed in the published accounts
of the BGC for tiw year endai 31 March 1973. TWLs amount has been
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estimated by the researcher by adjusting the estimate of 2992,517 for the 
year ended 31 March 1972 by the change in the Index of average salaries 
: non-manual employees (Great Britain) included in the Annual Abstract of 
Statistics for 1974 (HMSO, 1974).
The researcher has assumed that :
(a) salaries and related expenses accrued evenly through the year ended 
31 March 1972 and through the year ended 31 March 1973; and
(b) the index of average salaries accrued evenly between April 1971 and 
April 1973.
Given the above assumptions the researcher calculated the amount 
which would have been charged to capital account for the year ended 31 
March 1973 as follows :
Estimated salaries & related expenses x Index of average salaries <5 Oct J72 
charged to capital for the year ended Index of average salaries @ Oct '71 
31 March 1972
2992,517 (note 1) x 132.0 (note 3) = 21,101,870
118.9 (note 2)
(1) The estimated salaries and related expenses charged to capital for the 
year ended 31 March 1972 was obtained from the calculation above.
(2) The October 1971 index of average salaries was assumed to be the mid­
point between the index at April 1971 and the index at April 1972 and 
was calculated as follows :
Index at April 1971 + index at April 197.2. = 112.4 + 125.A
2 2
= 118.9
(3) The October 1972 index of average salaries was assumed to be the mid 
point between the Index at April 1972 and the index at April 1973 and 
was calculated as follows :
Index at April 1972 + index at April 1922. = 125.4 + 13&ZL
= 132.0
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The effect of the change In accounting base described above is to 
decrease both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 and the 
net assets at 31 March 1973 by 21,101,870.
Year ended 31 March 197A
The amount which would ahve been charged to capital account during 
the year ended 31 March 1974 was not disclosed in the published accounts 
of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1974. This amount has been 
estimated by the researcher by adjusting the estimate of 21,101,870 for 
the year ended 31 March 1973 by the change in the Index of average 
salaries : non-manual employees (Great Britain) included in the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics for 1975 (HMSO, 1975).
The researcher has assumed that :
(a) salaries and related expenses accrued evenly through the year ended 
31 March 1973 and through the year ended 31 March 1974; and
(b) the index of average salaries accrued evenly between April 1972 and 
April 1974.
Given the above assumptions the researcher calculated the amount 
which would have been charged to capital account for the year ended 31 
March 1974 as follows :
Estimated salaries & related expenses x Index of average salaries @ Qc-t— 12l 
charged to capital for the year ended Index of average salaries @ Oct 72
31 March 1973
21,101,870 (note 1) x 147.7 (note 31 = 21,232,926
132.0 (note 2 )
(1) The estimated salaries and related expenses charged to capital for 
the year ended 31 March 1973 was obtained from the calculation
(2) The October 1972 index of average salaries was assum^ 
mid-point between the index at April 1972 and Hie index at April
1973 and was calculated as follows :
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Index at April 1972 t Index at April IQ73 = 125.4 + i3A 7
2 2
= 132.0
(3) The October 1973 index of average salaries was assumed to be the 
mid-point between the index at April 1973 and the index at April 
1974 and was calculated as follows :
Index at April 1973 t index at April 1974 = 138.7 + 156.8
2 2
= 147.7
The effect of the change in accounting base described above is to 
decrease both the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 and the 
net assets at 31 March 1974 by 21,232,926.
The calculation of the cumulative effect on net assets is shown 
below :
Estimated salaries and related expenses not 
capitalised during the year ended 31 March 1972 2 992,517
Estimated decrease in net assets at 31 March 1972 992,517
Estimated salaries and related expenses not 
capitalised during the year ended 31 March 1973 ,1,10.1,870.
Estimated cumulative decrease in net assets at 
31 March 1973 2,094,387
Estimated salaries and related expenses not 
capitalised during the year ended 31 March 1974 1,232,908.
Estimated cumulative decrease in net assets at 
31 March 1974 23,327,2.91
Depreciation saved on non-capitalisatiOD, of interest, salaries and related, 
expenses
The non-capitalisation of interest, salaries and related expenses 
discussed in the previous two sections meant that there was a saving in 
depreciation in each of the three years ended 31 March 1972, 1973 and 
1974. The interest, salaries and related expenses discussed in the
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previous two sections all related to the construction of the natural gas 
transmission system. The basis on which natural gas assets were 
depreciated each year was described in the notes to each of these year's
published accounts as follows :
Depreciation has been provided on all natural gas assets in 
operation during 1971/72 by reference to the actual volume of gas 
transmitted compared with the planned throughput when operational, 
(note 3 to the published accounts of the Gas Council for the year 
ended 31 March 1972).
The cost of the national gas transmission system, built to transmit 
natural gas, is being written off by reference to the volume of gas 
passed through it each year compared with the known resources of 
natural gas. [note 2(c) (v) to the published accounts of the BGC for 
the year ended 31 March 19733.
The cost of the national gas transmission system, built to transmit 
natural gas, is being written off by reference to the volume of gas 
passed through the system each year compared with the estimated 
recoverable reserves of natural gas from known gas fields. 
Estimates of recoverable reserves will be reviewed annually with 
subsequent adjustment of the depreciation charges of the current and 
future years, [note 1(c) (iv) to the published accounts of the BGC for 
the year ended 31 March 19741.
Although the volume of gas passed through the system each year was 
disclosed each year the estimated recoverable reserves were not. It was 
therefore not possible to calculate the depreciation saved on the
interest, salaries and related expenses not capitalised using the method
described in the above notes.
Insufficient information was available for the researcher to
identify the fixed asset categories into which these expenses relating to 
the natural gas transmission system would have been allocated. Therefore 
the researcher decided to calculate the depreciation saved on the
interest, salaries and related expenses not capitalised on the basis that
they would have been depreciated at the average rate of depreciation used
each year. The average rates of depreciation for each year have been
calculated as follows :
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Average depreciation rate for
the year ended 31 March 1972
Average depreciation rate for 
the year ended 31 March 1973
Average depreciation rate for 
the year ended 31 March 1974
Total depreciation for the year
(note 1) 
275.4m (note 2 ) 1
Total depreciation for the year 
ended 31 March 1973 
ets @Total fixed ass ® 31 March '73
—  M.Qa (note 3? x m  
1,909.7m (note 4)
X 100
Total depreciation for the year
T5-Æ
— 108,3m (note 5) x iûü 
1,918.5m (note 6 ) 1
5a81
(1) Obtained from line 17 of the revenue account of the Gas Council for
the year ended 31 March 1972.
(2) Obtained from line 8 of the balance sheet of the Gas Council as at
31 March 1972.
(3) Obtained from page 37 of the published accounts of the BGC for the
year ended 31 March 1973.
(4) Obtained from page 36 of the published accounts of the BGC for the
year ended 31 March 1973.
(5) Obtained from page 37 of the published accounts of the BGC for the
year ended 31 March 1974.
(6 ) Obtained from page 36 of the published accounts of the BGC for the
year ended 31 March 1974.
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Jon-capitalisatlon 
of interest
Non-capita1isat ion 
of salaries and 
related expenses
Decrease in net assets at 
31 March 1972
Depreciation saved 
(4.5% thereof)
Decrease in net assets at 
31 March 1973
Depreciation saved 
(4.7% thereof)
Decrease in net assets at 
31 March 1974
Depreciation saved 
(5.6% thereof) t 400245 I 186.328
The cumulative effect on net assets has been calculated as follows:
Non-capitalisation 
Non-capitalisation of salaries and
21,237,391
£__
23,640,480
2- .163,822
27,147,240
2 992,517
2__ 44,663
22,094,387
2__ 98,436
23,327,293
of interest
Depreciation saved during 
year ended 31 March 1972
Increase in net assets at 
31 March 1972
Depreciation saved during 
year ended 31 March 1973
Cumulative increase in net 
assets at 31 March 1973
Depreciation saved during 
year ended 31 March 1974
Cumulative increase in net 
assets at 31 March 1974
2 55,683 
2 55,683 
2163,822. 
2219,505 
2466,245. 
2616,256.
related expenses 
2 4.4,663.
2 44,663 
2 98,436 
2143,099 
2186,328. 
2329,422
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ALL A m  BOARDS
Accelerated amortisation of displaced pimnt
Prior to the year ended 31 March 1972 the amounts transferred to 
displaced plant account and the basis for calculating the amounts to be 
written off to revenue were described in the notes to the published 
accounts of the relevant Area Boards in terms which were similar to the 
following extract from the notes to the published accounts of the Eastern 
Gas Board for the year ended 31 March 1971.
The unamortised balance of coal-based plant made obsolete during 
the year as a result of new sources of gas supply and technical 
developments has been taken to a displaced plant account. The 
balance will be amortised by charges to revenue account in future 
years, calculated on a straight line basis over a period of 15 years 
or the unexpired depreciation period of the plant concerned,
whichever is the shorter (note 9).
Prior to the year ended 31 March 1972 the amounts transferred to 
the "Deferred charges ; conversion to natural gas account" and the basis
for calculating the amounts to be written off to revenue were described
in the notes to the published accounts of the relevant Area Boards in 
terms which were similar to the following extract from note 8 to the 
published accounts of the North Western Gas Board for the year ended 31 
March 1971.
This represents the costs of conversion to natural gas. In 
accordance with the recommendations of the Gas Council the costs 
incurred in each financial year are being written off by equal
annual instalments over a period of 15 years.
Then the note explained that included in the deferred charges account :
are the cost of conversion and the unamortised capital expenditure 
on oil-based gas making plants and related plant spares taken out 
of commission on the introduction of natural gas.
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The noteH to the published accounts of the relevant Area Boards for 
the year ended 31 March 1972 described the change in accounting base in 
terms which were similar to the following extract from note 9 to the 
published accounts of the Eastern Gas Board for the year ended 31 March 
1972.
All unamortised capital expenditure on oil-based plant taken out of 
commission is now included in displaced plant and comparative
figures for 1970-71 have been adjusted. Such expenditure was
previously included in "Deferred Charges - Conversion to natural gas 
- Other consequential costs". The amortisation of displaced (coal- 
based and oil-based) plant has been accelerated to ensure that all 
such costs are written off by 31 March 1981.
Year ended 31 M&rch....l672
Details of the amounts written off displaced plant for the year 
ended 31 March 1972 are provided in Table Cl. The accelerated
amortisation of the displaced (coal-based and oil-based) plant led to 
additional charges being made to the revenue accounts of eleven of the 
Area Boards for the year ended 31 March 1972 (the North Eastern Gas 
Board did not have a balance on displaced plant account at 31 March 
1972). These additional charges were quantified and disclosed in the 
notes to the published accounts of eight of the Area Boards. For the 
three Area Boards which did not disclose these additional charges the 
researcher calculated them as described in note 3 to Table Cl.
As can be seen from Table Cl the additional amounts written of to 
revenue during the year ended 31 March 1972 due to the accelerated
amortisation of displaced plant totalled 23,009,062. Thus this change of 
accounting base had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus for the
year ended 31 March 1972 and the net assets at 31 March 1972 by
23,009,062.
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Year ended 31 March IQ73
Although the effect of the change In accounting base was disclosed 
in the published accounts of most of the Area Boards for the year ended 
31 March 1972 (as shown in Table Cl) the effect was not disclosed in the 
published accounts of the BGC for either the year ended 31 March 1973 or 
for the year ended 31 March 1974. Consequently the effect of the change 
for those two years had to be calculated by the researcher as described 
in the following paragraphs.
Examination of the published accounts of the relevant Area Boards 
for the year ended 31 March 1972 left the researcher with the impression 
that the Boards did not all calculate the amounts they wrote off to 
revenue on the same basis. Consequently the researcher decided to 
analyse what each Area Board had done in this regard during the year 
ended 31 March 1972.
The published accounts of each of the relevant Area Boards 
disclosed, where applicable, the following information relating to 
displaced plant :
(a) the unamortised balances at 31 March 1971;
(b) the unamortised balances at 31 March 1972;
(c) the amounts written off to revenue during the year ended 31 March
1972;
(d) the amounts written off to reserve fund during the year ended 31
March 1972.
The amounts transferred from fixed assets during the year were not 
disclosed, so these were calculated by the researcher by deducting item
(a) above from the total of Items (b), <o) and <d) as shown In Table C2. 
This enabled the researcher to prepare a detailed displaced plant account
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for each Area Board for the year ended 31 March 1972 as shown in Table
C3.
The details in Table C3 of the displaced plant accounts of the 
relevant Area Boards for the year ended 31 March 1972 indicated that 
although all the relevant Area Boards (except the Vest Midlands Gas 
Board) claimed to be writing off the balances on displaced plant to 
revenue by 1981 there were differences between the Boards in exactly how 
they calculated the amounts written off. The basis on which each of the 
Area Boards appeared to calculate the amounts written off to revenue is 
listed below.
East Midlands
Eastern
North Thames 
North Western 
Northern
Scottish
South Eastern
20% of the balance at 31 March 1972 before deducting 
the amount written off to revenue
10% of the unamortised balance at 31 March 1971 plus 
10% of the amounts transferred from fixed asets 
(probably from the date of displacement)
10% of the unamortised balance at 31 March 1971 
10% of the unamortised balance at 31 March 1971 
10% of the balance at 31 March 1972 before deducting 
the amount written off to revenue
10% of the balance at 31 March 1972 before deducting 
the amount written off to revenue
10% of the unamortised balance at 31 March 1971 plus 
10% of the amounts transferred from fixed assets 
(probably from the date of displacement)
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South Western : 10% of the unamortised balance at 31 March 1971 plus
10% of the amounts transferred from fixed assets 
(probably from the date of displacement)
Southern ; 10% of the balance at 31 March 1972 before deducting
the amount written off to revenue 
Wales : 10% of the balance at 31 March 1972 before deducting
the amount written off to revenue 
Vest Midlands ; 20% of the balance at 31 March 1972 before deducting
the amount written off to revenue
It should be noted that the exact basis on which the East Midlands
Gas Board calculated the amounts written off to revenue is not entirely
clear. Note 10(b) (1972) stated that the
amortisation of displaced plant has been accelerated to ensure that 
all such costs are written off by 1981.
However, as can be seen from Table G3 the rate of write off worked out to
be 20% of the balance at 31 March 1972 before deducting the amount
written off to revenue.
For those Boards (Eastern, North Thames, North Western, South 
Eastern and South Western) that did not base their calculation of the 
amount to be written off to revenue on the balance at 31 March 1972 the 
researcher calculated the amounts they had omitted from that calculation 
as shown in Table C4. The researcher felt it was necessary to do this as 
these amounts would have been included in the write-off calculations of
the Area Boards at 31 March 1973 as shown overleaf.
The effect for the year ended 31 March 1973 of the change in
accounting base can now be demonstrated as follows
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Amounts which would have been written off according to 
the published accounts for the year ended 31 March 
1972 (Table Cl) (note 1)
im.
4,041
Amounts which would have been written off during the 
year ended 31 March 1973 on the amounts which were 
not included in the write-off calculation for the 
year ended 31 March 1972 (Table 04)
(l/15th of 27,269,000) 4 35
Amounts which would have been written off those amounts 
transferred from fixed assets during the year ended 
31 March 1973 (notes 2 and 3)
(l/15th of 238,275,000) 2.552
Amounts which would have been written off for the year 
ended 31 March 1973 if the accounting base had not
been changed 7,078
Amount actually written off (BGC's published accounts 
for the year ended 31 March 1973, p 34) 11.605
Increase in amount written off due to the change of
accounting base . 4.527
(1) It has been assumed that the amounts which would have been written 
off to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1972 if the accounting 
base had not been changed would also have been written off to 
revenue for the year ended 31 March 1973 if the accounting base had 
not been changed. This seems reasonable as prior to the change of 
accounting base the amounts written off to revenue were to be
calculated on a straight-line basis.
(2) The amounts transferred from fixed assets during the year ended 31 
March 1973 were obtained from the comparative figures for the 
previous year included in Note 13 to the BGC's published accounts
■for the year ended 31 March 1974. These amounts were not disclosed 
in the notes to the BGC's published accounts for the year ended 31
March 1973.
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(3) It has been assumed that all amounts transferred from fixed assets
during the year ended 31 March 1973 would all have been subject to
the same write-off treatment, so that the inconsistencies between 
the Area Boards would have been eliminated. This is consistent with 
Note 1 to the published accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 
March 1973 which stated that :
Adoption of the accounting policies described in Note 2 on a 
consistent basis throughout the Corporation has resulted in several 
changes being made in the accounting policies previously followed by 
Area Boards. It has been' necessary to re-assess the amortisation 
period for the balances of displaced plant ....
It is for this reason that it has been assumed that l/15th would 
have been written off all amounts transferred from fixed assets 
during the year ended 31 March 1973.
As can be seen from the calculations above the additional amounts
written off to revenue during the year ended 31 March 1973 due to the
accelerated amortisation of displaced plant totalled 24,527,000. Thus 
this change of accounting base had the effect of decreasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 and the net assets at 31 March 
1973 by 24,527,000.
Year ended 31 March 1974
The effect of the accelerated amortisation of displaced plant for 
the year ended 31 March 1974 was calculated as follows :
2QQ6
Amounts which would have been written off for the year 
ended 31 March 1973 if the accounting base had not  ^gyg
been changed (note 1) ’
Amounts which would have been written off (those amounts 
transferred from fixed assets during the year 
March 1974 less the proceeds of sale of plant appll^ 
to reduce the unamortlsed balance of displaced pi
during the year ended 31 March 1974 (note 2) . pgg
(l/15th of 271,258,000 - 29,936,000) îljieô
29.949
Amount actually written off (note 3)
Increase in amount written off due to change of 18,783
accounting base
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(1) It has been assumed that the amounts which would have been written
off to revenue for the year ended 31 March 1973 if the accounting 
base had not been changed would also have been written off to 
revenue for the year ended 31 March 1974 if the accounting base had 
not been changed. This seems reasonable as prior to the change of 
accounting base the amounts written off to revenue were to be 
calculated on a straight-line basis.
(2) The amounts transferred from fixed assets during the year ended 31
March 1974 and the proceeds of sale of plant applied to reduce the 
unamortised balance of displaced plant during the year ended 31
March 1974 were obtained from Note 13 to the BGC's published 
accounts for the year ended 31 March 1974.
(3) The amount actually written off displaced plant during the year
ended 31 March 1974 was obtained from Note 13 to the BGC's 
published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1974.
As can be seen from the calculations above the additional amounts 
written off to revenue during the year ended 31 March 1974 due to the 
accelerated amortisation of displaced plant totalled 218,783,000. Thus 
this change of accounting base had the effect of decreasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 and the net assets at 31 March
1974 by £13,783,000.
The calculation of the cumulative effect on net assets is shown
overleaf :
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Increase in amount written off displaced plant
during the year ended 31 March 1972 2 3.009.062
Decrease in net assets at 31 March 1972 2 3,009,062
Increase in amount written off displaced plant
during the year ended 31 March 1973 2 4.527.000
Decrease in net assets at 31 March 1973 2 7,536,062
Increase in amount written off displaced plant
during the year ended 31 March 1974 218.783.000
Decrease in net assets at 31 March 1974 226,319,062
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Table Cl ; Amounts w ritten  o ff  displaced plant for the year
ended 31 March 1972
Area Board 
(note 1)
Total 
amounts 
written off 
(note 2)
Additional 
amounts 
written off 
(note 3)
Amounts 
which would 
have been 
written off 
(note 4)
East Midlands 970,403 641,000 329,403
Eastern 547,000 241,000 306,000
North Eastern - - —
North Thames 1,232,000 252,000 980,000
North Western 786,725 175,530 611,195
Northern 65,737 21,912 43,825
Scottish 365,863 128,037 237,826
South Eastern 1,422,000 855,000 567,000
South Western 324,000 108,000 216,000
Southern 575,000 191,667 383,333
Wal es 382,552 143,916 238,636
West Midlands 379,000 251,000 128,000
7,050,280 3,009,062 4,041,218
Notes to Table Cl
(1) All the Area Boards had a displaced plant account in their 
published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1972 except 
the North Eastern Gas Board.
(2) The total amounts written off displaced plant were obtained 
from the notes to the published accounts of the relevant 
Area Boards for the year ended 31 March 1972.
(3) The additional amounts written off displaced plant were 
obtained from the notes to the published accounts of the 
relevant Area Boards for the year ended 31 March 1972 
except in the cases of the Northern Gas Board, the South 
Western Gas Board and the Southern Gas Board. These three 
Area Boards had no entries for displaced plant in their 
published accounts for the year ended 31 March 1971 and 
consequently the adoption during the year ended 31 March 1972
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of the accounting policy of writing off the unamortised 
balance on the displaced plant account by 1981 did not 
represent a change of accounting base. Presumably for 
that reason these Area Boards did not quantify and 
disclose the effect of writing off the displaced plant 
by 1981 instead of writing it off on the basis used by the 
other Area Boards up to 31 March 1971. As the researcher 
was interested in the effect of the change of accounting 
base on the gas industry as a whole he calculated the 
additional charge for these three Area Boards. The 
researcher estimated that the additional change represented 
one third of the total amount written off to revenue for 
these three Area Boards for the year ended 31 March 1972. 
This estimate was based on the increase in the percentage 
write off due to the change in accounting base as shown 
below :
Percentage write off for the year ended
31 March 1972 (1/10th) 10.00?;
Percentage write off if the accounting base
had not been changed (l/15th) 6.67%
Increase in percentage write off due to the
change in accounting base 3.33?o
Thus one third of the total amount written off would appear 
to be due to the change in accounting base.
4) The amounts which would have been written off if the
accounting base had not been changed were calculated by 
deducting the additional amounts written off due to the 
change of accounting base from the total amounts written 
off.
— 104 —
II
S S
- >. -a
c -o
5 c
3
Ij "O
il
(w CD CO CD ^
3  CM ®Or» — £ as 4J
ill
a 2 ® "O * ^
S Z ^2 S ^(j k- ® a u ®c o jz -n en
a = CM n o r~
2 11
■§ 3
il
- 105 -
Il
11 p
* 3
11
5 © il
11
o -a n ®
In a H a
II
I § 3 cv
I I c a
3 2%S a
s o c I
® ç 5 "i
fcu o n ç
1 1
J3
CM 0)
g) 5
111
âsls -U
3
Ë 3 3
— 1 o6 —
Table CA
Calculation of the amounts not included in the calculations
of the amounts written off to revenue for the year ended
31 March 1972
Area Board 
(note 1)
Amount 
written off 
(note 2)
Amounts on 
which write-off 
calculation 
based 
(note 3)
Balances at 
31 March 1972 
before write-off 
(note 4)
Amounts not 
included in 
calculation 
(note 5)
Eastern 547 5,470 7,041 1,571
North Thames 1,232 12,322 13,651 1,329
North Western 787 7,868 10,314 2,446
South Eastern 1,422 14,220 15,407 1,187
South Western 324 3,240 3,976 756
7,269
Notes to Table C4
(1 ) The o n ly  Area Boards in c lu d ed  in  Table C4 are  those which d id  not base t h e ir  
c a lc u la t io n  o f th e  amounts to  be w r itte n  o f f  to  revenue fo r  th e  year ended 
31 fterch 1972 on th e  balances on d isp laced  p la n t account a t  31 March 1972 
b e fo re  deduction o f  th e  amounts w r itte n  o f f  to  revenue.
(2 )  The amounts w r it te n  o f f  to  revenue were obtained from th e  notes to each .Area
B oard’ s pub lished  accounts fo r  the year ended 31 March 1972-
(3 )  For North Thames and North Western the w r i te - o f f  c a lc u la t io n  was based on th e
unamortised balances of displaced plant at 31 March 1971 (after restate«nt to 
in c lu d e  d isp laced  o il-b a s e d  p la n t fo rm erly  included in  d e fe rre d  charges account! 
which were obtained from the comparaüve figures at 31 March 1971 provided with 
each Area Board's balance sheet at 31 March 1972. For the other three Area 
Boards the amount on which the write-off calculaüon was based was assuwd to 
be ten times the amount written off to revenue as each of these Area Boards 
claim ed to  be w r it in g  d isp la ced  p la n t o f f  by 19E1.
(4) The balances at 31 March 1972 before d«tjcting the amounts written off to
revenue were ob ta ined  from Table C3.
(5  I n .  not in c lo d .0  in  t o .  - r t t . - o f f  c a ito la t io r .  for « 0 0  i r «  ar.
t o .  d r f f . r » > o .  t , . t . e »  t h .  o a lan c .s  a t 31 «arcn 1972 o . f o r .  o f  t h .
reven u , u r ' . t e - o f f  and t n .  amounts on wbieh each Board's w i t e - o f f  -as 
c a lc u la te d .
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AEPEIDIY T)
ACCQÜHII1G CHOICES KADE DURIIG .THE YEAR EJDBn MAPr.w 
lBtrûdü.atloa
The discretionary accounting choices made in the published accounts 
of the BGC during the year ended 31 March 1973 are identified below.
The accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1973 
affected not only the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 but 
ilso the net suiplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 (the last year of 
the quinquennium). Similarly not only did these accounting choices affect
the net assets at 31 March 1973 they also affected the net assets at 31
March 1974.
The effect of each accounting choice on the net surpluses for the 
years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 and on the net assets at 31 
March 1973 and 31 March 1974 have been ascertained from the published 
accounts of the BGC for the years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 
or, where this has not been possible, calculated as explained below. The 
effects on the net surplus for each year are shown on Table D1 and the 
effects on the net assets at the end of each year are shown on Table D2.
Balance of compensation written off as an extraordiaary itea
To understand the background to the above it is necessary to refer
back to the date of nationalisation, 1 May 1949. At that date assets and
liabilities from over 1000 undertakings were transferred to the public 
sector (Williams, 1981, p 115). These undertakings were of a diverse 
nature as the First Report of the Gas Council (1950, para 62) pointed
out:
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Humber of
Undertaklngfi
Statutory Undertakings 
Local Authorities 
Companies 
Hon-Statutory Undertakings
-337
L m .
The Gas Council had to decide what basis should be used to provide 
the opening entries for fixed assets (para 272). Four bases were 
considered :
(a) A new valuation
(b) Original cost less an appropriate estimated depreciation 
provision to vesting date
(c) Effective cost to Area Boards, related to compensation payable
(d) Het book values as shown by the final audited accounts of 
the former undertakings.
The Gas Council decided that (d) was the most appropriate (para 272).
The "Balance of Compensation" entries arose as a result of the above 
decision. Any difference between the net book values of the total net 
assets in the final audited accounts of the former undertakings and the 
compensation payable to shareholders, together with that for severance
payable to local authorities had to be shown as a separate item in the
Balance Sheets of the Area Boards and described as "Balance of
Compensation" (para 275). This item was to be written off by equal
annual instalments over a period not exceeding 90 years (para 284). This 
process continued until 31 March 1973 at which point the unamortised 
balance of £4,686,000 was written off to revenue [Note 2(j) and Hote 10 
to the published accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1973].
Examination of the published accounts of the Area Boards at 31
March 1972 established that only five of the Boards still had unamortised
- 112-
balances an thalr «Balance of Ca»pensatlan« accaunte. Theae were as 
follows :
Area Board
Unamortlsed balance 
on Balance of 
Compensation Account 
at 31 March 1972 
 IQM________
Horth Eastern 353
South Eastern 3 qqq
South Western ' 34
Southern 3^2
Wales 462
Consolidated Accounts 4 ,7 ^^
Examination of the published accounts of these five Area Boards for
three years ended on 31 March 1972 established the amoui
to revenue by these Area Boards as follows ;
Amounts written off to revenue
Area Board 1970 1971 1972
North Eastern 10,000 10,000 10,000
South Eastern 71,683 72,000 72,000
South Western 1,000 1,000 1,000
Southern 14,000 14,000 14,000
Vales 6.914 6.914 . 6 .2 U
103ÆSZ_ 103.914 _ 103.914
The same amount appeared to have been written off to revenue during 
the year ended 31 March 1973 as the figures below indicate.
fOQQ
Unamortised balance at 31 March 1972 (Consolidated 
Balance Sheet of the Gas Council and Area Boards 
at 31 March 1972)
Unamortised balance at 31 March 1973 prior to being 
written off as an Extraordinary item (Mote 10 to 
the published accounts of the BGC for the year 
ended 31 March 1973)
Amount written off during year ended 31 March 1973
105
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The difference between the amount calculated above as having been 
written off during the year ended 31 March 1973 and the amounts written 
off during the years ended 31 March 1971 and 31 March 1972 was 
presumably due to rounding off to the nearest thousand pounds for balance 
sheet purposes. It seems reasonable to conclude that the exact amount 
actually written off during the year ended 31 March 1973 was £103,914. 
It also seems reasonable to conclude that £103,914 would have been 
written off during the year ended 31 March 1974 if the unamortised 
balance had not been written off as an extraordinary item during the year 
ended 31 March 1973.
The effect of that change of accounting base can now be calculated 
as follows :
1973 1974
Amounts actually written off
Annual amount written off 103,914 Mil
Unamortised balance written off 
as extraordinary item 4,686 SÜ
4,789.911 Mil
Amounts which would have been 
written off prior to the change
Increase (decrease) in amount
written off due to the change IB .««6,000 <103.914).
accounting base
This accounting choice had the effect of (a) decreasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 Karch 1973 and the net assets at 31 March 
1973 by £4,636,000 and of <b) Increasing both the net surplus 
year ended 31 March 1974 and the net assets at 31 March 1974 by
£103,914.
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The cumulative effect on the net assets at 31 Karch 1974 was a
decrease of £4,582,086 (£4,686,000 - £103,914).
Unamortlaed— balance— on— pre-yes ting— fixed assets written nff «« «n
extraordinary item
Para 281 of the Gas Council (1950) report pointed out that :
In many of the older undertakings the absence of information on the
date of installation and costs of assets made it impossible to adopt 
a standard method of compouting depreciation applicable to both 
pre-vesting and post-vesting expenditure.
As a result pre-vesting and post-vesting assets were depreciated
separately and were shown separately in the balance sheets of each Area
Board. The Area Boards agreed that :
where it was impossible to ascertain the written-down costs of pre­
vesting assets, they would compute the provision for depreciation, 
on an average straight line basis, by reference to the estimated 
remaining serviceability of those assets as a whole (para 281).
The pre-vesting assets were depreciated on this basis by the Area
Boards until 31 March 1973 at which point the unamortised balance of
£2,027,000 was written off to revenue [Hote 2(j) and Hote 10 to the
published accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 19733-
Examination of the published accounts of the Area Boards at 31
March 1972 established that only four of the Boards still had unamortised
balances on pre-vesting fixed assets account. These were as follows
Unamortised balance on 
pre-vesting fixed assets 
at 31 March 1972
 ^  ^  ism------- -Area Board
10,682
Horth Thames  ^493
South Western ’ 339
Southern
Wales 12.769.
Consolidated Accounts
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Examination of the published accounts of these four Area Boards for 
the three years ended 31 Karch 1972 established the amounts written off 
to revenue by these Area Boards as follows ;
Amounts written off to revenueArea. Board
Horth Thames 
South Western 
Southern 
Vales
1,009,000 1,009,000
----.
1,009,000
313,000 309,000 303,000
314,000 286,000 185,000
.278,410 .278,410 ...2.78,410
1,9.14,410-- L882.410 1.775,410
On the basis of the above information the amounts written off to 
revenue for the years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 are 
estimated as follows :
Area Board
Estimated amount written 
off to revenue
Horth Thames (note 1) 1,009,000 1,009,000
South Western (note 2) 295,000 285,000
Southern (note 3) 185,000 184,000
Wales (note 4) 225,000. -
1,714.000 1.478.00D
(3)
(1 ) Estimates for the Horth Thames Gas Board for 1973 and 1974 are 
identical to the actual amounts written off for 1970, 1971 and 1972.
(2 ) Estimates for the South Western Gas Board for 1973 and 1974 reflect 
the same decreasing trend as do the actual amounts written off for 
1970, 1971 and 1972.
Estimates for the Southern Gas Board for 1973 and 1974 are 
approximately equal to the amount written off during the year en e 
31 March 1972 and are exactly sufficient to write-off balance of 
pre-vesting fixed assets to zero by 31 March 1974.
The estimate for the Wales Gas Board for 1973 is exactly su«lcient 
to write off the balance of pre-vestlng assets
1973, The amount written off during the year ended 31 March 1972 
(£278,410) was greater than the unamortised balance of £225,000 at
31 March 1972.
(4)
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The effect of the change of accounting base can now be calculated as
follows :
1573. 1974
Amounts actually written off
Estimated amount written off (note 1) 1,714,000
Unamortised balance written off as 
extraordinary item 2.027.000
Hil
m
3^ A1,Q0Q Sli
Amounts which would have been written 
off prior to the change of accounting 
base
Estimated amounts written off 
(see above) 1.714.000 1.476.000
Increase (decrease) in amount 
written off due to the change in
accounting base 2,027,000 (1,478.000)
(1) It has not been possible to confirm the amount written off to
revenue during the year ended 31 March 1973 as insufficient 
information was provided in the published accounts of the BGC for 
the year ended on that date. Consequently the amount estimated has 
been used instead.
This accounting choice had the effect of (a) decreasing both the net 
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 and the net assets at 31 March 
1973 by £2,027,000 and of (b) increasing both the net surplus for the
year ended 31 March 1974 and the net assets at 31 March 1974 by
£1,478,000.
The cumulative effect on the net assets at 31 March 1974 was a 
decrease of £549,000 (£2,027,000 - £1,478,000).
Accelerated amnrtisatloB nf riAferred rbariTfs ; convprs1nTi t,n natural gaa 
For each year up to and including the year ended 31 March 1972 
during which conversion costs were Incurred the Gas Council Instr 
the Area Boards to write off these costs to revenue on a 15 year straight
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Une basis commencing In the year in which the expenditure was Incurred. 
This Instruction Is described In the notes to the published accounts of 
the relevant Area Boards. For Instance, note 12 to the published 
accounts of the Horth Thames Gas Board for the year ended 31 March 1972 
stated that :
In accordance with the recommendations of the Gas Council the costs 
incurred in each financial year are being written off by equal 
annual instalments over a period of 15 years.
However, note 1 (e) to the BGC's published accounts for the year
ended 31 March 1973 stated that ;
Expenditure incurred on converting systems and customers' appliances 
to natural gas during 1972/73 and subsequent years is being written 
off in seven equal annual instalments. The unamortised balance of 
conversion expenditure incurred up to 1 April 1972 will be written 
off in equal annual instalments so that amortisation is completed by 
the same date as that appropriate to post 1 April 1972 expenditure 
in the same Region.
This change of accounting base had the effect of decreasing Income 
for the year ended 31 March 1973 by approximately £11,125,000 calculated 
as follows :
IQM
248,046
76.668
324.714
Conversion costs incurred up to 31 March 1972 (note 1)
Add : Conversion costs incurred during the year 
ended 31 March 1973 (note 2)
Conversion costs incurred up to 31 March 1973
Amount which would have been written off during the 
year ended 31 March 1973 if the accounting base a 
not been changed (l/15th of £324,714,000)
Amount actually written off during the yèar ended ^2.773
31 March 1973 (note 3)
Increase in amount written off during the year ^ndW 11 j 25
31 March 1973 due to the change in accounting
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(1) The conversion costs incurred up to 31 March 1972 were obtained
from the Consolidated Balance Sheet at 31 March 1972 of the Gas 
Council and the Area Boards.
(2) The conversion costs incurred during the year ended 31 March 1973 
were obtained from the comparative figures for the previous year 
Included in Hote 14 to the published accounts of the BGC for the 
year ended 31 March 1974. This information was not disclosed in 
the notes to the BGC's published accounts for the year ended 31
March 1973.
(3) The amount actually written off during the year ended 31 March 1973
was obtained from Schedule 1 (page 34) to the published accounts of
the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1973 and from Hote 14 (1974).
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the net
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 and the net assets at 31 March
1973 by £11,125,000.
Year ended 31 March 19.7A
The effect of the accelerated amortisation of deferred charges for 
the year ended 31 March 1974 was calculated as follows :
£ Q M
Conversion costs incurred up to 
31 March 1973 (see above) 324,714
Add : Conversion costs incurred during
the year ended 31 March 1974 (note 1) 81,2^ 3.
Conversion costs incurred up to 31 March 1974 406,007
Amount which would have been written off 
during the year ended 31 March 1974 if the 
accounting base had not been changed
(l/15th of £406,007,000) '
Amount actually written off during the year 
ended 31 March 1974 (note 1)
Increase in amount written off during the 
year ended 31 March 1974 due to the change 17 564
in accounting base
the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1974.
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This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the net
surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 and the net assets at 31 March 
1974 by £17,564,000.
The cumulative effect on net assets at 31 March 1974 was calculated 
as follows ;
Increase in amount written off during the year
ended 31 March 1973 £11.125.000
Decrease in net assets at 31 March 1973 £11,125,000
Increase In amount written off during year
ended 31 March 1974 17.564,000
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1974 £28.689,000
Accelerated amortisation of loan expenses
The balance sheet of the Gas Council at 31 March 1970 included 
amounts totalling £32,142,000 described as "Deutsche Mark Bearer Bonds" 
and an amount of £1,678,000 described as "Discount, issue expenses and 
revaluation of Deutsche Mark Bearer Bonds". The backgrounds to these 
entries was described in Motes 19 and 21 to the Gas Council's published 
accounts as shown below.
Deutsche Mark Bearer Bonds
19. In April 1969 the Council made a public issue of DM 200 
million 6M% Bearer Bonds 1969/84 at 99 per cent and a private 
placement of DM 100 million 6M% Bearer Bonds 1969/79 at 99)4%. 
The DM 200 million Bonds are guaranteed by Her Majesty's 
Treasury as to payment of interest, principal and premium on 
redemption (if any). In addition the DM 200 million Bonds 
are guaranteed against fluctuations in exchange rates whereas 
the DM 100 million Bonds are not so guaranteed. Provision 
has been made for the loss arising from the revaluation of 
the Deutsche Mark in October 1969 in respect of the DM 100 
million Bonds.
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BlacQunt, nn ,ti-br ffrrlr......Bonds
21. This item consists of
Discount on bonds 
Subscription commission 
Capital stamp duty 
Provision for loss on 
revaluation (Hote 19)
Public Private
Issue -issue Total
£ £ £
207,577 78,596 286,173
518,941 130,993 649,934
52,083 52,083
_ 904.901 904.901
726,518 1,166,573 1,893,091
Less : amount written off 
(Schedule Ho 1) ■.69.192 145.822 215.014
As per Balance Sheet 657.326 1.020.751 1.678.077
The amount written off (£215,014) is on the basis of the life 
of the loans adjusted to take account of the varying dates of 
redemption.
In the balance sheet of the Gas Council at 31 March 1971 the title 
of the expenses item was changed to "Foreign Loan Expenses" and the 
amount was reduced to £1,463,063 by a write off to revenue of £215,014 
(Hote 22 to the published accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended 
31 March 1971). During the year ended 31 March 1971 the Gas Council 
arranged further foreign loans amounting to £36,095,000 (Hote 20 to the 
published accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended 31 March 1971). 
These loans were guaranteed by HM Treasury as to payment of interest and 
capital as well as against fluctuations in exchange rates (Hote 20). The 
expenses involved in arranging these loans were not transferred to the
foreign loan expenses account.
In the balance sheet of the Gas Council at 31 March 1972 foreign 
loan expenses were shown at £2,092,000 after a write off to revenue of 
£436,000 (note 18 to the published accounts of the Gas Council for the 
year ended 31 March 1972). Mote 16 to these published accounts contained
the following information ;
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Foreign Loans
16. During the year the Council arranged a foreign loan of 200
Billion Swiss Francs (£20,070,000) which Is guaranteed by HM
Treasury as to payment of Interest, principal and fluctuations 
in exchange rates.
As a result of the revaluation of the Deutsche Mark in 
December 1971, the Council's potential liability on the DM 100 
million loan increased by £525,000. This is reflected in the 
foreign loan liability. The amount will be written off over 
the remaining life of the loan.
Hote 8 to the published accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31
March 1973 disclosed the change of accounting policy as follows :
Adoption of a revised treatment of loan expenses, including exchange 
conversion differences on certain foreign currency loans, results in 
the charge for interest payable in the profit and loss account
including £844,000 relating to 1971/72 and £1,248,000 relating to 
earlier years.
Thus the unamortised balances of foreign loan expenses at 31 March 
1972 were completely written off during the year ended 31 March 1973. 
As foreign loan expenses did not appear in the balance sheets of the BGC 
at either 31 March 1973 nor at 31 March 1974 it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the "revised treatment" mentioned in Hote 8 above is to 
write off loan expenses as they are incurred.
The Financial Survey attached to the published accounts of the BGC
for the year ended 31 March 1973 (pp 13-14 ) stated that a foreign loan 
amounting to $20 million or £10.5 million had been raised at the end of 
March 1973. This loan was repayable after five years and was subject to 
Treasury cover of exchange risks. The expenses involved in arranging
this loan were not disclosed.
The Financial Survey attached to the published accounts of the BGC
for the year ended 31 March 1974 (p 13) stated that two loans had been
raised on the Eurodollar market totalling £120 million. The first was a
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private loan of *30 million (£12.4 million) raised from two Japanese 
banks and which was repayable after five years. The second loan 
amounted to *250 million (£107.5 million) and was repayable after seven 
years (Gas World, 8 December 1973, p 391). Both dollar loans were 
subject to Treasury cover of exchange risks. The expenses Involved In 
arranging these loans were not disclosed.
In order to estimate the effect of the change of accounting base on
the profit for the year ended 31 March 1973 and on the profit for the 
year ended 31 March 1974 it was necessary to estimate the foreign loan 
expenses incurred during these two years. This was done by :
(1) investigating the relationship between the size of the foreign loans 
raised and the size of the foreign loan expenses incurred during the
years ended 31 March 1970 and 31 March 1972.
(2) assuming that approximately the same relationship as that 
ascertained in (1) would have existed between the size of the 
foreign loans raised and the size of the foreign loan expenses 
incurred during the years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974. 
When investigating (1) above the provisions for exchange losses
were excluded from foreign loan expenses as all foreign loans raised 
during the years ended 31 March 1973 and 31 March 1974 were subject to
Treasury cover for exchange risks.
The relationship between the size of the foreign loans raised and 
the size of the foreign loan expenses incurred was calculated as a
percentage as follows :
PnrfjgT) Tnan expenses X
Foreign loan ^
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Year ended 31 March 1970 (note 1)
<1.893.091 - 9 M ,901). x m i  = — 588.09a x 100 = 3.1%
142,000 1 32,142,000 1
Year ended 31 March 1972 (note 2)
 5AQ.QQ0 X iûû. - o 7»L
20,070,000 1 "
(1) The foreign loan expenses figures were obtained from Hote 21 to the 
published accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended 31 March 
1970 and the foreign loan figure from the balance sheet of the Gas 
Council at 31 March 1970.
(2) The foreign loan expenses incurred during the year ended 31 March
1972 were calculated as shown below. The foreign loan figure was
obtained from Hote 16 to the published accounts of the Gas Council
for the year ended 31 March 1972.
Calculation of loan e%enses incurred during the year ended 31 March 1972 
oa_.Swiss loan of £20.Cf70.000
Amount written off to revenue (Hote 18 to the published 
accounts of the Gas Council for the year ended
31 March 1972) £436,000
Amount written off DM Bearer Bonds each year (Hote 21 
to the published accounts of the Gas Council for the 
year ended 31 March 1970 and Hote 22 to the 
published accounts of the Gas Council for the year 
ended 31 March 1971) 215,000
221,000
Unamortised balance relating to year ended 
31 March 1972 (Hote 8 to the published accounts for 
the year ended 31 March 1973) 844,00.0.
Amount transferred to Foreign Loan Expenses during 
year ended 31 March 1972 1,065,000
Less ; Increased provision for exchange loss on 
the DM 100 million loan (Hote 16 to the
ghe'y:a:\:d%"3f *lrch'l972) ' 525
'-3 ! \l% n 9 7 2 '% " ^  Sw Tis*lo\\" oTL0“ 07t000
On the basis of the above calculations it seems reasonable to
calculate the loan expenses incurred during the years ended 31 March 1973 
and 31 March 1974 on the basis of 3% of the loans raised during these
years.
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Estimated
loan
expenses -
Year ended 31 March 1Q73 38 of loan
5 year loan" 10,500,000 315,000
Year ended 31 March 1974
5 year loan 12,400,000 372,000
7 year loan 107,500,000 3,225,000
The effect of the change of accounting base can now be calculated as 
follows :
Amounts actually written off
2 M 1  i m
Unamortised balances at 31 March 1972 
(Hote 8 to the published accounts of 
the BGC for the year ended 31 March 
1973) 2,092,000
Estimated loan expenses incurred during 
the year ended 31 March 1973 as above 315,000
Estimated loan expenses incurred during 
the year ended 31 March 1974 as above
5 year loan 372,000
7 year loan   3.225.000
2.407.000
Amounts which would have been written.. 
off prior to the change of accounting.. 
bass.
On unamortised balances at 31 March 1972 
(Hote 18 to the published accounts of
31%ifch"l972V 436,000 436,000
On loan expenses incurred during the
63,000 63,000
On loan expenses incurred during the 
year ended 31 March 1974
(l/5th of £372,000) " JX'yiA
(l/7th of £3,225,000) ,o q ;oô ô 1 .oT . V iT
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Thus this accounting choice had the effect of :
(a) decreasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 and the
net assets at 31 March 1973 by £1,908,000 and
<b) decreasing the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 and the
net assets at 31 March 1974 by £2,562,886.
The cumulative effect on the net assets at 31 March 1974 has been 
calculated as follows :
Increase in amount written off during the year
ended 31 March 1973 £1.908.000
Decrease in net assets at 31 March 1973 £1,908,000
Increase in amount written off during the year
ended 31 March 1974 2.562.886.
Cumulative decrease in net assets at 31 March 1974 £4,470,886.
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afpeidiy R
ACCQgS Î ISû CHOICES MADE DUR If G THE YEAR HIDED 31 HAT?r.H 1974 
Iûtrûdu£tiQa
The discretionary accounting choices made in the published accounts 
of the BGC during the year ended 31 March 1974 are identified below.
The effect of each accounting choice on the net surplus for the year
ended 31 March 1974 and on the net assets at 31 March 1974 have been
ascertained from the published accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 
March 1974 or, where this has not been possible, calculated as explained 
below. The effects on the net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 
are shown on Table El and the effects on the net assets at 31 March 1974
are shown on Table E2.
Changes in various dépréciât ion, rataa
Hote 4 (1974) stated that :
From 1 April 1973 the Corporation's depreciation rates were revised 
to those shown in Hote 1(c). The charge for depreciation of £113.0 
million is £9.2 million greater than it would have been had the 
previous rates been applied.
These changes in depreciation rates had the effect of decreasing both the 
net surplus for the year ended 31 March 1974 and the net assets at 31 
March 1974 by £9.2 million.
Sm-capitalisatioTi nf overheads.
Hote 2(b) (1973) stated that in relation to fixed assets constructed by
the BGC cost included "related works and administrative overheads". But 
Hote 2(b) (1974) stated that in the case of fixed assets constructed by
the Corporation only direct expenditure was included in cost. Hote 
4(1974) expanded on this change by stating that :
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£3.7 million of expenditure which would have formed part of the cost 
of fixed assets on the basis used in previous yeaurs has been 
charged against the trading profit of the year to 31 March 1974 
following a review of the basis of overhead capitalisation.
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing both the net surplus
for the year ended 31 March 1974 and the net assets at 31 March 1974 by
£3.7 million.
Depreciation saved on non-capitalisation of overheads
The non-capitalisation of overheads discussed in the previous 
section meant that there was a saving in depreciation in the year ended 
31 March 1974. Insufficient information was published for the researcher 
to identify the fixed asset categories into which these overheads would 
have been allocated. Therefore the researcher decided to calculate the 
depreciation saved on the non-capitalisation of overheads on the basis 
that these amounts would have been depreciated at the average 
depreciation rate for the year. The average rate was calculated as 
follows :
Average depreciation rate for the year ended 31 March 1974
Total depreciation for the year
= __________ ended 31 March 1924-----  ^
Total fixed assets at 31 March 1974 1
= 108.3m (note II x
1,918.5m (note 1) 1
= 5 ^
(1) Obtained from Schedule 3 to the published accounts of the BGC for 
the year ended 31 March 1974
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The depreciation saved on the non-capitalisation of overheads can 
now be calculated as 5.6% of i3.7 million which is i207,200. This saving 
in depreciation had the effect of increasing both the net surplus for the 
year ended 31 March 1974 and the net assets at 31 March 1974 by 
2207,200.
Reduction of hire purchase interest earned
Mote 7(1974) stated that :
From 1 April 1973 the method of release of hire purchase interest
to revenue was standardised in all Regions. The result was to 
reduce by 2928,000 the amount of 'Interest on hire purchase and 
similar transactions' which would have been included on the previous 
basis.
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net surplus for 
the year ended 31 March 1974 and the net assets at 31 March 1974 by 
2928,000,
Inble El
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended.31 March 1974. on
the reported net surplus for that Year
Changes in various deprec rates 
Non-capitalisation of overheads
.InciL__________ Dscr
9.200.000
3.700.000
Deprec saved on non-capitalisation
of overheads 207,200
Reduction of hire purchase interest ooo
207,200 13,828,000
207.20a 
13.620.80a
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lable .E2
Kffect of accounting choices made during the year ended 31 March 1974_ qil 
the reported capital employed at the end of that year
Changes in various deprec rates
Non-capitalisation of overheads
Deprec saved on non-capitalisation 
of overheads
Reduction of hire purchase interest 
earned
_lncr_ Deer
9.200.000
3.700.000
207,200
928.QQO..
207,200 13,828,000
207.200
13.620.800
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APPElDTï h
The financial target set for the gas industry for the quinquennium
ended on 31 March 1974 was to earn a net return (surplus and interest
but excluding depreciation) of 7 per cent on average capital employed
during the five-year period (Gas Council, Annual Report and Accounts for
the year ended 31 March 1970, p 21).
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, p 104) point out that :
most accounting technique choices are timing choices because they 
shift revenues or expenses among periods, without altering total
revenue and expenses over these periods. Thus, the increase -
decrease dichotomisation does not fully reflect the decision being 
made.
Over the life of an accounting entity these timing differences will 
make no difference to the total income reported. However, over a
relatively short period of time, such as a quinquennium, this may not be 
the case.
Consequently, it was decided to investigate the effect of the 
accounting choices made during the quinquennium on the reported outcomes 
for each remaining year of the quinquennium. Calculations were made of 
not only the effect of each accounting choice on the net surplus or
deficit for the year in which the accounting choice was made but also the 
effect on the net surplus or deficit for each remaining year of the 
quinquennium. These calculations are shown in Appendices A to E. 
Calculations were made of not only the effect of each accounting choice 
on the net assets at the end of the year in which the accounting choice 
was made but also the effect on the net assets at the end of each
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remaining year of the quinquennium. These calculations are shown in
Appendices A to E.
In this Appendix the net surplus for each year and the capital 
employed at the end of each year are restated to what they would have 
been if the accounting choices made during each year of the quinquennium 
had not been made. The effect of these accounting choices on the 
reported return on average capital employed for each year is then
calculated.
The restatement of the surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970 is 
shown on Table FI, the restatement of the capital employed at 31 March
1970 is shown on Table F2 and the restatement of the return on average 
capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1970 is shown on Table F3.
The restatement of the surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971 is
shown on Table F4, the restatement of the capital employed at 31 March
1971 is shown on Table F5 and the restatement of the return on average 
capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1971 is shown on Table F6.
The restatement of the surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972 is
shown on Table F7, the restatement of the interest charge for the year 
ended 31 March 1972 is shown on Table F8, the restatement of the capital 
employed at 31 March 1972 on Table F9 and the restatement of the return 
on average capital employed for the year ended 31 March 1972 is shown on 
Table FIO.
The restatement of the surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 is
shown on Table Fll, the restatement of the Interest charge for the year
ended 31 March 1973 is shown on Table F12, the restatement of the
capital employed at 31 March 1973 is shown on Table F13 and the
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restatement of the return on average capital employed for the year ended
31 March 1973 is shown on Table F14.
The restatement of the deficit for the year ended 31 March 1974 is 
shown on Table F15, the restatement of the interest charge for the year 
ended 31 March 1974 is shown on Table F16, the restatement of the 
capital employed at 31 March 1974 is shown on Table F17 and the 
restatement of the return on average capital employed for the year ended 
31 March 1974 is shown on Table F18.
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Table FI
Restatement of surplus for the year ended 31 March 1970
Reported surplus
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table All)
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices 
made during the year ended 31 March 1970
£000
13,749
(1,435)
12,314
Table F2
Restatement of capital employed at 31 March 1970
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1970
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table A12)
Restated capital employed after adjusting for accounting 
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970
£000
1,657,954
10,993
1,668,947
-  137 -
KN
T3A) Pi
TD COC A)o X
Pi A)CO4)> Pi
OJC P.
■oCT #C X•H oPi f—1
3 aNO gA)
■o 1<0 CO
a
cn Q.A) to
U u•Ho A)
.r Oi
u CDPi(7 «C >•H CO
c
3 sou cu PiCB 3.p)A) A)
r k
NOP- A)
o P#O
u o.A) A)P. kP-
A* A)nA) PJ.Cpj g
P-
o O
Ç On3 V—M JCCO o1—1 P i
3U 1
(0o m
p j
c
A)
3  8
(0 U  "O
3  H C
— J o A)
T5 .C
CD U P
CO
P  O I A)
A) C X O
PJ H r~
P . p j A) ON
CD C r  r -
3 P> <33 cs CM r** On
"o 5 ■C kA p>* fA <33
A) a C  Ü ON rA (N 03 ON 03
PJ u •p  p
(0 @ eg r~ CM O CM 03 A
p> A) z  a 03 o 03 VÛ r~
CO P "o a r * NO A
A) O
g s a(K  P - f - f -
NO
"O A)
A) jC
PJ CO 03 On r«* CSi >o- fA
P  H CO kA < r O fA lA On
O  ^ p i ON 03 ON fA
C
3 A» r \ CM <3
p  a 3  o 03 T— o <33 A r "
Ü  o 1— NO A
CO c Ü  a
^  -H (0 w
a?
<T
\0
w\
\0
COA3(0
U. Oa
A3 p3n aCD3— piA3
A3 ONA3 PCO COpi
P 1-4
CO <0A3 •HX Üc
p 2o cp. p.
CO
3 1—1 a.
P
£
p
3 CCO P3
pi piA3 A3
Z cr
•H
Pi
e
IN
a
o
ON
j:
u
Pi
i
CO
•o
0)
>s
0r-i
1
(0
•H
8-
U
P i
3>s
ON
c
•H
P i
>\
O
CO
•H
Û.COa
0)
ONCO
k
<
T3D>\
O
a(0
Ü
u
ON<a
P i(U
>CO
co
c
P i
o4.)(U
oc
-  158 -
Table F4
Restatement of surplus for the year ended 31 March 1971
Reported surplus
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1971 (see Table B1)
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices_________________
made during the year ended 31 March 1971 2,894
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table All) (1,335)
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices------------- ----
made during the year ended 31 March 1970 1,559
Table F5
Restatement of capital employed at 31 March 1971
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1971 (see Table 82)
Restated cap ita l employed a fte r adjusting for accounting
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table A12)
£000
1,990
904
£000
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1971 1,868,238
887
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1971 1,869,125
620
Restated cap ita l employed a fte r adjusting for accounting
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 ' >
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Table F7
Restatement of surplus for the year ended 31 March 1972
£000
Reported surplus 15,119
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1972 (see Table C4) 7,665
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices--------------- -----
made during the year ended 31 March 1972 22,704
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1971 (see Table 81) 760
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices--------------- -----
made during the year ended 31 March 1971 23,544
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table All) (1,883)
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices--------------- -----
made during the year ended 31 March 1970 21,661
Table FB
Restatement of interest for the year ended 31 March 1972
. £000
Reported interest 124,782
Effect of accountino choices made during the year ended 237)
31 March 1972 (see Table C4) ’
Restated interest after adjusting for accounting choices
made during the year ended 31 March 1972 '
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Table F9
Restatement of capital employed at 31 March 1972
£000
Reported net assets at 31 March 1972 2,012,155
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1972 (see Table C5) 8,174
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting----------- -------
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1972 2,020,329
f Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended
31 March 1971 (see Table B2) 1,647
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting -------
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1971 2,021,976
Effect of accounting choices made during the yeaa ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table A12) 3,414
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 2,025,390
-  142 -
Table M O
Celculetion of the effect of the accounting choices made during the three years ended 
31 March 1972 on the reported return on avereqe capital employed for the year ended 
31 March 1972
As reported 
in published 
accounts
IÛOO
Restated after adjustment for accounting 
choices made in the:
year ended 
31 March 1972 
£000
2 years ended 
31 March 1972 
£000
3 years ended 
31 March 1972 
£000
Interest (see Table F8) 124,782 123,545 123,545 123,545
Net surplus for year 
(see Table F7) 15,119 22,784 23,544 21,661
Return for financial 
target purposes 139,901 146,329 147,089 145,206
Capital employed at 
1 April 1971 1,868,258 1,868,258 1,869,125 1,868,003
Capital employed at 
31 March 1972 
(see Table F9) 2,012,155 2,020,329 2,021,976 2,025,390
Average capital employed 
during year 1,940,206 1,944,293 1,945,550
1,946,696
Return on average capital 
employed during year 7.2% 7.5% 7.6ft
7.5%
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Table F il
Restatememt of the surplus for the year ended 31 March 1973 
Reported aurplus
c:
Table FI2
Restatement of interest for the year ended 31 March 1973
Reported interest
(r-
£000
5,600
Effect of accounting choices made during year ended 
31 March 1973 (see Table 01)
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices
made during the year ended 31 March 1973 25,346
Effect of accounting choices made during year ended 
31 March 1972 (see Table C4) 9,597
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices -----
made during the year ended 31 March 1972 34,943
Effect of accounting choices made Ajring year ended
31 March 1971 (see Table B1) 703
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices
made during the year ended 31 March 1971 35,646
Effect of accounting choices made during year ended
31 March 1970 (see Table All) (4,114)
Restated surplus after adjusting accounting choices
made during the year ended 31 March 1970 31,532
£000
143,213
Effect of accounting choices made ciiring year ended 403)
31 March 1972 (see Table C4) ’
Restated interest after adjusting for accounting 140,810
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1
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Table F13
Restatement of capital employed at 31 March 1973
£000
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1973 2,051,600
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1973 (see Table 02)
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting__________ _______
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1973 2,071,346
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1972 (see Table C5) 17,771
Restated cap ita l employed a fte r adjusting for the accounting ---------------
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1972 2,089,117
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1971 (see Table B2) 2,350
Restated c a p ita l employed a fte r adjusting for the accounting ---------------
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1971 2,091,467
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table A12) (4,664)
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting ~
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 2,086,803
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Table F I5
Restatement of d e fic it for the year ended 31 March i<?7a 
Reported d e fic it
Effect of accounting choices made during year ended 
31 March 1974 (see Table El)
Restatement of interest for the year ended 31 March 1974
Reported interest
£000
(41,500)
13,621
Restated deficit after adjusting for accounting choices________________ _____
made during the year ended 31 March 1974 (27,879)
Effect of accounting choices made during year ended 
31 March 1973 (see Table 01) 18,545
Restated deficit after adjusting for accounting choices
made during the year ended 31 March 1973 (9,334)
Effect of accounting choices made during year ended 
31 March 1972 (see Table C4) 24,219
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices---------------- -----
made during the year ended 31 March 1972 14,885
Effect of accounting choices made during year ended 
31 March 1971 (see Table 61) 991
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices
nade during the year ended 31 March 1971 15,876
Effect of accounting choices made during year ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table All) (2,035)
Restated surplus after adjusting for accounting choices
made during the year ended 31 March 1970 13,841
Table F16
£000
153,931
Effect of accounting choices made during the year er> (3,507)
31 March 1972 (see Table C4)
Reported interest after the accojnting choices made during IM.aza
the year ended 31 March 1972
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Table F I7
Restatement of capital employed at 31 March 1976
Reported capital employed at 31 March 1976
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1976 (see Table E2)
£000
2,106,500
13,621
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting______________ _______
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1976 2,120,121
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1973 (see Table 02) 38,291
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting-------------- -------
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1973 2,158,612
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1972 (see Table C5) 61,990
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting -------
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1972 2,200,602
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1971 (see Table 82) 3,361
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1971 2,203,763
Effect of accounting choices made during the year ended 
31 March 1970 (see Table A12)
Restated capital employed after adjusting for the accounting 
choices made during the year ended 31 March 1970 > >
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APPEHDH g
ACCQUBTIgG CHOICES MADE DURIffG THE YEAR rided 31 MARCH 107^
lji.tr.Qd.uctlQn
The discretionary accounting choices made in the published accounts 
of the BGC during the year ended 31 March 1975 are identified below.
The effect of each accounting choice on the net loss for the year 
ended 31 March 1975 has been ascertained from the published accounts of 
the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1975 or, where this has not been 
possible, calculated as explained below. The effects on the net loss for 
the year ended 31 March 1975 are shown on Table 01.
Accelerated ..amortisation of deferred charges : conversion to natural gas
Mote 3 (1975) stated that :
From 1st April 1974 the period of write-off being used for deferred 
charges : conversion to natural gas was revised to that shown in 
Note 1(e). The amount written off was f 16.6 million greater than it 
would have been had the previous basis been applied.
Note 1(e) titled "Deferred charges: conversion to natural gas" stated that
Expenditure incurred on converting systems and customers’ appliances 
to natural gas is being written off in five equal annual 
instalments. Prior to 1st April 1974 such expenditure was written 
off over approximately seven years.
This accounting choice had the effect of increasing the net loss for the 
year ended 31 March 1975 by £16,600,000.
Accelerated amortisation of displaced plaal
Note 1(d) (1974) stated that the unamortised balances of displaced plant 
"are being written off by equal annual instalments at rates sufficient to 
reduce the last of the individual balances to nil by 1980/81.
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Note 1(d) (1975) stated that the unamortlsed balances of displaced plant 
"are being written off in five equal annual instalments."
This would appear to accelerate by two years the amortisation of 
those items of displaced plant which would not have been written off 
until 31 March 1981. The effect of this accounting choice was not 
disclosed by the BGC. The researcher has attempted to estimate that 
effect as follows :
CaXQula.tiQn of the average rate of write-off for the year ended 31 March
£000
Unamortised balances at 31 March 1974 before deducting
amount written off for the year ended 31 March 1974 161,880
Amount written off for the year ended 31 March 1974 29,949
Average rate of write-off for the year ended 31 March 1974
29.x9.49.. X 100.
161,880 1 18.5%
Calculation of the effect of the accelerated amortisation of displaced 
plant during the year ended 31 March 19.75.
£000
Unamortised balances at 31 March 1975 before deducting
amount written off for the year ended 31 March 1975 186,404
Amount written off for the year ended 31 March 1975 38,265
Estimate of amount which would have been written off 
for the year ended 31 March 1975 if the accounting 
charge described above had not been made
18.5% of £186,404 '
Estimated increase in amount written off during the year 
ended 31 March 1975 due to the accounting change
Thus this accounting choice had the estimated effect of Increasing the 
net loss for the year ended 31 Haroh 1975 by 43,780,000.
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lable-Ol
Effect of the. aCQQUHtlag..chQlcee made during the year ended 31 March 
1Q75 on the reported net loss for the year ended 31 March 1975
Year ended 31 March 1975 
Effect on net loss
Accelerated amortisation of deferred charges: 
conversion to natural gas
Accelerated amortisation of displaced plant
16,600,000
3.780.000
20.360,OOQ.._ _ -
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APf£IX)IX..fl
ACCQÜBTIBG CHOICES MADE DURING THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 1976 
Introduction
Only one discretionary accounting choice was made in the published 
accounts of the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1976. That accounting 
choice is described below.
The effect of that accounting choice on the net profit for the year 
ended 31 March 1976 has been ascertained from the published accounts of 
the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1976. The effect on the net profit 
for the year ended 31 March 1976 is shown on Table HI.
Charging the cost of replacing certain categories ol existing fixed
assets.to revenue
Note 1(b) (1976) stated that :
In view of increasing inflationary costs and changes in technology 
the Corporation has decided to adopt with effect from 1 April 1975, 
a policy of charging the cost of replacing certain categories of 
existing fixed assets as a revenue expense, taking account also of 
the expected trend of expenditure over ' the next few years, and 
capitalising only that expenditure which represents an extension, 
increase in capacity or improvement to the Corporation's fixed 
assets. Costs of similar assets which were previously capitalised 
continue to remain in fixed assets and to be depreciated in the 
normal manner (see Note 3).
Note 3 (1976) stated that :
The revised policy of charging the cost of replacing certain 
categories of existing fixed assets to revenue as explained in Note 
Kb) results in £48.1 million being charged to revenue in 1975/76 
which would previously have been capitalised.
The profits of each remaining year of the sub-period were decreased 
by a charge for the replacement cost of fixed assets. The author decided 
to treat each year's charge as a new accounting choice for the
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following reasons :
(1) Each year a subjective judgement would have to be made as to which
Items should be written off as a revenue expense and which Items 
should be capitalised. This opens up the possibility of 
manipulation. This decision to charge the replacement cost of 
certain fixed assets to revenue is thus unlike a decision to change 
the number of years over which a fixed asset should be written off.
The latter decision would determine the amounts to be written off
each year until either the asset’s life is changed again or the 
asset is completely written off.
(2) The accounting choice described in Note Kb) is sufficiently vague
as to put very little constraint on management’s decision each year
as to which items should be charged to revenue. This vagueness 
presumably left the auditors, Price Waterhouse & Co, with a limited 
ability to argue with management on the items (and thus the amount) 
which should be charged as a revenue expense.
(3) To the best of the author’s knowledge this treatment of the
replacement cost of fixed assets is unusual and is not consistent
with the accounting practices generally used by British companies.
It could therefore presumably have been abandoned at any time
without creating any problems with the auditors, Price Waterhouse & 
Co. Perhaps the auditors would have been pleased to see the 
practice abandoned as they would then not be subject to criticism 
for allowing the BGC to use this unusual accounting practice in the 
audited financial statements.
For the above reasons the amount of replacement expenditure charged 
to revenue In each of the remaining years of the sub-period has been
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treated as the result of a new accounting choice. The amounts Involved
are shown below :
Year ended 31 March 1977 f 55,576,000
Year ended 31 March 1978 89,000,000
Year ended 31 March 1979 126,400,000
Year ended 31 March 1980 134,000,000
These amounts were obtained from the published accounts of the BGC for
the relevant years.
Table .,21
Effect, .of the accountIng chalce made during the, year, ended 31 .March.-19.76 
on the reported net profit for the ...year ended 31 March 1976
Year ended 31 March 1976 
Effect on net profit 
Increasing Decreasing
Charging the cost of replacing certain 
categories of existing fixed assets
to revenue ----------- f48,100*0,0.0
-_______£48.100.000
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APPesdty t
AC C O m iJG .CHOICES MADE PPBir, the YEAR fmnRn 31 mtru 
IntroduitIon
The discretionary accounting choices made in the published accounts 
of the BGC during the year ended 31 March 1977 are identified below.
The effect of each accounting choice on the net profit for the year 
ended 31 March 1977 has been ascertained from the published accounts of 
the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1977. These effects are shown on 
Table Jl.
Raplaceaent expenditure charged as a trading cost
As already noted in Appendix H the author decided to treat as an 
accounting choice during the year ended 31 March 1977 the charging of 
£55,576,000 replacement expenditure as a trading cost. This accounting 
choice had the effect of reducing the net profit for the year ended 31 
March 1977 by £55,576,000.
Supplementary depreciation charge
Bote 1(b) (1977) stated that :
The Corporation adopted with effect from 1 April 1975, a policy of 
charging the cost of replacing certain categories of existing fixed 
assets as a revenue expense, and capitalising only that expenditure 
which represented an extension, increase in capacity or improvement 
to the Corporation's fixed assets.
With effect from 1 April 1976, the Corporation have charged against 
trading profits (see Bote 3) the following, which in total are the 
equivalent of a depreciation charge based on the current cost of all 
its fixed assets :
(1) replacement expenditure referred to above which has been
<li> d S l t M t ^ o n ° t h e ^  historical cost of fixed assets
(111) increase the charge
to a current cost oasis.
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The accumulated historical depreciation has been deducted in the 
balance sheet from the cost of the related fixed assets and the 
supplementary charge has been credited to a fixed asset maintenance 
account.
Supplementary depreciation relating to periods prior to 31 March 
1976 has not been taken up.
Note 3 referred to above included the following information relating 
to the supplementary depreciation charge against the trading profit for 
the year ;
The supplementary depreciation amount shown above is calculated on 
the basis set out in Note 1 <b) as follows ;
1000
Total depreciation charge calculated 
on the current cost of fixed assets 335,000
Less: Depreciation based on the
historical cost of fixed assets 176,828
Replacement expenditure incurred 
during the year and charged to
revenue 55,576 232,404
Amount transferred to fixed asset 
maintenance account 102.596
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net profit for 
the year ended 31 March 1977 by £102,596,000.
The profits of each remaining year of the sub-period were decreased 
by a charge for supplementary depreciation. The author decided to treat 
each year's charge as a new accounting choice for the following reasons : 
<1) The BGC continued until 1981 to record its fixed assets in the 
balance sheet at historical cost. Thus the "total depreciation 
charge" above could not be related to the "current cost of fixed 
assets". This opens up the possibility of manipulation especially 
as the current cost of fixed assets was probably based on 
management estimates.
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(2) The charging of supplementary depreciation was unusual and was not 
consistent with the accounting practices generally used by British 
companies. It could therefore presumably have been abandoned at any 
time without creating any problems with the auditors, Price 
Waterhouse & Co. As with the charging of the replacement cost of 
certain categories of fixed assets as a revenue expense perhaps the 
auditors would have been pleased to see the practice abandoned as 
they would then not be subject to criticism for allowing the BGC to 
use this unusual accounting practice in the audited financial 
statements.
For the above reasons the amount of replacement expenditure charged 
to revenue in each of the remaining years of the sub-period has been 
treated as the result of a new accounting choice. The amounts involved 
are shown below :
Year ended 31 March 1978 £145,400,000
Year ended 31 March 1979 165,300,000
Year ended 31 March 1980 235,800,000
These amounts were obtained from the published accounts of the BGC 
for the relevant years.
Accelerated amortisation of displaced plant.
Bote 1(c) (1977) stated that :
The Corporation have decided with effect from 1 April 1976, to write 
off the unamortised balance and any plant displaced in 1977/78 by 
31 March 1978. Plant displaced after 31 March 1978, will be written 
off in the year of displacement. Amounts charged to this account 
were previously being written off in five equal annual instalments 
and the write-off would have been completed by 31 March 1979, after 
taking account of proceeds of sale.
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Note 3 (1977) stated that the revised policy for writing off
displaced plant described above resulted in additional charges of £27.3 
million against the trading profit for the year ended 31 March 1977. 
Thus this accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net profit 
for the year ended 31 March 1977 by £27,300,000.
Accelerated amortisation of deferred charges ; conversion to natural gas 
Note 1(d) (1977) stated that :
The Corporation have decided with effect from 1 April 1976, to 
write off the balance of expenditure incurred in converting 
customers' appliances to natural gas, together with further costs to 
be incurred in 1977/78 by 31 March 1978. Amounts charged to this 
deferred charges account were previously being written off in five 
equal annual instalments and would have been substantially written 
off by 31 March 1979.
Note 3 (1977) stated that the revised policy for writing off deferred
charges described above resulted in additional charges of £56.6 million
against the trading profit for the year ended 31 March 1977. Thus this
accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net profit for the
year ended 31 March 1977 by £56,600,000.
Table JL
Effect of the accounting choices made during, the Year ended 31. Marcb 
IM l  OIL the reported net profit for the Year ended bL. March 19.7.Z
Year ended 31 March 1977 
Effect on net profit 
Increasing Decreasing
Replacement expenditure charged as a trading
Lst 55,576,000
Supplementary depreciation charge 102,596,000
Accelerated amortisation of displaced plant 27,300,000
Accelerated amortisation of deferred charges 56,60.0,ODD.
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APPENDIX K
ACCOUNTING.CHOICES NAPE DURING THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 1978 
Introduction
The discretionary accounting choices made in the published accounts 
of the BGC during the year ended 31 March 1978 are identified below.
The effect of each accounting choice on the net profit for the year
ended 31 March 1978 has been ascertained from the published accounts of
the BGC for the year ended 31 March 1978. These effects are shown on 
Table Kl.
Replacement expenditure charged as a trading cost
As already noted in Appendix H the author decided to treat as an 
accounting choice during the year ended 31 March 1978 the charging of
£89,000,000 replacement expenditure as a trading cost. This accounting 
choice had the effect of reducing the net profit for the year ended 31 
March 1978 by £89,000,000.
Supplementary depreciation charge
As already noted in Appendix J the author decided to treat as an 
accounting choice during the year ended 31 March 1979 the charging of
£145,400,000 supplementary depreciation. This accounting choice had the 
effect of reducing the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1978 by 
£145,400,000.
Provision for field abandonment costs.
Note 1(c) (1978) :
Current licence agreements Impose an obligation on operators of 
North Sea oil and gas fields to restore the sea bed at the end of 
the producing lives of the fields to a condition acceptable vo the
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Department of Energy, Accordingly, it has been decided to commence, 
with effect from 1 April 1977, making provision for abandonment 
costs, calculated field by field on a throughput basis similar to 
that used for depreciation.
Estimates of abandonment costs will be reviewed annually and the 
provision adjusted accordingly.
Note 3 (1978) noted that the provision for field abandonment costs 
was £6.2 million.
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net profit 
for the year ended 31 March 1978 by £6,200,000.
Note 3 (1979) noted that provision for field abandonment costs had 
been increased by £6,9 million. This accounting choice had the effect of 
decreasing the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1979 by £6.9 
million.
Note 3 (1980) noted that provision for field abandonment costs had 
been increased by £6.2 million. This accounting choice had the effect of 
decreasing the net profit for the year ended 31 March 1980 by £6.2 
million.
Deferred tax charge.
Note Kg) (1978) stated that :
The Corporation is subject to United Kingdom taxation on its annual 
profits as calculated for tax purposes. The forecast levels of 
profits and capital expenditure indicate that in the foreseeable 
future tax losses brought forward from past years are likely to be 
fully utilised and a liability to Corporation Tax is expected to 
arise. Accordingly, after taking account of such losses available 
against future profits assessable to tax, provision is made in the 
accounts for deferred taxation at current rates on timing 
differences, which relate principally to the allocation for tax 
purposes of depreciation to periods different from those used for 
accounting purposes.
Note 6 (1978) stated that ;
The Corporation has no current liability to Corporation Tax in 
1977/78 (1977 £.1 million) as the taxable profit is extinguished by 
tax losses brought forward from past years. The charge in the
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accounts represents a provision for deferred taxation made in 
accordance with the Corporation policy described in Note 1 (g) as 
follows :
Deferment due to accelerated tax 
depreciation 
Less : Unutilised tax losses
1976
£m
793.0 
MÙJL
147.0 
76'4
1977
£m
1003.9 
1041.8 
 (37,9)
Tax at 52%
This accounting choice had the effect of decreasing the net profit 
for the year ended 31 March 1978 by £76,400,000. However the effect of 
this accounting choice has not been included in Table Kl for the reasons 
given in section 7.4.2.
Table Kl.
Effect of the accounting choices made during the ..year ended 31. March 
1978 on the reported pre-tax profit for the, year ended 31 larch 1978
Replacement expenditure charged as a 
trading cost
Supplementary depreciation charge
Provision for field abandonment costs
Year ended 31 March 1978 
Effect on pre-tax profit 
Increasing Decreasing
89,000,000
145,400,000
6.200.0QQ
240.600.000
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